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REPORT

OF A

BOARD OF ARMY OFFICERS

UPON THE

CLAIM OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH, U. S. V.,

MAJOR, U. S. ARMY (RETIRED),

THAT HE, AND NOT GENERAL ROSECRANS, ORIGINATED THE PLAN
FOR THE RELIEF OF CHATTANOOGA IN OCTOBER, 1863.

PROCEEDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND OPINIONS OF THE BOARD,
APPROVED BY HON. ELIHU ROOT, SECRETARY OF WAR.

MEMBERS OF THE BOARD:

MAJ. GEN. JOHN R. BROOKE, U. S. ARMY.

COL. GEORGE L. GILLESPIE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY.

COL. M. V. SHERIDAN, ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY.

WASHINGTON:

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.

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C O N T E N T S .

[For details of contents see index.]

	Page
Order convening board	5, 152
Report of the board	7
Case of the Park Commission as presented to the board	24
General Smith's letter to the Secretary of War, dated March, 1900, in reply to General Duffield's report, dated January 23, 1900.....	43
General Smith's first announcement of his claim, pamphlet published in 1891, entitled "The relief of the Army of the Cumberland and the reopening of the short line of communications between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Bridge- port, Ala., in October, 1863"	61
General Smith's second presentation of his claim, pamphlet published in 1895, entitled "The reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, Tenn., as related by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and the Official Record"	91
General Smith's third presentation of his claim, article in the Chattanooga, Times, September 15, 1895	111
General Boynton's brief answer to General Smith, article in the Philadelphia Times, September 30, 1895	115
General Boynton's full reply to General Smith's pamphlets and newspaper articles, from the Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, January 26, 1896.....	116
General Smith's appeal to Secretary Alger, November 5, 1897.....	125
General Smith's second appeal to Secretary Alger, November 15, 1897.....	127
The claim of General Smith as restated by himself.....	129
Letter from the Park Commission to General Duffield, dated March 22, 1898, presenting the case as viewed by the commission	133
General Smith's comments, dated April 3, 1898, on letter of the Park Com- mission to General Duffield, dated March 22, 1898.....	141
General Duffield's report to the Secretary of War, dated January 23, 1900.....	143
General Smith's appeal to Secretary Root, dated March 26, 1900.....	151
Miscellaneous correspondence between General Smith and the board, in which he presents certain letters and historical data.....	152, 189
First brief of Hon. Anthony Higgins, counsel for General Smith.....	178
Second brief of Hon. Anthony Higgins, counsel for General Smith.....	191
Additional statement by General Smith, January 31, 1901.....	200
Correspondence between the board and the Park Commission in which certain letters and historical data are presented to the board.....	203
War diary of Maj. Frank S. Bond, U. S. V., late aid-de-camp on the staff of General Rosecrans.....	213
Papers submitted to the board by General Smith	214
Papers submitted to the board by the Park Commission.....	218



WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, March 21, 1901.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you herewith a copy of the proceedings, finding, and conclusions of a board of officers appointed by War Department order of August 23, 1900, to investigate and report upon the claim made by Maj. William F. Smith, United States Army, retired, that the legend of the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission regarding the origin of the plan for recovering Lookout Valley, etc., is incorrect, together with a copy of the indorsement of the Secretary of War approving the finding and conclusions of the board.

Very respectfully,

HENRY P. MCCAIN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHICKAMAUGA AND
CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, August 23, 1900.

SIR: By direction of the Secretary of War, a board of officers, to consist of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, United States Army; Col. George L. Gillespie, Corps of Engineers, United States Army; Col. Michael V. Sheridan, Assistant Adjutant-General, United States Army, is hereby appointed to meet at Governors Island, New York, at the call of the president of the board, to consider, investigate, and report upon a claim made by Maj. William F. Smith, United States Army, retired, that the legend of the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission which declares that "At daylight of October 27 the river line of the communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley devised by General Rosecrans" is incorrect, and that he—Major Smith—conceived the plan mentioned.

The Secretary of War directs that the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission and Major Smith furnish the board such papers, records, and information as may be pertinent to the question at issue, and he also directs that the report of the board be forwarded to this office.

Very respectfully,

WM. H. CARTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
*Commanding Department of the East,
Governors Island, New York.*

REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York City, February 1, 1901.

GENERAL: The board of officers appointed by direction of the Secretary of War in War Department order of August 23, 1900, has the honor to submit the following report:

The duty confided to the board as stated in the order convening it is—to consider, investigate, and report upon a claim made by Maj. William F. Smith, United States Army, retired, that the legend of the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, which declares that "At daylight of October 27 the river line of the communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley devised by General Rosecrans," is incorrect, and that he, Major Smith, conceived the plan mentioned.

The letter of Gen. W. F. Smith to the Secretary of War, dated March 26, 1900, submitting a statement of his claim additional to the protest addressed to the Secretary of War, November 15, 1897, was referred to the board on the day of its organization by the Adjutant-General for consideration and report. This letter was in fact a reply to the report of Gen. H. M. Duffield, dated January 23, 1900, to whom the protest of General Smith, November 15, 1897, regarding the legend on the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, had been referred for investigation. This legend reads:

At daylight of October 27 the river line of the communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley devised by General Rosecrans, approved by General Thomas, and ordered executed by General Grant under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith.

The statement of General Smith's claim as presented to General Duffield is marked Appendix 8, attached to a letter of H. V. Boynton, chairman, Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, addressed to the board under date of October 30, 1900. (Inclosure A 1.)

The claim is stated specifically as follows:

The claim is this: That General Smith, on October 19, 1863, alone, and without assistance from anyone, fixed upon Browns Ferry as the best, if not the only, place where a lodgment could be made on the left bank of the Tennessee River, and, owing to the conformation of the ground, securely held, at such a distance from the enemy's batteries that a bridge, if thrown across the stream at that point, would be safe from their fire, and available for the needs of the military situation.

It would therefore appear that the claim of General Smith is that he is entitled to credit for both the selection of the place for lodgment on the south side of the river below Lookout Mountain, in cooperation with the troops operating from Bridgeport, and for the special measures he prepared and personally executed for making the lodgment.

From the special pleadings in the several papers prepared by General Smith one might infer that he claims also that the successful lodgment at Browns Ferry was the controlling means by which relief was given to Chattanooga, and that in consequence he is entitled to the credit for the success of the cooperative movements.

The board has carefully read the official papers submitted to it, as well as the official reports and dispatches contained in the printed records of the war of the rebellion referring to the time of the Chickamunga campaign and later, and the printed testimonials of officers before the Committee on the Conduct of War which were pertinent to the inquiry. It has also read portions of the diaries and other papers and books bearing upon the subject which were written at the time of the occurrence, or shortly afterwards, by participants in the campaign who had personal knowledge of the events in question. The board has given guarded consideration to the letters written in answer to inquiries set on foot since the controversy began some years ago. Two members of the board also gave the greater part of three days to a close personal examination of the ground, including Cameron Hill, Lookout Mountain, Lookout Valley to Wauhatchie, and the north bank of the river from Chattanooga to the lower end of Williams Island.

An inspection of the official map of Chattanooga and vicinity enables one to appreciate the condition of the main army after the battle of Chickamauga, September 20 to 21, 1863. Retiring before the enemy after the disaster of the 21st, General Rosecrans drew up his army behind a line of hasty intrenchments formed near the southern limits of the city with pickets established along Chattanooga Creek. An inner line of defenses was afterwards made more permanent and capable of holding the city with reduced forces, if necessary. The railroad connecting Chattanooga with Bridgeport, forming the then only available line of supplies from the North, after leaving Chattanooga crossed Chattanooga Creek near its mouth, followed the river closely to the north end of Lookout Mountain, which was passed through a tunnel and then debouched into the northern end of Lookout Valley, a little east of Wauhatchie.

The Chattanooga Creek Valley and the Lookout Creek Valley are connected by a dirt road passing over the north end of Lookout Mountain at an elevation higher than the railroad track, forming the most northerly pass of the mountain. Its distance from Chattanooga Creek is about 2 miles. The next mountain pass to the southward is at a distance of about 24 miles from the point.

The most northerly pass—in fact, all the passes in the mountain—was necessarily abandoned when the Union line was drawn up behind Chattanooga Creek, for the reason, as stated by General Rosecrans, that he could not hold this pass and Chattanooga at the same time, though the precaution was taken to establish batteries on Moccasin Point, north bank, which rendered it practically of little, if any, use to the enemy. The abandonment of the pass meant the abandonment of Lookout Valley for the time being, together with the suspension of rail and water connection with Bridgeport. General Rosecrans, however, issued orders late in September looking to the reoccupation of Lookout Valley by reinforcements then on their way from the North, which were to operate from the left bank opposite Bridgeport in cooperation with forces to be sent from Chattanooga, which latter were expected to cross the Tennessee River by a bridge to be thrown “opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain,” since testified to by General Rosecrans and other officers attached to his headquarters, as “Browns Ferry,” where the bridge was built October 27, 1863.

The reinforcements mentioned were the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, General Hooker commanding. They reached the vicinity of Bridgeport September 30, the day on which General Smith arrived at Chattanooga from New York City under orders to report to General Rosecrans as chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. General Smith was appointed chief engineer in orders dated October 3, and was immediately put in charge of the construction of the defenses of Chattanooga. In a paper appearing in the *North American Review* of December, 1885, General Rosecrans states that on General Smith's assignment to duty as chief engineer he was told what the plan was for opening communication with Bridgeport on the south side of the river, and what preparations were in progress for its execution. He also states that—

a sketch was made of the river and route to Browns Ferry, the route by which troops would be able to communicate from the Chattanooga side of the river with Lookout Valley over the pontoon bridge which we were straining every nerve to secure. The plan was talked over with General Coulton, and a copy of the sketch was sent to General Hooker, who was told to hurry up his transportation as rapidly as possible, so that on crossing the Tennessee River he would be able to subsist his troops directly from Bridgeport.

This article was written to refute implications that had been published in a previous issue of the *North American Review*, that General Rosecrans expected to evacuate Chattanooga. General Rosecrans's statements in this article are denied by Smith so far as they relate to him, but the abundant official testimony of this period furnished by telegrams between General Rosecrans and his subordinates, and between the Assistant Secretary of War and the Secretary of War,

quoted hereafter, show that active measures looking to the relief of Chattanooga were in progress at that particular time, the execution of which was delayed from time to time only by circumstances incidental to war.

BROWNS FERRY.

Up to October 19 General Smith had made, according to his own statement, no reconnoissance of the river, above or below Chattanooga, nor had studied the maps of his department, and his personal knowledge of the topography of Lookout Valley was that acquired by observations taken from the top of Cameron Hill, on the left bank of the river, on the west side of the town. On the 19th of October he made a reconnoissance by direction of General Rosecrans of the river "in the vicinity of Williams Island with a view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and storehouses, and began the examination near the lower end of the island." He followed up the river a short distance above Williams Island and came unexpectedly upon Browns Ferry, where he found a battery in position covering the crossing. This was the first time he had ever heard of Browns Ferry. An inspection of the opposite bank from this point for an hour or more impressed him with the fact that this ferry was a suitable place to cross the river, "in connection with the movements to be made from Bridgeport to open the river," and a few days later he was "directed to make the necessary arrangements for the expedition to effect the lodgment." (Smith's Report, S. 54, p. 77.)¹

The same day, October 19, General Rosecrans, with members of his staff, made a reconnoissance of the lower river (General Smith starting with them, but separating from them after crossing the river at Chattanooga), and also visited, according to evidence, Browns Ferry, which had previously been selected by General Rosecrans as the probable place of crossing. Returning to headquarters after the completion of the reconnoissance, General Rosecrans found orders awaiting him which relieved him from command of that army. There is also evidence that General Rosecrans had previously visited Browns Ferry, accompanied by Gen. P. H. Sheridan.

General Smith states that he had no conversation with General Rosecrans from September 30 to October 18 relative to shortening his line of supplies, and had none after the return from the reconnoissance, October 19, when he ascertained General Rosecrans had been relieved. He also states that he had no conference with General Thomas the night of October 19 (Appendix 8, inclosure A 1). The dispatch from General Thomas to Hooker that same night, directing him to use all possible dispatch in concentrating his command and preparing to move

¹NOTE.—This, and similar references, refer to the serial numbers of the volumes of the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.

in accordance with instructions of General Rosecrans, must, therefore, have been sent after conference with General Rosecrans, and not with General Smith (Conduct of War Supplement, part 1, p. 118). Five days later (October 24) the Assistant Secretary of War, then with headquarters, telegraphed to Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington:

Grant arrived last night. He is just going to reconnoiter an important position that General Smith has discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley and which will be occupied simultaneously with Hooker's occupation of Raccoon Mountain. (S. 54, p. 70.)

Owing to the prominence given by General Smith to this dispatch the board has carefully examined the records regarding the precise location where General Rosecrans expected to bridge the river below Lookout Mountain, and would here note that General Rosecrans had under consideration as early as September 26 a bridge crossing at the mouth of Lookout Creek (Dana to Stanton, S. 50, p. 201). That is, the locality had been selected, though the exact spot had been left undoubtedly to the decision of the moment of opening operations. General Smith, after a reconnoissance on the 19th of October, which was directed to be made by General Rosecrans, the conditions being ripe for starting the movements, finds a favorable crossing for the cooperating force from Chattanooga at Browns Ferry, just below the mouth of Lookout Creek, known already to army headquarters since September 24, inasmuch as a battery had been placed there on that day to cover it (S. 52, pp. 827, 828). The board is of the opinion that the strategic relation of this crossing to the operations proposed to be conducted in Lookout Valley was well known to General Rosecrans—an engineer officer by education and training—before its importance was brought accidentally to the attention of General Smith.

The board can not believe that because General Rosecrans had not spoken to General Smith, as the latter states, about the specific selection of Browns Ferry, he had therefore formed no plan for making a lodgment upon the south bank below the point of the mountain within an area which embraced Browns Ferry. Nor can it believe that because Browns Ferry was not accurately located on Merrill's map, issued prior to arrival at Chattanooga, General Rosecrans did not know it in its true place immediately after he had occupied Chattanooga.

General Smith furnishes a copy of a letter from Assistant Secretary of War [Dana], dated May 22, 1895, relating to the reconnoissance of October 19, in which the following language appears:

* * * I remember quite distinctly that as I rode across the bridge over the Tennessee at Chattanooga and proceeded up the northern slope toward the hospital I met you there on horseback. You told me you had come out with General Rosecrans and were going to reconnoiter down the line of the river; that General Rosecrans had gone in the hospital; that you had waited for him as long as you could, and now, without waiting any longer, you would ride on with me. We proceeded together until we came to the spot where the road divided, one branch going up the mountain and the other leading down toward the river. I took the mountain path on my way

to Bridgeport, while you went down in the direction of Browns Ferry, and somewhere about there you thought a position could perhaps be found which would enable us greatly to shorten the road from Bridgeport. This was the first time that I remember hearing of Browns Ferry. * * *

Now, it is known that General Smith had never heard of Browns Ferry until the afternoon of October 19, and this letter reveals that if Mr. Dana had knowledge at that time of Browns Ferry, he must have obtained it from General Rosecrans or from the headquarters staff. The board is of the opinion that whether General Rosecrans actually selected Browns Ferry himself as the point of crossing, or actually visited it on his personal reconnoissance of October 19, or before, the fact that he constantly referred in his dispatches to the mouth of Lookout Creek, at the northern end of Lookout Valley, as one of the objectives of his operations to recover the valley, plainly indicates that he had selected the locality in his own mind, and that, awaiting completion of the preparations for the more important movement of General Hooker, the exact point of crossing, for the cooperating movement from Chattanooga, within a straight reach of open river extending not exceeding 3 miles from Lookout Creek to the head of Williams Island, could be left, without neglect of prudent precaution on his part, to be determined at the last moment by a final and close examination, if not by himself, by that officer to whom such examination would naturally be confided, viz. General Smith, the chief engineer. The board is of the opinion that the duty assigned to General Smith October 19 of reconnoitering the river was a legitimate one for him as an engineer officer, which, if intrusted to another officer, would probably have been resented by him, and that the results of the final operations for recovering Lookout Valley confirmed the wisdom of General Rosecrans's plans, which contemplated a crossing of the river at the northern end of the valley within a reach which embraced Browns Ferry.

It seems hardly necessary, in view of the records, to discuss the priority of discovery of Browns Ferry. As a ferry it was known to department headquarters by Wood's report to Rosecrans, dated August 23, 1863 (S. 52, p. 137); and by Whitaker's dispatch to Captain Moe, assistant adjutant-general, September 24, 1863 (S. 52, pp. 827-828), in which it is stated that infantry and artillery are posted at Browns Ferry, described as located 3 miles below the position of Colonel Champion's command at a point "directly opposite the base of Lookout Mountain."

As an eligible point of crossing for troops, General Reynolds says Browns Ferry was already in everybody's mind as the proper place for the pontoon bridge, and that General Rosecrans selected it for that purpose, and it is known that General Reynolds visited the ferry in 1895 and identified it as the one General Rosecrans inspected

October 19. General Thomas, in his official report, November 7, 1863, mentions that Browns Ferry had been selected as the point of crossing before he assumed command October 19, and that the boats for the required bridge were nearly completed; and General Rosecrans and the Assistant Secretary of War frequently mention the immediate locality in field dispatches dated prior to October 19. Rosecrans specifically refers to it in his sworn testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, April 22, 1865. (Report Conduct of War, vol. 3, 2d series, p. 33, Rosecrans's Campaign.)

Major Bond, senior aid-de-camp on General Rosecrans's staff, says in his diary, written at the time, that General Rosecrans on reconnoissance of October 19 visited Browns Ferry, which he recorded as "the proposed point for location of the pontoon bridge."

General Rosecrans, at the third annual reunion of the Army of the Cumberland at Indianapolis, December 15, 1869, also mentions Browns Ferry as the place selected by him for bridging the Tennessee River, below the mouth of Lookout Creek, which statement was confirmed by Generals Sheridan and Granger. The chief quartermaster of the Army of the Cumberland and the provost marshal of Chattanooga also refer to Browns Ferry as well known at headquarters at that time.

These and other papers lead the board to believe that Browns Ferry in its true place, and the strategic relation of this crossing to plans projected for recovering Lookout Valley, were known to General Rosecrans late in September, 1863, immediately after the occupation of Chattanooga.

In a military sense, the northern end of Lookout Valley embraces the area on the south bank of the Tennessee River extended from the north point of Lookout Mountain downstream to where Raccoon Mountain, or its foothills, closes in upon the river.

A crossing of the river within this limitation would fulfill the conditions of the plan for occupying Lookout Valley outlined by General Rosecrans in his several dispatches from October 1 to October 19, 1863.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS PROJECTED AND EXECUTED.

General Thomas assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland the night of the day on which General Rosecrans was relieved, October 19. At 11 p. m. of that day he sends a dispatch to General Hooker announcing his assumption of command, in which he says:

You will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with instructions of General Rosecrans. (Conduct of War Supplement, part 1, p. 118, report General Thomas.)

The board here noted that neither General Thomas nor General Rosecrans had any conference with General Smith the night this dispatch was sent, and therefore General Thomas knew nothing of Gen-

eral Smith's reconnoissance of that day, nor of any plan he may have conceived as the result of it for occupying Lookout Valley, distinct from that of General Rosecrans outlined in previous dispatches.

In his testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war just cited, General Thomas explains this dispatch by saying:

The instructions referred to in the above were to concentrate as much of his command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and by rail. Before he was relieved in command of the Department of the Cumberland, General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving the army of Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short route of supplies from Bridgeport. * * *

Gen. J. J. Reynolds, then chief of staff to General Rosecrans, further explains the same dispatch by saying that the "instructions of General Rosecrans" referred to were communicated anew to General Hooker in a dispatch dated that morning (October 19), which was dictated by General Rosecrans just before starting on the reconnoissance. This dispatch has not been found in the records, but General Reynolds refers for its authenticity to the dispatch sent by Hooker to Granger of that date, which reads:

STEVENSON, *October 19, 9 a. m.*

Dispatch received. Have just received orders from Department headquarters to hold my command in readiness to march at short notice. * * *

The general plan for the movements designed to reoccupy Lookout Valley is mentioned in dispatches dated as early as September 26, viz: Dana to Stanton, September 26 (S. 50, p. 201); Meigs to Stanton, September 27 (S. 52, p. 890); Rosecrans to Hodges, September 30 (S. 52, p. 947); Rosecrans to Hooker, October 1 (S. 53, p. 24); Rosecrans to Hooker, October 4 (S. 53, pp. 89, 90); Dana to Stanton, October 14 (S. 50, p. 216); Dana to Stanton, October 16 (S. 50, p. 219); Meigs to Stanton, October 16 (S. 53, p. 413), and Rosecrans to Halleck, October 19 (S. 53, pp. 477, 478).

Operations were partially suspended owing to the non arrival of Hooker's transportation, and also to Wheeler's raid on the line of communication between Bridgeport and Nashville, which began September 30 and continued until he was driven across the river October 13. Active preparations for the forward movement were again resumed about October 4, when Hooker is again instructed regarding the crossing of his command at Bridgeport (Garfield to Hooker, S. 53, p. 90). The embarrassing condition of affairs shown in the dispatches of the period from September 21 to October 19, and the measures taken to remedy it, reveal, in the opinion of the board, constant alertness and

perspicacity on the part of General Rosecrans and his subordinates and a due appreciation of the perils of the situation. Wise precautions were taken, it will be observed, to maintain the longer and protected line of supplies while preparations were in progress to seize and hold the shorter one.

The relief of General Rosecrans from the command of the Army October 19 added to the complication of matters, but the contemplated operations were not delayed in consequence, for General Thomas wisely directed General Hooker that night to hold himself in readiness to carry out General Rosecrans's instructions to concentrate for the proposed movement into Lookout Valley.

The concentration of Hooker's force at Bridgeport was begun at once, but was not completed when General Grant reached Chattanooga October 23. On the 24th of October General Grant made a reconnoissance of the river at Browns Ferry, accompanied by General Thomas and General Smith, after which the expedition to move from Chattanooga in cooperation with Hooker's movement from Bridgeport was organized and placed under the command of General Smith on the afternoon of the 24th on the completion of the reconnoissance.

On October 24, 2.30 p. m., Thomas directs Hooker as follows:

* * * The Eleventh Corps and one division of the Twelfth will be concentrated at or in the vicinity of Bridgeport preparatory to crossing the Tennessee River and moving up the south side to take possession of Rankins Ferry. * * * We will cooperate at Browns Ferry as well as Rankins Ferry. Inform yourself with regard to the roads from Rankins Ferry, via Whitesides, to Browns Ferry. The object of the movement is to hold the road and gain possession of the river as far as Browns Ferry. (War Rebellion Records, Serial No. 54, pp. 43, 44.)

The movements were executed as projected. Smith, commanding the troops operating from Chattanooga, started from Chattanooga at 3 a. m. October 27, part of the forces floating down the river in pontoon boats to Browns Ferry and part going overland by north side of river to same point, and succeeded in making a lodgment on the south side at Browns Ferry by 7 a. m., where he intrenched. The bridge was completed by 4.30 p. m. of that day. Hooker marched from Bridgeport at daylight of the 27th of October, encamped that night in the vicinity of Whitesides, and next day penetrated Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie and opened communication with Smith at Browns Ferry about 5 p. m. Part of his command went into camp that night at Wauhatchie and the residue near Browns Ferry. In this position, the wings separated by 3 miles, a vigorous attack was made at midnight by the enemy in a movement upon the center by forces pushed from the main army confronting Chattanooga through the pass along the north end of Lookout Mountain and down the mountain side. The attack was successfully resisted by Hooker. No attack was made upon Smith. Hooker lost in his engagement about 400 killed, wounded,

and missing. Smith lost about 20 killed and wounded in surprising the passage and building the pontoon bridge.

As the success of the general plan of relief depended chiefly upon Hooker's movement, and as it had to start from a point remote from Chattanooga, dispatches from General Rosecrans, the Assistant Secretary of War, and others relative to it were necessarily frequent, and in them the board notes repeated mention of prudent instructions given prior to October 19 regarding every contingency of concentration, defense, and supply, as well as regarding the urgency of securing and holding advance supply points on the lower river as far up as the head of Williams Island, and the occupation of Lookout Valley, if possible.

While these preparations were going on equal but less apparent attention was given to preparations for the cooperative expedition starting from Chattanooga.

There is nothing in the records to show that General Rosecrans at any time intended to abandon Chattanooga to its fate, nor any intention to divert Hooker from the movement originally planned to recover Lookout Valley, though provision was made, it is true, for the contingent transfer of part of his forces to the extreme left to resist a threatened movement of the enemy in that direction. In the opinion of the board the record is clear that Rosecrans fully expected to hold Chattanooga and to reopen Lookout Valley as a supply line.

RESULTS OF THE EXECUTION OF THE PLANS.

The board now comes to the official reports announcing to the authorities the fruits of these two cooperative movements:

1. *Thomas to Halleck* (*War Rebellion Records, Serial No. 54, p. 40*), 11.30 p. m., October 27, 1863.—This dispatch contains an outline preliminary report upon what General Smith had accomplished and what it was hoped General Hooker could accomplish:

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., October 27, 1863—11.30 p. m.

(Received 9 p. m., 28th.)

Gen. William F. Smith, commanding Hazen's brigade, Sheridan's division, Fourth Corps, and Turchin's brigade, Baird's division, Fourteenth Corps, floated boats of pontoon bridge down the river from Chattanooga to Browns Ferry, 6 miles below; landed; surprised and drove off the enemy's pickets and reserves; took possession of the hills commanding débouché of the ferry on southwest side, and laid bridge and intrenched the command strongly enough to hold the bridge securely.

By the judicious precautions taken by General Smith before starting, and the intelligent cooperation of Generals Turchin and Hazen, commanding brigades, and Colonel Stanley, of the Eighteenth Ohio, commanding boat party, this was a complete success, and reflected great credit on all concerned.

Our loss, 4 killed, 15 wounded; enemy, 8 killed, 6 prisoners, and several wounded.

General Hooker, commanding troops composing Eleventh Corps and part of Twelfth, marched from Bridgeport at daylight to-day to open road from Bridgeport to Chattanooga and take some position protecting river. Two brigades of Palmer's division, Fourth Corps, should have reached Rankins Ferry to cooperate with Gen-

eral Hooker to-day. The Sixteenth Illinois reached Kelleys Ferry to cooperate with General Hooker. If General Hooker is as successful as General Smith has been, we shall in a few days have open communication with Bridgeport by water, as well as by a practicable road running near the river on the northern bank.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General, Commanding Department.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General in Chief.

2. *October 28. Grant to Halleck, Chattanooga, 8 p. m. (S. 54, p. 56.)*—The commander of the military division likewise notifies the commander in chief at Washington of the success attending the combined movements:

General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south side road hence to Bridgeport has proven eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. * * *

It will be noted in connection with this dispatch that General Thomas in his official report, November 7, 1863 (S. 54, p. 42), gives General Rosecrans credit for the plan. Previous reference has been made on the same point to General Thomas's dispatch, October 19, to General Hooker, then at Stevenson, directing him to carry out General Rosecrans's instructions.

3. *Thomas to the Adjutant-General, November 7, 1863.*—Report on Browns Ferry, transmitting reports of General Hooker and General Smith (S. 54, p. 42, and Conduct of the War Supplement, part 1, p. 120):

* * * Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command of the department devolved on me. The bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed.

On the 23d orders were sent to General Hooker to concentrate the Eleventh Corps and one division of the Twelfth at Bridgeport, informing him at the same time what his force was expected to accomplish, and that a force from this place would cooperate with him by establishing a bridge across the river at Browns Ferry and seize the heights on the south or Lookout Valley side, thus giving him an open road to Chattanooga when his forces should arrive in Lookout Valley. The force to throw the bridge was organized by Saturday, the 24th, and the boats and bridge completed, giving General Smith two days to examine the ground with the two brigade commanders and to give all the necessary detailed instructions to insure success. * * *

* * * The bridge was successfully thrown across the river on the night of the 26th, and General Hooker reached Lookout Valley and communicated with this place on the 28th. * * * The skillful execution by General Smith of the work assigned him and the promptness with which General Hooker with his troops met and repulsed the enemy on the night of the 28th reflects the greatest credit on both those officers and their entire commands. * * *

General Thomas here explicitly states that the object of Hooker's and Smith's operations was to gain possession of the south bank of the Tennessee River and to open the road for a depot of supplies at Bridgeport, and that October 19 "preliminary steps had already been

taken to execute this vitally important movement," and that the boats then building were to be used for a bridge to be thrown across the Tennessee at Browns Ferry, the exact location of which the records show had been known to the department headquarters since August 23, 1863 (S. 52, p. 137). This report also shows that the work assigned to General Smith was confined to Browns Ferry crossing.

4. Referring to these operations, General Thomas states to the Committee on the Conduct of War, March 9, 1866 (Thomas, Report Conduct of War, supplement vol. 1, p. 119):

The seizure of Browns Ferry and the splendid defense of Lookout Valley by General Hooker's command decided the question of our ability to hold Chattanooga, for steamers began immediately to carry rations from Bridgeport to Kelleys Ferry, leaving but about 8 miles of wagon transportation from that point to Chattanooga, and repairs were commenced on the railroad south of the Tennessee River. The enemy made no further attempt to regain Lookout Valley after it had slipped from his grasp, and confined himself to an occasional cannon shot from the top of Lookout as he watched our trains undisturbedly moving from Kelleys Ferry across the valley bearing rations to a grateful army.

To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry. The preparations were all made in secrecy, as was also the boat expedition which passed under the overhanging cliffs of Lookout, so much so that when the bridge was thrown at Browns Ferry on the morning of the 27th the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga as it was to the army besieging it from without.

It was a cooperative movement, and General Thomas, in the opinion of the board, desired to thank each commander for his special service—Hooker for his movement from Bridgeport and Smith for his from Chattanooga. In the paragraph referring to General Smith's conduct the last sentence fully explains the first sentence and limits the credit given to General Smith to the part he took at Browns Ferry. It can not be distorted to give Smith credit for conceiving the whole movement, Hooker's part of which having been provided for at the time Smith first arrived in that army, September 30.

5. Smith's report to Thomas of operations for making a lodgment on south side of river at Browns Ferry (War Reb., S. 54, p. 77):

[Extract.]

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations for making lodgment on the south side of the river at Browns Ferry:

On the 19th of October I was instructed by General Rosecrans to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of Williams Island, with a view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and storehouses, and began the examination near the lower end of the island. Following the river up I found on the opposite bank, above the head of the island, a sharp range of hills whose base was washed by the river. This range extended up the river nearly to Lookout Creek and was broken at Browns Ferry by a narrow gorge, through which ran the road to the old ferry and also flowed a small creek. The valley between this ridge of hills and Raccoon Mountain was narrow and a lodgment effected there would give us the command of the Kelleys Ferry road and seriously interrupt the communications of the enemy up Lookout

Valley and down to the river on Raceoon Mountain. The ridge seemed thinly picketed and the evidences were against the occupation of that part of the valley by a large force of the enemy, and it seemed quite possible to take by surprise what could not have been carried by assault if heavily occupied by an opposing force.

The major-general commanding the geographical division and the major-general commanding the department visited with me the ferry a few days after this reconnaissance, and were agreed as to the importance of the position by itself, and especially in connection with the movements to be made from Bridgeport to open the river, and I was directed to make the necessary arrangements for the expedition to effect the lodgment. * * *

General Smith does not claim in this report that he originated the general plan for relieving Chattanooga by way of Lookout Valley, but simply that he was charged with the organization and conduct of the movement which started from Chattanooga to connect at Browns Ferry with Hooker's movement from Bridgeport.

6. Thomas's congratulatory orders (S. 54, p. 68), November 1, 1863:
Orders.]

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, November 1, 1863.

The general commanding tenders his thanks to Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith and the officers and men of the expedition under his command, consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Turchin and Hazen, the boat parties under Col. T. R. Stanley, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers, and the pioneer bridge party, Captain Fox, Michigan Engineers, for the skill and cool gallantry displayed in securing a permanent lodgment on the south side of the river at Browns Ferry and in putting in position the pontoon bridge on the night of the 26th instant. The successful execution of this duty was attended with the most important results in obtaining a safe and easy communication with Bridgeport and shortening our line of supplies.

By command of Major-General Thomas.

C. GODDARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

This order congratulates General Smith and the officers and men of the expedition for the gallant and efficient services rendered in securing a permanent lodgment at Browns Ferry.

7. General Orders, 265, Headquarters Department of the Cumberland (S. 54, p. 68), November 7, 1863:

GENERAL ORDERS, { HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
No. 265. } *Chattanooga, Tenn., November 7, 1863.*

The recent movements, resulting in the establishment of a new and short line of communication with Bridgeport and the possession of the Tennessee River, were of so brilliant a character as to deserve special notice.

The skill and cool gallantry of the officers and men composing the expedition under Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, chief engineer, consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Turchin and Hazen, the boat parties under Colonel Stanley, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers, and the pontooneers under Captain Fox, Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, in effecting a permanent lodgment on the south side of the river at Browns Ferry deserve the highest praise.

The column under Major-General Hooker, which took possession of the line from Bridgeport to the foot of Lookout Mountain, deserve great credit for their brilliant success in driving the enemy from every position which they attacked. The bayonet charge made by the troops of General Howard up a steep and difficult hill over 200 feet high, completely routing the enemy and driving him from his barricades on

top, and the repulse by General Hooker's command of greatly superior numbers who attempted to surprise him will rank among the most distinguished feats of arms of this war.

By command of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas.

C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Cooperative movements are here again recognized and credit is given to the commanding general of each expedition for the particular services he rendered.

The board attaches great importance to the testimony of General Rosecrans before the Committee on the Conduct of War (vol. 3, p. 33, second series). It is full and detailed as regards the plans projected by Rosecrans, and was given in 1865, only seventeen months after the occurrence, when the details of the proposed operations were fresh in his mind and he had no motive in coloring his statements. (Inclosure D 8.)

The stenographic report of the proceedings of the third reunion of the Army of the Cumberland at Indianapolis, December 16, 1869, in which Generals Rosecrans, Sheridan, Granger, and many other participants in the Chickamauga campaign took part, threw important additional light upon the matter under consideration. (Inclosure D 11, pp. 76-80.) [NOTE.—Incorporated in letter of Gen. H. V. Boynton, A 1, pages 33-35.]

The board invites attention also to General Wilder's letter of September 8, 1900, forming Inclosure A 1, page 35. This officer led the advance in the original movement upon Chattanooga, August to September, 1863, and gives many interesting details regarding Chattanooga and its approaches which were communicated to General Rosecrans in a personal conference at headquarters, September 23, 1863, one month prior to the joint reconnoissance of the river October 19 by General Rosecrans and General Smith.

Attention is also invited to the manner in which the legend attached to General Thomas's official map, 1868, illustrative of the campaign of the Army of the Cumberland, was finally adopted, as described on page 31 of inclosure A1.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOARD.

After a diligent search of the official records the board fails to find any evidence that Gen. W. F. Smith was the originator of the plan for the relief of Chattanooga, Tenn., by military operations to be conducted in Lookout Valley, October, 1863. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence in the official records to show that the plan, which contemplated crossings of the Tennessee River at Bridgeport and at the northern end of Lookout Valley, and which was successfully executed by General Thomas October 26 to 28, 1863, was devised and prepared for by General Rosecrans before relinquishing command, and that its execution was begun, under orders issued by General Thomas,

the very night (October 19) that General Rosecrans was relieved from command of the Department of the Cumberland and without consultation with General Smith.

There is no evidence to show that General Smith took any part, whether by counsel or by action, in the operations conducted by General Hooker through Lookout Valley from the direction of Bridgeport.

In conclusion, the board is of the opinion that the legend complained of does no injustice to the military record of Gen. W. F. Smith.

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

G. L. GILLESPIE,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers.

M. V. SHERIDAN,
Colonel, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

The proceedings, conclusions, and opinion of the board are approved.
ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 16, 1901.*

LIST OF INCLOSURES.

A 1. Letter from the chairman of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission to Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, dated October 30, 1900, which is a history of the case as borne out by the official records. The following papers accompany this letter, viz:

1. Copy of a pamphlet issued by General Smith in 1891, entitled "The Relief of the Army of the Cumberland, and the opening of the short line of communication between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Bridgeport, Ala., in October, 1863. William Farrar Smith, brevet major-general, United States Army."

2. Pamphlet issued by General Smith in 1895, entitled "The Reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863, as related by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and the Official Record. Compiled and annotated by Bvt. Maj. Gen. William Farrar Smith."

3. A newspaper statement of his case, by General Smith, in the Chattanooga Times and Philadelphia Times of September 15, 1895.

4. Preliminary reply, October 5, 1895, of H. V. Boynton to this paper of General Smith.

5. Extended reply, January 26, 1896, of H. V. Boynton, to the same paper of General Smith.

6. General Smith's first appeal to Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, dated November 5, 1897.

7. General Smith's second appeal to the Secretary of War, dated November 15, 1897.

8. Statement of General Smith's claim, as made by him to Gen. H. M. Duffield.

9. Letter of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission to General Duffield in regard to the claim set forth in paper 8, dated March 22, 1898.

A 2. Letter of Gen. H. M. Duffield to the Secretary of War, dated January 23, 1900, transmitting report on the Browns Ferry case, regarding who deserved credit for the conception of certain flank movement at Bridgeport, Ala., in 1863.

A 3. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith to the Secretary of War, dated March, 1900, which is a reply to the report of General Duffield.

A 4. Letter of Gen. W. F. Smith to the Secretary of War, dated March 26, 1900, submitting an additional statement to substantiate his claim that he and not General Rosecrans conceived the idea of opening the Tennessee River, and asking for the appointment of a board to decide the question.

B 1. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith to General Gillespie, dated August 26, 1900, stating that he would like to see the reply to his paper, and reply to it if he finds statements without evidence. Requests Colonel Gillespie to read certain independent statements, and mentions them.

B 2. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith to General Gillespie, dated September 8, 1900, stating that he will not be able to send the histories to the board, for he does not own them, but will send to the recorder titles and pages.

B 3. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith to General Gillespie, dated September 14, 1900, asking to have presented to the board a list of books he wishes the board to consult, etc.

B 4. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith to Gen. John R. Brooke, requesting that certain books be examined by the board, dated September 14, 1900.

B 5. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith, dated September 20, 1900, asking the board, when discussing the question of his protest to the Secretary of War of November, 1897, to examine certain authorities.

B 6. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith, dated September 20, 1900, inclosing a revised list of books he requests the board to examine while discussing the subject of the Legend, etc.

B 7. Letter of General Smith to Colonel Sheridan, not dated, in which he desires to make a correction in a letter, copy of which he incloses, written by Mr. T. Williams.

B 8. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith, dated October 8, 1900, inclosing the following papers for the information of the board:

1. Extract from Van Horne's Life of Thomas.
2. List of letters received at various times from well-known parties.
3. Copy of letter of John C. Ropes, dated May 2, 1895.
4. Pamphlet entitled "The reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863."

B 9. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith, dated October 8, 1900, inclosing the following papers which were sent him by the War Department:

1. Copy of letter of R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, dated November 30, 1897.
2. Copy of letter from General Smith to Col. H. M. Duffield, dated April 3, 1898.
3. Copy of letter of Gen. J. J. Reynolds, dated May 20, 1895.
4. Map of Chattanooga and vicinity.
5. Copy of letter of John C. Ropes, dated May 2, 1895.
6. Extract from Van Horne's Life of Thomas, from page 154.
7. A package of letters from various sources relating to the matter.
8. A pamphlet entitled "The reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863."
9. List of references to authorities.
10. List of letters received at various times from well-known persons.

B 10. Letter of General Smith to General Gillespie, dated October 25, 1900, explaining some things in connection with his claim, and especially Mr. Dana's letter.

B 11. Letter of General Smith, dated December 29, 1900, in answer to one from General Gillespie asking certain questions.

B 12. Letter from Hon. Anthony Higgins, dated September 21, 1900, stating that General Smith is not well, and that he requests Mr. Higgins to represent him before the board. Mr. Higgins asks when the board will meet, etc. Carbon answer to Mr. Higgins inclosed.

B 13. Letter of Gen. William F. Smith, dated September 28, 1900, requesting to be furnished with a list of the papers forwarded by the War Department to the board. Carbon answer inclosed.

B 14. Letter of General Brooke to General Smith, dated November 26, 1900, relative to inability of board to meet until return of General Gillespie from Porto Rico.

B 15. Letter of General Brooke to Hon. Anthony Higgins, dated December 3, 1900, asking if he proposes to submit any argument before board, and if so, whether or not a copy of said argument can be furnished to the park commission.

B 16. Letter from Hon. Anthony Higgins, acknowledging General Brooke's letter of December 3, 1900. States he has not yet completed the preparation of his paper, but inquires if he could have a copy of any paper submitted on behalf of the park commissioners. Carbon answer herewith.

B 17. Letter of General Brooke to Hon. Anthony Higgins, relative to a meeting of the board called for Wednesday, January 9, 1901.

B 18. Letter from Hon. Anthony Higgins, acknowledging communication of January 7, 1901, and incloses a paper prepared on behalf of General Smith.

B 19. Copy of letter to Hon. Anthony Higgins, dated January 11, 1901, inclosing copy of the letter of the chairman of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission (paper marked A 1).

B 20. Letter from General Smith, dated January 21, 1901, asking that he be permitted to appear before the board in person. Carbon answer herewith.

B 21. Letter of General Smith to General Gillespie, dated January 24, 1901, relative to being permitted to appear in person before the board.

B 22. Letter from Hon. Anthony Higgins, dated January 22, 1901, inclosing an additional statement in behalf of General Smith, and also a short letter from General Smith himself upon the same subject.

B 23. Letter of General Smith, dated January 28, 1901, submitting a paper on matters which he intended to present orally to the board.

C 1. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated September 4, 1900, relative to certain papers furnished General Smith which have not been returned, and asks if they have been referred to the board. Asks if he can see General Smith's reply to General Duffield's report, etc. Carbon answer herewith.

C 2. Letter of Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated September 7, 1900, asking to be sent a letter of General Smith, of March last, to Secretary of War, discussing report of General Duffield. Carbon answer herewith.

C 3. Letter of Gen. H. V. Boynton, returning letter of Gen. William F. Smith, transmitted to the commission by letter of September 8, 1900.

C 4. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated October 3, 1900, relative to "The mistakes of Grant," in the North American Review for December, 1885.

C 5. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated October 30, 1900, submitting to the board "such papers, records, and information" in the commission's possession as are pertinent to the claim of Gen. W. F. Smith.

C 6. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated November 12, 1900, forwarding copy of atlas issued by Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, the first page of which contains the full text of the legend to which General Smith objects, and Plate VI of which shows the positions about Browns Ferry.

C 7. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated November 24, 1900, relative to General Gillespie's inquiry about the sending of maps by General Rosecrans's order to General Hooker.

C 8. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated November 24, 1900, inclosing a letter written by Captain Margedant, September 4, 1895, which describes the maps and plans on hand before the relief of General Rosecrans.

C 9. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated November 27, 1900, stating that the Park Commission have the names and addresses of 16 survivors of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery, and have sent them all a copy of the inclosed letter. Answers to the letter sent these survivors are herewith.

C 10. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated November 30, 1900, requesting that ex-Senator Higgins submit his argument to the board in writing, to the end that if it contains errors of statement the Commission may have an opportunity to point them out.

D 1. Copy of letter from the Adjutant-General United States Army, dated August 25, 1900, designating names of officers to comprise board to investigate General Smith's claim.

D 2. Copy of letter to the Adjutant-General United States Army, dated November 12, 1900, asking that the board appointed to report upon the matter of Maj. William F. Smith be authorized to visit Chattanooga. Letter of authority from Adjutant-General herewith.

D 3. Letter from the Coast and Geodetic Survey, dated January 11, 1901, relative to maps on file concerning Chattanooga and its approaches.

D 4. Letter from Frank S. Bond, late major and aid de camp on staff of General Rosecrans, dated December 27, 1900, submitting an extract from his diary of events kept during the three years he was in the service.

D 5. Extract from article by Gen. J. D. Cox on the Chickamauga crisis. Scribner's, September, 1900, page 332.

D 6. Extract from Memoirs of General Grant, vol. 2.

D 7. Extract from the Memoirs of Gen. P. H. Sheridan (pp. 298-302).

D 8. Extract from Rosecrans's testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War of 1865. Report of committee, part 3, 1864-65, p. 32-33.

D 9. Letter from Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated November 26, 1900, transmitting three copies of a half tone showing the western slope of Lookout Mountain.

D 10. Letter of Gen. A. W. Greely, dated November 1, 1900, forwarding for use of the board, History of the United States, Vol. IV, by J. F. Rhodes; The Mississippi Valley in the Civil war, by Fiske.

D 11. Stenographic report of the proceedings at the third reunion of the Army of the Cumberland, at Indianapolis, December 16, 1869.

NOTE.—Where duplicates appear in the above list, they are printed but once.

THE CASE OF THE PARK COMMISSION.

[Inclosure A 1.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, October 30, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: This commission has been notified by the Adjutant-General of the Army that the Secretary of War has appointed you president of a board to pass upon the accuracy of a legend, in an atlas issued by this commission, which attributes the

authorship of the plan for opening the Tennessee River line of supplies from Chattanooga, Tenn., to Bridgeport, Ala., in October, 1863, to Gen. W. S. Rosecrans. The accuracy of this legend is questioned by Maj. William F. Smith, United States Army, retired, who at the time of the operations referred to was chief engineer of the Department of the Cumberland, with the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers, and who now claims that the plan for reopening the river line was his and not General Rosecrans's.

The Secretary of War has directed this commission to furnish your board with "such papers, records, and information as may be pertinent to the question at issue."

That portion of the legend to which General Smith objects appears in the atlas of the commission for map No. 6 (copy herewith) in the following form:

At daylight of October 27 the river line of communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley, devised by General Rosecrans, approved by General Thomas, and ordered executed by General Grant under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith.

General Smith's contention, which has reached this commission, unofficially, in various forms, is that the authorship of the entire plan set forth in this legend should be ascribed to him. His last request to the Secretary of War for an official inquiry in the case is as follows:

I have the honor to ask that some officer of the United States Army, on the active or retired list, may be detailed to take up and report upon the truth or falsity of the legend of the atlas published by the Chickamauga Park Commission in so far as the legend refers to the authorship of the plan for relieving the Army of the Cumberland from its position of starvation in 1863 (October).

The history of the case, which this commission accepts as fully borne out by the official records, is:

(1) That the plan for reopening the Tennessee River from Chattanooga to Bridgeport by the advance of General Hooker's forces from the latter point to Lookout Valley, there to meet cooperating troops to cross from Chattanooga, was devised by General Rosecrans before the arrival of General Smith from the east, and that before such arrival the preliminary orders for the execution of the plan for reopening the river line, including the construction of a steamboat at Bridgeport, and directions to General Hooker to cross the Tennessee at that point and come forward at once to Chattanooga, had been given by General Rosecrans.

(2) That this movement was delayed by the operation known as the Wheeler raid on the mountain lines of communication; that orders for the original movement were repeated by General Rosecrans immediately after that raid, and the construction of pontoon boats for a bridge to Lookout Valley urged forward with vigor; that on October 19, 1863, after ordering General Hooker to be ready to move forward, General Rosecrans rode with Gen. J. J. Reynolds and Maj. F. S. Bond, of his staff, to Browns Ferry, and selected that as the place for throwing a pontoon bridge for the crossing into Lookout Valley of the cooperating force from Chattanooga, and that upon returning from that ride he received the order relieving him and placing Gen. George H. Thomas in command.

(3) That General Thomas, upon assuming command, telegraphed the same night (October 19) to General Hooker to carry out General Rosecrans's last instructions, and proceeded to perfect the details of General Rosecrans's plan; that upon the arrival of General Grant, four days later, the plan was explained to him, and the next day its execution was ordered, the throwing of the bridge and occupation of the opposite shore being confided to Gen. W. F. Smith, who executed this part of the plan in a brilliant manner during the night of October 26 and morning of the 27th.

(4) That General Grant in his dispatches ascribed the plan of relief to General Thomas, who, in turn, testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that the general plan was General Rosecrans's, and that he (Thomas) had completed

it upon assuming command. In his official dispatches he gave great credit to General Smith for the "skillful execution by General Smith of the work assigned him."

The following dates will be found convenient in the further examination of the case:

The Army of the Cumberland, after the battle of Chickamanga, was established in Chattanooga during September 22, 1863.

General Hooker's army reached Bridgeport September 30.

Gen. W. F. Smith reached Chattanooga September 30, and was assigned to duty as chief engineer of the Department of the Cumberland October 3.

General Rosecrans was relieved the evening of October 19, and Gen. George H. Thomas immediately assumed command.

General Smith fixes October 19 as the date of his first visit to and first knowledge of Browns Ferry. In a signed communication printed in several newspapers, among others the Philadelphia Press and the Chattanooga Times, the date of the latter being September 15, 1895, General Smith also fixes the evening of October 19 as the time when he devised his plan for the movement to reopen the river, and sets forth that he laid his plan before General Thomas October 20.

The connection of General Rosecrans with the reopening of the river by way of Browns Ferry and Lookout Valley, so far as the same bears upon the accuracy of the legend called in question by General Smith, is thus set forth in the official records—the references being to the serial number and page of the published records of the war.

The day the Army of the Cumberland reached Chattanooga from Rossville after the battle of Chickamanga, General Rosecrans ordered Whitaker's brigade to occupy the heights opposite Lookout Mountain. These were known as Moccasin Point. (Serial No. 50, p. 163.)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 22, 1863.

Maj. Gen. GORDON GRANGER:

The general commanding directs that you order General Whitaker's brigade at once across the river to occupy the heights opposite the point of Lookout Mountain.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. G. SWAIM,
Captain, and Assistant Adjutant-General.

September 24 General Whitaker reports the occupation of Browns Ferry by the One hundred and fifteenth Illinois and one section of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery, and fixes the position as 3 miles below the position of Colonel Champion (Ninety-sixth Illinois), which was at Moccasin Point. (S. 52, p. 828):

The Ninety-sixth Illinois Volunteers, and the Eighty-fourth Indiana and Tenth Indiana Battery, Fortieth Ohio Volunteers, and one section Eighteenth Ohio Battery are directly opposite the base of Lookout Mountain, protecting the ferry. The One hundred and fifteenth Illinois Volunteers, one section of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery at Browns Ferry, about 3 miles below the position of Colonel Champion.

This report was received the same day at General Rosecrans's headquarters, as appears from a preceding dispatch (S. 52, p. 827).

This is held by this commission to dispose of General Smith's contention, presented at length in his pamphlet furnished this commission (pp. 102, 103), that General Rosecrans had no knowledge of the real Browns Ferry, but supposed it to be at the mouth of Lookout Creek, 3 miles above and opposite Moccasin Point. The map with which General Smith sustains this contention is one of the series of progress maps issued as the army advanced, with the best obtainable information of the country in advance. This particular map was issued at Stevenson, Ala., September 8, and so before the entrance of any Union troops into Chattanooga. It was soon after corrected as to the position of the ferries.

September 27 Quartermaster-General Meigs telegraphed Secretary Stanton as follows (S. 52, p. 890):

One steamboat and a few flats are ready for service. Another steamboat is nearing completion. For another the machinery is at Bridgeport. The water is too low at present for the *Paint Rock*, the captured steamboat, to navigate the river, and the rebels command the channel. When the troops understood to be on their way here arrive General Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport. Supplies can then be accumulated by water.

General Smith, in his pamphlet sent this commission (p. 97), asserts that General Meigs as late as October 16 was ignorant of any plan to reopen the river, and argues from that that General Rosecrans had no plan.

When General Hooker, in command of the forces on the way from the Army of the Potomac to the relief of General Rosecrans at Chattanooga, reached Cincinnati he telegraphed General Rosecrans, September 29, as follows (S. 48, p. 177):

Will General Rosecrans please indicate the point where the troops will leave the railroad?

September 30 General Rosecrans replied (S. 48, p. 179):

Your corps will pass directly to Bridgeport without reshipment at Nashville. Field transportation will be ready for you at Bridgeport.

The wagon transportation of the column had been left at the East.

September 30 Colonel Hodges, chief quartermaster at Nashville, telegraphed General Rosecrans (S. 52, 947):

Will you please give me an idea as to where the troops now coming in will be for the present?

The same date General Rosecrans replied (S. 52, p. 947):

Your dispatch of this morning received. The troops now coming in will operate on the Lookout Valley line, unless called northward.

The contingency of calling some of the troops northward referred to the possibility that they would be needed to assist in repulsing the Wheeler raid. It turned out that this raid seriously delayed Hooker's forward movement to Chattanooga.

September 26 Assistant Secretary Dana, in a telegram to Secretary Stanton, thus indicated General Rosecrans's preparations for meeting General Hooker's forces in Lookout Valley (S. 50, p. 201):

Rosecrans is about to lay a bridge across the Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek, so that he can operate from here in that valley without crossing the mountain.

And again, September 29, Mr. Dana telegraphs Mr. Stanton (S. 50, p. 203):

Hooker will first be stationed at Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley, at the junction of the Chattanooga and Trenton and Memphis and Charleston railroads.

The day after General Smith's arrival at Chattanooga and two days before he was assigned to duty, namely, October 1, General Rosecrans telegraphed General Hooker, who had arrived at Bridgeport September 30 (S. 53, p. 25):

Put down a pontoon bridge and make immediate preparation for crossing your command at that point.

With the exception of the last dispatch the quotations thus far made from the official records relate to a period antedating General Smith's arrival in the Western army. Yet in the face of these records he declares in his pamphlet (p. 99) that up to October 16 "no line emanating from him [Rosecrans] has squinted toward a movement to recapture Lookout Valley, nor has he given to Dana or Meigs any hint of such a plan being on foot."

It is held by the commission that these dispatches make it perfectly clear that General Rosecrans, at a time previous to the arrival of General Smith at Chattanooga, and at least three days before the latter was put on duty there, and nearly three weeks before the day which General Smith himself fixes as the date of his first visit

to Browns Ferry, had fully decided upon the plan of opening Lookout Valley by an advance of General Hooker's troops from Bridgeport in cooperation with the troops from Chattanooga.

On the 22d of April, 1865, General Rosecrans appeared before the Committee on the Conduct of the War in Washington, and upon being sworn, testified as follows in regard to his plan for opening the line of supplies through Lookout Valley to Bridgeport:

As early as the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle, I called the attention of General Thomas and General Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that, as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for the purpose, I would take possession of Lookout Valley, opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain, and fortify it, thus completely covering the road from there to Bridgeport, on the south side as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well as of Lookout Valley; because, by means of a fortified tête-de-pont, after our fortifications at Chattanooga were completed, we could easily concentrate our whole force to fight the enemy if he entered Lookout Valley, and that within less than two hours' march, while he could not approach us in force with artillery without making a circuit over Lookout Mountain by way of Fricks and Stevens Gap, 26 miles southeast, which would take two or three days.

An interior line of fortifications was laid out and put in course of construction, designed to cover our depots with a garrison of one or two divisions against all the forces the enemy could bring. I had, moreover, ordered the construction of small steamboats and barges at Bridgeport to run thence to Chattanooga, two of which were well advanced when the army crossed on its advance into Georgia; and from the 23d of September my correspondence and my staff officers will testify that I was urging the quartermaster, Captain Edwards, who had the work in hand, to hasten its completion, which it was hoped would be the case by the time we were ready to take and hold Lookout Valley. To effect this General Hooker was directed to concentrate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and advised that as soon as his train should arrive, or enough of it to subsist his army 10 or 12 miles from his depot, he would be directed to move into Lookout Valley to take possession of that; and every effort was made to complete the pontoons, etc., to connect that with our troops at Chattanooga. On the 19th of October I examined the river and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at Ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chattanooga. I moreover directed Gen. W. F. Smith to reconnoiter the shore above Chattanooga, with a view to that very movement on the enemy's right flank which was afterwards made by General Sherman.

On the 19th of October, on my returning from selecting the position of the pontoon bridge, I received orders to turn over the command of the army of the Cumberland to Major-General Thomas, repair to Cincinnati, and report from there by letter to the Adjutant-General for orders. (Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, 2d series, p. 33, of Rosecrans Campaigns.)

This testimony was given by General Rosecrans April 22, 1865, or only seventeen months after the events. So far as the official record refers to the various points presented it accords with this testimony.

Gen. Daniel Butterfield, who was General Hooker's chief of staff, writing this commission under date of September 12, 1900, in reply to a letter asking for his knowledge of the plan for reopening the river line of supplies, says:

I left Stevenson by General Hooker's orders, and through telegraph agreement with General Rosecrans, for Chattanooga and a conference and agreement with General Rosecrans as to our proposed march to the relief of the situation at Chattanooga with our forces. General Hooker and myself had gone over the situation and our factors and conditions, and agreed upon the movement across the Tennessee at Bridgeport and march up the south bank of the river to a point to be selected and agreed upon with General Rosecrans for our debouchment into Lookout Valley near Wauhatchie, and clearing and protecting the movement of the steamer General Le Duc, our most efficient quartermaster, had approaching sufficient state of completion to carry forage and rations up to a point accessible to Chattanooga, all of which was done, and are matters of history by the records of our movement. I have nothing accessible to refresh my memory, but I send this to General Le Duc to ask him to write you fully on the subject.

My journey to Chattanooga found General Rosecrans's headquarters in charge of Gen. Gordon Granger, an old personal friend, who told me in strict privacy and con-

fidence, upon my promise that I would under no circumstances permit it to be known, that he had in his possession a telegram (showing it to me) from Washington to Rosecrans, which Rosecrans had not seen and did not know of as yet, being out inspecting and going over the works and line, which telegram relieved Rosecrans of command of Army of the Cumberland and directed him to turn it over to General Thomas.

From this quotation it appears that General Rosecrans previous to October 19 had arranged for a full conference with General Hooker through General Butterfield, his chief of staff, in regard to the details of the proposed movement forward into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie.

A communication from Gen. W. G. Le Due shows that as early as October 4 he was actually engaged under General Hooker's orders in rushing the completion of a small steamboat to transport supplies to Chattanooga.

In a recent letter to General Butterfield, which he has placed at the service of this commission, General Le Due writes:

Rosecrans had arranged almost every detail of the movement, as you well know who were at his headquarters to arrange plans and details, when he was relieved.

In regard to hastening the construction of the steamboat and barges which Captain Edwards was building at Bridgeport for service as soon as the river line could be opened, dispatches S. 53, pages 309, 323, 343, and 347 sufficiently attest. The quoting of one will be sufficient here:

Rosecrans to Hooker.

CHATTANOOGA, October 12.

Push Edwards to hasten on the steamboat. The preparation of that is of primary importance both to your movements and mine.

This is one of the boats for which General Rosecrans directed General Smith to find a landing place below Browns Ferry and behind Williams Island. According to General Smith's own claim these instructions antedated the evolution in his own mind of a plan for reopening the river.

As to the urging forward the construction of pontoons for a bridge to Lookout Valley, Col. P. V. Fox, who, as a captain in the First Michigan Engineers, had this work in charge, declared in his address at the dedication of the monument of his regiment at Chattanooga, prepared from a war-time diary:

We had boats and equipage enough completed for a bridge 1,000 feet long when General Rosecrans was relieved, October 19.

And that the Browns Ferry bridge when thrown was "900 feet long."

General Grant's report contains this allusion (S. 55, p. 27) to the plan, which in telegraphing General Halleck (S. 54, p. 56) he treated as General Thomas's:

Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of October, and found that General Thomas had immediately, on being placed in command of the Department of the Cumberland, ordered the concentration of Major-General Hooker's command at Bridgeport, preparatory to securing the river and main wagon road between that place and Browns Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain. The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with Thomas and Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, I made a reconnoissance of Browns Ferry and the hills on the south side of the river and at the mouth of Lookout Valley.

General Thomas, in turn, in his official report [Nov. 7, 1863] (S. 54, p. 42), thus sets forth that the plan originated with General Rosecrans:

Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command of the department devolved on me. The bridge, which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river, was nearly completed.

That is, that these preliminary steps, including the bridge for Browns Ferry, had been taken by General Rosecrans previous to October 19—the date when General Smith claims to have evolved his plan.

General Thomas, in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, made this full statement in regard to his taking command and proceeding to execute the plan for reopening the river:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND,
October 19, 1863—11 p. m.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson*:

Maj. Gen. G. H. Thomas directs me to state that, in obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, he has assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland. He desires that you will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards.

J. J. REYNOLDS,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.

The instructions referred to in the above were to concentrate as much of his command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and by rail. Before he was relieved in command of the Department of the Cumberland, General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement, which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short line of supplies from Bridgeport.

While General Thomas relates that General Rosecrans had, previous to his relief, consulted with General Smith as to a plan for reopening the river line of supplies, General Smith, in paragraph 3, page 54, of his reply to General Duffield, declares emphatically that "not a single word ever passed between" them on the subject, "nor was any partial plan made or discussed for any such purpose." General Smith further says:

In making this statement, General Thomas could not have had personal knowledge of such an occurrence, and must have taken the story from hearsay. A day or so after arriving at Chattanooga, I gave an opinion to General Rosecrans about his line of communications, and was so abruptly challenged as to the value of my opinion that from that time until the 18th of October not a single word ever passed between us as to any "means of relieving the difficulty of obtaining supplies" nor was there any partial plan made or discussed by us for any such purpose. On the 18th of October I said to General Rosecrans that I was going the next day to make a reconnoissance for a specific purpose. I went, made it alone, did not find what I had hoped for, returned to headquarters to find Rosecrans relieved from command, had no conversation with him about my day's work, and never saw him afterwards. The detailed account of this reconnoissance I will give as a supplement. I wish here to show only what is proved from the record, and the above remarks are only to show wherein General Thomas was led astray by incorrect statements of others.

And yet it appears from General Smith's private letter, which he quotes on page 59 of the same paper, that in some way he had been informed of the plan for General Hooker to come forward into Lookout Valley.

It is pertinent to add, upon the authority of Gen. J. J. Reynolds, chief of staff, that upon the morning of this order from General Thomas, General Rosecrans, before starting on his ride to Browns Ferry, sent an order to General Hooker, at Bridgeport, directing him to hold his command in readiness to march, for reasons set forth in General Thomas's testimony, quoted above. This dispatch, as it will be noticed, was received at Stevenson at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 19th.

STEVENSON, October 19, 1863—9 a. m.

Brig. Gen. R. S. GRANGER:

Dispatch received. Have just received orders from department headquarters to hold my command in readiness to march at short notice. Yours will be the only troops left on the line when I leave; therefore I can not relieve them. Confer with General Rosecrans on the subject.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.

In 1868, when General Thomas's headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, were at Louisville, the engineer office, being ready to issue General Thomas's official map of the campaigns of the Army of the Cumberland, wrote to General Thomas's headquarters for such corrections, if any, as it was thought desirable to make in the legends which had been furnished in 1865 with the map to the engineer's office. These legends as first submitted to the engineer's office contained this paragraph, omitting, as will be seen, any part that General Rosecrans may have had in the plan for opening the river:

On the 19th (October) Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas succeeded General Rosecrans in the command of the Department of the Cumberland. General Grant arrived in Chattanooga on the 23d, and approving of General Thomas's plans they were carried into execution. General Thomas directed Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, to make a lodgment on the south bank of the Tennessee River, at Browns Ferry, and seize the range of hills in that vicinity, as they commanded the Kelleys Ferry road. In connection with this movement General Hooker was to cross the Tennessee River at Bridgeport and advance on Wauhatchie.

This portion of the legend was amended at General Thomas's headquarters by returning it with the following insertion, showing that prior to being relieved—that is, prior to the day that General Smith, as he himself claims, first visited Browns Ferry—General Rosecrans had ordered Hooker's troops to advance toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening the line of supplies:

Prior to being relieved General Rosecrans had ordered the concentration of Hooker's troops at Bridgeport, preparatory to advancing along the line of the railroad toward Chattanooga. On assuming command of the army of the Cumberland, General Thomas ordered the immediate execution of this movement, and, after consulting with Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, he determined upon certain other movements, in conjunction with General Hooker's advance, looking to the opening of the Tennessee River and main wagon road from Bridgeport to Browns Ferry, it being impossible to supply the army at Chattanooga by the road on the north bank of the river.

The technicalities by which General Smith seeks to limit the point in Lookout Valley where General Rosecrans intended to throw his bridge to the exact mouth of Lookout Creek are not regarded by this commission as of any force, since this was not only a thoroughly unmilitary point, but an impossible point unless the throwing of a bridge was to be supported by a sufficient force to clear Lookout Valley of the enemy and drive the Confederate army off Lookout Mountain. A bridge thrown at this point, as everyone who examines it sees at a glance, would have been under the plunging fire of batteries and riflemen upon inaccessible bluffs on the opposite shore.

Not only this, but the haul would have been increased by several miles through the deep soil of rich river bottoms, which would have been a matter of most serious importance in view of the well known reduced condition of the train animals. Besides, such route of supply wagons to and from the bridge would have been under artillery fire for more than a mile. It is held by this commission that to assume that an officer of General Rosecrans's attainments would have attempted to throw a bridge at the mouth of Lookout Creek, when the long-established road from Chattanooga into Lookout Valley crossed at Browns Ferry, much nearer Chattanooga and quite beyond the reach of the enemy's guns, is too preposterous for serious consideration. Undoubtedly the terms "mouth of Lookout Creek" were used as equivalent to the mouth of Lookout Valley.

While no official decision has been made by this commission because of the unofficial agitation of the various claims of General Smith, its members have given much and careful study to all questions involved in the present discussion. They have satisfied themselves by abundant testimony, and, as they think, beyond pos-

sibility of doubt, that what is now known as Browns Ferry has been so known back to the time of the Indian occupation of the surrounding country.

Mr. Jesse Allison, a resident of Chattanooga and a pilot upon the Tennessee River in that vicinity for a long term of years before the war, says that to his knowledge no other ferry than what is now known as Browns Ferry has ever existed within his knowledge of the river between that point and Chattanooga.

Mr. Allan Parker, an old citizen who has lived all his life in Lookout Valley, near Browns Ferry, informs members of the commission that the present Browns Ferry has been known as such to his knowledge for seventy-five years, and that during that time there has been no ferry above it from Lookout Valley, either by that or any other name.

Much has been made at times in the course of this discussion of a claim that a ferry existed in the vicinity of Moccasin Point, and it has been attempted to establish this claim by reference to the capture and recapture of a ferryboat at the foot of Lookout Mountain above the mouth of Lookout Creek. Upon prosecuting inquiry into this matter, the commission discovered and entered into correspondence with members of the One hundred and fifteenth Illinois Infantry who were engaged in navigating this boat at the time of its capture by the Confederates. It turns out to have been a boat which had floated down from the vicinity of Chattanooga and caught upon the shoal between the city and Lookout Mountain. The boat was dislodged from this position by a detail from the One hundred and fifteenth Illinois, and in the attempt to take it to the vicinity of Williams Island it came under the fire of the Confederate pickets and was captured. It was subsequently recaptured. Full information in regard to these facts in writing from the persons engaged in the attempt to take the boat down the river is now in the possession of this commission. The boat had never been used as a ferry anywhere in the vicinity of Lookout Mountain or Lookout Valley.

Gen. James A. Garfield, chief of staff to General Rosecrans at Chattanooga, answering an inquiry as to the authorship of the plan for reopening the Tennessee River line of supplies, wrote June 8, 1876, as follows, to General Carman:

I left Chattanooga for Washington late in October [15], but before I left, General Rosecrans and I had not only discussed the project of securing Lookout Valley, but General "Baldy" Smith had been sent to examine the river and report a plan for bridging it, and the pontoons were nearly completed when I left. I was familiar with all the details of the plan and aided General Rosecrans in perfecting them. Whether they were subsequently changed or modified in execution I can not now say. But the inception of the general plan is certainly due to General Rosecrans.

Capt. William Margedant, recently deceased, at Hamilton, Ohio, who was General Rosecrans's topographical engineer at the time of the Browns Ferry movement, has exhibited to members of the commission photographs of the river, including Browns Ferry and the adjacent shores, taken before General Smith arrived from the Eastern army, by direction of General Rosecrans, as part of the work of preparing for opening the river at that point.

Gen. J. J. Reynolds, chief of staff to General Rosecrans, who rode with the General on the 19th of October, 1863, to Browns Ferry for the purpose of examining it with a view to throwing a bridge at that point, in 1895 visited that position with a member of the commission. He clearly recognized it as the point to which he rode with General Rosecrans the day the latter was relieved. Upon also visiting the river in the vicinity of Moccasin Point and opposite the mouth of Lookout Creek, he was equally certain that no point in that vicinity had been examined with a view to bridging the river at that location.

Maj. Frank S. Bond, now residing in New York, and senior aid to General Rosecrans in Chattanooga, also rode with the general and General Reynolds on October 19 to Browns Ferry for the purpose of selecting a point for a practicable crossing

for General Hooker's command into Lookout Valley. He said of his recollections, in a letter to the chairman of this commission, dated November 7, 1895:

They are, however, perfectly clear as to the fact that General Rosecrans, General Reynolds, Gen. Baldy Smith, and I started early on the morning of October 19 to make a reconnoissance on the north bank of the river, for the purpose of selecting a point for a practicable crossing to General Hooker's command into Lookout Valley. A careful examination of the river was made and a point known as Browns Ferry was selected for such crossing. The entire day was spent in making this examination, and my recollection is that it was just after dark when we returned to Chattanooga, and the general, stopping at General Thomas's headquarters, there learned that the order relieving him from command had been received. General Smith, while admitting that he started with General Rosecrans to make an examination of the river, claims that the general stopped at some hospital en route, and that he, General Smith, went on by himself and made an examination of the river on his own account. I do not wish to be understood as questioning General Smith's statements as to his personal movements; he would know as to them better than I. I do know, however, that I accompanied General Rosecrans, with General Reynolds, in making that reconnoissance, and that the point on the river known and believed to be Browns Ferry was selected as the best point for a crossing. I also know of my own knowledge that, previous to making this examination of the river, orders had been given for the building of some fifty or more pontoons, additional to those required for a second bridge (at Chattanooga), and that these were intended to be used for such crossing, and they were about completed on the day General Rosecrans made his selection of Browns Ferry as the point where he intended to move General Hooker's command across the river. I have also a distinct recollection that prior to this examination of the river bank I accompanied General Rosecrans a number of times to the point where the pontoons necessary for this movement were being constructed.

This is a statement of Major Bond long after the event, but while it is supported by the official record, General Smith furnishes the copy of a record made by Major Bond at the time. The entry in his daily diary for October 19, 1863, is thus quoted by General Smith on page 131 of the paper, wherein he lays his claim before General Duffield: (Appendix 8.)

October 19, Chattanooga.—Took long ride over the river with General Rosecrans and General Smith. Went to Browns Ferry, the proposed point for location of pontoon bridge, pontoons for which are being built, and are nearly finished, at Chattanooga. On return heard General Rosecrans was relieved of command, with orders to report at Cincinnati. Remainder of the night was busy getting ready to start in the morning.

Col. A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster on the staff of General Thomas, writing to Major Bond, says:

Let me here say that I fully concur in your statement that orders had been given to build boats for bridging the river at Browns Ferry previous to the arrival of General Smith. Upon his arrival General Smith assumed full charge and direction of the work to open the "cracker line," a service for which he secured the recognition of the principal generals.

In reference to General Rosecrans's plans for the Browns Ferry movement, as they had developed previous to General Smith's arrival in the Western army, Captain Margedant, topographical engineer of the department, writes to this commission that he had already prepared for General Rosecrans a map of Browns Ferry and its surroundings, being the Browns Ferry where the pontoon bridge was afterwards thrown, and that at this point he had on his map sketched in the boats of a pontoon bridge; and further, that this map was taken from his headquarters to General Smith's headquarters immediately after General Smith was assigned to duty as chief engineer of the Department of the Cumberland, by Coast Survey officers acting under General Smith's orders.

At the third annual reunion of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland, held at Indianapolis December 15 and 16, 1869, General Rosecrans, who met his comrades

for the first time after his relief at Chattanooga, being called upon at the banquet, where Gen. P. H. Sheridan presided as president in the absence of General Thomas, in referring to the reopening of the Tennessee River said:

It was known to the corps commanders almost immediately after we took possession of Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign, that I intended to do what I could to move General Bragg's boots [laughter], and that in pursuance of that intention I directed pontoon bridges to be built with the utmost rapidity, so that we could get the use of the roads on the north side of the Tennessee. I had contracted with two of the heaviest bridge-building firms in the country—one in Cleveland and one in Chicago—to rebuild the railroad bridges across the Tennessee and Running Water without delay, and I had ordered constructed four steamboats for use on the river. The hull of one was about finished and the calking was being done on another before we crossed the river. I had also directed other pontoons to be constructed by which we could throw a bridge across the Tennessee below the mouth of Lookout Creek, on which to march and take possession of Lookout Valley. That matter was known to the corps commanders, and it was known; I think, to my young friend, Phil. Sheridan, for, though a division commander, he used to be down at headquarters frequently, and I took a great deal of pleasure in consulting with him.

Gen. P. H. Sheridan, interposing, said:

I will state that I rode in company with General Rosecrans at the time he was looking at the crossing of the river, when he was making arrangements to put the bridge across. [Cheers.]

General Rosecrans continued:

At an early period after his arrival I directed Gen. Baldy Smith, he having reported to me and been made chief engineer, to make a careful examination of the shore opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga with a view to operations as soon as General Sherman should arrive. On the 19th of October we proceeded to examine the exact point where we intended to cross the river for the purpose of taking possession of Lookout Valley. On returning that evening I received a telegraphic dispatch announcing my removal from the command of the Army of the Cumberland and the appointment of Major-General Thomas to that command. * * *

There is one other little incident which I will tell you, because it concerns myself, and that is: After the orders were all dispatched and sent to the adjutant-general, and orders were given for the baggage to be made ready for my departure in the morning, General Thomas said: "Now, General, I want you to be kind enough to describe the exact plan for the taking of Lookout Valley as you proposed it." I went over it again, and told him when, where, and how it was my purpose to cross the river; how to occupy Lookout Valley and to secure the use of the road on the south side of the river.

A few moments after Gen. Gordon Granger, who was present at the closing interview with General Thomas when the plan for opening the river was rehearsed, asked General Rosecrans to yield to him for one moment, and said:

I am not going to make a speech. I have nothing to say, but I simply want to confirm what the General has said. I was in command of part of the forces, and I saw and know that what General Rosecrans has said is true, verbatim, et literatim, et punctuatim.

General Rosecrans, resuming, said:

Before long we went to battle, for, don't you know, we wanted to command Lookout Valley and have the use of the river. The time came very soon for the execution of that plan, and it was executed. The plan was executed and Lookout Valley was taken. The river was opened and the army was saved and supplied with bread. The remarks of the soldiers that they could defend that line if I would open the cracker line were about right. [Laughter.]

At the conclusion of General Rosecrans's remarks General Granger added:

I simply want to testify to the truth of what General Rosecrans has said. I have got it in writing. It is a matter of record. The plan was inaugurated and proposed by the two friends you see there—Gen. Phil. Sheridan (I think you call him) and Gen. W. S. Rosecrans. I remember the night of the discussion in General Sheridan's tent about crossing that river, and when we'd cross it, and where, and how, and

what was necessary to cross it with. And then what the General has spoken of took place. It was the right plan, of course, and the plan was followed out, and the plan was successful, and the result showed that it was the right plan. It has long since been said that it was a bad time to swap horses when crossing a stream, and I thought it was a bad time to swap commanders; but it was done, and General Thomas and all there went to work at General Rosecrans's plan and policy, and it was carried out, and carried out successfully. [Applause and cheers.]

All of the above remarks were stenographically reported by Mr. W. H. Draper, of Indianapolis, who had been appointed official stenographer of the society.

Gen. John T. Wilder, the well-known commander of a brigade of mounted infantry, was the first to appear before Chattanooga in the course of the campaign. He closely patrolled the north bank of the river from the mouth of the North Chickamauga to the Suck, below Williams Island, until the city was occupied by the Union forces.

Soon after General Smith's claim was called to the attention of this Commission, General Wilder made a verbal statement of his early knowledge of Browns Ferry to a member of this Commission. Having been recently asked to write his recollections of his visits to Browns Ferry, he writes as follows:

UNITED STATES PENSION AGENCY,
Knoxville, Tenn., September 8, 1900.

Gen. H. V. BOYNTON, *Washington, D. C.*

DEAR GENERAL: I have just returned from Chicago and find your letter here. On August 20 or 21, 1863, my command arrived on the north bank of the Tennessee River, opposite the city of Chattanooga. The next morning I, with an escort of one company, and with William Crutchfield, a prominent citizen of Chattanooga, who had crossed the river the previous night, as a guide, went down the river to examine all possible fords and practical crossings, following the river bank as far down the river as the "Suck."

Mr. Crutchfield pointed out Ross Tow-head as a ford; the bar at mouth of Lookout Creek as another during extreme low water; Williams Island as a practical ford, below which point there was no practical ford. At Browns Ferry, a short distance above Williams Island and about a mile and a half or more below the mouth of Lookout Creek, a wagon road reaches the river from Lookout Valley, on the south side, as well as from the Chattanooga Valley, on the north side of the river. The approaches to this ford are pretty well hidden by a low ridge of hills running parallel to and on the southeast side of the wagon road.

General Rosecrans had signaled me from Bridgeport, Ala., to make and forward to him a sketch and description of the topography and military surroundings of Chattanooga. This I did, and accompanied it with a sketch map, on the 23d of August. After the battle of Chickamauga on September 23 Gen. J. J. Reynolds called me to his headquarters in Chattanooga and asked me for the same information, which I embodied in a sketch map of the surrounding country, and went with General Reynolds to the office of General Rosecrans, where we found Gen. George H. Thomas and the same William Crutchfield. I immediately produced the map, and with the aid of Mr. Crutchfield explained to Generals Rosecrans and Thomas the whole situation of roads, mountains, ferries, and fords near Chattanooga.

The next day I accompanied Generals Reynolds and Rosecrans, accompanied by Mr. Crutchfield, to the north side of the river, at Browns Ferry, and explained to General Rosecrans how supplies might reach Chattanooga by way of Kelleys Ferry, Lookout Valley, Browns Ferry, and across Stringers Ridge to Chattanooga, all this route being beyond the reach of the enemy's guns on Lookout Mountain. Mr. Crutchfield told us that the ferry had been established by a Cherokee half-breed named Brown, and who was reputed to have murdered many travelers for robbery and to have thrown their bodies in the river during the time of the Cherokee occupation of the country by the Indians.

I know that General Rosecrans had full knowledge of the location of Browns Ferry and its possibilities as a supply route from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, and when I left him after the visit there—Browns Ferry—he was discussing the plan, afterwards adopted, for taking possession of Browns Ferry by a night attack from pontoon boats dropped down the river in the darkness from Chattanooga.

I am, truly yours,

J. T. WILDER.

P. S.—Mr. Crutchfield assured General Rosecrans that this route from Kelleys Ferry was without mountains and not one-fourth as long as the precipitous and rocky

route across Waldens Ridge, which he said was impracticable because of the impossibility of sustaining the animals required for transportation, and that teams could scarcely haul their own forage, let alone supplies for the army at Chattanooga.

J. T. W.

The board will also see by examining the second paragraph of Gen. T. J. Wood's report to General Rosecrans, dated August 23, 1863 (S. 52, p. 137), that this officer was calling attention to the crossing at Browns Ferry, the road at that point from Chattanooga being formerly known as the Nashville Pike. From this statement, in connection with that of General Wilder, it seems clear that General Rosecrans was informed in regard to Browns Ferry and the roads leading therefrom during the last week in August, or at least five weeks before General Smith arrived at Chattanooga.

In Van Horne's History of the Army of the Cumberland, Volume I, in the preface of which he says "the materials for the work were mainly collected and compiled by General Thomas," in the course of his discussion of the reopening of the Tennessee River he says, page 393:

In anticipation of an open river, steamboat building had been commenced long before at Bridgeport, and a steamboat captured at Chattanooga had been repaired. General Rosecrans had in view the opening of the river and the erection of storehouses on Williams Island, situated opposite the termination of Lookout Valley, and gave orders to General Hooker to concentrate such portions of his command at Bridgeport as the safety of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad would permit, and hold himself in readiness to move toward Chattanooga. He also gave orders for the construction of pontoons for a bridge down the river. On the 19th he directed Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, his chief engineer, to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of Williams Island, with a view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and storehouses. That day he was relieved as commander of the Army of the Cumberland.

This is followed on pages 395, 396 by this statement:

* * * The same day, October 19, the day the command of the army was formally relinquished by General Rosecrans, General Thomas directed General Hooker to hasten the concentration of his command and his preparations to move, in accordance with the previous instructions of General Rosecrans.

General Grant reached Chattanooga on the 23d in the evening, and the projected plan for securing a lodgment of troops on the left bank of the river at Browns Ferry, as the initial step in opening the river and shorter roads to Bridgeport, was at once submitted to him. The day following, in company with Generals Thomas and Smith, he made a thorough reconnoissance north of the river, with reference to the feasibility of the plan proposed. Agreeing with those who had matured the scheme, he authorized its execution. Fortunately, the preparations were far advanced, and their completion required little time. General Smith was charged with the enterprise and directed to perfect the necessary arrangements.

It is just to General Smith to add that this account also presents General Thomas's strong commendation of the brilliancy with which General Smith conceived and executed the part of the movement assigned to him.

Gen. J. G. Parkhurst was provost marshal of the Fourteenth Corps at the time of the movement on Browns Ferry. One division of this corps was in the force cooperating with Hooker's advance. General Parkhurst, under General Thomas, commanded the post of Chattanooga, and always had close relations with the General and his staff. In reply to a recent letter asking for his recollections upon the points at issue, he writes:

COLDWATER, MICH., *September 10, 1900.*

My dear BOYNTON: I am in receipt of your favor of the 2d instant.

At the time of the "Browns Ferry" expedition I was acting as provost marshal, Fourteenth Army Corps, to which General Palmer had recently been assigned.

It was the understanding of General Thomas's old staff that the expedition was conceived by General Rosecrans, and was ordered by General Thomas soon after he relieved Rosecrans.

The point settled upon by Rosecrans was a ferry about 2 miles below Point Lookout, and Hazen's and Turchin's brigades were selected by General Thomas for the expedition.

I had no means of being posted in the details, but have a distinct recollection that General Thomas gave General Rosecrans all the credit for conceiving this plan for the relief of our army.

Very truly, yours,

J. G. PARKHURST.

Gen. H. V. BOYNTON,
Washington, D. C.

The above official records, and other papers from officers of note who participated in the events which your board is called upon to review, are held to sustain the general accuracy of the legend called in question by General Smith.

Claims of General Smith to the contrary, as set forth in pamphlets and newspaper communications, have been informally before this commission since 1891. They were never called officially to its attention until the reference by the adjutant-general of Gen. H. M. Duffield's report to the Secretary of War.

General Duffield, whose investigation of the case by direct order of Secretary Alger was wholly independent of this commission, referred to it a paper from General Smith containing but one feature of his claim, namely, the discovery of Browns Ferry. To that answer was made and some other features of the case discussed. It is understood that this report of General Duffield, and its accompanying papers, has been placed in the possession of your board.

The various forms in which General Smith's claims have reached this commission are these:

1. In a pamphlet published by General Smith in 1891, entitled, "The relief of the Army of the Cumberland and the reopening of the short line of communication between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Bridgeport, Ala., in October, 1863; William Farrar Smith, brevet major-general, U. S. A.," wherein General Smith says:

* * * From the hills on which I was at work I looked on the river and the northern end of Raccoon Mountain daily, and it finally occurred to me that if we could seize the end of that mountain resting on the river, and if Hooker, at the same time, could occupy and hold the passes, we could make a depot for supplies on Williams Island, and from there supply the army at Chattanooga by wagons over a road not more than 5 miles in length, which would be practically reopening the river and saving the army from the fate that seemed closely impending.

So impressed was I with this idea that on the afternoon of the 18th of October I went to General Rosecrans and told him that I desired, on the following day, to reconnoiter down the river to see if a footing could not be gained which could be held and thus perhaps give us relief. General Rosecrans said, "Go by all means, and I will go with you." In my official report of operations afterwards (from courtesy) I mentioned that as an order from General Rosecrans. * * *

2. In a pamphlet published by General Smith in 1895, entitled "The reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863, as related by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and the Official Record; compiled and annotated by Bvt. Maj. Gen. William Farrar Smith," in which it is said:

It was only after Rosecrans's paper in the North American Review appeared that I ever took any steps towards vindicating my claims to the credit of the whole movement. At the time no one in the Army of the Cumberland gave the credit to any other person, and I was entirely willing to let my actions drift into history in an ordinary way. Of late it has become a question almost of veracity between me and certain other persons who are not willing to let the Official Record make the history of the war, but set up ex parte statements based on nothing.

3. In a letter from General Smith to Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, dated Wilmington, Del., November 5, 1897, in which this occurs:

I have the honor to make this appeal to you to correct the official misrepresentation of history which has been made by your subordinates in the War Department.

I make this appeal to you as the only source to which such appeals can be made and through whom justice can be done.

In a series of maps, entitled "Atlas of Battlefields of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and vicinity," a copy of which has recently come into my possession, there is found in the second paragraph of the legend, under the head of Chattanooga, the following statement, viz: "At daylight of October 27 the river line of communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley devised by General Rosecrans, approved by General Thomas, and ordered executed by General Grant under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith." * * *

4. After General Alger had referred this appeal to General Duffield for consideration and report, General Smith laid before General Duffield a paper signed by himself, entitled "The Browns Ferry movement—The claim of General Smith stated."

In this paper his claim was reduced to the single point that he, and not General Rosecrans, selected Browns Ferry as the best point for the bridge into Lookout Valley, and the claim is thus stated:

The claim is this: That General Smith, on October 19, 1863, alone, and without assistance from anyone, fixed upon Browns Ferry as the best, if not the only, place where a lodgment could be made on the left bank of the Tennessee River, and, owing to the conformation of the ground, securely held, at such a distance from the enemy's batteries that a bridge, if thrown across the stream at that point, would be safe from their fire and available for the needs of the military situation.

It is not denied that General Rosecrans had in mind the desirability of establishing a bridge over the river nor that he visited the river—also on October 19, 1863—for the purpose of selecting a site for a bridge, but it is denied that he visited Browns Ferry, where the bridge was thrown, and it is claimed that this spot was selected, not by him, but by General Smith.

The matter in dispute, therefore, is a very narrow question of fact.

5. In General Smith's comments upon General Duffield's adverse findings, page 56, he repeats his claim to the whole plan as set forth in his pamphlet of 1891, and already quoted.

6. In his letter to Secretary Root asking for the appointment of a board, dated January 16, 1900, as quoted on page 25 of this communication, which is construed by this commission as a claim to the authorship of the entire plan for relieving the Army of the Cumberland.

It is held that the papers already produced in this communication demonstrate the accuracy of the legend called in question by General Smith in each and all of these various forms of stating his claim.

Although this commission regards the claim of General Smith as to the falsity of the legend in question fully disproved by the matter thus far presented, it is impelled to place on file with the board, although through partial repetition, its dissent from many points made by General Smith in the course of his long controversy lest the silence of the commission should be accepted as assent.

General Smith insists at much length in his published pamphlets and other papers submitted to the board that since a progress map issued at Stevenson, Ala., before the occupation of Chattanooga, designates Browns Ferry as Williams Ferry, and places Browns Ferry near the mouth of Lookout Creek, therefore General Rosecrans knew nothing of the real location of Browns Ferry, since, as General Smith asserts, this was the only map known to General Rosecrans.

In this connection the commission deems it sufficient to call attention to the reports of General Wilder and General Whitaker, the latter showing that the real Browns Ferry was occupied under orders from General Rosecrans as early as the 24th of September, previous to the arrival of General Smith from the Eastern army.

General Smith repeatedly declares that a ferry existed at the mouth of Lookout Creek, and that General Rosecrans had this in mind in all of his plans, and rode to this point with General Reynolds on the day of his relief, instead of to the real Browns

Ferry, 3 miles below. To sustain his claim of a ferry at the mouth of Lookout Creek he refers to the capture of a ferryboat in the vicinity of Moccasin Point, and affirms that this was the boat used in an established ferry at that point. This, however, was the boat of a horse ferry which had long been in use near the foot of Market street in Chattanooga, and which had floated down and caught upon the tow-head above the point of Lookout Mountain. This was a ferry operated by a well-known citizen named Long. General Wilder refers to it in his dispatch, serial No. 52, page 122. It was taken off the tow-head by a company of the One hundred and fifteenth Illinois Infantry of General Whitaker's brigade, and in attempting to float it down to Williams Island it was covered by Confederate riflemen at the foot of Lookout Mountain and captured. It was soon recaptured and taken to the Union forces operating below Browns Ferry.

To sustain his contention that General Rosecrans had continually in mind the throwing of a bridge at the mouth of Lookout Creek, General Smith quotes a statement of the General to the effect that he intended to throw his bridge across the Tennessee beyond the point of Lookout Mountain. As the whole of Lookout Valley, as seen from Chattanooga, is beyond the point of Lookout, this point seems to the commission to be entirely without force. It is also true that General Thomas, General Grant, and Mr. Dana used the terms "mouth of Lookout Valley" and "mouth of Lookout Creek" as apparently synonymous.

General Smith presents the various dispatches showing energetic work on the part of General Rosecrans in restoring several lines of communication north of the river as proof that he was not at work upon any plan for opening the shorter line of river supplies, and says in regard to this matter:

"If General Rosecrans had, as he asserted, a plan for opening the short line between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, it is difficult to understand his reason for beginning the repair of the long route."

General Thomas, however, seems to have been able to comprehend this matter, even if General Smith failed to appreciate it, when he telegraphed to General Halleck the day after the successful opening of this short line:

"I intend to repair the roads leading to Tracey City and McMinnville, two termini of branch railroads. The importance of the position of Chattanooga is too great to neglect any means of supplying or reinforcing it." (Serial No. 54, p. 41.)

In the same way the telegram of Mr. Dana to the Secretary of War, dated on the 23d of October, saying: "The pontoons are done for a bridge across to Lookout Valley as soon as Hooker has moved into that position," is thus disposed of by General Smith: "The last part of that last sentence shows that Mr. Dana did not appreciate the plan."

General Smith makes the point that as no orders for a bridge at Browns Ferry passed through his hands after all engineering operations had been placed in his charge by an order of October 10, consequently there could have been no orders for the completion of boats for such a bridge. It, however, clearly appears from what has already been presented that General Rosecrans in person gave orders on the 7th of October to Capt. P. V. Fox, in charge of pontoon construction, to go on with the building of boats, which afterwards transpired were for Browns Ferry, and that, according to Captain Fox, boats for a bridge 1,000 feet long had been completed before the date of General Rosecrans's relief.

In his second pamphlet, page 93, General Smith declares that all idea of opening the river line seems to have been abandoned by October 9, the close of the Wheeler raid, a statement which is directly contradicted by the official records heretofore produced.

On the ninth, tenth, and eleventh pages of the same pamphlet [pages 94, 95, 96, of this reprint] General Smith argues that if there was a plan of opening the river as far as Shellmound, nothing further was heard of it after the 14th of October.

On page 12 of the same pamphlet [96], notwithstanding it is clearly established that orders for boats for a bridge to communicate with Lookout Valley were given by General Rosecrans on the 7th of October, General Smith declares that on the 16th of that month: "There was no thought on the part of anyone at the time of putting together materials for such a bridge."

On the thirteenth page of his second pamphlet [97] General Smith declares that General Meigs, who was supposed to possess the full confidence of General Rosecrans, was "ignorant of any such plan," being the plan for opening the river line. And yet in serial No. 52, page 890, of the official records, appears the following from General Meigs to Secretary Stanton under date of Chattanooga, September 27, 1863, three days before General Smith arrived from the eastern army:

* * * One steamboat and a few flats are ready for service. Another steamboat is nearing completion. For another the machinery is at Bridgeport. The water is too low at present for the *Paint Rock*, the captured steamboat, to navigate the river, and the rebels command the channel. When the troops understood to be on their way here arrive, General Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport. Supplies can then be accumulated by water. * * *

On page 15 of this second pamphlet [97] the statement telegraphed by Mr. Dana to the Secretary of War at noon on the 16th of October, that General Hooker had been ordered to prepare for the opening of the river, General Smith disposes of in a footnote by the brief statement that "Mr. Dana was misinformed by General Rosecrans."

In this second pamphlet, pages 31 and 32 [106], appears the following:

General Boynton further says that on the 19th [October] the order was again given by Rosecrans for the troops at Bridgeport to be ready to move. No such order of that date is in existence or was ever issued.

Also that on the same night (19th) "General Thomas directed General Hooker to be ready to obey the order given him in the morning by General Rosecrans."

That account of General Thomas's order of October 19 is much like General Rosecrans's quotation from General Thomas's report, which has been given before.

The statement here referred to General Smith had already characterized as "a barefaced forgery."

The authority for the assertion that such an order was sent and in the terms described is in a statement repeated to this commission on several occasions during the consideration of the Browns Ferry affair by Gen. J. J. Reynolds, at the time chief of staff to General Rosecrans. While this order has not been found in the records, an acknowledgment of its reception by General Hooker at Stevenson at 9 o'clock on the morning of October 19 is found in Serial No. 53, page 482, heretofore quoted upon page 13 of this communication to your board, and in order that this subject may consecutively appear at this point is here reproduced:

STEVENSON, *October 19, 1863—9 a. m.*

Brig. Gen. R. S. GRANGER:

Dispatch received. Have just received orders from department headquarters to hold my command in readiness to march at short notice. Yours will be the only troops left on the line when I leave, therefore I can not relieve them. Confer with General Rosecrans on the subject.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.

General Smith lays much stress upon a letter of Mr. Dana to himself, reproduced on page 29 of his second pamphlet [104]. Mr. Dana's summing up of the matter thus appears in his closing paragraph:

After a careful study of the documents in the case, and after reviewing my own recollection, I remain convinced that the credit of planning as well as executing the occupation of Browns Ferry belongs to you alone.

It is held by this commission that this conclusion of Mr. Dana agrees with its own, namely, that after Browns Ferry was fixed upon as the point for the throwing of the bridge, the details for opening communication with Lookout Valley, which, after

all, was simply an incident of the general plan, were confided to General Smith. And this position of the commission agrees with the statement in Van Horne's History, Volume I, page 396, that "General Smith was charged with the enterprise and directed to perfect the necessary arrangements."

General Smith at various times has quoted the following from General Thomas's report as fully sustaining his claim to originating the general plan for opening the river line of supplies:

To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry.

The commission holds that this, interpreted by the official records, clearly shows that it refers to the preparation and execution of the details of the plan for throwing the bridge at Browns Ferry, after this was decided upon, and which he did most brilliantly perform.

The commission has no desire to present a rejoinder to the reply of General Smith to the report of Gen. H. M. Duffield now before your board. In view of the voluminous quotations from the official records bearing upon the case, this commission is quite content to rest this portion of the case without appearing to enter into an argument before your board.

There are, however, two points in the private letters submitted by General Smith, as an appendix to this reply, to which attention is called as sustaining the contention of this commission.

Writing home at the time—the night after the successful occupation of Browns Ferry—General Smith says, "I have been congratulated all around to-day on my part," which seems to indicate that at the time he did not consider his part the whole. It is respectfully submitted that this "part" of his is fully recognized by the commission in the legend to which General Smith takes exception, in the same way that the parts of General Rosecrans, General Thomas, General Grant, General Hooker, and the parts assigned to and executed by General Hazen and General Turchin were also included in the legend.

Writing privately also on the 31st of October the General thus sets forth his part of the operation as he then understood it:

On the 19th of October I was scouting along the river bank 3 or 4 miles below here and I came to a place that attracted my attention. On the other side of the river was a sharp ridge of hills a mile and a half long, the base of which was washed by the river. Between this ridge and a high rugged mountain was a narrow valley, which was a strong place for us, and would give us a good share of the river if we owned it, and would also give us an opportunity of aiding Hooker on his march to seize the rest of the river should he meet with any heavy force. Its immense importance struck me, and I found a deep gorge in the hills through which ran a road for an old ferry. I sat down on the bank of the river for two hours within a thousand feet of a rebel picket, who thought me some soldier not on duty, and as I sat there I conceived a plan for the capture of that hill which, if taken, would make Hooker's work easy and give our soldiers and animals something to eat and save Chattanooga to us. That day General Thomas took command and I proposed it to him and asked him to go and look at the place and see for himself. General Grant came then, and the day after he came I took the two down and showed them the promised land. They were both impressed with the great value of it, and I was allowed to arrange the details myself. * * *

This seems to show conclusively, in General Smith's own words, that at the time he first visited Browns Ferry he was fully aware that Hooker's column was to attempt to seize the rest of the river, and also to show plainly that he then had in mind only a plan for bridging the river and opening communication with General Hooker's column when it should reach Lookout Valley.

The park commission rests its case upon the above presentation of official records and the unofficial information obtained during several years of careful attention to

the subject. It has no desire to argue the question at issue, except as the facts presented constitute an argument, regarding it as quite unnecessary, if not presumptuous, to assume to discuss the military points involved in the plans for reopening the river line of supplies for the army at Chattanooga before your honorable board.

The conclusion of the national commission is that in the legend to which Brigadier-General Smith takes exception overmuch credit is given to him and the two brigades under his command, at the expense of Major-General Hooker and the six and a half brigades of his command, for the parts taken by them, respectively, in opening communication between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, in that it is not made plainly to appear therein that Hooker's was the principal movement and Smith's was cooperative. (See General Thomas's official report, p. 42, serial No. 54, War Records; also dispatch Thomas to Hooker, pp. 40, 47, same volume.) This error has since been partially corrected in the text of the more recent historical tablets which have been placed upon the field.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

For the commission:

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman.

APPENDIX.

Herewith are submitted copies of the chief papers in the long discussion of the Browns Ferry affair now in possession of this commission. It will be noticed that until the commission was informed that the case had been submitted to General Duffield for consideration and report most of these papers relate to public discussions of the matter, which, so far as this commission was concerned, were entirely unofficial.

The papers submitted are as follows:

1. Copy of pamphlet issued by General Smith in 1891, entitled "The relief of the Army of the Cumberland and the opening of the short line of communication between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Bridgeport, Ala., in October, 1863. William Farrar Smith, brevet major-general, United States Army."

2. Pamphlet issued by General Smith in 1895, entitled "The reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863, as related by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and The Official Record. Compiled and annotated by Bvt. Maj. Gen. William Farrar Smith."

3. A newspaper statement of his case by General Smith in the Chattanooga Times and Philadelphia Times of September 15, 1895.

4. Preliminary reply, October 5, 1895, of H. V. Boynton to this paper of General Smith.

5. Extended reply, January 26, 1896, of H. V. Boynton to the same paper of General Smith.

6. General Smith's first appeal to Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, dated November 5, 1897.

7. General Smith's second appeal to the Secretary of War, dated November 15, 1897.

8. Statement of General Smith's claim, as made by him to Gen. H. M. Duffield.

9. Letter of this commission to General Duffield in regard to the claim set forth in paper 8, dated March 22, 1898.

In addition to these papers there were sent from the files of the War Department to General Smith General Duffield's report on the case, sustaining the correctness of the legend in question, together with the accompanying papers of that report. These latter were as follows:

1. Letter of instructions from Secretary Alger, November 30, 1897, with General Smith's appeal and letter from him to Senator Proctor.

2. General Smith's pamphlet, "The Reopening of the Tennessee River," etc., with maps attached.

3. Reply of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission to General Smith's appeal, March 22, 1898.

4. General Smith's rejoinder to the above, April 3, 1898.

5. Copy of letter of Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds to General Smith, May 20, 1895.

6. Copy of letter of May 23, 1895, from same to same.

7. Letter of Gen. H. V. Boynton, January 12, 1898, stating conversation with Gen. John T. Wilder.

8. Letter of Maj. Frank S. Bond to Gen. H. V. Boynton, November 7, 1898.

There was also forwarded to General Smith from the files of the Department a "summary and review of the claim of Gen. W. F. Smith, for the information of the Secretary of War," by this commission, dated February 2, 1900.

As none of these papers have been returned to the War Department by General Smith, the supposition is that he has forwarded them to your board. If they had been in the files, they would have been submitted as a part of the case of this commission.

THE CASE OF GENERAL SMITH.

[Preface.—The legend of the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission declares that "at daylight of October 27 the river line of the communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley, devised by General Rosecrans," etc.—Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, who was in command at Chattanooga on the 27th of October, reports that "to Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry."—Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War, Supplement, vol. 1, part 1, p. 119.—Report of Thomas.]

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Evidence taken from official record and remarks thereon.

Summary of evidence.

Report of Gen. George H. Thomas before the Committee on the Conduct of the War and analysis thereof.

Summary of analysis of above.

Personal statement of history of reconnoissance and movements connected with my capture of the hills at Browns Ferry, with extracts from letters written by me to my home.

WILMINGTON, DEL., *March —, 1900.*

To the Hon. ELIHU ROOT,

Secretary of War.

SIR: Herewith is submitted a reply to the report of H. M. Duffield, esq., as to the truth or falsity of the legend of the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, wherein it is stated that Gen. William S. Rosecrans devised the plan for recovering Lookout Valley, carried out October 27, 1863.

I will quote from the Official Record up to October 19, 1863, all that pertains to the subject of the lines of communications between Bridgeport and the army at Chattanooga to ascertain, as we proceed, whether any of those high in authority ever looked to the opening of the line by the river and south of it, according to the plan carried out October 27, 1863, or even approximating to that plan.

First, the historian of the commission says (1):

These cotemporaneous dispatches leave no doubt that General Rosecrans had in mind the general plan of recovering Lookout Valley and opening the river to Bridgeport by operations as far up (down) the river as the head of Williams Island.

It would not take a very astute mind to see that the short line could not be reopened without capturing and holding some part of it. I will assume that the author of the report means by a "general plan" some proposed operation for securing by land or river, or both, a line for the transportation of the necessary army supplies from Bridgeport to Chattanooga within the limits of the capacity of the transportation department. Of particular and feasible plans there were but few possible.

First, the capture and holding of Lookout Mountain, which, with the holding of Lookout Valley, would have placed the army where it stood on the 23d of September, with its communications assured over the short line and no question of ability to supply the army from Bridgeport as long as there were supplies there.

Second, the holding of Lookout Valley without the occupation of Lookout Mountain. This would have given the use of the short line and the river to a point sufficiently near Chattanooga to come within our capacity for transportation, and thus have relieved the stress of the army existing during the month of October, 1863.

Third, holding the passes in Raccoon Mountain and a position on the river at the northern end of the mountain. If the latter were supported by the troops in the passes this would give control of the river as far as Williams Island, but not of the road south of the river for transportation of supplies into Chattanooga. This, however, would give a shorter road on the right bank of the river to Chattanooga.

Lastly, the plan carried out by General Thomas, to seize and fortify the hills on the left bank of the river at Browns Ferry and build a bridge there to allow any necessary support from the army at Chattanooga. On the same morning that these hills were seized a sufficient force was to cross the river at Bridgeport and march on Wauhatchie. The hills at Browns Ferry were seized on the 27th of October, the bridge was completed by 10 o'clock a. m. of that day, and in the afternoon of the 28th Hooker marched into Wauhatchie, and both river and southern road were open. The record shows that such a plan was not matured by Rosecrans or even hinted at by himself or by anyone under him. I certainly, from my position, should have known of it, for a bridge and other engineering work was required, and there is no record of any such work being ordered of the engineer department.

I will give a copy of the order of October 10, defining my position, to show that I must have received and carried out orders for any plan requiring engineer work (2):

October 10.—Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, being the senior officer in his corps in this department, is announced as chief engineer. All troops on engineer duty and all engineering operations will *be under his professional control.*¹

Now, my contention is simply this: That there is not a tittle of evidence to show that any such plan as that carried out by Thomas was ever hinted at in the record, and that no plan suggested in the record up to and including the 19th of October was feasible or carried with it any probability of success. *The only evidence against this statement is that given in the report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War by General Thomas in 1866, and that evidence I shall show later was contradicted by General Rosecrans himself on the 18th and 19th of October and by other portions of the record of that time.

On the 24th of September Rosecrans had abandoned Lookout Mountain and the short line to Bridgeport. Supplies were to be sent via Jasper over Waldens Ridge. He also ordered a survey for a road from Jasper eastward, which should be safe from artillery fire from the left bank of the Tennessee River. Two trestle bridges were laid at Chattanooga to connect with the new lines of communication. These bridges could be maintained only when the river was low, but the chief engineer was ordered

¹ Italics throughout are by General Smith.

to forward lumber to replace them by pontoons. The first was finished October 6 and was the only bridge thrown at Chattanooga until after the battle of Missionary Ridge. At this time General Meigs, the Quartermaster-General of the Army, was sent to Tennessee to examine into the matters connected with his department, to report on matters of importance to the Secretary of War, and to give advice and instructions to all connected with the administration of transportation in that military department. From his report to Stanton, September 27, I take the following extract (3):

I have, with General Rosecrans, visited the lines of defense of this place. * * * When the river rises, the bridges will go; * * * when the troops understood to be on their way here arrive, General Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport. * * * Animals still in very fair condition; * * * plenty of them here and at Nashville. * * * I have ordered ship carpenters to be sent from Louisville to build boats at Bridgeport.

The inference drawn from these extracts is that Rosecrans had a plan for recovering the short line in which Meigs must have had some confidence, or he would not have ordered mechanics from Louisville to build boats which were of no use until the river was controlled by us beyond Waldens Ridge. On the 16th of October, from Nashville, (4) he advises Rosecrans that plenty of tools are available for work on the long route, without a hint as to the plan for opening the short line. On the same day, later, at Louisville, he tells the Secretary of the "vital importance that he [Rosecrans] get possession of the river, at least as far as the rebel batteries on Lookout will permit him to use it" * * * (5) and "repair the roads over Waldens Ridge. * * * It will require much work *and more time than I fear can be spared.*" That is, the chances were that we had not time to save ourselves by either plan. Garfield also on the same day writes Rosecrans two letters with suggestions as to improvement of the long route, but with no reference to the opening of the short route, any plan for which must, perforce, have been known to him as well as to Meigs. Evidently, therefore, they looked to safety from the long route. To return a little: On the 30th of September, Colonel Hodges, chief quartermaster, asks (6):

Please give me an idea as to where the troops now coming in will be for the present.

The answer was (7):

The troops coming in will operate on the Lookout Valley line unless called northward—

Leaving a fair inference that the movement was to be made soon. There was then no possibility of any cooperation from the army at Chattanooga, for there were no boats for bridges for cooperation, the first bridge for Chattanooga being completed only on October 6; therefore, so far as any immediate move under orders of October 1, 4, or 12 was concerned, they looked to the occupation of Lookout Valley or Raccoon Mountain from the passes to the river, without any bridges below Lookout.

On the 12th of October Rosecrans sends to Hooker as follows (8):

Can you have a column of one division to move up to Shellmound and push an advance to Whitesides, to start by daylight in the morning? They can take ten days' rations in haversack and knapsack. Answer.

To which Hooker replies (9):

I can do it, but only with infantry. I should prefer to have a battery to accompany the column, but as the horses have but just arrived, I doubt if they will be in readiness that early.

And then Rosecrans says (10):

I will delay the order till your batteries are ready. Hasten their preparation and report when ready. *The object is to get possession of the line of the river up to this place.*

After which we hear nothing more of the idea, the intention of which is so vaguely stated to be "the possession of the river to this place" (Chattanooga). Now, can

that order to Hooker be construed into a plan similar or even approximating to that carried out by Thomas October 27, 1863?

The route from Shellmound to Chattanooga by road would not be shortened to any extent, and would be over Waldens Ridge and not within the limits of our capacity for transportation. Would the occupation of Whitesides by a brigade give Rosecrans the river up to Williams Island? Would that same move and position of troops give him the river up to Chattanooga? Could he have meant to assault, carry, and hold Lookout Mountain with a division or any force under Hooker's command? It must be borne in mind that this movement is without a cooperating bridge across the Tennessee, for which no order had been given, and for which Rosecrans knew at 7:30 p. m. on the 18th of October that no boats were being built. This inquiry, made of Hooker, was furnished to Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, as an order for concentration of troops with a view to (11) "seizing the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupying Shellmound, and, if possible, Lookout Valley," with, as an eventuality, the hope of a recapture of Lookout Mountain. But Rosecrans's dispatch to Halleck, October 16, seems to preclude any idea of such a result as the capture of Lookout, as is seen in his estimate of Bragg's force as compared with his own. In this same dispatch he complains that he has not a railroad to Chattanooga and that the roads are bad. Not a word about transportation by river, and this only three days before being relieved.

The roads are very heavy. Our future is not bright. Had we the railroad from here to Bridgeport, and the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought up, we should not probably outnumber the enemy. This army, with its back to barren mountains, roads narrow and difficult, while the enemy has the railroad and the corn in his rear, is at much disadvantage (12).

On the 14th, however, Rosecrans, without waiting for Hooker's report as to his ability to take batteries with him, gave an order (13) to begin at once the construction of a railroad on a graded bed from Bridgeport to Battle Creek. With reference to this section of the *long route*, Meigs telegraphed to Stanton, October 16 (14):

The roads from Bridgeport to Battle Creek will, after the rises, be almost impassable, and I will send forward tools and urge upon the generals commanding the importance of straining every nerve. The troops must do the work.

From the extract above it is evident that General Meigs at this time was not looking forward to any relief by the way of a movement on Shellmound and Whitesides. On the 15th, at 10 a. m., Mr. Dana (15), reporting the state of the roads, etc., says: "Troops here receiving half rations; it will soon become necessary for all persons except soldiers to leave here;" and on the 16th (16), at 12 m.:

Our couriers report that from Bridgeport to the foot of the mountain the mud is up to their horses' bellies. * * * Day before yesterday the mules attached to the empty train returning to Bridgeport were too weak to haul the wagons up the mountain without doubling the teams, though they went on the easiest of all our roads which had just been put in thorough order. (See also report (17) of Tucker.) General Brannan tells me he could not possibly haul away the artillery with the horses that are left. * * * Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight, and with a vast loss of public property, and possibly life, except the opening of the river. General Hooker has been ordered to prepare for this, but Rosecrans thinks he can not move till his transportation arrives from Nashville. * * * It should have been in Bridgeport on the 14th, but is not yet reported.

No order for preparation has been issued later than that of the 12th, which did not order concentration.

On the same day, at 4 p. m., Dana reports (18):

I have just had a full conversation with General Rosecrans upon the situation. He says the possession of the river as far up as Williams Island, at least, is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible for him to make any movement toward gaining such possession until General Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. Hooker's troops are now scattered along the

line of the railroad and can not be got together before next Wednesday [October 21]. The wagons must all have arrived by that time, and if the enemy does not interfere sooner the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted.

Now, what has become of a movement of a division, with ten days' rations on person, on Shellmound, with a brigade at Whitesides, which Rosecrans stated explicitly was for the purpose of getting "possession of the line of the river up to this place" (Chattanooga)? A movement announced on the 16th, without any bridge ordered for a crossing below Lookout, with no arrangements for the troops to protect bridge layers, could not have looked forward to any cooperation with or aid from the troops at Chattanooga, and must therefore have been deemed of strength to protect itself in Lookout Valley or the passes in Raccoon Mountain against Bragg's best efforts. Bragg was bound to make such efforts, for the starvation of our army-by holding that line between Bridgeport and Chattanooga was *the* campaign Bragg was making against Rosecrans (19). (See Bragg's and Longstreet's reports.) This plan, then, by no possibility could be the one carried out by Thomas on the 27th of October. Rosecrans tells Halleck at 5 p. m. of this same day (October 16) (20): "We can not feed Hooker's troops on our right." Why not? Our right would have been in Lookout Valley, and if he could maintain them there he would hold the short line. "* * * Our future is not bright." And then he goes on to tell what is necessary to secure the position at Chattanooga, suggestions which would have taken months to carry out, and our life was measured by days.

Now, it seems proper to say here that had Rosecrans given an order on the 16th in precisely the words that General Thomas used on the 24th, the short line could have been opened by the 21st of October at the latest.

I have stated, in my own account of this matter, that my boat builders were all at work on material for a second bridge at Chattanooga, and that Thomas's first order to me was to lay it at once. When he determined to carry out the plan ordered on the 24th he abandoned temporarily the idea of a second bridge at Chattanooga, and sufficient boats and material were to be taken for the bridge at Browns Ferry. On the 16th, at the time Rosecrans telegraphed "Our future is not bright," though we had not sufficient boats for a bridge at Chattanooga, we had sufficient for a bridge at Browns Ferry, where the river is much narrower and the banks steeper. As for the wagons, Thomas (21) would not allow any to be taken. Giving Hooker five days to concentrate, he should have been ready by the 21st. It took four days to get boats and materials ready and to instruct the chiefs of brigades detailed for the capture of the position, to instruct the officers connected with the movement of the boats, and to fix the point at which the bridge was to be begun, so on the 16th Rosecrans had everything that Thomas had on the 21st, and the short line might have been opened by the 21st by Rosecrans had he had in his mind the plan adopted by Thomas.

To return to the history developed by the record. On the 17th (22) Morgan was directed to take his command to Harrison's Landing on the Tennessee above Chattanooga, and Howard was to replace his force, thus stretching Howard from Bridgeport to Anderson, guarding and working on the *long route*. (23) On the same day Rosecrans gave orders to put the railroad in running order to Jasper, 6 miles beyond Battle Creek on the *long route*. On this day also Rosecrans sent this order to Hooker at 10 p. m. (24):

*If the enemy should attempt to cross the Tennessee in force above us, it will be necessary for your command to come up. The general commanding directs you to make such preliminary preparations as will enable you to move promptly and effectually. To this end the Twelfth Corps ought to be as far down as is consistent with the protection of the exposed points of the railroad. * * **

If Sherman comes in from Huntsville, the general commanding will be able to concentrate and move *your* entire strength at once, according to circumstances. "We must have the river, and that soon." Here is an order for a *partial concentration* to

be ready to move if the enemy crosses above Chattanooga, and most certainly not looking to a move on Lookout Valley. As an afterthought, when Sherman arrives, Rosecrans *can concentrate* and move Hooker's entire strength at once, and according to circumstances. Then follows what may be a platitude or an axiom. That "we must have the river, and that soon." This is, however, according to the record, the *last* order by Rosecrans having reference to concentration of Hooker's force. To this order I shall refer in the analysis of the report of General Thomas in 1866 to the Committee on Conduct of the War.

On the 18th of October Rosecrans telegraphed to Hooker as follows (25):

It will be necessary to make extraordinary efforts to get the road passable from Bridgeport to Jasper [on the long route]. * * * It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here. That steamboat must be got ready so that we can freight to Shellmound, and thus shorten wagon transportation. This will require us to hold both sides of the river and fortify, but make our depot on this side. I must confide the pushing up of repairs to the wagon roads * * * to your care, as * * * the active authority and intervention of officers of high rank are absolutely necessary to the preservation of our army.

This dispatch has reference, first, to the repair of the wagon roads on the long route; second, to holding the river as far up as Shellmound and no farther, for otherwise no fortifications would be needed and no depot required at Shellmound. I have already shown that water transportation to Shellmound did not shorten our line of communication sufficiently to bring it within the limits of our capacity for supplying the army at Chattanooga, which capacity was daily diminishing. There are no other inferences possible from the above dispatch, and so up to the 18th of October no idea was developed of any movement similar to that adopted by Thomas on the 24th at 2.30 p. m. At 7.30 p. m. of the 18th Rosecrans telegraphed to Halleck (26):

Our pontoon bridge restored [it had been impassable for three days]; boats [for] a second under way; roads horrid; forage and animals failing.

The foregoing dispatch is given as showing from the highest authority that at that day and hour there was but one bridge at Chattanooga; that under the orders of Rosecrans we were at work on a second, also for Chattanooga, and that at that time, *to his knowledge*, no bridge was being prepared for crossing the river below Chattanooga. This fact also recurs in the analysis of the report of General Thomas before referred to.

On the 19th of October, at 6.30 p. m., Rosecrans acknowledged the receipt of the order removing him from command, saying (27), "Will be executed immediately." An hour and forty minutes later he telegraphed this reply to the following message of the 18th from Halleck:

* * * Why give up to the enemy the passes of Lookout Mountain? By holding them can you not cover your railroad and river communications with Bridgeport? Would it not be best to regain them even at a heavy cost?

The terms of his reply are as follows (28):

Sherman's movement will operate favorably and the cavalry force will be timely. Lookout was given up temporarily, because we could not then safely hold it. It was isolated from us by distance and the defile of Chattanooga Creek. We expect to *retake it* as soon as we are prepared to hold it. That could only be done when the railroad being secured, the depots replenished, and Hooker's transportation provided. Without that he can not subsist in a suitable position.

Rosecrans here states plainly, and with good reasons, why Lookout Mountain was given up. He goes on to say that it will be retaken *when it can be held*, and gives the conditions under which this can be done. They were, however, such that the whole power of the Government could not have fulfilled them before the army at Chattanooga had become a mob climbing Waldens Ridge to reach food and safety. The claim of the historian (29) of the commission is that Rosecrans devised a gen-

eral plan for getting the short line without the recapture of Lookout, and that he devised the particular plan carried out by Thomas on the 27th of October by a cooperative movement via Browns Ferry. It has never been asserted that Rosecrans visited and selected the place for the crossing at Browns Ferry before the 19th of October. What, then, was the purpose of the orders of October 1-4 and the suggestions of the 12th? Could it be possible that any of those orders could open the river to Chattanooga, as General Rosecrans averred was the intention on the 12th in the dispatch to Hooker? Now, when Rosecrans wrote the dispatch at 8 p. m. on the 19th, if he had in his mind the plan for reopening the river by a cooperative movement at Browns Ferry, would he not have stated to Halleck, to make his own record clear, a movement would have been begun to-morrow to secure the short lines without the capture of Lookout, or expressed some idea similar to that? Rosecrans, in his testimony in 1865 (30), two years after the event, states:

On the 19th of October I examined the river and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chattanooga.

Ferry is a little indeterminate, for he had said before that on the 4th of October he had told Generals Thomas and Garfield that "as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose I would take possession of Lookout Valley opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain" (where a ferry existed) "and fortify it, thus completely covering the road to Bridgeport on the south side, as well as the river." That description applies to the hill at the mouth of Lookout Creek on its left bank, *and to no other spot in that vicinity.*

General Rosecrans's testimony, therefore, comes in conflict with General Duffield's belief that Rosecrans was too capable an engineer to have selected the mouth of Lookout Creek as the place for crossing.

To this testimony General Duffield objects, because he says the bridge was not necessarily to be laid at the mouth of Lookout Creek. That is possible, but Mr. Dana says on the 26th of September and on the 4th of October that the bridge was to be laid at the mouth of Lookout Creek. To Mr. Dana's testimony the historian objects, because "he does not give his authority." Mr. Dana generally gives the authority for his statements as to operations, and it is highly improbable that he would have sent to the Secretary doubtful information. Moreover, who but General Rosecrans could have given this information? Not the Engineer Department, surely, for at that date they had not enough boats for the first Chattanooga bridge.

The historian finds ample proof that Rosecrans on the "19th of October visited the place where the bridge was laid, and selected that as the crossing place." Then, on his return, he found the order removing him, and later in the evening sent to Halleck the dispatch quoted on page 9, which contains no hint of Browns Ferry or of any movement independent of the capture of Lookout Mountain.

I may say here, as apropos of much of the discussion of the subject of the mistaken name for the ferry above Williams Island, that it was altogether longer than it merited. Mr. John C. Ropes sent me the information, and thought that perhaps when General Rosecrans gave his testimony he still went by the map of "Chattanooga and the vicinity," which would have made his testimony agree with the geography.

General Duffield, quoting Mr. Dana's dispatch of the 16th of October, says: "Williams Island was but a short distance from Browns Ferry." That is the truth, but, as explained above, if the river was controlled to Williams Island, the roads to it east of Raccoon Mountain would not necessarily be in our possession, and a bridge at Browns Ferry might not be possible or profitable.

Mr. Dana is properly quoted as saying, on the 16th, that Rosecrans says:

The possession of the river as far up [down] as the head of Williams Island at least is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga. * * *

[Hooker's] must have all arrived by that time [Wednesday], and if the enemy does not interfere sooner, the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted.

The opinion of the historian on this dispatch is that "obviously no movement upon Raccoon Mountain by crossing the river at Moccasin Point is here contemplated." I agree entirely with the military opinion thus expressed. The remaining part of the sentence, "but a movement from the neighborhood of Williams Island," I do not think is correct, taking facts into consideration, and they have been lately under the eye of the historian. The facts against that last statement are that under the orders of October 10 *all engineering operations were under my professional control*. I had received no orders to make a bridge to cross the river below Chattanooga, nor to begin any of the engineer operations necessary to the laying of such a bridge, and as late as the 18th of October Rosecrans states that a second bridge is under way for Chattanooga, and therefore no boats could be building for a bridge near Williams Island. From a close analysis of the dispatches and orders in the record, it follows that the order for movement on the 1st of October—the explanation of that movement on the 4th of October—the suggestion on the 12th, of sending a division to Shellmound with ten days' rations on the person, had they been carried out, would have meant, beyond question, only an operation on the south side of the river, unsupported by any cooperative movement by the troops at Chattanooga. If so large a force as Hooker's had been sent toward Lookout Valley, the movement would have caused a close watch to be kept on the river. This would have destroyed all hope of seizing the hills at Browns Ferry, which was the vital essence of the plan carried out by Thomas. Therefore, as no boats were building for a bridge to cross at Williams Island, a move by Rosecrans simply on Lookout Valley, before a bridge was built, was something more than hazardous. I do not see why the historian omitted to call attention to the dispatch of October 18, with reference to fortifying both sides of the river at Shellmound, to establish a depot there. That seems to have a very important bearing upon the intentions of General Rosecrans as late as the 18th. Now, during the time from the 14th on, every effort had been directed to constructing a railroad to Jasper and to the repair of the routes from Jasper to Chattanooga. To this the advice and orders of Meigs and Garfield have been added in the same direction, and one is left clearly of the opinion that the various analyses by Mr. Dana of the character of the commanding general have been wonderfully accurate.

I must intrude one dispatch later than the 19th of October. It is from Mr. Dana, and of the 24th, 10 a. m. (31):

Grant arrived last night, wet, dirty, and well. He is just going to reconnoiter an important position which General Smith has discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and which will be occupied from here. * * * This movement will probably take place within three days.

The historian quotes this dispatch to show that the movement was against Lookout Valley, but he is silent in regard to Mr. Dana's statement that "General Smith has discovered" the position. The historian must feel very sure of his case if he can accept as testimony the end of a dispatch, while he rejects the beginning of the same document. It may be that Mr. Dana here becomes an authority on the place that is to be occupied, when that place is Lookout Valley. This is on page 14 of his report [149], yet no farther back than page 13 Mr. Dana is quoted, when the place in question is Lookout Creek, and we are told that his statements are not conclusive. [149]. Says the historian: "He does not state his authority for the location of the bridge. It is obvious that in such an intended movement the place of crossing would be kept as secret as possible." Why not apply that to page 14? Dana had twice before, on September 26 and on October 4, reported that Rosecrans was going to lay a bridge at the mouth of Lookout Creek, "so that he could operate in that valley without

crossing the mountain." Rosecrans had therefore discussed the matter of bridges to cross into Lookout Valley with Dana.

Dana's dispatch of the 16th, 4 p. m., which was a "full conversation," is silent on the subject of a cooperative movement by a bridge, and this would hardly be left out, as Mr. Dana's reports were necessarily full. The adopted plan had been laid in detail before General Thomas on the 20th of October, and neither General Thomas nor his chief of staff, General Reynolds, would have called Browns Ferry a discovery of mine had Rosecrans ever spoken of that to either of them as a crossing place. Dana's information of that kind always came from headquarters, as he had the right to demand it.

SUMMARY.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE AS FURNISHED BY THE RECORD, SHOWING PLANS FOR IMPROVING THE LONG ROUTE OR SHORTENING THE LINE OF SUPPLIES FROM BRIDGEPORT TO CHATTANOOGA.

September 27, 1863.—Meigs states to Stanton that Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport when reinforcements arrive.

Orders were given to forward the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps to Stevenson and Bridgeport without stopping at Nashville. That would have been a concentration of Hooker's command, but Wheeler's raid began September 30 and broke up that plan, as the troops were required on the railroad for its protection.

September 30.—Hodges is told that these troops are to operate in Lookout Valley unless called northward.

October 1.—Hooker is directed to put down a pontoon bridge at Bridgeport and be ready to cross his command.

October 4.—Garfield explains order of October 1.

October 9.—Railroad repaired and operating again from Nashville to Bridgeport.

October 12.—Hooker asked to send a division to Shellmound with ten days' rations on person. Purpose: "To get possession of the river to this place" (Chattanooga). No boats ordered and none making to connect this division with the army at Chattanooga. This suggestion was given to Mr. Dana as an order to concentrate and seize Raccoon Mountain.

October 14.—Railroad ordered between Bridgeport and Jasper.

October 16.—Letter from Meigs with reference to repairs on long route, and to Secretary explaining vital necessity of getting to river near Chattanooga; no plan suggested, and therefore no idea of any plan to be taken up by Rosecrans. Two letters from Garfield to Rosecrans having reference to condition of long route and suggestions about the administration; no reference to possibility of shortening line.

Dana reports condition of road and animals; necessity of retreat within a fortnight unless the river is opened. States that Hooker has been ordered to prepare for this (meaning order of October 12, movement to Shellmound), but Rosecrans waits for Hooker's wagons. (Thomas directed movement without wagons.) (See dispatches of Dana and Hooker referred to.)

Dana reports full conversation with Rosecrans. Hooker can be concentrated by October 21, "and if the enemy does not interfere sooner the movement on Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted." No orders, however, to the engineer department of any intended operation, and no boats building for a bridge below Chattanooga.

October 17.—General Morgan ordered to Harrison's Landing and Howard to extend to Anderson from Bridgeport.

Hooker ordered to lay the railroad to Jasper.

Rosecrans at 10 p. m. tells Hooker that if the enemy should attempt to cross in force above Chattanooga he (Hooker) must be ready to move promptly and effect-

ually; therefore, to move the Twelfth Corps as far down as is consistent with the safety of the railroad. As Howard is already stretched along the long route, and as nothing is said about the Eleventh Corps, it is conclusive that Hooker is expected to move to meet Bragg to the north of Chattanooga and not toward Lookout Valley.

As seemingly an afterthought, Rosecrans adds that if Sherman comes in he can then move Hooker's entire strength, according to circumstances. Possibly that may mean toward Lookout Valley. Sherman was at that date at or near Corinth, Miss. This is the last order for concentration given by Rosecrans to Hooker.

October 18.—Rosecrans informs Halleck that the pontoon bridge at Chattanooga is restored (it was broken for three days) and that a second bridge (for Chattanooga) is under way.

Innes acknowledges receipt of order to extend railroad to Jasper.

October 19.—Rosecrans is removed, acknowledges receipt of order, and tells Halleck when Lookout Mountain can be retaken and the position of the army made secure. No hint of any possible plan for reopening the short line by any plan he has in view.

ANALYSIS OF REPORT OF GENERAL G. H. THOMAS.

In discussing the report of General Thomas, dated March 9, 1866, to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, I wish to begin by stating that no one ever had a more sincere friendship for General Thomas than myself. This friendship began years before the war, and no one has ever had more faith in his integrity and truthfulness. If his report, made nearly three years afterwards, conflict with the official record of the time under consideration, it will be understood that I charge the contradiction to a memory not fortified with contemporary documents, and to the fact that the circumstances were not necessarily known to General Thomas personally, nor would they at the time have impressed themselves upon his memory.

On October 19, 11 p. m., he sends to Hooker the following order:

He desires that you will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command, and preparing to move in accordance with the instruction of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards.

In his report to the committee, Thomas says:

The instructions referred to in the above, were to concentrate as much of his command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communications with that place by river and by rail. Before he was relieved in command of the Department of the Cumberland, General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short route of supplies from Bridgeport.

And later he says:

Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command of the department devolved upon me. The bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communications with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed.

Let us now take these statements of Thomas one at a time and compare them with the record made from day to day, and at the time of the events. This comparison will develop the discrepancies between this record and his report made in 1866. Also bear in mind that for most of these statements he must have accepted what he was told by others, as he had not been in a position to learn them for himself.

First; he refers to his order to Hooker, and says that the latter was instructed by

Rosecrans to concentrate as much of his command as he could spare from guarding the railroad, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga.

Rosecrans's instructions to Hooker, beginning October 1, are as follows:

October 1.—He directs him to put down a bridge and to make immediate preparations for crossing at Bridgeport.

October 4.—Cavalry raid causes postponement of movement; "Rosecrans hopes soon to bring Hooker's troops across the river."

October 12.—Inquires if Hooker can move a division to Shellmound and a brigade to Whitesides.

October 12.—Informs Hooker that he will delay order till Hooker's batteries are ready.

October 17.—He indorses on a report by McCook, "General Hooker must replace him at Battle Creek, Jasper, and Anderson." This refers to General Morgan's forces.

October 17.—He sends the following order:

If the enemy should attempt to cross the Tennessee in force *above us*, it will be necessary for your command to come up. The general commanding directs you to make such preliminary preparations as will enable you to move promptly and effectually. To this end the *Twelfth Corps* ought to be as far down as is consistent with the protection of the exposed points of the railroad. * * * If Sherman comes in from Huntsville, the general commanding will be able to concentrate and move your entire strength at once, according to circumstances. We must have the river, and that soon. * * *

There is no order here to concentrate, as stated by Thomas.

The suggestion of concentration on October 12 was never followed up by an order. There is an order to distribute his command on October 17, and on the same date we find an order to be ready to move to meet a crossing if made *above Chattanooga*—that is, to throw his force by the long route back of Chattanooga, against a force operating on the Union left.

Second. This movement by Hooker was for the purpose of opening communications with Chattanooga by river and rail.

The correspondence on this subject is as follows:

October 12 (quoted before).—"* * * The object is to get possession of the line of the river up to this place."

October 14.—Referring to a railroad from Bridgeport to Jasper on the long route, he (Rosecrans) indorses on a report, "The road to be begun at once."

October 16.—General Meigs telegraphs Stanton that roads from Bridgeport to Battle Creek are in very bad condition, but that he is urging the importance of repairing them.

October 16.—General Meigs to Rosecrans: has made arrangements for supply of tools and urges repair of long route.

October 16.—Rosecrans complains to Halleck that the roads are very bad and that he has no railroad to Bridgeport.

October 16.—Garfield writes twice to Rosecrans regarding repairs to the long route over which he (Garfield) was then traveling.

October 17.—Rosecrans orders Hooker to build a railroad from Bridgeport to Jasper.

October 18.—Rosecrans telegraphs to Hooker that extraordinary efforts will be necessary to put the road in order from Bridgeport to Jasper; also that a steamer must be got ready for freighting to Shellmound.

October 19.—Rosecrans telegraphs to Halleck that Lookout Mountain could not be held until the railroad was secured.

There is no very clear idea to be obtained from the above, but this much is evident, that all efforts were being made to improve the long route. In the very first one the river is spoken of as a line of transportation, but without further explanation,

and when such a river route is more fully explained on the 18th, it is only to be used as far as Shellmound. Can any of these routes be called a "river and rail" route in the sense that applies to the line opened under Thomas?

Third. "General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to the means of relieving the army, * * * and had partially planned the movement * * * to open a short route of supplies from Bridgeport."

In making this statement General Thomas could not have had personal knowledge of such an occurrence, and must have taken the story from hearsay. A day or so after arriving at Chattanooga I gave an opinion to General Rosecrans about his line of communications and was so abruptly challenged, as to the value of my opinion, that from that time until the 18th of October not a single word ever passed between us as to any "means of relieving the difficulty of obtaining supplies," nor was there any partial plan made or discussed by us for any such purpose. On the 18th of October I said to General Rosecrans that I was going the next day to make reconnaissance for a specific purpose. I went; made it alone; did not find what I had hoped for; returned to headquarters to find Rosecrans relieved from command; had no conversation with him about my day's work, and never saw him afterwards. The detailed account of this reconnaissance I will give as a supplement. I wish here to show only what is proved from the record, and the above remarks are only to show wherein General Thomas was led astray by incorrect statements of others.

Fourth: "Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement [opening the short route for supplies] before the command devolved upon me. The bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communications with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed."

October 18—7.30 p. m.—Rosecrans telegraphs Halleck: "* * * Our pontoon bridge restored. Boats [for] a second under way." Thus the completed bridge was laid down on the 6th, broken on the 15th, and restored on the 18th, the day before Rosecrans was relieved from command. And on the same day the boats for the second bridge for Chattanooga were *not* ready. As all the supplies had to cross the river to reach the army, the necessity for the second bridge is manifest. Lumber was hard to get, logs had to be cut, rafted, and sawed, which, with unsatisfactory appliances, was very slow work. Standing in great need of the second bridge, every effort was bent upon it, and no boats were being built for any other bridge.

Summing up, it appears that Hooker had received no order to concentrate of the nature stated by Thomas.

Rosecrans had been working for a rail and wagon route and a water and wagon route before being relieved. No specific plan of a rail and water route is in evidence.

Rosecrans and I had not consulted together as to means of relieving Chattanooga, nor had we partially planned any movement whatever.

No preliminary steps had been taken to execute this movement, for no boats had been built except for the second bridge, nor had any been ordered.

The natural deduction from the above facts is that Thomas in his report has made statements on points on which he was grossly misinformed or misled.

It has now been clearly shown from the War Record that the testimony of General Thomas, given above, can be entirely eliminated from this question of Rosecrans devising the plan carried out by Thomas on the 27th of October, 1863.

The remainder of his report pertinent to the subject is contained in the following extract, viz:

To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry.

Can there be possibly more than one meaning to the words "the ingenuity which conceived the movement at Browns Ferry?"

PERSONAL STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM F. SMITH ON THE OPENING OF THE TENNESSEE
RIVER, OCTOBER 27, 1863.

I arrived at Chattanooga, Tenn., on the 30th of September, and reported to General Rosecrans, in accordance with my orders received in New York City on the day of the news of the battle of Chickamauga. I arrived at Nashville without detention, and waited there three or four days for the raid to be made, which I expected would be the result of the battle of Chickamauga. Finally, not being able to wait longer, I left Nashville, reaching Bridgeport after twenty-four hours' travel. There learning that the journey with escort and with the trains would be a long and tedious one, I took my horse and, with my aid, proceeded over the mountains by what was known as the Haley Trace to Chattanooga, arriving there late in the afternoon. On reporting to General Rosecrans, who was an old acquaintance of mine, he asked me to accept his hospitality until I could get settled for myself, which I did, and was with him three or four days. During that time I was engaged in looking about the army and the lines, and in one of the conversations I had with General Rosecrans I told him he would not be able to supply his army by the route over which the supplies then came—a longer route than I myself had taken to get there—and it would be necessary for him to shorten his line of communication. To this he replied, "Come with me to the commissary's and I will show you that we are receiving supplies very much in excess of our requirements," and seemed to think my opinion entirely erroneous. On the night of the 30th of September we heard of the crossing of the Tennessee River by General Wheeler, of the Confederate cavalry, and the beginning of his famous raid, which kept the army very much excited for some days. This raid was over and the railroad again in use by the afternoon of the 9th of October, but the loss of animals and supplies in the very large train destroyed by Wheeler at once began to be felt in Chattanooga, so that the army was very shortly put on half or three-quarter rations. To add to this, the rains began at once and rendered the roads almost impassable. Meanwhile, I was made chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. The order assigning me to this duty was published on the 3d day of October, and I entered on my duties by beginning the construction of boats for bridges and also laying out the lines of fortifications.

At the time of my arrival at Chattanooga there were two trestle bridges over the river only available for the low water then existing, and work was immediately begun on boats and material for the pontoon bridge, which was finished and laid on the 6th of October, and was the only bridge in use there up to and after the battles of November, with the exception of the flying bridge which I established just above. This was capable of carrying only one wagon and its team at a time. During all this time the state of affairs at Chattanooga was growing daily worse by reason of the loss of mules from overwork and starvation, and also by the loss of artillery horses from the latter cause. I was very hard at work attending to various engineering duties on my hands, these duties being principally the superintending of the work on the fortifications. Our purpose was then to make a system of fortifications which would be able to stand a siege with a small garrison and thus diminish the number of men required to hold the position at Chattanooga. During all this time no conversation ever took place between General Rosecrans and myself with reference to obtaining control of any part of the old route by river and road to Bridgeport. This road was in length only about 27 miles from Chattanooga, as against the 60 or 70 miles of mountain route for supplies. I finally became convinced that it was impossible for us to collect provisions, ammunition, and forage sufficient to maintain the garrison for the fortifications. In fact as we then stood it was impossible for us to fall back over the mountains and take with us anything except what the soldiers could carry on their persons. In superintending these fortifications I had daily to ride on the hills surrounding Chattanooga, and from them I looked down upon the

face of Raccoon Mountain. In studying over carefully the situation of the army, and trying to think of some means by which it could be relieved, it occurred to me that if we could hold the passes on Raccoon Mountain and the northern end of the mountain abutting on the river, and could manage to support that position on the river from the troops in and near the passes, it would give us the control of the river up as far as Williams Island; then by using the north side of that island or the adjacent shore of the river we might have a depot for supplies practically sheltered from any artillery fire that could be brought to bear on it, or from any infantry attack that could be made against it. Thinking that this idea might turn out to be of value, on the afternoon of the 18th of October I went to General Rosecrans and told him that I proposed to go down the river on a reconnoissance the next day to see if we could not make some lodgment on Raccoon Mountain that would give us the river up to that point. General Rosecrans said: "That is a very good idea, and I will go down with you."

I wished to make the reconnoissance in my own way, and knew that if he went with me I should go where he wanted me to go, and not necessarily where I wanted to go. So I said to the general that it would be a long day's work, and I had to start very early in the morning, to which he replied, "Fix your hour and I will be ready." Then I said, "We will start at 8 o'clock," which we did. Besides General Rosecrans and myself there were two or three of his staff belonging to the party whom I do not recollect now. Shortly after crossing the Tennessee River our road led by the hospital, which was filled with the wounded from Chickamauga. General Rosecrans, on coming up to the hospital, said, "I must go in and see the boys for a little while." I said, "General, recollect we have a long day's work." "I will not be more than fifteen minutes." He and his staff went in, leaving me alone on the road, I having no desire to go into the hospital. I waited there for about half an hour, when Mr. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War, came along on his way over the mountains to Bridgeport. Mr. Dana was there to represent the Secretary of War and to give him daily the fullest information with reference to the condition of the army, its intended movements, etc. I said to Mr. Dana, "I am waiting here for General Rosecrans. I have waited for half an hour, and as I am going down the river, I can not afford the time, so I will leave him to follow on if he chooses, and I will go on with you as far as our paths lie together." Reaching the point where the road turned up over the mountain we separated and I went down toward the river bank and he went toward Bridgeport. I began my examination near the lower end of Williams Island, studying carefully the topographical features of the country, but could find nothing that I thought would answer for a position to be held against a strong attacking force. I then abandoned all idea of carrying out the plan which had come into my mind, and which had caused this reconnoissance, and started back for headquarters.

Not long after leaving the river bank I saw in front of me and to the right an artillery battery. As I knew of no battery in that place I turned my horse and went in to it, asked the captain why the battery was there, and he said, "To defend the crossing here at Browns Ferry." We were on one of two high banks, with a road leading between them to the river. On the opposite side was a range of steep hills, about 100 to 150 feet in height, and directly opposite our position was a gorge between the hills, with a good road leading down to the river. These two roads constituted Browns Ferry, all but the boat. The topographical features of the locality attracted my attention, and upon further talk with the captain I found that they had an agreement with the picket on the other side that persons going down the river should not be fired upon. I went down and sat on the bank until it was so dark that I could see nothing. I examined the hills opposite as well as possible to see whether men could scramble up them or not, the gorge between them as far as I could see it, and, what was of much importance, the distance and position of the reserve of pick-

ets, and the supporting force near it guarding that portion of the valley. It seemed to me that if those hills could be taken by surprise and held and a bridge built across, bringing the Army of the Cumberland to within less than 3 miles of Lookout Mountain, our position there would prevent Bragg's army from defending the passes in Raccoon Mountain, by being forced to present their flank to us in their movements. Then, if on the same day that we seized these heights, a force should leave Bridgeport for Lookout Valley we could be assured that it would not be stopped by Confederate forces, and that on reaching Lookout Valley the whole army would be practically united to defend it, and the short lines of communication by road and river thus recaptured. My examination being over, owing to darkness, I started back for the headquarters. I was confident that this movement would be a success, provided we could surprise and capture these hills, and that I thought was more than probable. Then came the question as to whether General Rosecrans would approve of the plan.

From my experience with him I thought he probably would, but that in a day or two he would get hold of some other idea and lose faith in this plan. On arriving at headquarters I found that he had been relieved from command, and that General Thomas was in his place, which, from my knowledge of General Thomas, seemed to me to be a great change for the better. I have no recollection of seeing General Rosecrans that night—at any rate, for more than a very short conversation, and the subject of my examination of the day was not mentioned between us. The next morning I went in to report to General Thomas and say what was customary on such occasions; that I desired him to select his chief engineer to suit himself without reference to me, as I had taken the place unwillingly at the outset. General Thomas replied that he desired no change, and directed me to put down a second bridge at Chattanooga. I said: "General, I have sufficient boats for a bridge here, but if you will listen to a story of a reconnoissance I made yesterday you may alter your mind about the bridge, at least for the present." I then went on and explained, as stated here, what I had found the day before and what I thought could be done, and asked the general to think of it and let me know. After a few hours he sent for me to say that he had been consulting with some of the highest officers of his army, and they said that the plan was not in accordance with the rules of the art of war; that I only wanted notoriety by a big slaughter, and that if he approved of my plan he would lose two of his best brigades. To this I said I thought the officers were wrong about the art of war; that I knew that they were wrong as far as I was concerned, for I had held during the war that every officer who was guilty through ignorance or ambition of needlessly causing the death of a soldier was guilty of murder. General Thomas then approved of the plan, and I went to work from that minute to carry it out. The order to General Hooker was issued on the 24th, and on the 25th I was ready to move. The movement, however, did not take place until the night of the 26th and 27th. At daylight of the morning of the 27th we had the coveted hills, the gorge was well protected by our force, and at 10 o'clock that morning the bridge was completed. On the afternoon of the 28th Hooker with his command marched into Wauhatchie. The valley of Lookout was held, Hooker was in close communication with the Army of the Cumberland, and we had control of the short road to Bridgeport and the river.

In my report of this affair, from a spirit of courtesy, I said I made the reconnoissance by order of General Rosecrans, which was literally true, as he approved of it, as seen by the above statement. Some people asserted that I was with Rosecrans the whole day, and that the party followed the river as closely as possible to Browns Ferry. In my report I say that I began the examination near the lower end of Williams Island and worked upstream. That route was certainly not to find a crossing into Lookout Valley, which was above Williams Island, and my only purpose in taking that route must have been to examine Raccoon Mountain, as Williams Island,

without a point held on the mountain, would have had no military value, as was seen after our occupation of the valley.

SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL STATEMENT.

After the above personal statement was made I accidentally found some extracts from my letters from Chattanooga to my home. These were made some years since, had been mislaid, and I thought them lost. I append all the extracts, though, like letters to one's home, they may be a little egotistical. It was my habit to write daily, and sometimes more than once a day, generally before going to bed or early in the morning, and I will certify that these extracts, made some years ago, are true copies from the letters written from Chattanooga at the dates given. Owing to finding these extracts I have made one, and only one, change in the personal statement, and that was in the date of arriving at Chattanooga, which I had there put as the 28th, 29th, or 30th of September.

[Extracts from letters home, written at Chattanooga, 1863.]

Wednesday night, October 14.— * * * It has rained most of the day and is still raining, and I think with horror of the long impassable roads between here and our supplies. We are really in a very dangerous condition, and this place may have to be given up, because we can not get enough to eat so far from the depot. I have not dared to write lest the letter should miscarry, but this goes by General Garfield, who I trust will not be captured. I have been here a fortnight to-night. * * *

Same date as above.—We will have a change of commanders, and General Thomas is to be the man. I don't know how he will do, but he has the confidence of this army to a far greater degree than Rosecrans, and will, I think, do far better, for Rosecrans has many of McClellan's weaknesses, and some of them exaggerated.

Monday morning, October 19.—I wrote you a long letter last night, and it is now on the road. Mr. Dana goes unexpectedly, and I send to say that I am well, and the rain has gone, and the sky is bright, and the pack mule is ready, and I am off for a couple of days. Mr. Dana expects to go to Washington. * * *

Same date, evening.—Went over the river and took a long ride. * * * To-day the order has come relieving Rosecrans and putting Thomas in command, so that I am again all at sea as to what will be my fate, as he may not want me as chief engineer, though he told me he had urged Rosecrans to make me chief of staff. I am sorry for poor Rosy, for he has worked hard and done his best, but he has no administrative talent, and so we have been going to the bad ever since I came here. He has been a good friend of mine, and I feel grateful to him for it. * * *

Same date (October 19).—I shall give Thomas up if he does not get this river open for us in six days, for by that time we shall have to fall back if we do not succeed.

NOTE.—This was evidently written after my return from the reconnaissance. It shows plainly that I had a plan all worked out which I felt confident would give us the country south of the river.

* * * This morning I wrote two notes and sent one by Mr. Dana.

Tuesday night, October 20.— * * * It bids fair to rain again, and if so, our new general will be swamped before he gets fairly in command. We are looking for Grant, and I presume he will be along in a day or two.

Thursday night, October 22.— * * * General Thomas is going into his new work with diligence and a clearness that I hope augurs well for the future of this army. * * * Captain West came in to-night, having been five days on the road from Stevenson, and he says the roads are simply shocking. We look for General Grant to-morrow, and I trust my friend, Mr. Dana, will come back with him. * * *

Friday, October 23.—Mr. Dana came back and I asked him to come and stay with me. * * * he remarked that General Grant thought highly of me, and had said that Franklin and myself were the ablest officers in the Army. * * * He then told me that General Grant would take my opinion about things here and would rely on my knowledge and my judgment, so that I find myself here with more influence than I ever had when I had the Sixth Corps. Grant is now here, and to-morrow I am looking for a conversation that will fix my status. * * * Grant is here and I feel that this torpid animal of an army will wake up and begin to move, and that we shall be saved from ruin and keep Chattanooga. * * * This terrible storm is fixing us just here, and in three or four days, but before you get this, you will get news of a fight and I hope a successful one to us.

Saturday night, 10.30, October 24, 1863.—To-day I had a ride with General Grant and showed him something new, rather a bright idea of mine I thought, which is to be acted upon in about forty-eight hours, and I was informed by Grant that the order was being made out making me chief engineer of the "Division of the Mississippi," and so I said to Mr. Dana, "I am farther off than ever from a command." Mr. Dana said that he had said to Grant that I wanted a command, and the general replied that I had to stay with him as he wanted the benefit of my knowledge. * * * I hope to be in command of a division for one day this week, and if I am successful it will give Grant an excuse for demanding my promotion. * * * Our things look brighter now that we have new commanders, and I trust you will have no more of the ingubrious from me.

Sunday night, October 25.—To-morrow night will be an anxious night for me. * * * Tuesday, if I succeed, I hope this army may stand in a fairer position than it does now.

Monday, October 26, 3.30 p. m.—My expedition starts to-night, and to-morrow I may be fighting all day. * * * Hooker moves to-morrow, and I fear will get a whipping, though I sincerely hope not, for it is a vital question to us.

NOTE.—See Mr. Dana's dispatches of the 25th and 27th of October, vol. 54, pp. 70 and 72.

Tuesday night, October 27.—I am nearly dead and have to go across the river again to my troops to-night and sleep out in the open air, and am here only to write to you a short note which is going by express to New York, and so you will get it before you get my letter of last night. * * * I planned an enterprise and worked out the details and took command and carried it to a most perfect success, with 4,000 men engaged and a loss of killed and wounded of about 23. * * * I passed a most anxious night, for if any one of my little particulars had been neglected and had miscarried, instead of success I should meet with disaster, when disaster to me was ruin to this army. * * * Thank God, who gave us the success, I have been congratulated all around to-day for my part. This morning at 3 o'clock I was on the bank alone in the dark waiting to hear my boats, loaded down with men, come to me, and listening to hear the rebels open on them; and they came so silently I did not know it until they were abreast of me, then an hour of sharp skirmishing and the coveted ground was mine, and not to be wrested from me by ten times my numbers. * * * Last night was foggy and the fog was a necessity, and to-night, when I don't care, the full moon lights up the river as the sun.

Wednesday night, October 28.—To-day Hooker came in and joined onto me, and now we have the river and can supply our troops, and will not have to leave Chattanooga.

It is a breathing spell for us all, and the men, who are getting gaunt as wolves (all except me), look cheerful now, and will work hard to finish up our roads and fortifications. * * * I will give you a long account (Dana's Report, vol. 54) of this in a day or two, if I can find time, and then you can add a page to my history. I think Bragg will fall back now, for we learn he has hard work to keep himself alive where he is, and now that Hooker has joined us we can snap our fingers at him.

P. S.—In the morning: Hooker was attacked last night, and I was up all night.

Saturday night, October 31.—On the 19th of October I was scouting along the river bank 3 or 4 miles below here, and I came to a place that attracted my attention. On the other side of the river was a sharp ridge of hills a mile and a half long, the base of which was washed by the river. Between this ridge and a high, rugged mountain was a narrow valley, which was a strong place for us and would give us a good share of the river if we owned it, and would also give us an opportunity of aiding Hooker on his march to seize the rest of the river should he meet with any heavy force. Its immense importance struck me, and I found a deep gorge in the hills, through which ran a road for an old ferry. I sat down on the bank of the river for two hours, within a thousand feet of a rebel picket, who thought me some soldier not on duty, and as I sat there I conceived a plan for the capture of that hill, which, if taken, would make Hooker's work easy and give our soldiers and animals something to eat and save Chattanooga to us. That day General Thomas took command, and I proposed it to him and asked him to go and look at the place and see for himself. General Grant came then, and the day after he came I took the two down and showed them the promised land. They were both impressed with the great value of it, and I was allowed to arrange the details myself. Mr. Dana suggested that I be allowed to command the expedition, and that was done. * * * Then two hours' work with the axes and we could not be driven out. The thing was done, and I thanked God who had given us so signal a success when the risks were so great and where the stake was so immense. * * * The next day Hooker came into the valley which we already occupied, but posted his troops so carelessly that he was nearly overwhelmed and all our gains nearly lost by gross carelessness.

* * * Now we haul provisions 9 miles in place of 65. * * * I think General Grant and General Thomas are going to ask for my promotion, * * * but then I want to get back my old date or else the pill will be as bitter as ever. * * *

P. S.—I got my new aqua scutum and my only coat cut on the shoulder, but it went no deeper.

NOTE.—I desire to call attention to the two hours which I stated I passed in the examination. In my personal statement I was careful not to overestimate the time. The extract must be correct. Rosecrans is said to have been at Browns Ferry and to have returned just before dark. He was not there during my visit, nor did the captain of the battery mention his visit. Had he been there and gone he would have arrived at headquarters much before dark, for it was a short 3 miles. He would not have gone by the river between Moccasin Point and Browns Ferry, as the road was all under fire of the picket of the enemy.

Respectfully submitted.

WM. F. SMITH.

AUTHORITIES ON EVIDENCE AS PER RECORD.¹

- (1) Duffield, page 13.
- (2) O. R., vol. 53, page 250.
- (3) Vol. 52, pages 890 and 891.
- (4) Vol. 53, page 413.
- (5) Vol. 53, page 413.
- (6) Vol. 52, page 947.
- (7) Vol. 52, page 947.
- (8) Vol. 53, page 322.
- (9) Vol. 53, page 322.
- (10) Vol. 53, page 322.
- (11) Vol. 50, page 216.
- (12) Vol. 53, page 415.
- (13) Vol. 53, page 349.
- (14) Vol. 53, page 413.
- (15) Vol. 50, page 218.
- (16) Vol. 50, page 218.
- (17) Vol. 53, page 335.
- (18) Vol. 50, page 219.
- (19) Vol. 51, pages 36, 37, and vol. 54, page 216, et seq.
- (20) Vol. 53, page 414.
- (21) Vol. 54, page 69.
- (22) Vol. 53, page 441.
- (23) Vol. 53, page 437.
- (24) Vol. 53, page 446.
- (25) Vol. 53, page 467.
- (26) Vol. 53, page 455, 456.
- (27) Vol. 53, page 478.
- (28) Vol. 53, page 477, 478.
- (29) Duffield, page 16.
- (30) R's testimony com., vol. 3, suppt., page 32.
- (31) Vol. 54, page 70.

AUTHORITIES TO GO WITH ANALYSIS OF REPORT OF GENERAL THOMAS.

- (1) Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, Vol. I, supplement part 1, page 118, Thomas's report.
- (2) Same report, page 120.
- (3) October 1st to 17th, inclusive, vol. 53, pages 25, 89, 322, 441, 446.
- (4) Vol. 53, Oct. 12th to 19th. Pages 322, 349, 412, 415, 437, 467, 477, 478.

¹In all the above references "Vol." should be Serial No.

GENERAL SMITH'S FIRST ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS CLAIM.

THE RELIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND AND THE REOPENING OF THE SHORT LINE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CHATTANOOGA, TENN., AND BRIDGEPORT, ALA., IN OCTOBER, 1863.

[Wm. Farrar Smith, brevet major-general, U. S. Army. Wilmington, Del., 1891.]

PREFACE.

I have been asked by friends to put in print an account of the relief of the starving Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga, by the reopening of the short line of communication with Bridgeport, in Alabama, in October, 1863. The movement which effected this was the seizure of the hills on the south side of the Tennessee River and the gorge between them, where there had been a ferry called Browns Ferry. This capture and occupation gave to the Army of the Cumberland *interior lines* in its connection with Lookout Valley, and thus prevented the occupation by the enemy of the passes in Raccoon Mountain on the short road between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, or, being occupied, allowed the Army of the Cumberland to attack the passes in the rear and also to attack any reenforcing column in the flank. A glance at the map will show the peculiar advantages of the position at Browns Ferry, and the history of the entire movement shows that, the Browns Ferry hills being occupied, Hooker's column marched into Lookout Valley with hardly a shot fired, and the short line to Bridgeport was held and covered.

WM. FARRAR SMITH,
Bvt. Maj. Gen., U. S. Army,
Late Chief Engineer, Army of the Cumberland.

ERRORS AND OMISSIONS FOR PAMPHLET ON RELIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

[Note: The errors and omissions set forth have been corrected in this reprint.]

THE RELIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND AND THE REOPENING OF THE SHORT LINE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CHATTANOOGA, TENN., AND BRIDGEPORT, ALA., IN OCTOBER, 1863.

The situation on the 24th of September, 1863, was as follows, viz: On that day Lookout Mountain was given up by the Federal forces and occupied by those of Bragg. This involved the loss of Lookout Valley and the short line of communication with Bridgeport, the terminus of railroad transportation and the depot of supplies for the Army of the Cumberland, forcing a haul of from 50 to 70 miles over bad mountain roads and through alluvial valleys. We find from the reports of Bragg and Longstreet that after the battle of Chickamauga Longstreet recommended a movement to the north of Chattanooga, with the alternative of a march on Nashville or Knoxville as circumstances might determine:

The suggestion of a movement by our right immediately after the battle to the north of the Tennessee and thence upon Nashville requires notice only because it will find a place on the files of the Department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reenforcements just before the battle without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The railroad bridges, too, had been destroyed to a point south of Ringgold, and on all the roads from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for artillery, and the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which all communication would be cut, a contingency which did actually happen a few days after the visionary scheme was proposed. But the most serious objection to the proposi-

tion was its entire want of military propriety. It abandoned to the enemy our entire line of communication and laid open to him our depots of supplies, while it placed us with a greatly inferior force beyond a difficult and at times impassable river in a country affording no subsistence to men or animals. It also left open to the enemy, at a distance of only 10 miles, our battlefield with thousands of our wounded and his own, and all the trophies and supplies we had won. All this was to be risked and given up for what? To gain the enemy's rear and cut him off from his depot of supplies by the route over the mountains, when the very movement abandoned to his unmolested use the better and more practicable route, of half the length, on the south side of the river. It is hardly necessary to say that the proposition was not even entertained, whatever may have been the inferences drawn from subsequent movements.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRAXTON BRAGG, *General*.

On this question Bragg had other and very sound views, as appears from the following extract in the same report:

* * * As soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted the army was moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had with his supplies in the rear. *His most important road and the shortest by half to his depot at Bridgeport lay along the south bank of the Tennessee.*¹ The holding of this all-important route was confided to Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command, and *its possession forced the enemy to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains, by wagon transportation.* At the same time our cavalry, in large force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and difficult route. *These dispositions, faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage.* Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, *we held him at our mercy and his destruction was only a question of time.*

Holding those views and acting upon that plan, it was evidently Bragg's paramount duty to take all measures to see that such a vital advantage was not wrested from him.

THE SITUATION ON THE 24TH OF OCTOBER.

The plan seemingly worked well and was near its fulfillment in just one month, for Grant arrived on the scene October 23, and describes in his Memoirs the condition of affairs on the 24th of October:

This country afforded but little food for his (Rosecrans's) animals, nearly 10,000 of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there—"on the lift." Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with faint facetiousness, that they were living on half rations of hard bread and *beef dried on the hoof*. [Italics—Grant's.]

No language could more strongly or faithfully depict the condition of the army at that time, and General Grant is positive in his assertion as to the effect of a retreat. Therefore, under the then existing conditions, the Army of the Cumberland could not remain where it was and a retreat was destructive to it.

HOW TO CHANGE THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS.

The only possible way to do that was to reopen the short line of communication with Bridgeport or fight a general battle and defeat Bragg, to do which, as is seen by Grant's statement of the condition of the army and its artillery horses, was to be considered as impossible.

¹ Italics throughout are by General Smith.

The routes from the Chattanooga Valley into that of Lookout were, first, by the nose of Lookout Mountain, overlooking the Tennessee River; second, by a road up Lookout Mountain, starting from near the northern extremity, thence along the mountain about 10 miles to Johnsons Crook, and so to Trenton, in Lookout Valley; third, up Chattanooga Valley along the eastern slope of Lookout to Coopers Gap, and so over the mountain to Trenton. The battery at the extremity of Moccasin Point, across the Tennessee from Lookout Mountain, entirely swept the first road, so that it could not be used during the day, and therefore it was a difficult matter for the Confederates to reenforce troops in Lookout Valley. Its mouth was hardly more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Chattanooga, and if we could secure a position there we could reenforce our troops in less than an hour. Longstreet says in his report: "The enemy's position was such that he could reenforce from any point of his lines in half an hour, while I could only reenforce from my *nearest* point in about *three hours*. He would have the benefit of his artillery, and we could not cross the mountain with ours." We would thus have interior lines with the disparity in distance increasing as we went toward the northern flanks of the two armies. *The vital advantage*, however, of holding a point in Lookout Valley was that a force marching across it to hold or defend the passes in Raccoon Mountain would expose its flanks to an attack from our army, and a hostile force in those passes could be attacked from the rear by our troops. If, then, such a point in Lookout Valley could be secured and held, it made the march of a reenforcing column from Bridgeport a very simple military question, and such a column once in Lookout Valley covered the line to Bridgeport and would be in close contact with the other troops of the army. To have moved a force from Bridgeport without such a foothold in Lookout Valley would have been to expose that force to an attack without any prospect of assistance from the Army of the Cumberland, no troops from which could have hoped to gain a footing with the enemy in force in Lookout Valley. The whole enterprise seemed to turn upon the opportunity to gain possession *there* by a surprise. Browns Ferry was admirably adapted for the work of effecting a lodgment. The road through the gorge connected with all the roads in the valley, and it was sufficiently far from the batteries on Lookout Mountain to make a bridge safe from anything but chance shots.

The hills on the south side of the river at Browns Ferry were captured on the morning of the 27th of October, just before daylight. The bridge connecting our new possession with the Army of the Cumberland was completed before noon of that day. On the afternoon of the 28th the troops of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps marched into the valley and connected at Browns Ferry, having met only skirmishers, and the short line to Bridgeport was recaptured at a trifling cost of life and secured to us, except from the chances of a general engagement, in which our interior lines gave us great advantages. On this point I quote from the report of General Longstreet:

About October 31 Lieutenant-General Hardee, Major-General Breckinridge, and myself were ordered to examine this position with a view to a general battle. It was decided that an attack was impracticable; that the only route by which our troops could reach the field was a difficult mountain road only practicable for infantry and entirely exposed to the enemy's batteries on the other side of the river. His positions were connected by a short and easy route, while ours would have been separated by a mountain, impassable to artillery except by a *detour* of some 50 miles, and hardly practicable for infantry. Our position was so faulty that we could not accomplish that which was hoped for. We were trying to starve the enemy out by investing him on the only side from which he could not have gathered supplies.

On the subject of the last sentence, Bragg says:

The disastrous loss of these advantages and our subsequent operations in consequence must be the subject of a future communication. (See Bragg's report quoted above.)

WHOSE WAS THE PLAN?

The following is a dispatch from Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, to the Secretary:

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *October 23, 1863.*

No change in the situation here. Ten days' rations on hand. Thomas firmly resolved to hold at all events. Rain heavy since midnight and roads worse to-day than yesterday.

An immediate movement for the occupation of Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley is indispensable, but Hooker, though ordered ten days since to concentrate his forces for the purpose, has not done so, but waits on the ground that his wagons have not arrived from Nashville. The fact is, however, that about 100 have arrived, and, besides, Thomas will not allow him to take any wagons at all in this movement. But Hooker seems to show no zeal in the enterprise. It will necessarily wait somewhat for the arrival of Grant, who was not able to make the whole distance of 55 miles on horseback yesterday, but will get in before night.

The interior line of fortifications is so far advanced that General Smith tells me only one day's work more is needed to make them tenable and the place temporarily safe with a garrison of 10,000 men, though the works will still be far from finished. The pontoons are done for a bridge across to Lookout Valley as soon as Hooker has moved into that position.

The last part of that last sentence shows that Mr. Dana did not appreciate the plan. It may have been the plan confided to him by Rosecrans.

DANA TO SECRETARY OF WAR.

CHATTANOOGA, *October 24, 1863—10 a. m.*

Grant arrived last night, wet, dirty, and well. *He is just going to reconnoiter an important position which General Smith has discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and which will be occupied from here simultaneously with Hooker's occupation of Raccoon Mountain. This movement will probably take place within three days.*

To one who understands the military principle involved in the movements to seize the hills at Browns Ferry it will be apparent that the movements from Chattanooga and the occupation of Raccoon Mountain should *not* be simultaneous.

The operation of occupying the "important position" in Lookout Valley was effected on the morning of the 27th, just three days after the above dispatch was sent.

OCTOBER 25, 1863—11 a. m.

The force which will cross at Browns Ferry to occupy the mamelon at the mouth of Lookout Valley will consist of three brigades, of which the first, under Hazen, will proceed to the spot in the pontoons of which the bridge to be thrown across there will be composed. The other two march, the distance being about 4 miles, and all are to be on the ground before daylight Tuesday morning.

This expedition to Lookout Valley will probably be commanded by General Smith. Reconnaissance yesterday showed the rebels have only a cavalry picket at Browns Ferry and no force on the mamelon. Cold; cloudy; no rain.

[C. A. DANA.]

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

General Thomas reported the affair:

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *October 27, 1863—11.30 p. m.*
(Received 9 p. m., 28th.)

Gen. William F. Smith, commanding Hazen's brigade, Sheridan's division, Fourth Corps, and Turchin's brigade, Baird's division, Fourteenth Corps, floated boats of pontoon bridges down the river from Chattanooga to Browns Ferry, 6 miles below; landed, surprised and drove off the enemy's pickets and reserves, took possession of the hills commanding *debouche* of the ferry on southwest side, and laid bridge and intrenched the command strongly enough to hold the bridge securely.

By the judicious precautions taken by General Smith before starting and the intelligent cooperation of Generals Turchin and Hazen, commanding brigades, and Colonel

Stanley, of the Eighteenth Ohio, commanding boat party, this was a complete success and reflected great credit on all concerned.

Our loss—4 killed, 15 wounded; enemy—8 killed, 6 prisoners, and several wounded.

General Hooker, commanding troops composing Eleventh Corps and part of Twelfth, *marched from Bridgeport at daylight to-day* to open road from Bridgeport to Chattanooga and take some position protecting river. * * * If General Hooker is as successful as General Smith has been, we shall in a few days have open communication with Bridgeport by water, as well as by a practicable road running near the river on the northern bank.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General, Commanding Department.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

General in Chief.

THOMAS TO HALLECK.

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *October 28, 1863—11 p. m.*

Hooker reached Browns Ferry to-day about 3 p. m. Met with no serious opposition. The enemy still hold Lookout Mountain in considerable force. The wagon road is now open to Bridgeport. We have, besides, two steamboats, one at Bridgeport and one here, which will be started to-morrow. We have also another steamboat here undergoing repairs; will be ready for work as soon as portions of her machinery (sent for to Nashville) arrive. By this operation we have gained two wagon roads and the river to get supplies by, and I hope in a few days to be pretty well supplied. * * *

GENERAL THOMAS ORDERS THANKS.

Orders.]

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

Chattanooga, November 1, 1863.

The general commanding tenders his thanks to Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith and the officers and men of the expedition under his command, consisting of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Turchin and Hazen, the boat parties under Col. T. R. Stanley, Eighteenth Ohio Volunteers, and the pioneer bridge party, Captain Fox, Michigan Engineers, for the skill and cool gallantry displayed in securing a permanent lodgment on the south side of the river at Browns Ferry, and in putting in position the pontoon bridge on the night of the 26th instant. *The successful execution of this duty was attended with the most important results in obtaining a safe and easy communication with Bridgeport and shortening our line of supplies.*

By command of Major-General Thomas.

In a later report General Thomas says:

To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry. * * * When the bridge was thrown at Browns Ferry on the morning of the 27th, the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga as it was to the army besieging it from without. (Vol. I, p. 398, History of the Army of the Cumberland, by Van Horne.)

DANA TO SECRETARY OF WAR.

BRIDGEPORT, *October 26, 1863—2 p. m.*

The movement for the occupation of Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley was to have begun this morning. Everything is ready at Chattanooga, and Palmer will be at Rankins Ferry in season; but Hooker is behindhand, and it is postponed until to-morrow. The forces sent from here are Howard's two divisions and Geary's, 10,000 men in all.

CHATTANOOGA, *October 28, 1863—5 p. m.*

Everything perfectly successful. The river is now open, and a short and good road in our possession along the south shore. We had an insignificant skirmish near Wauhatchie. The great success, however, is General Smith's operation at the mouth of Lookout Valley. Its brilliancy can not be exaggerated.

[C. A. DANA.]

* Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

That General Grant then thought he knew who had planned and executed the delicate part of this operation appears to be shown by his letter of November 12 to—

E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

SIR: I would respectfully recommend that Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith be placed on the list for promotion to the rank of major-general. He is possessed of one of the clearest military heads in the Army; is very practical and industrious. No man in the service is better qualified than he for our largest commands.

As the recapture of the short line of communication was the only affair of the slightest importance which occurred in the three previous weeks spent by Grant at Chattanooga, the credit for that must have been largely in his mind when that letter was written.

In summing up the results of the Browns Ferry movement it must not be forgotten that success there alone made it possible for Sherman's force to reach Chattanooga, which in its turn made possible the victory of Missionary Ridge.

WHO HAS CLAIMED THE PLAN.

1. *Gen. Ulysses S. Grant.*—In his Memoirs he writes:

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at Browns Ferry, some 3 miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side of about 20 men in full view, and we were within easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. But I suppose they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defense.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport—"a *Cracker line*," [*Italics—Grant's*] as the soldiers appropriately called it. They had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them.

To any person who knew of the war, only that which is to be learned from these Memoirs, the single conclusion drawn from the foregoing extract would be that the morning after Grant's arrival at Chattanooga, without hint from any person, he had taken the general commanding the Army of the Cumberland and his chief engineer directly to the proper point, shown it to them, and returned to write out the order for the opening of the "Cracker line."

Now, a glance at Dana's dispatch of the 23d of October, *before Grant's arrival*, will show that Thomas had given orders with reference to a movement of Hooker's troops in connection with a bridge into Lookout Valley, while his dispatch of the 24th states that Grant, having arrived the night before, was going to look at an important point discovered before his arrival; gives a synopsis of the plan to be carried out, and says "the movement will probably take place within three days." Thomas, in his report, says:

* * * The force to throw the bridge was organized by Saturday, the 24th, and the boats and bridge completed, giving General Smith two days to examine the ground with the 2 brigade commanders and to give all the necessary detailed instructions to insure success.¹ General Hooker reported on the 26th that he would be ready to move on the 27th at daylight.

2. *Gen. William S. Rosecrans.*—General Rosecrans, in the *North American Review* for December, 1885, put forward a specific claim, in much detail as to statements,

¹This was the day on which General Grant says he took Thomas and myself to see Brown's Ferry, and according to Thomas my preparations were then all made and I was waiting for Hooker.

but without any corroborative evidence, except the fact that he had issued orders which were of record, for Hooker to be ready to move his troops across the Tennessee River at Bridgeport.

Generals Boynton and Turchin, in their respective histories of the campaign and battle of Chickamauga, have made the same claim for General Rosecrans, giving no evidence whatever, and on being interrogated as to their authority for the assertion, have given General Rosecrans's *verbal* statements, and his paper to which reference has been made above.

This account of General Rosecrans is, then, the only one with which I have to deal, and as that will require reference to many extracts of official papers, I shall put *those references* into an appendix and give in the body of these pages only my own personal history of the matter, so far as I have ever known it.

I arrived at Chattanooga on the 29th or 30th of September, and was, contrary to my own desires, appointed chief engineer to the Army of the Cumberland. The order was published on the 3d of October. On the reorganization of the army a general order was published on the 10th of October, an extract from which is given to show what my duties were as chief engineer:

OCTOBER 10.

II. Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, being the senior officer of his corps in this department, is announced as chief engineer. All troops on engineer duty and *all engineering operations will be under his professional control.*

The duty of laying out and pushing on the defensive works and keeping the bridges up took all my time, and I never volunteered any advice as to any movements, nor was I ever asked to give any opinions; so that there was never any conversation between General Rosecrans and myself as to any plan for retaking possession of the short line of communication between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, the actual terminus of railroad facilities. I saw (as I suppose did all others of the army) the order for Hooker to concentrate his troops so as to be ready to move promptly from Bridgeport, but no hint in any way, shape, or manner was ever conveyed to me that the engineer department of the staff would have anything to do in connection with any movement of Hooker's command. I could only suppose that Hooker would be ordered to make a move in the direction of the Raccoon Mountain passes, which it was probably supposed by Rosecrans would relieve the terrible strain then on the army. I could not suppose that Hooker would move into Lookout Valley without some preparation being made for a connection with the troops at Chattanooga, for that would be to court his destruction while the Chattanooga troops were powerless to help, and yet, as no word was said to me about bridges, I concluded that some plan was in the mind of General Rosecrans which I could not fathom, and which he was keeping to himself, although not usually a secretive man. The condition of affairs, however, was getting so that work on fortifications seemed useless, as in a few days there would be nothing to put into them but guns and starving soldiers.

This, of course, gave to me, as I suppose to all involved, much serious thought. From the hills on which I was at work I looked on the river and the northern end of Raccoon Mountain daily, and it finally occurred to me that if we could seize the end of that mountain resting on the river, and if Hooker at the same time could occupy and hold the passes, we could make a depot for supplies on Williams Island, and from there supply the army at Chattanooga by wagons over a road not more than 5 miles in length, which would be practically reopening the river and saving the army from the fate that seemed closely impending.

So impressed was I with this idea that on the afternoon of the 18th of October I went to General Rosecrans and told him that I desired on the following day to reconnoiter down the river to see if a footing could not be gained which could be held and thus perhaps give us relief. General Rosecrans said, "Go by all means, and I will go with you." In my official report of operations afterwards (from courtesy) I men-

tioned that as an order from General Rosecrans. We started early and our road led us by the hospital, into which Rosecrans said he must go for a few minutes.

I waited for half an hour, and Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, coming along on his way to Bridgeport, I joined him, saying I had a hard day's work ahead of me and could not wait longer. I saw no more of Rosecrans until evening, and then he was no longer in command of the Army of the Cumberland. I parted from Mr. Dana at the foot of Waldens Ridge and went south to the river, going up along the bank, making careful inspection of the opposite shores for a favorable position for the purpose desired. I had passed above Raccoon Mountain and the head of Williams Island, and gave up all hope, having found nothing which could be made useful in the way proposed. As I was about to turn my horse's head toward Chattanooga I caught sight of a battery behind an earthwork and rode into the works to ask the purpose of that position.

The captain said the battery was there to guard the passage of the river at Browns Ferry, and standing with him I could see the road leading down through the gorge opposite. I was attracted by the topography of the opposite shore, and, learning from the captain that the pickets did not fire on each other, I went down to the water's edge and spent the time until dark in looking at the hills and estimating the distance to the smoke of the picket reserves. Given a successful surprise, and the remainder of the problem was simple. On returning to Chattanooga I learned that General Rosecrans had been relieved, and I said no word to him of my work that day.

The following morning I went to report to General Thomas, and the first order he gave me was to throw another bridge, there being then but one, across the river west of the town. I then said, "I have only so many boats, which will be wanted elsewhere, if you approve a plan I have to explain to you," and I told him what I had found the day before in my reconnoissance.

General Thomas held it under consideration for a few hours, and then told me of objections made to it by some persons unmentioned. I answered the objections, and was then told to go on and make the necessary preparations. The only point after this about which his advisers made difficulty was the time of starting Hooker's command. I insisted upon making the effort at Browns Ferry the morning that Hooker left Bridgeport, urging that if he began his march a day before I made my attempt Lookout Valley would be filled with Bragg's troops, and that I should fail. The argument at once satisfied General Thomas, and it was the last we ever had. General Grant arrived on the night of the 23d. Of course his approval became necessary, and on the 24th he visited the place and at once gave his consent to carrying out the plan. He took with him a large staff and all went down to the river bank. I was in mortal fear lest the unwonted appearance of such a party should cause suspicions of some intended movement and a closer guarding of the ferry and valley. The official reports of Generals Turchin and Hazen and Colonel Stanley gave in detail the account of the affair, and reference is made to them.

OCTOBER 27, 1863—3.30 p. m.

General REYNOLDS:

This place can not be carried now. I shall come into headquarters unless the General moves. A regiment has just gone up the mountain and all is quiet, so I suppose the sharpshooters have left the Suck.

SMITH, *Brigadier-General*.

I wish to acknowledge here that in the hurry and press of matters at the time of making my report I did not give sufficient credit to the individual efforts which aided me in carrying out the details of the affair at Browns Ferry. Without the zealous and efficient labors of Captain Fox, who commanded a battalion of the regiment of Michigan engineers, the bridge could not have been made or thrown. Without the untiring energy and intelligence of my confidential aid and assistant, Capt. Preston C. F. West, some details necessary to success would have been lacking. Either of the officers away, the whole affair might have been a failure.

OCTOBER 27, 1863.

The analysis of the official papers bearing upon the claim of General Rosecrans to the plan for the recapture of the short line of communication between Bridgeport and Chattanooga is given as an appendix, to clear a long and perhaps tiresome discussion from the body of the account, and leave optional to the reader to read or to omit. Every extract following is taken from the Official Record of the Rebellion, except where other authority is given.

Rosecrans, in opposition to earnest advice, gave up Lookout Mountain on the 24th of September, 1863. The act was deliberate and effect known, as is seen by the following order:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 24, 1863.

Lieut. Col. A. C. DUCAT:

The general commanding directs you to proceed immediately to make a careful survey of the most practicable route for a wagon road from this place to Jasper, on the right of the Tennessee River. Hold in view the location of a road that can be made most expeditiously and will be safe from the enemy's artillery from the other side of the river. * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

The expectation was that the enemy would occupy the country from Lookout to Bridgeport.

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *September 24, 1863—2 p. m.*
(Received 4.25 p. m.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General in Chief:

* * * The great point is to have troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, to secure those points and the railroad. We can hold this point if we can keep up communication and supplies. * * *

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.

The dispatch to Halleck of 2 p. m. of the 24th of September, taken in connection with the order to Colonel Ducat of the same day, seemingly indicates that Rosecrans expected, by holding the railroad from Nashville to the Tennessee River, to use the mountain road on the right bank of the river and to find that sufficient for giving him supplies. September 27, three days after the short line had been given up by the withdrawal from Lookout Mountain, General Meigs, who had served for years in the Engineer Corps, to which Rosecrans belonged, and who might be supposed to be in the latter's confidence so far as hopes and plans were concerned, telegraphs to the Secretary of War as follows:

* * * When the troops understood to be on their way here arrive General Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport. Supplies can then be accumulated by water. * * *

Rosecrans had then some plan for recovering the control of the river, as to whether vague or well defined there is at present no clue.

CHATTANOOGA, *September 28, 1863.*

Brig. Gen. J. St. C. MORTON, *Chief Engineer.*

GENERAL: The general commanding directs you to hurry forward the work of sending lumber for the pontoon bridge. You need not send any more timber for magazines at present. * * *

From the foregoing it will be seen that on the following day he writes to hurry forward lumber for a pontoon bridge. As the bridge at Chattanooga was on trestles, and liable to be carried away on a rise of the river, this order must have been sent

with a view to a pontoon bridge at Chattanooga. The next dispatch, of the 29th, to Col. Thomas A. Scott, looks to a concentration at Bridgeport, perhaps to protect the terminus of the railroad and "secure his command" in that way; perhaps for aggressive purposes and to recover territory.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 20, 1863.

THOMAS A. SCOTT:

Your dispatch received. All the eastern troops must concentrate at Bridgeport with all possible dispatch. Every effort and will must be bent to this. Please report progress frequently. *We will want to secure our command [there?]*

The order to Hooker on the 30th, with reference to tools, would seem to have reference only to making and repairing roadways, and not to intrenchments, as they are required only by reason of the "nature of the country," and yet the roads from Bridgeport into Lookout Valley did not require such extra precautions. Perhaps an approach to a bridge was in contemplation.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 30, 1863.

Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER,
Commanding Corps.

The general commanding directs you to furnish your command with the tools allowed it by the War Department and an extra wagonload of tools to each division. *The nature of country through which you are to operate requires that special care be taken in this matter.* * * *

The following dispatch is the first indicating clearly a purpose in the concentration at Bridgeport:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 30, 1863.

Colonel HODGES:

Your dispatch of 10 this morning received. The troops coming in *will operate on the Lookout Valley line unless called northward.* * * *

There was a fear lest Bragg should cross the river above Chattanooga. On the 30th, however, Wheeler began his celebrated raid, which kept everything west of the Tennessee River in a most excited and busy state for several days.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, September 30, 1863.

Maj. Gen. G. GRANGER:

* * * * *

He may be needed very soon, as General Crook has been fighting to-day to resist the crossing of a rebel force at Washington.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

The following order of October 1 to Hooker was sent before Wheeler's operation was fairly developed, but is specific to the effect that one bridge was to be thrown at Bridgeport to replace the trestle bridge there, and the remaining boats held ready to be sent up the river, as the same change was required there, viz, the replacing of a trestle bridge by one of boats. The last sentence shows a definite plan to operate with Hooker's command somewhere on the east side of the river from Bridgeport. Up to this time, however, there is not a line to indicate any intended cooperation required on the part of General Morton, chief engineer of the army and commander of the Pioneer Brigade of the army, and surely from him was required time to mature his arrangements and collect his "material."

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 1, 1863.

Maj. Gen. JOSEPH HOOKER:

The major-general commanding directs you to select from the pontoons and lumber at Bridgeport sufficient materials for one bridge at that place composed wholly of pontoons. The remaining boats will be held in readiness for shipment up the river. Make provision for saving the lumber of the trestle bridge there in case the river rises. *Put down a pontoon bridge and make immediate preparation for crossing your command at that point.*

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

So early as October 2 came the necessity for lessening the daily food of the soldiers, as is shown by the following order:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 2, 1863.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS:

The major-general commanding directs that until further orders only two-thirds rations will be issued to your command, and when you consider it sufficient, only one-half rations.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. McMICALH,
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Same to Major-General McCook, Major-General Crittenden, and Major-General Granger.)

HOOKER HAS ASKED FOR MAPS.

NASHVILLE, *October 2, 1863—9 p. m.*

General GARFIELD, *Chattanooga:*

General Hooker requests that maps of the country in which he is to operate may be sent to him at Stevenson; also instructions as to the portion of the railroad his command is to guard.

J. BATES DICKSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 3, 1863.

Capt. WILLIAM E. MERRILL:

The general commanding directs you to forward by courier at once a complete set of maps to General Hooker at Bridgeport, and make provision for supplying his division commanders as soon as they arrive.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

After the publication of the following order I might be supposed to know something of the operations of the engineer department with the Army of the Cumberland.

Special Field Orders, }	HEADQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
No. 263. }	<i>Chattanooga, Tenn., October 3, 1863.</i>
* * *	* * *

II. Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, having reported for duty, is announced as chief of engineers of the department, and all engineer officers will report to him.

Wheeler's raid had caused orders to be given to Hooker seemingly in conflict with the order of October 1, and the following orders are explanatory of the situation:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 4, 1863—11 a. m.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson:*

Your dispatches of yesterday are received. The general commanding does not desire you to draw your forces back from Bridgeport. Put the pontoon bridge in order, so as to be ready for crossing the river. Maps have been ordered sent you from Nashville. We hope to hear soon where the rebel cavalry intend to strike. Our cavalry is in pursuit and fighting them in rear.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 4, 1863—8.30 p. m.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson*:

Your dispatch and General Butterfield's of 11 a. m. to-day are received. It was the intention of the general commanding to put your force across the river at Bridgeport as soon as you were supplied with field transportation, and the dispatch of October 1 was written with that in view. Since then the bulk of the enemy's cavalry has crossed the river and is now rapidly approaching the line of railroad between Bridgeport and Nashville. The general commanding directs you to take the necessary steps to protect the railroad and at the same time push forward the preparations for crossing the river as soon as the situation will warrant it. * * *

The general commanding hopes that the enemy's cavalry will soon be destroyed and that he may be able to bring your whole command forward to this side of the river. I have just sent you a set of maps. I hope soon to supply your officers.

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.

THE BRIDGE WAS TO BE COMMENCED ON THE 5TH.

STEVENSON, October 4, 1863—5.30 p. m.

Brigadier-General GARFIELD,
Chief of Staff, Chattanooga:

Major-General Howard will build the bridge at Bridgeport to-morrow morning, as ordered in dispatch of October 1. The opposite shore is not occupied.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General Commanding.

CHATTANOOGA, October 4, 1863.

* * * * *
Engineers are now engaged upon the pontoon bridge across the Tennessee at *mouth of Lookout Creek*. Nothing done yet on interior fortifications here, without which a very large garrison is necessary.

[C. A. DANA.]

[Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.]

Compare with dispatch of Rosecrans of October 18.

The above dispatch is specific, showing that to Mr. Dana were made known all the plans that passed through the fertile brain of General Rosecrans. From a dispatch from General Meigs to the Secretary of War, dated October 5, 8 p. m., will be seen the real condition at Chattanooga at that time.

OCTOBER 5, 8 p. m.

* * * The pontoon bridge will, I think, be completed early to-morrow. The rise in the river, which steadily increases, has rendered the other two bridges impassable. A ferry rope and flatboat, and a steamboat (the *Paint Rock*), captured and repaired, afford the means of crossing at present. The river is about 1,000 feet wide, and is now deep enough for navigation at this point. The rebel guns on Lookout Mountain, however, *command the channel* at its base.

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

TO SECRETARY OF WAR.

Now, when General Rosecrans was relieved (October 19) there was one pontoon bridge and a flying bridge at Chattanooga, and boats and flooring for another had but just been completed, which on the morning of the 20th I was ordered by General Thomas to lay at Chattanooga, as will be seen from my statement in the body of this paper.

OCTOBER 5, 1863—9 a. m.

P. S.—The courier has arrived with the package of maps. Your dispatch of this date just received.

* * * * *
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General Commanding.

General Hooker was ordered to put down one pontoon bridge at Bridgeport, and hold the remaining boats and material ready to send up the river. On October 5 he reports: * * * "On learning there were pontoons sufficient to complete two bridges, I directed their use for that purpose, in place of trestles, which seem too insecure for reliance at this season. Bridges will be completed over both streams to-morrow." Later, October 6, 10 a. m., * * * "All of the infantry and two batteries of the Eleventh Corps are at Bridgeport. As at present advised, but one pontoon bridge will be thrown across the river at that point." * * *

If the remaining boats were wanted for a bridge from Chattanooga to Lookout Valley, it would have taken a train a week to transport them, and every wagon was needed for rations.

If General Hooker at that time had been informed of the vital importance of a bridge across the Tennessee River *in connection with his move on Lookout Valley*, it is not at all probable that he would have thought of disobeying his orders and directed the laying of a second bridge at Bridgeport. On the 1st of October Hooker was ordered to make *immediate* preparation for crossing the river, holding all boats except for the one bridge in readiness to be sent up the river. No order was ever given to ship the superfluous boats, and it is safe to infer that the *Engineer Department had never been informed of any plan looking to the bridge into Lookout Valley*, and yet on the 4th Mr. Dana says the engineers were then engaged on such a bridge, of course at Chattanooga.

A ferryboat (an old scow) had been used between Lookout Creek and Moccasin Point, which had been captured by the enemy and recaptured. The mouth of Lookout Creek and Moccasin Point were covered by the artillery of the enemy, and no bridge could have been thrown there *until Lookout Mountain* was in our possession.

On October 9 the raid was over, and Hooker's troops, ordered October 1 to make immediate preparation for crossing the river, could then move without leaving a line of communication in danger behind them.

NASHVILLE, October 9, 1863—10.10 a. m.

Brig. Gen. J. A. GARFIELD,
Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that the road will be opened through by noon. I start immediately from here with stores and forage direct for the front.

WM. P. INNES,
Colonel and Military Superintendent.

In place, however, of a concentration of Hooker's troops, Hooker was ordered to relieve General Morgan, commanding Second Division Reserve Corps, from *duty on the railroad, and the latter was ordered to concentrate at Andersons Crossroads to protect trains there*. If Rosecrans opened the short line the road over the mountains would become useless immediately. Therefore at this date the movement by Hooker was not imminent.

The following order is given merely to show that I should have had knowledge of what was going on in the way of making maps by the Engineer Department:

Circular.]

HQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 9, 1863.

Corps commanders will cause the division topographical engineers to report forthwith what they have done in fulfillment of orders from these headquarters and to show them their work, and afterwards to forward what they have at once to Brigadier-General Smith, chief engineer, at these headquarters. They will also report their work daily to topographical department. Officers failing to comply with this or the standing order of the topographical department without satisfactory reasons will be arrested and tried for disobedience of orders.

By command of Major-General Rosecrans:

C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 10th Hooker was directed to order a *corduroy road located and made* from Bridgeport to Battle Creek (all useless if the short line were opened), and with specifications for a very durable road which would require days of labor to complete.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 10, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson*:

Please direct General Howard to put troops under an able officer to locate and make a corduroy and repair two wagon roads from Bridgeport to Battle Creek—one for going and the other for returning trains. One should be undertaken and completed before the other is begun. The corduroy should be of the most permanent kind—three heavy stringers or sleepers, then the cross pieces or corduroy of logs, not less than 8 or 10 inches in diameter, tied at proper distances by forks.

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General*.

The trains coming down into the valley of the Tennessee from Jasper were interfered with on the 11th of October and a force was sent to drive away the enemy.

WALDENS RIDGE, *October 11, 1863—11.50 a. m.*

Captain MERRILL:

The train is forced to stop. They have killed a large number of our mules.

BERRY, *Acting Signal Officer*.

HEADQUARTERS, *October 11, 1863—1.05 p. m.*

Lieutenant BERRY:

Where is the train stopped?

MERRILL, *Captain, etc.*

WALDENS RIDGE, *October 11, 1863—1.30 p. m.*

Captain MERRILL:

Train stopped in the road at Big Suck. Firing continues.

BERRY,
Lieutenant and Acting Signal Officer.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 11, 1863.

Brig. Gen. JAMES B. STEEDMAN.

GENERAL: The general commanding directs you to send 250 picked sharpshooters and two pieces of artillery as quick as possible down the Haley trace road to a point where the enemy are firing upon our train and endeavor to drive them away. Send them in charge of a good, reliable, discreet officer, and order him upon his arrival to report the condition of things there; the force of the enemy; whether they can be driven away; and if he can not drive them, the force that is necessary for that purpose.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. FULLERTON,
Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

The following report will show that this short line from Jasper was effectually closed:

HDQRS. EIGHTEENTH KENTUCKY VOLUNTEER INFANTRY,
Camp near Williams Island, October 13, 1863.

Brig. Gen. J. A. GARFIELD, *Chief of Staff*.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the Haley trace road cleared of dead animals and broken wagons. The enemy in considerable force yet occupy the opposite bank of the river. The force under command of Major Shane, Ninety-eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, failed to dislodge them, the artillery (Napoleon guns) having proved ineffective, nor do I think guns of longer range could be used with much advantage. Work upon the road is suspended, as for nearly 4 miles the men are exposed to the fire of sharpshooters. Trains passed over the new route up the mountain yesterday.

I am, very respectfully,

HUBBARD K. MILWARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Returning to the 11th of October we find that General Morgan is ordered to put a heavy force on the repair of the road from Battle Creek to Jasper, which is heavy work over the long road *and useless if Rosecrans had a plan for opening the "short line" to Bridgeport.*

General Morgan has but just now been relieved to go to *Andersons Cross Roads.*

CHATTANOOGA, *October 11, 1863.*

Brig. Gen. J. D. MORGAN,
Care Major-General Howard:

Collect the men of the Third Ohio and Eighteenth Illinois Infantry, also any other regiments or detachments not belonging to General Hooker's command, unite them to your command, and proceed with the whole without delay to Battle Creek. Repair the road from Battle Creek to Jasper, and thence in the direction of Chattanooga. Detail fatigue parties and employ citizens if you can to advantage, and provide material for a bridge over the Sequatchie River to replace the one burned. * * *

J. A. GARFIELD, *Brig. Gen., Chief of Staff.*

A report is here given to show the condition of the roads and animals:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Andersons Cross Roads, Tenn., October 12, 1863.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Hdq'rs Dept. of the Cumberland, Chattanooga, Tenn.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the road up the mountain is in good order and being fast improved. I have relays of fatigue men *at each bend to lift wagons.* Am using all my tools in repairing roadbed. I allow no trains to enter after 5 p. m., as they can not get through after that time before dark, and have no proper camping place on the summit. *Teams are also exhausted at that hour by their day's travel.* * * *

Moccasin Gap was on the line from Chattanooga to Browns Ferry and the river road to Jasper. Bragg, whose plan has been given heretofore, knew that it was vital to him to hold the "short line," which was really *his campaign* against Rosecrans. If the following order had any effect, it would be to make *Bragg pay increased* attention to his holding of Lookout Valley, and thus vastly increase the chances against Rosecrans's success, either by a movement of Hooker or a movement on Lookout Valley, or both. * * *

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 12, 1863.

Col. D. McCook,
Mouth of the Chickamauga:

I wish to send a party back toward Moccasin Gap to build some small fires, and some smoke, so concealed as to make an appearance of a strong reinforcement concealed, and keep up this camp till further orders. You understand the object. I confide in your intelligence to execute the order successfully. It must be near roads and water.

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*

Now we come to some correspondence bearing upon the plan which Rosecrans seems to have had in his mind.

It must be kept in view that the plan which Thomas followed with success was to make *no movement from Bridgeport until a foothold was secured in Lookout Valley*, lest the movement from Bridgeport should *fill Lookout Valley with hostile troops and make the capture of the hills at Browns Ferry impossible.* The correspondence would seem to indicate no disposition to enter Lookout Valley, for the contemplated movements would, under ordinary circumstances, have at once caused the enemy to take steps to check Hooker; and yet Rosecrans specifies the object to possess the river to Chattanooga.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 12, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson*:

Can you have a column of one division to move up to Shellmound and push an advance brigade to Whitesides, to start by daylight in the morning? *They can take ten days' rations in haversack and knapsack.* Answer. Any news from cavalry?

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*

STEVENSON, October 12, 1863—7.45 p. m.

Major-General ROSECRANS:

I can do it, but only with infantry. I should prefer to have a battery to accompany the column, but as the horses have but just arrived I doubt if they will be in readiness that early. Not a syllable from the cavalry to-day.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 12, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson*:

I will delay the order till your batteries are ready. Hasten their preparation and report when ready. The object is to get possession of the line of the river up to this place. * * *

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*

Rosecrans has now a new plan, which is to move *a division* to Shellmound and *push an advance brigade* to Whitesides, half way to Chattanooga; he delays orders until batteries are ready, and directs Hooker to hasten preparations. Such a move as Rosecrans proposed on the 12th, to send *one division* to Shellmound and *one brigade* from there to Whitesides, was the only one with a definite plan to carry out a defined purpose that the "Official Record" of the war gives. It was entirely in the direction of what I supposed the order to Hooker of October 1, unaccompanied by instructions to the Engineer Department, and also unaccompanied by any instruction to troops to cover the landing of the engineers, foreshadowed.

I have no disposition to claim any plan but that which was followed, which Rosecrans, when the article was written for the North American Review, did not seem to grasp. It was the little principle involved that gave to the plan any vitality, and it would have been abandoned if Thomas had followed some advice given him and ordered Hooker to move *the day before* Browns Ferry was captured. I think such a plan, as well as that outlined by Rosecrans in his order referred to here, would have been a failure, attended with great loss of life and *loss of all hope.*

The only chance of success lay in effecting a surprise to get our foothold at Browns Ferry, and that was only made possible by Longstreet's utter indifference, as is shown by the reports.

The following dispatch is given because it was evidently deemed of *great importance* for Hooker's movements as well as those of Rosecrans. While that is not apparent, it may be positively stated that it was not necessary to the *followed plan* for the recapture of the "short line."

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 12, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson*:

* * * Push Edwards to hasten on the steamboat. *The preparation of that is of primary importance, both for your movements and mine.*

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*

Now comes the explanation by Mr. Dana to the Secretary of War as to Rosecrans's plans as developed thus far:

OCTOBER 14—12 m.

The necessity of opening the river being thus imperative, General Rosecrans has ordered Hooker to concentrate his troops preparatory to seizing the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupying Shellmound, *and, if possible, Lookout Valley.* If this can be done we shall greatly shorten our lines of wagon transportation. *If we could regain Lookout Mountain we could use water all the way.* * * *

Mr. Dana is reporting to the Secretary of War what the hopes of holding Chattanooga are as he learns them from the lips of Rosecrans. He gives to the Secretary the statement that Rosecrans proposes that Hooker shall seize the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupy Shellmound, *and, if possible, Lookout Valley*, adding, "If we could capture *Lookout Mountain we could use water all the way.*" The occupation of Shellmound did not solve the problem. The occupation of Lookout Valley and the passes did. But Rosecrans's intention is that Hooker shall capture *Lookout Valley if possible*, and only expresses, not a hope, but a statement that the "*capture of Lookout Mountain* would give us the river all the way." Thomas *began by capturing Lookout Valley*, or rather making it untenable by the enemy, and then he moved Hooker and gained the river to within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles of Chattanooga, over which $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles a road of gold would have been cheap for the country.

There is certainly not a line from Rosecrans or Dana with reference to the proposed movement akin in any way to the plan by which Thomas succeeded, and yet we are at noon of *October 14*.

The following circular, from its tenor, would seem to show that Rosecrans was not looking forward to retaking his short line, but to a system of fortifications requiring but a portion of the army to hold the place while the remainder fell back to be nearer the base of supplies. For any *aggressive* movement there was no necessity for any such strain upon the nerves or energy of the men to complete the interior defenses.

Circular.]

HQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 13, 1863.

The general commanding desires to return his thanks to the officers and men of this command for their assiduity and energy in finishing our exterior defensive works to completion.

He finds it necessary to ask a continuation of that energy, assiduity, and labor to complete the interior defenses with all possible dispatch; the highest interests are at stake on their speedy completion. Let every nerve be strained and every energy taxed to effect the object. The general commanding confidently appeals to the commands on fatigue duty to expedite these essential labors.

By command of Major-General Rosecrans:

C. GODDARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the 14th of October, as appears from the following papers, General Rosecrans ordered the building of a railroad of 6 miles in length to shorten the road over the mountain, which would have taken certainly three weeks of time, while the army was absolutely starving, and *at that time* four days would have captured the "short line" by Thomas's method, which would have rendered the additional railroad valueless.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,
October 14, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded.

I don't know how dependent the army at Chattanooga is upon the present line for supply, but I think the railroad might be extended so as to save wagon transportation for at least 6 miles with very little expense. I forward the quartermaster's report for the general's information.

O. O. HOWARD, *Major-General.*

[Second indorsement.]

OCTOBER 14, 1863.

Respectfully forwarded for the information and instructions thereon of the major-general commanding department.

JOSEPH HOOKER, *Major-General.*

[Third indorsement.]

The road to be begun at once.

W. S. R.

General Howard, at least, had never been informed of the condition of the army at Chattanooga or of any plan for the recovery of the short line, and yet he was in the advance from Bridgeport and had built the bridge there.

The difficulties are increasing on the road, and yet General Rosecrans looks to the road over the mountain rather than to a capture of the "short line" by any plan yet devised by him.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

Chattanooga, October 14, 1863—10 p. m

Major-General HOWARD, *Bridgeport*:

Rains will render a pontoon bridge necessary across the Sequatchie near Jasper. Please inquire at once if there be spare pontonier force and wagons at your post to send to Battle Creek, haul the materials from thence, and, aided by General Morgan's men, put up the structure. Answer.

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General*.

THE REPLY.

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,

October 15, 1863—1.15 a.m.

Major-General ROSECRANS.

GENERAL: Your dispatch received. Have ordered boats to proceed without delay by river, and wagons by land, to Battle Creek, there to load.

O. O. HOWARD, *Major-General*.

Howard's efforts are given in the following report:

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH CORPS,

October 16, 1863.

Brigadier-General GARFIELD, *Chief of Staff*:

The pontoons were taken to Battle Creek without difficulty by water, but the pontoon wagons loaded with the planking took all day yesterday to get through. The water rose 2 feet and more in the bottom, rendering about a mile of the road almost impassable. It has now subsided, and the trains are passing. I have put on as much force as I can work corduroying the road. The timber is very large, and must be cut and split into slabs. The boat was rescued from the high water and raised on flatboats, so that work now goes on without interruption.

O. O. HOWARD, *Major-General*.

(Copy to General Hooker.)

On the same day Garfield, en route for Washington with the report of the battle of Chickamauga, reports on the condition of a part of the short road from Jasper:

HDQRS. TWENTY-FIRST KENTUCKY VOLUNTEERS,

On Waldens Ridge, 6 miles from Andersons, October 16, 1863.

[Maj. Gen. W. S. ROSECRANS:]

* * * I learned on the way that the rebels are clearing away the ground on the opposite side of the river at the Narrows, to plant a battery. If they do this the Haley road will be of no further use, day or night, till the peninsula is cleared of rebels. The creek just ahead of us was 6 feet deep last night when we arrived, but we can cross it now. I have directed Colonel Price to bridge it. It only needs a bridge 30 feet long, which can be made in a day. * * *

The situation on the 16th at 12 m. is given by the following dispatch to the Secretary of War:

Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight, and with a vast loss of public property and possibly of life, except the opening of the river. General Hooker has been ordered to prepare for this, but Rosecrans thinks he can not move till his transportation arrives from Nashville, from which place it marched on the 8th. It should have been in Bridgeport on the 14th, but is not yet reported. The telegraph between there and here is broken, however, and it now requires ten to twelve hours for couriers to make the distance.

In the midst of all these difficulties General Rosecrans seems to be insensible to the impending danger, and dawdles with trifles in a manner which can scarcely be

imagined. Having completed his report, which he sent off for Washington by General Garfield yesterday, he is now much occupied *with the map of the battlefield and with the topography of the country between here and Burnside's lower posts.* Most probably the enemy contemplates crossing in that region, but we are no longer able to pursue him, hardly to strike a sudden blow at his flank before he shall have crushed Burnside. Meanwhile, with plenty of zealous and energetic officers ready to do whatever can be done, all this precious time is lost because our dazed and mazy commander can not perceive the catastrophe that is close upon us *nor fix his mind upon the means of preventing it.* I never saw anything which seemed so lamentable and hopeless.

A rebel officer last evening shouted to one of our pickets that Bragg had been relieved and either Johnston or Longstreet put in his place.

Reports from our cavalry, which Rosecrans will forward to-day, make the rebel loss in the recent raid 2,000 men and 5 guns. Thirty-eight men captured in our uniform were summarily executed. Nothing heard from forces of Sherman.

[C. A. DANA.]

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
[Secretary of War.]

On the same day, four hours later, the following report is made:

CHATTANOOGA, October 16—4 p. m.

I have just had a full conversation with General Rosecrans upon the situation. He says the possession of the river as far up as the head of Williams Island at least, is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible for him to make any movement toward gaining such possession until General Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. Hooker's troops are now scattered along the line of the railroad and can not be got together before next Wednesday. The wagons must all have arrived by that time, and *if the enemy does not interfere sooner*, the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted. *Rosecrans, however, expects that as soon as the weather will allow the enemy will cross the river in force on our left, and then it will be necessary for us to fight a battle or else to retreat from here and attempt to hold the line of the Cumberland Mountains.* * * *

It will be seen from the foregoing dispatch that Rosecrans had faced the possibility of being obliged to hold the line of the Cumberland Mountains, *i. e.*, to give up Chattanooga. Now, on the 16th of October Rosecrans could not have retreated over Waldens Ridge, nor could he have moved far to fight a battle outside of his lines. His men were too weak for a lengthened march and a battle. He had no horses for his artillery nor draft animals of any kind for his ammunition. Under the idea of a crossing by Bragg to the northward, which idea Bragg repudiates, the only possible way for Rosecrans to get the short line of march to head Bragg off was by Bridgeport, to turn the south flank of the Great Cumberland Plateau. This required the reopening of the "short line," which, from the account of Mr. Dana, was not in the thoughts of General Rosecrans.

On the same day, one and one-half hours after Mr. Dana's report, Rosecrans utters the following wail to Halleck, in which there is no hope of a reopening of the "short line" nor any outlook of promise within the limits of human probability. When the dispatch of 5.30 of the 16th of October was sent there was in Rosecrans's mind no plan for opening the "short line" to Bridgeport:

* * * * *

The enemy will probably operate on our left flank, either to cross the river and force us to quit this place and fight them or lose our communications. They will thus separate us from Burnside. *We can not feed Hooker's troops on our right, nor can we spare them subsistence from our left depots and communications, nor has he transportation to move.* The rains have raised the river and interrupted our pontoon bridges. The roads are very heavy. *Our future is not bright.* Had we the railroad from here to Bridgeport, and the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought up, *we should not probably outnumber the enemy.* This army, with its back to barren mountains, roads narrow and difficult, while the enemy has the railroad and the corn in his rear, is at much disadvantage. To secure this position, at least McMinnville should be made a strong fortified depot, Kingston the same, and for ulterior operations twenty thousand or more troops put in Tennessee at easy points to cover the railroad and subsist until called to the front.

Meigs's ideas at 8 p. m. of that date are given as follows:

LOUISVILLE, *October 16, 1863—8 p. m.*
(Received 9 a. m., 17th.)

Hon. E. M. STANTON:

* * * The rebel cavalry, General Hooker informed me at Stevenson, had been attacked a second time and dispersed into small parties. If this be so, the Twelfth Corps can be called forward by General Rosecrans. It appears to me of vital importance that he get possession of the river, at least as far as the rebel batteries on Look-out Mountain will permit him to use it—that is, either to 5 or 6 miles of Chattanooga—to repair the roads over Waldens Ridge, so as to make it possible to throw full supplies of rations and forage into Chattanooga by wagon trains. *It will require much work and more time than I fear can be spared.* This labor must be performed by the troops. The roads from Bridgeport to Battle Creek will, after the rains, be almost impassable. It was very bad when I came through. I will send forward tools, and urge upon the generals commanding the importance of straining every nerve upon this work. The troops must do the work.

M. C. MEIGS, *Quartermaster-General.*

General Meigs at the same time, October 16, 8 p. m., took the responsibility of going over the head of Rosecrans and telegraphing to General Hooker, not with reference to securing any "short line," the plan for which he would have known had it then been developed in Rosecrans's mind, but for the making of the route by Jasper practicable for the supply of enough of rations to maintain a starving army. The dispatch would leave the inference that help must come from the subordinates.

Major-General HOOKER:

It is of the utmost importance that a corduroy road be made to beyond Battle Creek in direction of Jasper, with a good bridge over Battle Creek. Twenty-five hundred each of picks, spades, and axes went to Stevenson a week ago, yet General Howard had, when I saw him, tools only for 300 men. Please send them forward. I have ordered more tools to be sent from Nashville. I think the road should be so located that a covered way or epaulement may be thrown up to protect it from the enemy across the Tennessee where it is near the river. A large body of troops, with tools for both earth and rock work, ought to be set to work immediately on the ascent and descent of Waldens Ridge. This is essential to supplying the army by that route. As the road is, after these rains, the supply over it will be impossible. Forage depots and posts to rest and feed mules should be established at the base of the mountain on each side. Teams too weak to climb the mountain could haul forage to these points. I shall work here to-morrow and then return to Nashville, and will probably be in Stevenson in a few days. If the rebel cavalry is dispersed, can you not call forward the Twelfth Corps?

M. C. MEIGS, *Quartermaster-General.*

General Garfield gives a picture of the road near Battle Creek on his trip to Stevenson in the following dispatches:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Battle Creek, Tenn., October 17, 1863—9.30 a. m.

[General ROSECRANS.]

MY DEAR GENERAL: Have just arrived here. Encamped last night on the other side of the Little Sequatchie, which was too high to be forded till this morning. We came over with the ambulance at 6 o'clock. Trains are waiting on both sides of the crossing. Empty trains can cross now; loaded ones by 2 p. m. We passed three empty trains, of 100 wagons in all, since we left Andersons, and met the same number of trains, in all 175 wagons, loaded with forage and rations.

The pontoon bridge across the Sequatchie at Jasper will be done by noon to-day. There is a good pontoon bridge across Battle Creek here. General Morgan is doing as well on the road as he can with his scant supply of tools. He has failed to get them either from Bridgeport or Stevenson and has sent to Nashville. The trains on the road are being pushed forward with energy. I think you will make a decided gain by establishing a feeding station for the animals on Waldens Ridge, under charge of Colonel Price, Twenty-first Kentucky Volunteers. Every train must halt there long enough for one feed and half the trains must stop there over night. By leaving forage there it will save hauling it to Chattanooga and back. There is no forage at

all on the mountain. Another temporary forage depot somewhere in Sequatchie Valley—say halfway between Andersons and Jasper—and another here will be of great service. *Half the mules we saw on the mountain had nothing to eat and were looking very bad.*

* * * * *

Very truly, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

STEVENSON, *October 17, 1863—8 p. m.*

Major-General ROSECRANS:

I reached Bridgeport at 1 p. m., called on General Howard, and found a large detachment of his men at work corduroying the road to Battle Creek. I met Mr. Stanton, who has made careful examination of the grading between Bridgeport and Jasper. He says there are nearly ties enough for the track, and with a sufficient force properly distributed he can complete a tramway in five or six days. I am satisfied it will be of great service to complete it at once.

I called on Captains Edwards and Dudley. The steamboat will be finished next week. The railroad bridge at Bridgeport is getting on well. Two spans are up and the trestles nearly all up. The rest of the bridge, I should think, could be completed in one week. * * *

From these it would appear that so late as October 17 at 1 p. m. General Howard was at work on the route by Jasper and there was no hint of any movement by Bridgeport across the Tennessee.

On the 17th of October Rosecrans has ordered a work begun on the "long haul," the execution of which would have outlasted the *staying* qualities of the Army of the Cumberland.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 17, 1863.

Col. W. P. INNES, *Nashville:*

The general commanding has determined to put the railroad from Bridgeport to Jasper, 12 miles, in running order. The road is graded for that distance, and General Hooker has been directed to put it in order and have the ties cut, commencing at Bridgeport end. The general directs you to provide track and track layers as soon as General Hooker is ready for them and push the road to completion as soon as possible.

There is a bridge to be built at Battle Creek and a small one, some 30 feet long, between there and Bridgeport. Communicate with General Hooker in regard to the road and give him every assistance in your power.

C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 17, 1863—10 p. m.

Major-General HOOKER:

If the enemy should attempt to cross the Tennessee in force above us, it will be necessary for your command to come up. The general commanding directs you to make such preliminary preparations as will enable you to move promptly and effectually. To this end the Twelfth Corps ought to be as far down as is consistent with the protection of the exposed points of the railroad. The presence of our cavalry in the direction of Athens, as directed in the order to General Mitchell sent to your care, will secure us against heavy raids in the direction of the lower valley of the Tennessee.

Your artillery will not be indispensable, *since we have 16 reserve batteries which we can not keep equipped for want of horse feed.* The horses will be sent up the valley soon if we do not get forage.

If Sherman comes in from Huntsville, the general commanding will be able to concentrate and move your entire strength at once, according to circumstances. We must have the river, and that soon. He desires you to send scouts to obtain news from Sherman and to direct General Crook to do so also. Generals Mitchell and Crook must keep open communication with you and carry out the orders for foraging. The general commanding desires careful estimates of the available forage in the country where they are.

I am, General, very respectfully,

C. GODDARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

Now, if Bragg had moved to turn the left flank of Rosecrans, Hooker could have joined the Army of the Cumberland via the short line in less than one-third the time it would have taken to go by the Jasper route, but Rosecrans does not hint at the "short route" in the directions to Hooker of 10 p. m., October 17.

Halleck seems to have waked up to the trouble and the cause of it, as is evinced by his dispatch to follow:

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1863—10.40 a. m.
(Received 11 a. m., 19th.)

Major-General ROSECRANS,
Chattanooga, Tenn.:

Every available man has been sent to assist you. As fast as cavalry can be organized and equipped it will be sent forward. *But you already have more men and animals than you can feed.* It was for this reason that Sherman was directed to open a line on the Tennessee River to Athens. At last advices he had reached Bear Creek and would probably cross the river at Eastport or Florence. He has already drawn a large force of the enemy against his line, thus effecting a diversion in your favor. *Why give up to the enemy the passes of Lookout Mountain?* By holding them can you not cover your railroad and river communications with Bridgeport? *Would it not be best to regain them, even at a heavy cost?*

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

On that day Rosecrans sends to Halleck this dispatch:

CHATTANOOGA, October 18, 1863—7.30 p. m.
(Received 11.35 p. m., 19th.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:

Enemy in front. Rumor of his moving a corps up as if to cross at Washington River at a stand. Our pontoon bridge restored. Boats [for] a second under way. Roads horrid. Forage and animals failing. Great efforts making to supply deficiencies. Rumored fighting of General Burnside's command, 60 miles north of Knoxville. Weather unsettled. No news from Sherman.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.

No hope expressed of opening the "short line," or of intention to make the effort.

Amid the wail of the above telegram it is necessary to call attention to the statement "Our pontoon bridge restored. Boats for a *second under way*;" and to recollect that this was made at 7.30 p. m. of the 18th of October.¹

On this same day Rosecrans says to Hooker:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 18, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER, Stevenson:

It will be necessary to make extraordinary efforts to get the road passable from Bridgeport to Jasper. Also to have rations thrown into Stevenson as rapidly as possible. *It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here.*

That steamboat must be got ready, so that we can freight to Shellmound, and thus shorten our wagon transportation. This will require us to hold both sides of the river and fortify, but make our depot on this side. I must confide the pushing up of the repairs to the wagon roads and seeing that our supplies are brought forward to your care, as the remoteness of our position and the necessity of the active authority and intervention of officers of high rank are *absolutely necessary to the preservation of our army.*

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.

A positive statement there of a *hope only* to open the river to Shellmound, fortifying on both sides, and this dispatch sent the day before Rosecrans turned over the command, demanded "extraordinary efforts" on the wagon road from Bridgeport to Jasper—the old road which starved the animals and carried only a percentage of food to the soldiers. Rosecrans states that "it will require almost *superhuman* efforts to sustain us here." In less than ten days the river was ours, with a loss of less than

¹This "second bridge" refers, of course, to one for Chattanooga, which was a military necessity, as one bridge was not enough to do the work required, and that broken left the army with its back to an impassable stream. This second bridge was therefore the first thing for Thomas to consider and order on assuming command.

ten men. Could Rosecrans have written that dispatch with the successful plan in his mind? The Shellmound project would have allowed the use of the railroad (when repaired) to Shellmound. (The holding of Shellmound and both sides of the river did not, however, lessen the difficulties sufficiently to allow the army to recover and support itself at Chattanooga, and Rosecrans in this dispatch to Hooker, dated October 18, almost throws himself into the arms of Hooker to ask his aid.) The subjoined telegram from Howard shows that he had not heard of the carefully developed plan confided to Generals Thomas and Coulton, and was not aware of the straits to which the Army of the Cumberland was reduced.

BRIDGEPORT, *October 19, 1863.*

Brig. Gen. W. F. SMITH,
Chief Engineer, Department of the Cumberland:

Shall I commence to build a bridgehead for the railroad bridge at this point, which will take 250 men thirty days to complete?

O. O. HOWARD, *Major-General.*

On the morning on which I have stated that I made the reconnoissance of Raccoon Mountain by myself, Rosecrans sent to Thomas to say:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 19, 1863.

Major-General THOMAS,
Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.

GENERAL: The general commanding directs me to notify you that he had started to reconnoiter the other side of the river and would probably be gone some hours. He wishes you to take command in the meantime.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. THOMS,
Captain and Aid-de-Camp.

Had the plan for reopening the short line been thoroughly elaborated and explained to others, myself among them, why was such a reconnoissance needed so late as the 19th of October?

To examine Raccoon Mountain for positions—yes; but for the *other plan*, conceived as stated, before October 2—no. *Nearly two hours after acknowledging receipt of order relieving him from duty* Rosecrans sent the following telegram:

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *October 19, 1863—8 p. m.*
(Received 2.30 a. m., 20th.)

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:

Your dispatch of the 18th received. Sherman's movement will operate favorably, and the cavalry force will be timely. Lookout was given up temporarily because we could not then safely hold it. It was isolated from us by distance and the defile of Chattanooga Creek. We expect to retake it as soon as we are prepared to hold it. *That could be done only* when the railroad being secured, the depots replenished, and Hooker's transportation provided. *Without that he can not subsist in a suitable position.*

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*

A dispatch sent at such a time, which was unnecessary except for self justification, would naturally have contained his best hopes and last plans for recovering his lost line.

The plan exposed, then, is to retake "Lookout," which "was given up temporarily." This certainly was not the plan adopted by Thomas, and was an *impossibility* before the arrival of Sherman's army. The army might have held out three weeks. When does Rosecrans, in this final dispatch, say the short line could be recovered?

When the railroad being secured, the depots replenished, and Hooker's transportation provided. *Without that he can not subsist in a suitable position.*

In less than eight days from the hour of sending that dispatch the river was ours without any of those conditions, and therefore by following no plan of Rosecrans.¹

¹ Rosecrans says Lookout Mountain cannot be taken until Hooker's transportation is furnished. Dana says that Thomas's plan was such that he would not allow Hooker to take wagons. Could two plans be even similar with such a difference in one condition.

In this record is there any evidence of *any plan* developed by Rosecrans? That he had given certain orders is true; but no order looked to anything like a precise plan. Rosecrans could not have carried out the plan adopted by Thomas without some orders or conference with the engineer department, and there is not a line hinting at any cooperation by the engineers. In no way, shape, or manner, by written or spoken word, did he ever intimate to me that a bridge would be needed for connection with Lookout Valley.

I have explained the expression in my report, and that expression looks forward to anything but the occupation of Lookout Valley.

Rosecrans has placed great stress upon Thomas's assertion in his report, which will be given further on.

Thomas could only have had reference to the order for Hooker to be ready to cross the river. Thomas had never heard from Rosecrans of the plan which he adopted, for *his first order to me* was to use my boats in a second bridge, and Rosecrans's dispatch of *October 18, 7.30 p. m.*, says: "Our pontoon bridge restored. *Boats for a second under way.*" There were, therefore, no boats being built for Browns Ferry, and General Thomas was in error in his statement in his report. He ordered those boats to be used, as intended by Rosecrans, for a *second* bridge at Chattanooga. He had to be talked to and convinced that the plan was feasible before he consented to it, and it is preposterous to suppose that, having learned of such a plan from Rosecrans, he should assert that to me belonged the credit for the *ingenuity which conceived* and the ability which executed the plan.

THOMAS'S REPORT, NOVEMBER 7.

* * * * *

Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command of the department devolved on me. *The bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed.*¹

On the 23d orders were sent to General Hooker to concentrate the Eleventh Corps and one division of the Twelfth at Bridgeport, informing him at the same time what his force was expected to accomplish, and that a force from this place would cooperate with him by establishing a bridge across the river at Browns Ferry and seizing the heights on the south or Lookout Valley side, *thus giving him an open road to Chattanooga when his forces should arrive.* * * *

It now remains only to take up the statement of Rosecrans in his paper published in the North American Review for December, 1885, which was written twenty-two years after the events, and which has for corroboration only the extract from the report of Thomas quoted above.

To answer this paper is a different matter from the analysis of telegrams and reports, for it leads to a direct conflict of statement.

General Rosecrans, in the paper to which I have referred, says:

I had been working with indefatigable energy to get ready the pontoons and material for a *third* pontoon bridge, which was indispensable for *securing and holding control of the south side of the river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga.*

On the 5th of October at 8 p. m. Meigs reports watching, on that morning, the laying of the pontoon bridge, which "will, I think, be completed early to-morrow. * * * *A ferry rope, and flatboat and a steamboat* * * * *afford the means of crossing at present.*" This was then the first bridge, *commenced two days* after my assignment to duty. October 6, General Morton, commanding Pioneer Brigade, reports to me that *forty boats* are in the bridge, "which will be completed to-night unless the *number of boats is found to be insufficient.*" There was evidently at that time no question of a second bridge, and much less of a third.

¹See Rosecrans's dispatch to Halleck of October 18 with reference to *second* bridge.

General Morton reports on the bridge:

HEADQUARTERS PIONEER BRIGADE,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October 15, 1863.

Brigadier-General SMITH,
Chief Engineer Department of the Cumberland.

GENERAL: The officer in charge of *the* bridge reports great quantities of driftwood against *it*; enough, in his opinion, to carry *it* away. I will proceed immediately to the bridge and see that everything is done to cut away the drift if possible. I would like to have instructions.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. ST. C. MORTON,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

I have stated that *as late as the 19th of October there was but one pontoon bridge connecting Chattanooga with the right bank of the Tennessee River*. The above dispatch from General Morton, commanding Pioneer Brigade, makes the statement good until the 15th of the month.

A dispatch from Rosecrans, already quoted and dated *October 18, 7.30 p. m.*, says: "Our *pontoon bridge* restored. *Boats for a second under way*;" and yet Rosecrans, in his paper, asserts "while completing the *first two bridges* Gen. William F. Smith arrived, and was assigned to duty as chief engineer." A reference to the quoted order will show *October 3* as the date of my assignment. General Rosecrans's statement is at variance with those of Meigs and Morton and with his dispatch of the *18th of October*.

Quoting again:

Hooker was advised that as soon as his wagon trains could be ready to move he would be ordered to cross the river at Bridgeport and follow the line of the road up to the vicinity of Wauhatchie. He was to be put in connection with the rest of the army by a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River at or near Browns Ferry, so that in case the enemy should attempt to crush him there would be no difficulty in receiving support from us by the short route across the neck of land between Chattanooga and Browns Ferry.

Hooker was more than once ordered to be ready to cross at Bridgeport, but there is not a line to show that Hooker ever received any intimation as to what he was to do. When was the bridge to be thrown, after or before Hooker arrived at Wauhatchie? If before, there would have been a necessity for a *detail of troops to seize and occupy territory for the southern end of the bridge* and specific instructions as to landing, etc. I hardly think General Rosecrans will assert that any such detail was made. There is also entire absence of orders to the Engineer Department. In his dispatch to Hooker of *October 18* Rosecrans requires "extraordinary efforts" on the repairs of road from "Bridgeport to Jasper." The whole army could not have made the road by Jasper to Chattanooga passable in six weeks.

That steamboat must be got ready so that we can freight to Shellmound, and thus shorten our wagon transportation. This will require us to hold both sides of the river and fortify, but make our depot on this side.

Thus, on the 18th, in his last order to Hooker, Rosecrans gives his plan, which is only to acquire the river on the left bank as high as Shellmound and fortify. Could anything be more different from the plan pursued? No lip of Browns Ferry or a third bridge.

Rosecrans continues:

The great difficulty was to obtain material for *this third pontoon bridge*. * * * So urgent was I to have this completed that I personally, and almost daily, visited the work. Colonel Stanley was running the sawmill to cut out what materials we had and searching among the houses for more.

* * * He [General Smith] was told what the plan was for opening communication with Bridgeport on the south side of the river and what preparations were in progress for its execution.

The last sentence is a very bald assertion by General Rosecrans without any corroboration. He never confided to me his plan, and, in fact, until the evening of the

18th of October no word ever passed between us having reference to the shortening of our line of communications. I knew of the order to Hooker, as did everyone else in the army, and I supposed that Hooker was to move from Bridgeport *toward Wauhatchie*. I did *not* suppose he would get far in that direction. As for telling me "what preparations were in progress for its execution," General Rosecrans is in error, for up to the time of his leaving there were no preparations whatever in progress unless, perhaps, Howard's bridge at Bridgeport might be considered in that light, and that was not in progress at that time, October 3. The orders to Hooker of October 1, occasionally renewed, were the only preparations ever made so far as I ever knew or heard of, and certainly the official records are silent on the subject. He goes on to say of the confidences to me "and moreover that upon the arrival of the troops *then on their way* I intended to drive the enemy from Missionary Ridge."

This confidence must have been made on October 3, for I was chief engineer, Hooker not up, and on October 2 Hooker was at Nashville. Thus, in nine days after giving up Lookout Mountain, he had *a sure plan* for the recapture of the "short line," and had expressed his determination to drive the enemy from Missionary Ridge as soon as the troops then on their way arrived. On the 16th, two weeks after this asserted confidence to me, Rosecrans, in a telegram to Halleck, says:

Had we the railroad from *here* [Chattanooga] to Bridgeport and the *whole* of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought up we should not probably outnumber the enemy.

Was it not then impossible for him at that time to talk of driving the enemy from a position almost impregnable to assault, and with an inferior force?

I am very positive that no such intentions were ever confided to me. I was at that time fortifying the place so that it could be held *by a comparatively small force*. Why? "I requested him to examine the river above Chattanooga with a view of ascertaining its capabilities and adaptation for a movement on the enemy's right at the north end of Missionary Ridge." In short, while we were starving, General Rosecrans had planned the mode of *retaking* the "short line," and had also planned the battle of Chattanooga, fought on the 23d, 24th, and 25th of November.

This was all new to me when I first read it. I never went up the river above Chattanooga until the 7th of November, and I am certain that up to that time the plan for the coming battle had never entered into the mind of anyone at Chattanooga.

A sketch was made of the river and route to Browns Ferry, the route by which the troops would be able to communicate from the Chattanooga side of the river with Lookout Valley, *over the pontoon bridge which we were straining every nerve to secure*.

No such sketch was ever made by me or by my direction, nor did I ever see any such sketch. When I arrived at Browns Ferry on the evening of the 19th of October and asked the name of the place, I am sure I heard of Browns Ferry for the first time.

Continuing:

The plan was talked over with General Thomas and Gen. Th. L. Coulton, and a copy of the sketch was sent to General Hooker, who was told to hurry up his transportation as rapidly as possible, so that on crossing the Tennessee River he would be able to subsist his troops directly from Bridgeport.

If any such conference took place, I am certain that on the 20th of October General Thomas had entirely forgotten it. I do not know who Gen. Th. L. Coulton was or why he should have been taken into a knowledge of plans which, if they leaked out and got into the hands of the enemy, might have been easily nipped in the bud. I can not find General Coulton's name in the volumes of *The Record* pertaining to the time and place now being considered.

Rosecrans, again:

On the 19th of October Gen. W. F. Smith accompanied me in a ride *along this route* and the *Tennessee near Browns Ferry*. We returned about sunset, when I found the telegram awaiting which *released* me from the command of the Army of the Cumberland.¹

General Rosecrans is again in error. He left headquarters with me that morning, but went into the hospital, as he said, for a few minutes. I waited half an hour or more and then went to the foot of the mountains below Williams Island and began my examination. I arrived at Browns Ferry shortly before sunset and remained there taking notes until I could no longer see the surface of the hills across the river. When I arrived at headquarters Rosecrans had been relieved.

Now, if Rosecrans had explained to me on the 3d of October the plan of a movement by Browns Ferry, it is hardly possible that I should not have been far advanced with my preparations, which could only have been made after a close study of the ground on both sides of the river. What earthly reason could there have been for his taking me on the 19th of October along "this route," *i. e.*, the route by which the troops would communicate "with Lookout Valley over the pontoon bridge which we were straining every nerve to secure." The purpose for which I made the examination is found in the subjoined extract from my report, and from that it will be seen that *I began below the head of Williams Island*, which was entirely unnecessary if Rosecrans had two weeks before perfected his plans, even to the sketches.

On the 18th of October I was instructed by General Rosecrans to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of Williams Island with a view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and storehouses, and *began the examination near the lower end of the island*. Following the river up, I found on the opposite bank, above the head of the island, a sharp range of hills whose base was washed by the river. This range extended up the river nearly to Lookout Creek, and was broken at Browns Ferry by a narrow gorge, through which ran the road to the old ferry, and also flowed a small creek. The valley between this ridge of hills and Raccoon Mountain was narrow, and a lodgment effected there would give us command of the Kelleys Ferry road and seriously interrupt the communication of the enemy up Lookout Valley and down to the river on Raccoon Mountain. The ridge seemed thinly picketed, and the evidences were against the occupation of that part of the valley by a large force of the enemy, and it seemed quite possible to take by surprise what could not have been carried by assault, if heavily occupied by an opposing force. * * *

Of Rosecrans's vague ideas which he communicated at various times to Dana and Meigs we get no two alike on different days, and *none* like the plan adopted. Meigs, on the 16th of October, at 8 p. m., looks forward to Rosecrans getting possession of the river to within 5 or 6 miles of Chattanooga.

On the same day Dana reports that Rosecrans says the holding of the river to Williams Island is a necessity—to be able to hold Chattanooga. That day Rosecrans's plan was held to—long enough to impress Meigs and Dana. On the 19th, however, he is waiting for certain conjunctions of conditions to *retake Lookout Mountain*. That plan has never been developed and would be studied with interest. Thomas held the river to within 3 miles of Chattanooga without retaking Lookout Mountain. Now as to Hooker's knowledge of the plan, which Rosecrans says he explained fully and accompanied with a sketch:

The order from Thomas to Hooker to concentrate is dated October 24, 2.30 p. m., and is very much in detail, and properly gives to the general who is to do the work the object of the movement—the roads to be watched and the *cooperations* he might expect.

¹In his paper Rosecrans calls this "a *ride* along this route—near Browns Ferry." In his note (October 19) to Thomas he says he is going to reconnoiter on the other side of the river. In my report I say I *reconnoitered* for a special purpose, which had no reference to Browns Ferry.

That Hooker had never had the plan given to him at an earlier date, and that he *failed to see the consequence* of the seizure of the hills at Browns Ferry, is shown by his reply to the order, as follows:

STEVENSON, October 24, 1863—7.15 p. m.

Major-General REYNOLDS:

I am informed by the people familiar with country on south side of Tennessee River that the direct route from Bridgeport to Browns Ferry is not practicable for wagons, and in order to take artillery to that point it will be necessary to take the road to within 2 miles of Trenton, and from there turn down Lookout Creek Valley; that there are several bridle paths leading from the crest of Lookout Mountain into the valley between Trenton and the river, and that infantry can descend the north slope of Lookout at many points. My informants are men who have grazed their stock on Lookout Mountain. *From the official map furnished me, there appears to be an ascent to the south of what is called Hotel Institute. If this is the case, from my present knowledge of the means at hand at Chattanooga to prevent enemy's infantry ascending the mountain from the south side, I can see no reason for his not detaching two-thirds of his force to thwart the execution of their [your] purposed object. I may be incorrect in my views of this movement, from the limited opportunity I have had in comparison with others to gain correct information, and only state the foregoing with the hope that I may be in error.*

JOSEPH HOOKER, Major-General.

Hooker is afraid of encountering *two-thirds* of the entire force of Bragg; he therefore does not see the significance of the movement on Browns Ferry.

"I may be incorrect in my views of this movement from the *limited opportunity I have had in comparison with others to gain correct information.*" "Does Hooker show, then, that Rosecrans had given him the plan shortly after he arrived at Stevenson, and when he first received order to concentrate, or at any later day when Rosecrans renewed the order? He does not believe in the movement. This explains in part Dana's dispatches as given herewith.

BRIDGEPORT, October 26, 1863—2 p. m.

The movement for the occupation of Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley was to have begun this morning. Everything is ready at Chattanooga and Palmer will be at Rankins Ferry in season, *but Hooker is behindhand and it is postponed till to-morrow.* The forces sent from here are Howard's two divisions and Geary's—10,000 men in all.

BRIDGEPORT, October 27, 1863—6.30 a. m.

Troops are now just moving out for Shellmound and Raccoon Mountain. No evidence to show that the rebels will oppose the undertaking. *Hooker came here from Stevenson last night. He is in an unfortunate state of mind for one who has to cooperate—fault-finding, criticising, dissatisfied. No doubt the chaos of Rosecrans's administration is as bad as he describes, but he is quite as truculent toward the plan he is now to execute as toward the impotence and confusion of the old régime.*

[C. A. DANA.]

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Now, one word as to the condition of the army at Chattanooga when Rosecrans was relieved. He says in this paper:

The author [General Grant] goes on to give the pitiable condition in which the Army of the Cumberland was at a date which he does not state, but leaves the implication that it was at the time of his arrival at Chattanooga. I affirm that when I left it, on the 20th of October, the Army of the Cumberland was in no such condition * * * as to supplies, rations, or fuel. * * * Doubtless the animals were *thin*, because forage was scarce.

Some of Rosecrans's dispatches will be given or referred to, showing a different picture from that drawn above. He acknowledges a loss of 400 wagons, which should mean 2,400 mules—a desperate loss, not made up in any way before he left.

October 12 he telegraphed the President:

* * * Our danger is subsistence [want of it, rather]. * * * Enemy's side of valley full of corn. Every exertion will be made to hold what we have and gain more, after which we must put our trust in God, who never fails those who truly trust.

But Bragg also was a devout man.

Rosecrans to Hooker October 16: "We must have some kind of roughness [long forage] for our mules when they come to Stevenson, or they will soon die. *None up here.* Please try to have it supplied till hay can be sent from Nashville."

No hay at Chattanooga and apparently none at Bridgeport. Animals died in consequence. October 12 he telegraphed to Halleck:

* * * The roads are very heavy. Our future is not bright. To secure this position wants McMinnville and Kingston strongly held and 20,000 troops put in Tennessee.

Ten days from that Thomas had changed the condition without reinforcements. Garfield says on the 17th: "There is no forage at all on the mountain"—Waldens Ridge.

The subjoined order shows that to keep animals from starving at Chattanooga they had to be sent by cars to Nashville.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 18, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER:

The general commanding has sent a number of animals, which the scarcity of forage will not permit us to retain at this place, under charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Simpson, quartermaster, en route to Nashville, where they can be properly cared for. He directs that these animals be sent from Stevenson on the empty cars returning to Nashville, and that they be shipped as soon as practicable after their arrival, that they may not consume what little forage there is in and about Stevenson.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

C. GODDARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

October 18 Rosecrans telegraphs to Hooker: * * * "It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here," which is different in tone from his statement in the North American Review, denying Grant's description of affairs October 23.

General Rosecrans quotes from Grant:

They [the general officers at Chattanooga] pointed out on the maps the line marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon,

And says—

no officer * * * ever told him that I contemplated falling back. The line, if any, which was pointed out to him was the line of communication by way of Browns Ferry, to be established between the troops in Chattanooga and the troops to come into Lookout Valley * * * and had no reference whatever to a line of retreat.

Mr. Dana's dispatches to Stanton show that Rosecrans looked to holding the line of the Cumberland Mountain if Bragg crossed the river above Chattanooga, and also to a retreat if the river could not be used as far up as Williams Island.

For the explanation of Rosecrans as to the lines "pointed out," is it not very remarkable that a plan, the success of which involved a surprise and therefore should be kept secret, was sketched on a map and exposed at headquarters and discussed by the officers who were calling on Grant? It seems too improbable a story to tell of any general, and certainly of Thomas. No such *sketch was ever made until after the river was won.*

One misquotation of General Rosecrans is important to this discussion.

General Thomas, in his report of the reopening of the river, dated November 7, says:

Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement.

Rosecrans quotes as follows:

In pursuance of the plan of General Rosecrans, the execution of which had been deferred until Hooker's transportation could be got, etc.

The discrepancy between the report and Rosecrans's translation of it is extraordinary, and unexplainable.

Rosecrans to Halleck, October 18, 7.30 p. m.: * * * "Forage and animals failing. Great efforts making to supply deficiencies."

To Meigs, same date: * * * "Relays will be necessary to maintain our position here. It will require great effort."

To Hooker, same date: * * * "It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here."

From Dana to Stanton, October 16: "Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight * * * except the opening of the river."

I could have paved the streets of Chattanooga with the bones of draft animals in the vicinity, and for the movement of the 7th of November Grant ordered impressment of private animals of officers to draw batteries. The remainder of Rosecrans's article in the North American Review contains assertions at variance with my statement. So far as I know they are not corroborated by a single line of official correspondence, all of which that is of record and pertains to the subject I have given in this paper.

Rosecrans probably had many plans, none of which were matured, as can be seen from the records, and which were changed daily. He never gave the slightest idea, so far as I have heard, to anyone that a movement on Browns Ferry formed a part of any plan. The whole history of the time shows that he had no thought of the principle of the Browns Ferry movement, which was to secure a footing in Lookout Valley *first*. Rosecrans's forces were "*stoshing*" around east of Bridgeport in a way to have attracted attention and made success impossible but for the fact that Longstreet was in command in Lookout Valley and was at loggerheads with Bragg.

Had Rosecrans had the real plan in his mind he would have allowed no reconnaissances in Lookout Valley, and would have had everything ready and moved as soon as Wheeler's raid was over, say October 10. He would then have continued in his independent command.

In the North American Review Rosecrans, in speaking of his interview with Grant at Stevenson October 21, says:

The suggestions to which the author [General Grant] alludes were a detail of the plan, already explained, for establishing communication between the army at Chattanooga and Hooker's troops on the south side of the river, which were to be brought up by the way of Wauhatchee to Lookout Valley. Doubtless they were "excellent suggestions," for they were precisely the ones which the author of the Century article [General Grant] followed.

Now, Rosecrans's dispatch to Halleck of October 19, written *after he had been relieved from command*, shows that he at that time had no plan, unless the expressed idea of retaking *Lookout Mountain* at some *indefinite* time in the future might be called a plan. That was certainly not the plan followed by Grant *six days after*, and therefore could not have been among the "excellent suggestions" of Rosecrans to Grant, and it follows that Grant could not have gone to Chattanooga with any such plan in his mind.

WM. FARRAR SMITH.

POSTSCRIPT.


Since this paper was written I have received two letters from Col. (formerly Capt.) P. V. Fox, who ran the two sawmills and made all the bridges that were made at Chattanooga during my term of service as chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. His letters are dated August 19 and September 11, 1891, and are full of interesting details as to his preparations for the work accomplished at Browns Ferry. In the first letter Colonel Fox says:

I never heard that the place for the bridge was Browns Ferry until told by you (confidentially). * * * Colonel Stanley had nothing whatever to do with running the sawmills or making the boats.



THE
DINOSAUR
BOOK

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Scale. 1 inch to the Mile

Camp Stevenson, Ala, Sept. 8, 1863

MAP OF CHATTANOOGA & VICINITY

compiled from the latest information, under direction of W. E. Merrill, Capt. Eng^s

Chief Engineer, Army of the Cumberland

Recd. Sept. 25 1863 without letter of transmittal

J. C. W.

In the second letter Colonel Fox says:

I regret that I can not fix the exact date that you took me to near Browns Ferry and showed me where the bridge was to be laid and the materials to be packed until wanted. My recollection is that it was about five days prior to the movement, and strict secrecy enjoined. My own men did not know until the 26th of October where the bridge was to be laid.

W. F. S.

GENERAL SMITH'S SECOND PRESENTATION OF HIS CLAIM, 1895.¹

THE HISTORY OF THE BROWNS FERRY OPERATION IN 1863, AS TAKEN FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE WAR.

The question as to who planned the movement for reopening the Tennessee River as a line of communication and supplies, by securing a permanent foothold in Look-out Valley, was never brought before the public until December, 1885, when General Rosecrans in a bitter article in the *North American Review* attacked General Grant for using an expression in a paper on Chattanooga, published in the November issue of the *Century Magazine*, in which, inferentially, General Grant claimed the plan as his own. General Rosecrans asserted that he was the sole author of the plan in question, and made statements in much detail to substantiate his claim. As his paper was written twenty-two years after the event, and is unsupported by reference to a single outside authority, it is presumable that it was written from his own memory, a presumption strengthened by the fact that he is at various points in direct conflict with his own and other correspondence in the *Official Record*, and also with his sworn testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War given in 1865, two years after the occurrences which he discusses, and when his memory was supposably much less liable to play tricks with him. Twenty-two years is a long period for a human memory to stand the test of being able to furnish forth a statement of facts for history without having any support from official or other papers which would be useful to direct it and stimulate a reader's faith. Since the publication of the paper referred to in the *North American Review* other persons have made the same claim for General Rosecrans, having little or no personal knowledge of the question and advancing no authorities to reenforce their unfounded assertions. Under this latter class will come Gen. H. V. Boynton, one of the commissioners of the National Military Park at Chickamauga and Chattanooga, whose very office should preclude the introduction by him of any matter into the history made in that locality which will find no place in the pages of any historian who analyzes the published *Official Records* of that period.

I propose to furnish from those records a history of every effort made from the 24th of September, 1863, not only looking forward to the betterment of the lines of supplies in use between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, but to the acquiring of the whole, or any valuable portion of the short line on the left bank of the Tennessee River from Chattanooga to Bridgeport, given up on the 24th of September and reestablished on the 27th and 28th of October of that year. (References to *Official Record* will give page and serial number of volume only.)

After the army withdrew to Chattanooga on the 22d of September, 1863, it took up a line about 3½ miles in length from the mouth of Chattanooga Creek on the south to Citico Creek on the north. The right bank of the river only was occupied above and below the line around the town of Chattanooga, and with only the force necessary to watch fords and ferries, and prevent or give notice of crossings to turn the flanks of the army. The abandonment of the country south of Chattanooga Creek carried with it the loss of the short road to Bridgeport over the nose of Look-out Mountain (about 28 miles in length), and compelled the use of the longer roads

¹Throughout this reprint of General Smith's second pamphlet, "Vol." in his footnote references should be "Serial No."

over Waldens Ridge, the shortest of which was about double the length of the one throughout Lookout Valley and the passes in Raccoon Mountain. Rosecrans on the 24th of September ordered his supplies by the longer road, and that same day ordered a survey for a road via Jasper on the right of the river which should be safe from the artillery fire of the enemy on the other side of the river.¹ The valley of Lookout on the short line was promptly occupied by the enemy, who on the same day captured a ferryboat, which had been used from Moccasin Point to near the mouth of Lookout Creek.² Bridges to communicate with the right bank at Chattanooga on the new line of supplies thus became an absolute necessity, and for want of boats, two trestle bridges were thrown to be replaced at the earliest possible moment by pontoon bridges, the lumber for which the chief engineer was ordered to send forward from below.³ General Rosecrans as early as the 27th, three days after abandoning it, expressed an expectation of recovering the short line, "when reinforcements should arrive."⁴ He, however, developed no plan of action which is of record. On the 30th of September General Wheeler began his celebrated raid on the communications, and all use of the railroad between Nashville and Bridgeport for moving supplies was stopped until the 9th of October.⁵ During the raid about 350 wagons (500 says Rosecrans)⁶ belonging to trains in the Sequatchee Valley were captured—the wagons burned and the mules killed or driven off.⁷ The loss of so much transportation and supplies crippled the army seriously, and its effects were felt immediately, and lasted for months. The arrival of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps under Hooker at Nashville during the last days of September was opportune, as the troops of the Twelfth Corps were rapidly thrown to unprotected points on the railroad, and much damage thereby avoided. General Rosecrans was undoubtedly, as he expressed to General Meigs, quoted above, looking forward to using Hooker's command to reopen the line of supplies through Lookout Valley, for on the 1st of October⁸ Hooker was ordered to put down a pontoon bridge at Bridgeport and make immediate preparations for crossing his command. He had been previously ordered to secure a large supply of tools for his command, "the nature of the country through which you are to operate requires that special care be taken in this matter."⁹ The object of this order will never be known. The roads into Lookout Valley were in good condition, and no extra amount of tools could be required for repairs. Perhaps they were required for the construction of a bridgehead to which he refers in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of War.¹⁰ Reference to this will be made later on.

Wheeler's raid interfered with the arrival of the troops at Bridgeport, and with the order of October 1, as to concentration. Howard's corps (Eleventh), however (numbering about 6,000), arrived at Bridgeport by the 3d¹¹ and the bridge there was laid by the 6th.¹² (I was appointed chief engineer of the department October 3. See page 62, O. R. 53.) At Chattanooga a pontoon¹³ bridge, to replace the trestle bridges, rendered impassable by a rise in the river, was begun on the 5th and finished on the 6th.¹⁴ When the pontoon bridge was being laid to connect Chattanooga with the new

¹ Vol. 52, p. 813, Official Record.

² Vol. 52, p. 830, Official Record.

³ Vol. 52, p. 911, Official Record.

⁴ Vol. 52, p. 890, Official Record.

⁵ Vol. 52, p. 950, and Vol. 53, p. 209.

⁶ Vol. 52, p. 114.

⁷ Vol. 53, p. 58.

⁸ Vol. 53, p. 25.

⁹ Vol. 52, p. 954.

¹⁰ Report on Conduct of the War, vol. 111, 1865, p. 33.

¹¹ Vol. 53, p. 49.

¹² Vol. 53, pp. 91 and 160.

¹³ Vol. 53, p. 101.

¹⁴ Vol. 53, p. 123.

line of supplies from Bridgeport *there was but a flatboat and ferry rope and a small steamer (the Paint Rock) to keep open communication with the right bank.*¹ With the addition of a flying bridge, placed above the pontoon bridge at a later date, *no other bridge was laid at Chattanooga until after the battle of Chattanooga* in November, a constant and imperative need for boats and bridge material for other places arising as fast as they could be gotten out in sufficient lengths for river bridges. The fact that but one pontoon bridge was laid while General Rosecrans was in command² is proven up to 7.30 p. m. of October 18 by authorities cited, and also by sundry dispatches from Mr. Dana of about October 18.³

The modification of the orders to Hooker of the 1st of October by the letter of October 4 placed⁴ him in charge of the protection of the portion of the railroad between Wartrace and Bridgeport, and on that day the Twelfth Corps had the guarding of the road from Wartrace to Tanton and the Eleventh Corps had the road from Tanton to Bridgeport.⁵ On the 7th of October this disposition of Hooker's command was seemingly made more lasting by relieving from railroad duty the division of Gen. J. D. Morgan⁶ (Reserve Corps, Army of the Cumberland) and ordering it to Andersons Crossroads to protect the wagon road at that point. The hope, however, still existed, as expressed by Rosecrans on October 4,⁷ that after the destruction of Wheeler's force Hooker's command might be brought across the river. As this movement, however, did not seem imminent, Hooker was ordered, October 7, to begin the repair of the wagon road from Bridgeport to Jasper, under the idea that⁸ "a large part of our supplies must for the present be brought over that route."

The same day⁹ the pontoons not in use at Bridgeport were ordered to be put in immediate readiness for use up the river. On the 10th,¹⁰ Morgan, before ordered to Andersons Cross Roads, was directed to establish his headquarters at Battle Creek, and begin a thorough repair of the road to Jasper and beyond.¹¹ On the same day Hooker was ordered to put a force at work constructing two substantial corduroy roads from Bridgeport to Battle Creek.

The damage done by the raid to the railroad was repaired, and trains set in motion on the 9th, but in place of ordering a concentration of Hooker's forces at Bridgeport for a movement across the river to reopen the short line, the idea seems to have been abandoned, when heavy repairs were ordered on the route via Jasper. With any successful plan put in operation, three days at the most would have been required to complete the work of recapturing the short line. The other route would have taken months to have made of it a decent wagon road. The whole of the road from Bridgeport to the foot of the mountains, about 40 miles, was in alluvial soil, and for a wet-weather road would be required a regular corduroy roadway, or else, much more expensive in point of time, a roadway of stone. On the mountains the road was rough from the rocks and filled with deep holes of soft mud into which animals would flounder belly deep and wheels would go in up to the axles. The two kinds of road required repair for nearly 70 miles.

If General Rosecrans had, as he asserted, a plan for opening the short line between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, it is difficult to understand his reason for beginning the

¹ Vol. 53, p. 102. Italics throughout are by General Smith.

² Vol. 53, pp. 102-123-152; Merrill to Garfield, p. 388; Morton to Smith, pp. 455 and 456; Rosecrans to Halleck and Dresser to Rosecrans.

³ Vol. 50, p. 221.

⁴ Vol. 53, pp. 88, 89, 90.

⁵ Vol. 53, pp. 93 and 94.

⁶ Vol. 53, p. 157.

⁷ Vol. 53, pp. 88 and 90.

⁸ Vol. 53, p. 159.

⁹ Vol. 53, p. 165.

¹⁰ Vol. 53, p. 257.

¹¹ Vol. 53, p. 261.

repair of the long route, almost a herculean task, instead of bending all his energies to the recapture of the short line, thereby saving immense labor, and freeing enough of the troops from the guarding and repairing of the long line to more than furnish the necessary guards for the railroad from Wartrace to Bridgeport. By the 10th of October the animals were failing rapidly and rations getting very short.¹ One of the wagon roads from Jasper to Chattanooga led by a rough mountain road called Haley's trace, which came down from Waldens Ridge into the valley of the Tennessee near the northern end of Raccoon Mountain, and was under musketry fire for a mile and a half from the southern side of the river. On the 11th of October that road was closed by sharpshooters posted on the northern flank of Raccoon Mountain.² This was a most serious blow to the maintenance of the army at Chattanooga, as it increased the length of the supply road by miles, and already it was much longer, as was shown by decreasing rations in store at Chattanooga, than comported with the safety of the Army of the Cumberland. On the 12th General Rosecrans, feeling the gravity of the situation, sent the following telegram to the President,³ probably in answer to Mr. Lincoln's dispatch of the same date and page:

CHATTANOOGA, October 12, 1863—3 p. m.

HON. A. LINCOLN,
President of the United States:

Line from here to Kingston is long; our side is barren mountain; rebel side has railroad. *Our danger is subsistence.* We can not bring up Hooker to cover our left against a crossing above us for want of means to transport provisions and horse feed. Enemy's side of valley full of corn. Every exertion will be made to hold what we have and gain more, after which we must put our trust in God, who never fails those who truly trust.

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*

The despondent tone of this dispatch found good reason for existence in the fact that it had been impossible even under repeated orders from the General in Chief to get Burnside down from East Tennessee to cover Rosecrans's left flank above Chattanooga, and the latter saw, day by day, the roads to Bridgeport getting worse, the animals dying of starvation, and apparently no prospect of escape from impending disaster.

Rosecrans, however, had a fertile and active mind, and the same day in which he sent the foregoing dispatch he telegraphed to Hooker⁴ asking if he could send a division to start at daylight the next morning (13th) for Shellmound with an advance brigade pushed to the pass at Whiteside, about 8 miles beyond, and suggesting that the men could take *ten days' rations in haversack and knapsack.*

To this Hooker⁴ replied that he could only send infantry, as the battery horses had but just arrived and could hardly be in readiness that early. Rosecrans⁴ then announced that he would delay the order until the batteries were ready, and directing that a report be made to him when they were prepared to move. That was the last of that plan. The following was the report of Mr. Dana on that same morning (October 12):⁵

Rosecrans, who is sometimes as obstinate and inaccessible to reason as at others he is irresolute, vacillating, and inconclusive, pettishly rejected all their arguments [Granger and Garfield] and the mountain was given up. It is difficult to say which was the greatest error, this order [giving up Lookout Mountain] or that which on the day of battle created the gap in our lines. At any rate, such is our present situation; our animals starved and the men with starvation before them, and the enemy bound

¹53—pp. 206, 306-307. Meigs to Stanton and Rosecrans to President.

²Vol. 53, pp. 281, 282.

³Vol. 53, pp. 306, 307.

⁴Vol. 53, p. 322.

⁵Vol. 50, p. 255.

to make desperate efforts to dislodge us. In the midst of this the commanding general devotes that part of the time which is not employed in pleasant gossip to the composition of a long report to prove that the Government is to blame for his failure. It is my duty to declare that while few persons exhibit more estimable social qualities, I have never seen a man possessing talent with less administrative power, less clearness and steadiness in difficulty, and greater practical incapacity than General Rosecrans. He has inventive fertility and knowledge, but he has no strength of will and no concentration of purpose. His mind scatters; there is no system in his busy days and restless nights, no courage against individuals in his composition, and with great love of command he is a feeble commander.

He is conscientious and honest, just as he is imperious and disputations; always with a strong grain of caprice and an overwhelming passion for the approbation of his personal friends and the public outside.

Now, when the Haley's trace in the valley was shut up by the sharpshooters of the enemy there were two roads left open, one going to Andersons Cross Roads, and so by the Anderson road entering the valley of the Tennessee nearly opposite Chattanooga, the other going still farther up the Sequatchee Valley to Hensons, and thence over Waldens Ridge to Poes Tavern, higher up the Tennessee.

The occupation of Shellmound and the use of the river from Bridgeport to that place¹ would have saved 8 miles of land haul to Chattanooga, but did not avoid the ascent and descent of Waldens Ridge with its 1,200 feet of elevation, and though every mile saved was a decided gain, yet this was not enough to give hopes of security to the army at Chattanooga. In the closing paragraph of the last dispatch referred to, Rosecrans stated that the object of the move was to get possession of the line of the river to Chattanooga. No movement could have attained that purpose which did not *enter and control Lookout Valley*; this the occupation of Whiteside, supposing it could be held, did not do.

Lookout Valley itself could not have been held by Hooker's force, isolated from the army at Chattanooga, as it would have been, without a bridge from the valley to the north or right bank of the river. The occupation of Shellmound by Hooker would have inevitably led to the occupation of Lookout Valley in force by Bragg, which in its turn would have prevented Rosecrans from gaining a foothold in the valley to allow a bridge to be thrown. In addition to this, no bridge had been ordered for that or any other purpose. The Michigan Engineer Battalion was getting out boats and other materials for a bridge, but another bridge was imperiously demanded at Chattanooga, and at that time not a sufficiency of boats had been built for that. No detail of troops had been made to support the bridge builders, or to hold the left bank while the bridge was being thrown into Lookout Valley. Taking all things into account, therefore, it seems to have been wise on the part of Rosecrans not to have pushed that movement to a conclusion. That he had expressed an idea that in some way such a movement by Hooker would open the river is shown by the dispatch of Mr. Dana² of October 14, in which he says Rosecrans has ordered Hooker to *concentrate* his troops preparatory to seizing the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupying Shellmound, and if possible Lookout Valley. *There was no order for concentration*,³ only a request for information as to whether Hooker could move a division by daylight the next morning, and, as expressed in the message, *only to Shellmound, with an advance brigade to Whiteside*, several miles from Lookout Valley. Mr. Dana's dispatch was dated two days after the message to Hooker, and yet Rosecrans had not given any order to Hooker to move, though he knew Hooker's battery horses had arrived on the 12th. Rosecrans had either seen the futility and danger of such

¹A further dispatch to Hooker of the 12th (Vol. 53, p. 323) urges him to push work on the steamer being built at Bridgeport, on the ground that it is of primary importance, showing that the expectation was to use the boat to Shellmound.

²Vol. 50, p. 216.

³Rosecrans frequently makes mistakes of that kind in giving his information to Mr. Dana.

a move, or else he was in the condition described by Mr. Dana in his dispatch of October 16.¹

Notwithstanding the seeming importance of, and what might have been hoped by Rosecrans in quick results from, the move in contemplation on the 12th, Rosecrans on the 14th² of October ordered a *railroad* built from Bridgeport to Battle Creek, on the long line to Chattanooga, and nothing more is heard of the move to Shellmound.

This plan for a movement to Shellmound, as we learn from Mr. Dana,³ Assistant Secretary of War (who was with Rosecrans to report everything of interest, and to whom Rosecrans was bound to give all information of importance), looked forward in some remote way to gaining a foothold in Lookout Valley, and perhaps even the *recapture of Lookout Mountain*,⁴ either of which objects gained would have solved the problem of supplying the Army of the Cumberland with food and forage. This was abandoned, though, as before stated, Rosecrans knew that on the 12th the battery horses were then at Bridgeport, but would not be in condition for a movement on the 13th. However, there should have been no difficulty in having them ready by the 14th. The railroad was therefore ordered to be begun when Hooker's excuse for not moving was *no longer of value* and the Shellmound plan, with its hopes of Lookout Valley and Lookout Mountain gained, must have been abandoned, because Rosecrans himself had lost faith in it.

On the 16th of October it became necessary, owing to high water, to throw a pontoon bridge across the Sequatchie near Jasper, as one of the roads over the mountain crossed that river just above the town, and this necessity made an inroad upon the supply of pontoons saved, as before noticed, for use up the river, but for which transportation had been and was at that time lacking. These circumstances therefore precluded the idea of boats from below for a bridge into Lookout Valley, and above *there* was no thought on the part of anyone at that time of putting together materials for such a bridge. Now we will take a look at the condition of the roads and the army about this date.

On the 15th of October General Garfield was ordered to Washington, and he reports by letter frequently to General Rosecrans, giving particulars as to character of road and deficiencies observed.⁵ Other references are given herewith.⁶ These take the history up to and including the 18th of October. Some are so pregnant of hints that extracts will be given from them, as follows: On the 16th of October the Secretary of War telegraphs to General Meigs,⁷ Quartermaster-General, directing him to remain in the Department of the Cumberland because "all reports indicate the necessity of a controlling and regulating mind where you are," to which Meigs replies on the same day:⁷

If this be so [raiders dispersed], the Twelfth Corps can be called forward by General Rosecrans. It appears to be of vital importance that he gets possession of the river at least as far as the rebel batteries on Lookout Mountain will permit him to use it—to repair the roads over Waldens Ridge, so as to make it possible to throw full supplies of rations and forage into Chattanooga by wagon trains. It will require much work *and more time, I fear, than can be spared*. The road from Bridgeport to Battle Creek will, after the rains, be almost impassable.

General Meigs was at Chattanooga by order of the Secretary of War, was a man of great ability, and a high official of the United States Army. He says, on the 16th,

¹ Vol 50, p. 218.

² Vol. 53, p. 349.

³ Vol. 50, p. 216.

⁴ See Rosecrans's dispatch to Halleck of the 16th, comparing the forces in the two armies, and then see if Rosecrans could have dreamed of recapturing Lookout Mountain.

⁵ Vol. 53, Oct. 16, pp. 415–416; Oct. 17, 435–436.

⁶ Vol. 53, pp. 396, 397, 418, 421, 428, 435, 437, 441, 443, 445, 446, 461, 462, 467.

⁷ Vol. 53, p. 413.

two days after Rosecrans ordered the railroad to be built from Bridgeport to Jasper, that this long road will require more time than can be spared—more time than the army could stay at Chattanooga under the short rations then being issued.

General Meigs also says it is of vital importance that he (Rosecrans) get possession of the river at least as far as the rebel batteries on Lookout Mountain will permit him to use it—that is, within 5 or 6 miles of Chattanooga.

Rosecrans, in the *North American Review*, October,¹ 1885, says that he talked over the recovery of the “short line”² with Thomas, and a General Colton explained it all to his chief engineer, sent a sketch to Hooker descriptive of the route to Browns Ferry, ordered him to hurry up his transportation, etc. After all these confidences of Rosecrans it would seem as though he would have included among those entitled to know a plan matured so early in October, General Meigs, whose power was so great, and who was in constant correspondence with the Secretary of War, and yet on the 16th of October he is ignorant of any such plan, and stated only a fact patent to everyone “that it was of vital importance to get possession of the river to within five or six miles of Chattanooga.” On that same day Meigs³ telegraphs to Rosecrans—of tools “you can order what you need. General Howard has 300 men *on the road to Battle Creek*, having no tools for more. A large force ought to be at work on each slope of the mountain. * * * Forage and feed depots are needed at each base of the mountain to feed passing trains.” Meigs also telegraphs Hooker⁴ thus:

OCTOBER 16—8 p. m.

Major-General HOOKER: It is of the utmost importance that a corduroy road be made to beyond Battle Creek in the direction of Jasper with a good bridge over Battle Creek. Twenty-five hundred each of picks, spades, and axes went to Stevenson a week ago, yet General Howard had, when I saw him, tools only for 300 men. Please send them forward. I have ordered more tools to be sent from Nashville. I think the road should be so located that a covered way or epaulement⁵ may be thrown up to protect it from the enemy across the Tennessee, where it is near the river. A large body of troops, with tools both for earth and rock work, ought to be set to work immediately on the ascent and descent of Walden's Ridge. This is essential to supplying the Army by that route. As the road is, after these rains, the supply over it will be impossible. Forage depots and posts to rest and feed mules should be established at the base of the mountain on each side. Teams too weak to climb the mountain could haul forage to these points. I shall work here to-morrow and then return to Nashville, and will probably be in Stevenson in a few days. If the rebel cavalry is dispersed can you not call forward the Twelfth Corps?

M. C. MEIGS,
Quartermaster-General.

The above dispatch was sent direct to Hooker, showing how deeply anxious Meigs was, and how little he expected of action from Rosecrans.

The 16th was an exciting day for those who were reporting on the condition of the Army at Chattanooga, as is shown by the following:⁶

16th—12 m.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Nothing can prevent the retreat of the Army from this place within a fortnight, and with a vast loss of public property and possibly of life, except the opening of the river. General Hooker⁷ has been ordered to prepare for this, but Rosecrans thinks he can not move till his transportation arrives from Nashville, from which place it marched on the 8th. It should have been in Bridgeport on the 14th, but is not yet reported. The telegraph between there and here is broken, however, and it now requires ten or twelve hours for couriers to make the distance.

¹ Vol. 53, p. 413.

² At the time of or before I was made chief of engineers, viz, October 3.

³ Vol. 53, p. 413.

⁴ Vol. 53, p. 526.

⁵ At point commanded by rebel sharpshooters mentioned before.

⁶ Vol. 50, p. 218.

⁷ Mr. Dana was misinformed by General Rosecrans. Every order to Hooker having reference to concentration has been given.

In the midst of all these difficulties General Rosecrans seems to be insensible to the impending danger, and dawdles with trifles in a manner which can scarcely be imagined. Having completed his report, which he sent off to Washington by General Garfield yesterday, he is now much occupied with the map of the battlefield and with the topography of the country *between here and Burnside's lower posts*. Most probably the enemy contemplates crossing in that region, but we are no longer able to pursue him, hardly to strike a sudden blow at his flank before he shall have crushed Burnside. Meanwhile, with plenty of zealous and energetic officers ready to do whatever can be done, all this precious time is lost because our dazed and mazy commander can not perceive the catastrophe that is close upon us, *nor fix his mind upon the means of preventing it*. I never saw anything which seemed so lamentable and hopeless.

A rebel officer last evening shouted to one of our pickets that Bragg had been relieved and either Johnston or Longstreet put in his place. Reports from our cavalry, which Rosecrans will forward to-day, make the rebel loss in the recent raid 2,000 men and 5 guns. Thirty-eight men captured in our uniform were summarily executed. Nothing heard from forces of Sherman.

C. A. DANA.

And four hours later:¹

CHATTANOOGA, October 16—4 p. m.

I have just had a full conversation with General Rosecrans upon the situation. He says the possession of the river, as far up as the head of Williams Island at least, is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible for him to make any movement toward gaining such possession until General Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. Hooker's troops are now scattered along the line of the railroad and can not be got together before next Wednesday. The wagons must all have arrived by that time, and if the enemy does not interfere sooner the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted. Rosecrans, however, expects that as soon as the weather will allow the enemy will cross the river in force on our left, and then it will be necessary for us to fight a battle, or else to retreat from here and attempt to hold the line of the Cumberland Mountains.

It will be seen from the foregoing dispatch that Rosecrans had faced the possibility of being obliged to hold the line of the Cumberland Mountains, i. e., to give up Chattanooga.² Now, on the 16th of October Rosecrans could not have retreated over Waldens Ridge, nor could he have moved far to fight a battle outside of his lines. His men were too weak for a lengthened march and battle; he had no horses for his artillery, nor draft animals of any kind for his ammunition. Under the idea of a crossing by Bragg to the northward, which idea Bragg repudiates, the only possible way for Rosecrans to get the short line of march to head Bragg off was by Bridgeport, to turn the south flank of the Great Cumberland Plateau. This required the reopening of the "short line," which from the account of Mr. Dana was not in the thoughts of General Rosecrans.

On the same day, one and one-half hours after Mr. Dana's report, Rosecrans utters the following wail to Halleck, in which there is no hope of a reopening of the "short line" nor any outlook of promise within the limits of human probability. When the dispatch of 5.30 of the 16th of October was sent, there was in Rosecrans's mind no plan for opening the "short line" to Bridgeport.

The enemy will probably operate on our left flank, either to cross the river and force us to quit this place and fight them or lose our communications. They will thus separate us from Burnside. We can not feed Hooker's troops on our right, nor can we spare them subsistence from our left depots and communications, nor has he transportation to move. The rains have raised the river and interrupted our pontoon bridges. The roads are very heavy. Our future is not bright. Had we the railroad from here to Bridgeport, and the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought up, we should not probably outnumber the enemy. This army, with its back to barren mountains, roads narrow and difficult, while the enemy has the railroad and the corn in his rear, is at much disadvantage. To secure this position, at least McMinnville should be made a strong fortified depot; Kingston the same, and for ulterior operations *twenty thousand or more troops put in Tennessee*, at easy points to cover the railroad and subsist until called to the front.

¹ Vol. 50, p. 219.

² The idea which he so fiercely repudiates in the North American Review

Here is Rosecrans stating in the most positive manner that he expected the enemy to operate on his left flank, which would force him to quit Chattanooga and fight them or lose his communications, which he has stated he was anxious to abandon, and had planned early in the month to do, for a better line south of the river; but up to this date, with the exception of the order of October 1,¹ suspended as it was by the order of October 4,² no line emanating from him has squinted toward a movement to recapture Lookout Valley, nor has he given to Dana or Meigs any hint of such a plan being on foot. Every effort except the spasmodic one of October 12 has been directed to make the long route serviceable for the entire work of supplying the army at Chattanooga. He also stated what, in his opinion, was necessary to secure the position at Chattanooga, viz: To make of McMinnville a strong fortified depot; Kingston the same, and for ulterior operations *twenty thousand or more troops put into Tennessee*. While all this was being done, if it had been practicable, what was to become of the army at Chattanooga, which had, according to Mr. Dana, who was not exaggerating, not a fortnight longer to hold the place unless the river was opened? The dispatch of Rosecrans is utterly without hope, and to say that behind that was a well-matured plan *for doing anything* is without foundation. Yet in ten days from that time without a man or wagon added to his army and with less of rations Thomas had conquered the situation and saved Chattanooga.

On the 17th of October³ Rosecrans directs Innes, railroad superintendent, to lay a track to Jasper, 12 miles, and build two railroad bridges, and all this on the long road over the mountains. On that day Hooker⁴ takes charge of the long route to Anderson, Morgan having been moved to the Tennessee River above Chattanooga.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 17, 1863—10 p. m.

Major-General HOOKER:

If the enemy should attempt to cross the Tennessee in force above us, it will be necessary for your command to come up. The general commanding directs you to make such preliminary preparations as will enable you to move promptly and effectually. To this end the Twelfth Corps ought to be as far down as is consistent with the protection of the exposed points of the railroad. The presence of cavalry in the direction of Athens, as directed in the order to General Mitchell sent to your care, will secure us against heavy raids in the direction of the lower valley of the Tennessee.

Your artillery will not be indispensable, since we have sixteen reserve batteries, which we can not keep equipped for want of horse feed. The horses will be sent up the valley soon if we do not get forage.

If Sherman comes in from Huntsville the general commanding will be able to concentrate and move your entire strength at once, according to circumstances. We must have the river, and that soon. He desires you to send scouts to obtain news from Sherman, and to direct General Crook to do so also. Generals Mitchell and Crook must keep open communication with you and carry out the orders for foraging. The general commanding desires careful estimates of the available forage in the country where they are.

I am, general, very respectfully,

C. GODDARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.

Now, if Rosecrans could not move Hooker toward Lookout Valley for want of transportation, how could he move him over Waldens Ridge to help defend Rosecrans's left? He is, however, to make preliminary preparations to enable him to move promptly and effectually. Rosecrans suggests that in that view the Twelfth Corps ought to be as far down—that is, toward Bridgeport—as is possible and yet protect the railroad.

On the 1st of October Hooker was ordered to concentrate at Bridgeport; that order was suspended on the 4th. On the 12th Rosecrans suggested the movement of a division to Shellmound, which he translated to Mr. Dana into an order to concen-

¹ Vol. 53, p. 25.

² Vol. 53, p. 90.

³ Vol. 53, p. 437.

⁴ Vol. 53, p. 445.

trate.¹ Nothing more was heard of that, and now on the 17th he wildly suggests bringing down the Twelfth Corps nearer to Bridgeport, taking care, however, not to leave the railroad exposed, and this effort at increasing the force at Bridgeport was the last pretense at concentration. He had, however, sent Howard's troops as far up as Anderson (24 miles above Jasper), which would be in the direction of the move indicated by Rosecrans in his dispatch.

The last paragraph is, however, the important one in showing that Rosecrans, unless forced by a turning movement of Bragg, had no expectation of moving Hooker until Sherman's arrival, when "*Hooker's whole force could be concentrated, and would move according to circumstances.*" He feels, however, that the possession of the river soon is a necessity; yet Sherman's advance did not reach Bridgeport until near the middle of November, and the river had at that time been ours for over two weeks. Rosecrans said the plan followed for recapturing the river was entirely his own, and given to Grant October 21 at Stevenson. If that plan had been in his mind he could have carried it out and had the river open before the order came superseding him.

He had in his hands everything that Thomas had on the 26th of October.

Under the last order of Rosecrans, Hooker gives to the Twelfth Corps the care of the railroad from Wartrace to Bridgeport, leaving Howard with his 6,000 men stretching from Bridgeport to Anderson, nearly 40 miles.

The concentration is not yet visible, *but Hooker has carried out the order to the very letter.*

On the 18th, at 7.30 p. m., Rosecrans sends to Halleck the following:²

Enemy in front. Rumor of his moving a corps up as if to cross at Washington. River at a stand. Our pontoon bridge restored. Boats [for] a second under way. Roads horrid. Forage and animals failing. Great efforts making to supply deficiencies. Rumored fighting of General Burnside's command 60 miles north of Knoxville. Weather unsettled. No news from Sherman.

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General.*

No hope expressed of opening the "short line" or of intending to make the effort.

In the above telegram it is necessary to call attention to the statement "Our pontoon bridge restored. Boats for a second under way" and to recollect that this was made at 7.30 p. m. of the 18th of October.³

The following order to Hooker shows a mind distracted by two ideas—one to get the road made passable from Bridgeport to Jasper and the other to get freight by water to Shellmound, neither plan aiding the other, as the road from Shellmound, as has been shown, struck the Anderson road *above* Jasper.

Shellmound, however, had to be occupied and fortified before the river could be used. The utmost, however, that Rosecrans could hope from that plan was to use the river to Shellmound. There is no suggestion of an effort to secure and use it above, and yet here we are at the 18th of October.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, October 18, 1863.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson:*

It will be necessary to *make extraordinary efforts to get the road passable from Bridgeport to Jasper.* Also to have rations thrown into Stevenson as rapidly as possible. It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here. That steamboat must be got ready, so that we can freight to Shellmound, and thus shorten our wagon transportation. This will require *us to hold both sides of the river and fortify*, but make our depot on this side. I must confide the pushing up of the repairs to the wagon

¹See dispatch of Dana to Stanton, October 14, 12 m., given above.

²Vol. 53, pp. 455-456.

³This "second bridge" refers, of course, to one for Chattanooga, which was a military necessity, as one bridge was not enough to do the work required, and, that broken, left the army with its back to an impassable stream. This second bridge was therefore the first thing for Thomas to consider and order on assuming command.

roads and seeing that our supplies are brought forward to your care, as the remoteness of our position and the necessity of the active authority and intervention of officers of high rank are absolutely necessary to the preservation of our army.

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General*.

On the 19th of October, 1863, at 6.20 p. m., Rosecrans acknowledges the receipt of the order placing Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland.¹ One hour and forty minutes after that acknowledgment he sent to Halleck the following:²

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *October 19, 1863—8 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. W. H. HALLECK,
General in Chief:

Your dispatch of the 18th received. Sherman's movement will operate favorably, and the cavalry force will be timely. Lookout was given up temporarily, because we could not then safely hold it. It was isolated from us by distance and the defile of Chattanooga Creek. We expect to retake it as soon as we are prepared to hold it. *That could be done only when the railroad being secured, the depots replenished, and Hooker's transportation provided.* Without that he can not subsist in a suitable position.³

W. S. ROSECRANS, *Major-General*.

A dispatch sent at such a time, which was unnecessary except for self-justification, would naturally have contained his best hopes and last plans for recovering his lost line.

His plan, as developed then, was to retake Lookout Mountain, but only when he was prepared to hold it, and that could not be until the railroad was secured, the depots replenished, and Hooker's transportation provided—a most indefinite time in the future.

This dispatch was sent on the evening of the day on which Rosecrans, in his testimony⁴ two years after the fact says, "on the 19th of October, on my returning from selecting the position of the pontoon bridge, I received orders to turn over the command, etc."

In the *North American Review* (December, 1885), twenty-two years after that day, Rosecrans says:

While completing the first two bridges, Gen. William F. Smith arrived, and was assigned to duty as chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. He was told what the plan was for opening communications with Bridgeport on the south side of the river, and what preparations were in progress for its execution. A sketch was made of the river and route to Browns Ferry, the route by which troops would be able to communicate from the Chattanooga side of the river with Lookout Valley over the pontoon bridge, which we were straining every nerve to secure. The plan was talked over with General Thomas and Gen. Thomas L. Colton and a copy of the sketch was sent to General Hooker, who was told to hurry up his transportation as rapidly as possible, so that on crossing the Tennessee River he would be able to subside his troops directly from Bridgeport. On the 19th of October Gen. W. F. Smith accompanied me in a ride *along this route and the Tennessee near Browns Ferry*. We returned about sunset, when I found the telegrams awaiting me which released me from the command of the Army of the Cumberland and placed General Thomas in command.

In his *testimony*, before referred to, Rosecrans says that as early as *the 4th of October*, fourteen days after the battle, he "called the attention of General Thomas and General Garfield to the map of *Chattanooga and vicinity*, and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I (he) could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose I (he) would take possession of Lookout Valley *opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain*, and fortify it, thus completely covering the road to

¹ Vol. 53, p. 478.

² Vol. 53, p. 477-478.

³ All these conditions to be fulfilled before Lookout Mountain could be recaptured and the short line reopened; and yet on the 16th Mr. Dana reports to the Secretary of War that the army must retreat within two weeks unless the river is opened.

⁴ Report on conduct of the war, 1865, vol. 3, p. 33.

Bridgeport on the south side as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both as well as of Lookout Valley." In this statement, made under oath and but two years after he left the army, Rosecrans makes no pretense of having told me of this plan, nor does he say in the same account that I accompanied him on his reconnoissance which he made on the 19th of October. The remembrance of that was kept latent for twenty years longer, and was apparently brought into action by the appearance of Grant's paper on Chattanooga in the *Century Magazine* for November, 1885. Now it so happens that Grant, on the 28th of October, in a telegram to Halleck, gave to Thomas explicitly the credit for the plan.¹ Had Rosecrans copied that telegram his case against Grant was complete.

In recalling Rosecrans's statement in the *North American Review* we find him saying:

This fraud—this lie [Grant's claim]—has been floating before the public for twenty-odd years; but it is explicitly nailed to the pillory by the opening paragraph of General Thomas's official report, wherein he says:

"In pursuance of the plan of General Rosecrans, the execution of which had been deferred until Hooker's transportation could be got," etc., and then follows a description of his operations. This noble and chivalrous testimonial by Thomas was placed on the books of the Army of the Cumberland, wherein was written the report made by the author of the *Century* article.

The epithets applied by Rosecrans to the claim for the originating of the plan for the relief of the army at Chattanooga compels attention to his version of the opening paragraph of Thomas's report of November 7.² The words used by Thomas are: "Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement." The quotation, as given above by Rosecrans, is a barefaced forgery, given, let us hope, by some one to Rosecrans as a veritable extract, and changes the whole meaning of the report. General Rosecrans was then manifestly wrong in attributing any hostility of Grant to Thomas, by reason of words never used in the report of Thomas. But let us see what were the preliminaries which were arranged before Thomas took command—not a concentration of Hooker's troops, for, as has been shown, there was no active order for that in existence; not the preparation of boats for a bridge into Lookout Valley, for Rosecrans himself tells us on the 18th of October that there was but one bridge then at Chattanooga, and that boats for a second bridge there were under way.

There is one more thing to call attention to in Rosecrans's statement. If on the 4th of October he had pointed out to Thomas and Garfield the place where his bridge was to be thrown, and at Brown's Ferry as he says, and if a sketch of the route by which the troops were to be marched from Chattanooga to support Hooker had been sent to Hooker, what was the object of the examination made by him on the 19th of October? What purpose did it subserve, especially as no order had been given at that date for throwing a bridge into Lookout Valley and no troops ordered to support the bridge party? That part of the story in the *North American Review* is a creation of the imagination. Perhaps we may get at the grain of truth by going back to the record and to the *testimony* of Rosecrans. On the 4th of October Mr. Dana telegraphs what Rosecrans tells him, viz, that the engineers are at work on a pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek.³ Now this was not a fact, for the first pontoon bridge at Chattanooga, which exhausted all the boats, was not laid until the 6th of October.⁴ On the 4th, however, Rosecrans says he showed Thomas and Garfield a "map of Chattanooga and vicinity" and pointed out the position where the bridge was to be thrown to capture a hill commanding the roadway over the nose of Lookout Mountain.⁵ The only isolated hill in that locality

¹ Vol. 54, p. 56.

² Official Record, Vol. 54, p. 1.

³ Vol. 50, p. 207.

⁴ Vol. 53, p. 102.

⁵ Report on the war, 1865. Testimony of General Rosecrans.

which does command *that road is at the mouth of Lookout Creek*, precisely where Mr. Dana says the bridge was to be thrown, and Rosecrans's detailed explanation of what can be done when that hill is fortified applies to no other hill in Lookout Valley.

Furthermore, the only "map of Chattanooga and vicinity" in Rosecrans's possession was one made by Col. William E. Merrill, a copy of which reached the Engineer Bureau in Washington on the 28th of September, 1863.¹ On that map Brown's Ferry is put down at *Moccasin Point*, and the place where the bridge was thrown was called Williams Ferry. Merrill was wrong in his nomenclature, but that was the map by which Rosecrans and the army were guided at that time, for as late as the *10th of October* General Whittaker,² in command of the troops along the river, describes the topography from Lookout Mountain to Williams Island, and calls the ferry above Williams Island "Williams Ferry."

The map, therefore, and Mr. Dana's dispatch of the 4th, go to confirm Rosecrans's statement that his idea at that date was to throw a bridge at *that point*. The river there was under the guns of the enemy and no bridge could have been thrown or maintained there.³ Rosecrans went somewhere on the 19th of October, I do not know where, but if he went on that day to what he knew as Brown's Ferry he went to Moccasin Point.

Since writing the above I received a letter from Gen. J. J. Reynolds, then chief of staff, dated May 20, 1895, saying that he was with Rosecrans on the 19th of October, 1863. That the ride was made with the view of selecting a location for a pontoon bridge. "As I remember it, Brown's Ferry was already in everybody's mind as the proper place, but the point had not been decided definitely. We visited one battery *on the high ground on the north side of the river and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain.* * * * My understanding was that Rosecrans fixed Browns Ferry as the place for the bridge."

General Reynolds describes exactly the battery on Moccasin Point, and not the battery where the bridge was thrown. The General's extract proves, therefore, that Rosecrans was still impressed with the idea of a bridge near the mouth of Lookout Creek, and that the place on the 19th of October was known to the army as "Browns Ferry."

There are various inaccuracies in the statement of General Rosecrans, one of which does great injustice to a most excellent officer and splendid battalion of men, and which I will notice. Rosecrans attributes the bridge building to Colonel Stanley and the Eighteenth Regiment Ohio Volunteers.

The bridges were made under the direction of Capt. P. V. Fox by the battalion of Michigan engineers under his command. (See my report and the orders of General Thomas.)

I have now given every line from the official record pertaining in any way to any ideas or attempts to recover the short line from Chattanooga; also the story of Rosecrans, told two years after the command of the army was taken from him, as well as his story as told in the North American Review.

I will now give my own statement with reference to the successful movement, with such corroboration as is given by the Official Record and other testimony.

The first thing to be settled is the question as to the correctness of the statement of Rosecrans (in the North American Review Dec., 1885) in which he says I accompanied him on the 19th of October (1863) in a ride along this route (route for troops shown to Thomas and Colton early in October before I was made chief engineer, which was on the 3d of October) "and the Tennessee River near Browns Ferry." In this same article, on the previous page, Rosecrans says I "was told what the plan was for opening communication with Bridgeport on the south side of the river, and that a sketch was made of the river and route to Browns Ferry," the route for the troops to communicate with Lookout Valley. Rosecrans's statements, unsupported, are made the

¹ See small map accompanying this paper. ² Vol. 53, p. 254. ³ Vol. 53, p. 107.

basis by General Boynton of an assertion that at Browns Ferry I only carried out the plan furnished by Rosecrans to Thomas and myself early in October.

On my part I can only positively assert that at no time did Rosecrans ever impart to me any plan for opening the river, or give any instructions to the engineer department to make a bridge to connect with Lookout Valley, or even suggest that he had the intention of throwing such a bridge.

On the 18th of October I told Rosecrans I would go down the river to see if we could not utilize Raccoon Mountain.¹ He said he would go with me, and I fixed the hour (8 o'clock of the 19th) for starting. Rosecrans and his party went into the hospital on our road. I urged him not to delay, as we had a long day's work. I waited there half an hour or more when Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, came along on his way to Bridgeport. I told him what I had started to do; that I would wait no longer, but would ride with him as far as our roads were in common. We parted at the foot of Waldens Ridge, and that day I saw no more of Rosecrans or his party. Rosecrans and his supporters say that that ride was to fix the position of the bridge, and that Browns Ferry was fixed. Rosecrans says it was fixed earlier, but the ride was along the route (for the troops) "and the Tennessee River near Browns Ferry." Some of his staff have claimed that I was of the party during the ride that day that he visited Browns Ferry, and Rosecrans then and there fixed the place for the bridge. In this collision of statements, made from memory years after the events, it would seem at first that the question of *weight* would be simply a question of numbers. Fortunately the Official Record comes in here and gives positive testimony in my favor, not only as to the route I took, but my purpose in making the reconnaissance, and that purpose had nothing to do at the outset with Browns Ferry. My report, agreeing with my statement, says that I began the reconnaissance below Williams Island and *worked up the river to Browns Ferry*. That report, dated November 4, 1863, could by no possibility have been worded with reference to this contest. General Reynolds, then chief of staff, Army of the Cumberland, says he went with Rosecrans on that ride (October 19), and I do not doubt it, but he did not go with me, for Rosecrans and Reynolds give a different route in their statements from mine.

In corroboration of the statement often repeated by me, that on the 19th of October, 1863, I examined the river for a specific purpose, which had nothing to do with a bridge into Lookout Valley, and the statement that I was alone during that examination, which statement has been contradicted by General Rosecrans and Boynton, I will give a letter from Mr. Charles A. Dana. Mr. Dana is certainly a disinterested witness and the only one with the exception of my report of November 4, 1863.²

NEW YORK, May 22, 1895.

Dear General SMITH: In compliance with your request, I have examined anew the various documents relating to events at Chattanooga in October, 1863, and I will now proceed to state what I find in the records and in my own recollection concerning certain matters which it appears have become the subject of controversy.

For some two months or more I was attached to the headquarters of General Rosecrans as Assistant Secretary of War, for the purpose of shortening the line between the Army of the Cumberland and the War Department, and for getting forward more promptly any reinforcements or other assistance that General Rosecrans might desire. My daily duty was to report to the Secretary and the President everything that happened in the army, and to receive for this purpose information not only as to events, but also as to plans and designs of the commanding general. These reports were written by me in cipher and were sent daily by telegraph.

About the middle of October the situation of the army at Chattanooga became dangerous. Supplies were brought up with extreme difficulty and in limited quantities; draught animals were perishing for lack of forage; and even after General Hooker arrived at Bridgeport, with two army corps from the Army of the Potomac, it was manifest that the Army of the Cumberland was still in a perilous and uncertain position.

¹The utilization of Raccoon Mountain and the establishment of a depot at Williams Island are both contained in the one idea, viz, the necessity of controlling the river up to the northern end of Raccoon Mountain.

²O. R., Opening of the Tennessee River.

During this period I saw General Rosecrans every day and had many conversations with him respecting the measures he contemplated for changing this situation. The one idea which he put forward was the establishment of a pontoon bridge at a ferry which led from the north side of the Tennessee across to the Lookout Valley. Orders were given for the preparation of this bridge, but materials were very scarce, and no actual step toward putting up a bridge was accomplished while General Rosecrans was there. Of Browns Ferry, which was some distance down the river, or of any operations connected with it, I never heard General Rosecrans speak, nor did any member of his staff ever say anything in my hearing upon the subject.

The first intimation respecting Browns Ferry which I received was on the 19th of October as I was leaving Chattanooga under the order of Secretary Stanton to join him at Louisville. After having previously taken leave of General Rosecrans, I proceeded as promptly as possible to obey the order. I remember quite distinctly that as I rode across the bridge over the Tennessee at Chattanooga and proceeded up the northern slope toward the hospital I met you there on horseback. You told me you had come out with General Rosecrans and were going to reconnoiter down the line of the river; that General Rosecrans had gone in the hospital; that you had waited for him as long as you could, and now, without waiting any longer, you would ride on with me. We proceeded together until we came to the spot where the road divided, one branch going up the mountain and the other leading down toward the river. I took the mountain path on my way to Bridgeport, while you went down in the direction of Browns Ferry, and somewhere about there you thought a position could perhaps be found which would enable us greatly to shorten the road from Bridgeport. This was the first time that I remember hearing of Browns Ferry. Indeed I never heard of it from any person but yourself until its occupation had been accomplished by you under General Thomas's orders. If General Rosecrans had any views or designs respecting it, he could hardly have failed to inform me, and I should have promptly conveyed the information to headquarters at Washington.

After a careful study of the documents in the case and after reviewing my own recollection, I remain convinced that the credit of planning as well as executing the occupation of Browns Ferry belongs to you alone.

I remain, very sincerely, yours,

CHARLES A. DANA.

Attention has been called to the error in the statement of General Rosecrans with reference to Colonel Stanley, Eighteenth Ohio, and the boats made at Chattanooga. These boats were made by the battalion of Michigan engineers under Capt. Perrin V. Fox.

The subjoined letter of Captain Fox will throw some light on the *second* bridge made at Chattanooga. The third bridge was the one Rosecrans and Colonel Stanley, according to the North American Review, were so hard at work upon when the former was relieved from command.

Captain Fox (now colonel) in his statement agrees with the dispatch of Rosecrans to Halleck October 18, that the second bridge was not completed when Thomas assumed command.

GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., *June 1, 1895.*

DEAR GENERAL SMITH: I have your favor of the 29th ultimo, in answer to mine of the 18th.

I regret exceedingly that I failed to answer some of the questions you asked. I have just received yours of March 6 last and now make the effort to do so, and is supplementary to mine of the 18th ultimo, which you can arrange to suit your purpose.

General Rosecrans gave me verbal orders to construct a pontoon bridge east of Cameron Hill, as I have stated. Upon completion of said bridge he gave me verbal orders to run the two sawmills and get out a second bridge, as I have stated. He never gave me orders personally or otherwise to make a third bridge for *any* place—the boats and equipage for the second bridge were not completed when he was relieved. You were the first person that told me about the plan to place the bridge at Browns Ferry, and in confidence, as I have stated. I will not change my statement in regard to Col. T. R. Stanley's part in the affair.

General Rosecrans never intimated to me where the second pontoon bridge would be laid, but I supposed it was to be ready for any emergency. I know he never said anything about Browns Ferry to me personally or indirectly.

Now, General, please inform me if there is any point unanswered and what it is. My rheumatism is slowly improving.

Yours, sincerely,

PERRIN V. FOX.

General Rosecrans asserts that General Thomas gave explicit testimony in his behalf on that question and his misquotation is given above. The terms in which Thomas is spoken of in that connection precludes any attempts at impeaching any testimony of General Thomas. Now, in addition to the orders published by Thomas, which will be given in the appendix, I will quote from General Thomas, who says of this operation: "To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer,¹ should be accorded great praise for the *ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement of Browns Ferry.*"² When the bridge was thrown at Browns Ferry on the morning of the 27th, the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga as it was to the army besieging it from without." With every one who has studied the character of General Thomas that testimony must sweep away any unsupported statements of Rosecrans, made twenty-two years after the events, and which besides are not in unison with his testimony given but two years after. General Boynton's remarks in his guide to the National Military Park call for some little attention.

Taking up his story at October 13, he says: "Ten days before, Wheeler had destroyed nearly 200 wagons. * * * The opening of the river to the latter point (Bridgeport) therefore became imperative." That idea occurred to some people as early as September 30, before Wheeler's raid was begun. Also that Rosecrans's order of October 1 mentioned that "Hooker was to move toward Chattanooga." That is not correct; no movement was specified. But assuming that General Boynton tried to give the spirit of that order, it would prove conclusively that General Rosecrans had no intention of having a cooperative movement into Lookout Valley, for *there was not a boat at Chattanooga at that time for a bridge into that valley.* Therefore, Browns Ferry was not in question.

Now, on the 12th of October, we find Rosecrans had hoped to have Hooker move with a division from Bridgeport to Shellmound, about 7 miles, with a brigade pushed as far as Whiteside, about 10 miles farther, but still several miles from Lookout Valley—no orders to the engineer department, none to any supporting column, no bridge material, therefore no thought of a cooperative movement, and so no thought as yet of Browns Ferry.

"That day (the 19th) he (General Rosecrans) rode with Gen. William F. Smith, his chief engineer, and Gen. J. J. Reynolds, his chief of staff, making a general examination looking to selecting a point below Lookout Mountain for throwing the bridges, and a special examination of Browns Ferry, where the bridge was finally thrown." Winding up with this positive assertion: "The plan was that of General Rosecrans. The details were left to General Smith."

General Reynolds writes to me that he and others were on that ride; he does not mention any names, though Major Bond says he was of the party.

General Reynolds, however, says they went to a battery on high ground where there was directly opposite on Lookout Mountain a rebel battery. That applies to Moccasin Point, and no other point on the river, and Merrill's map gives that point as *Browns Ferry.*

General Boynton further says that on the 19th the order was again given by Rosecrans for the troops at Bridgeport to be ready to move. No such order of that date is in existence or was ever issued.

Also that on the same night (19th) "General Thomas directed General Hooker to be ready to *obey the order given him in the morning by General Rosecrans.*"

That account of General Thomas's order of October 19th is much like General Rosecrans's quotation from General Thomas's report, which has been given before.

Thomas said: "You will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans."

¹ Report on Conduct of War, Supplement Vol. 1, page 119.

² How does that expression agree with the misquotation Rosecrans gives from the report of Thomas. Ante, page 102.

No reference to any order of the morning, for there had been none. The order of Thomas could have referred to but one order of Rosecrans, and that was dated October 17,¹ and looked as little like a move across the river at Bridgeport as any order to move in an entirely different direction could look.

On the 22d of October Thomas had been three days in command, and having then approved the plan given by me to him telegraphed to Halleck:² "Hope to move Hooker in a few days to open the wagon road and railroad from here to Bridgeport."

On the 23d, before the arrival of Grant, Thomas³ ordered the concentration of Hooker's command, setting forth that he was to operate on the south side of the Tennessee, and that a force would cooperate with him at Browns Ferry.

When Thomas gave the order to move there was no doubt about where he was to move, the purpose for which the move was made, or the nature of the support Hooker would find in Lookout Valley.

I have now given every order or suggestion of Rosecrans, and such information and suggestions from Mr. Dana, General Meigs, or others, looking toward any improvements or shortening of the line of supplies from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. These taken together show distinctly that Rosecrans never had any plan for recovering the short line which he ever communicated to Thomas, to the chief of engineers of the Department of the Cumberland, to the Assistant Secretary of War, to General Hooker, or to the captain of the battalion of engineers which made all the bridges from September to November, 1863. Rosecrans, in his dispatch to Hooker of October 17 and to Halleck October 19, looked forward, the first toward the arrival of Sherman's forces, and the latter to that same, and other, as he thought, necessary reinforcements, and also to the taking of Lookout Mountain as necessary to the recovery of the short line. He could not have stayed at Chattanooga until Sherman's arrival, let alone the conditions inserted in his dispatch of the 19th, after he was relieved. These conditions would have taken months to establish.

Thomas took eight days to open the river with just what materials and forces Rosecrans had left to him.

It was only after Rosecrans's paper in the *North American Review* appeared that I ever took any steps toward vindicating my claims to the credit of the whole movement. At the time, no one in the Army of the Cumberland gave the credit to any other person, and I was entirely willing to let my actions drift into history in an ordinary way. Of late it has become a question almost of veracity between me and certain other persons who are not willing to let the official record make the history of the war, but set up *ex parte* statements based on nothing.

The official notice of this operation is given in the subjoined correspondence and orders:

*Dana to Secretary of War.*⁴

CHATTANOOGA, October 24, 1863—10 a. m.

Grant arrived last night, wet, dirty, and well. He is just going to reconnoiter an important position which General Smith has discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and which will be occupied from here simultaneously with Hooker's occupation of Raccoon Mountain. This movement will probably take place within three days.

¹ That order was to protect the railroad and concentrate as much as possible, but with a view to meeting Bragg, who was then supposed to be making preparations to cross the river above Chattanooga. Hooker obeyed the order by putting the Twelfth Corps in charge of the railroad from Tanton to Bridgeport, and the Eleventh Corps was stretched from Bridgeport to Anderson, in the direction which Hooker would have taken to meet Bragg. Rosecrans looks forward in that order to moving Hooker "according to circumstances" when Sherman arrives, unless forced before that to move to meet Bragg's crossing—that is, that then he might cross at Bridgeport.

² Vol. 54, p. 700.

³ Vol. 54, p. 42.

⁴ Vol. 54, p. 70.

OCTOBER 25, 1863—11 a. m.¹

The force which will cross at Browns Ferry to occupy the mamelon, at the mouth of Lookout Valley, will consist of three brigades, of which the first, under Hazen, will proceed to the spot in the pontoons of which the bridge to be thrown across there will be composed. The other two march, the distance being about 4 miles, and all are to be on the ground before Tuesday morning. This expedition to Lookout Valley will probably be commanded by General Smith. Reconnoissance yesterday showed the rebels have only a cavalry picket at Browns Ferry, and no force on the mamelon. Cold, cloudy, no rain.

C. A. DANA.

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*General Thomas reported the affair.²CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *October 27, 1863—11.30 p. m.*

(Received 9 p. m., 28th.)

Gen. William F. Smith, commanding Hazen's brigade, Sheridan's division, Fourth Corps, and Turchin's brigade, Baird's division, Fourteenth Corps, floated boats of pontoon bridges down the river from Chattanooga to Browns Ferry, 6 miles below; landed, surprised and drove off the enemy's pickets and reserves; took possession of the hills commanding debouches of the ferry on southwest side, and laid bridge and intrenched the command strongly enough to hold the bridge securely.

By the judicious precautions taken by General Smith before starting, and the intelligent cooperation of Generals Turchin and Hazen, commanding brigades, and Colonel Stanley, of the Eighteenth Ohio, commanding boat party, this was a complete success, and reflected great credit on all concerned.

Our loss, 4 killed, 15 wounded; enemy, 8 killed, 6 prisoners, and several wounded.

General Hooker, commanding troops composing Eleventh Corps and part of Twelfth, marched from Bridgeport at daylight to-day to open road from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, and take some position protecting river. * * *

If General Hooker is as successful as General Smith has been, we shall in a few days have open communication with Bridgeport by water, as well as by a practicable road running near the river on the north bank.

GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, Commanding Department.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General in Chief.

CHATTANOOGA, *October 28, 1863—8 p. m.*

General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south side road hence to Bridgeport has proved eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled.³ * * *

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General in Chief.

*Thomas to Halleck.*CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *October 28, 1863—11 p. m.*

Hooker reached Browns Ferry to-day about 3 p. m.⁴ Met with no serious opposition. The enemy still hold Lookout Mountain in considerable force. The wagon road is now open to Bridgeport. We have besides two steamboats, one at Bridgeport and one here, which will be started to-morrow. We have also another steamboat here undergoing repairs; will be ready for work as soon as portions of her machinery (sent for to Nashville) arrive. *By this operation we have gained two wagon roads and the river to get supplies by, and I hope in a few days to be pretty well supplied.* * * *

*General Thomas orders thanks.*⁵

ORDERS.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Chattanooga, November 1, 1863.

The general commanding tenders his thanks to Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith and the officers and men of the expedition under his command, consisting of the brigades of Brig. Gen. Turchin and Hazen, the boat parties under Col. T. R. Stanley, Eighteenth

¹ Vol. 54, p. 71.² Vol. 54, p. 40.³ Vol. 54, p. 56.⁴ Vol. 54, p. 41.⁵ Vol. 54, p. 68.

Ohio Volunteers, and the pioneer bridge party, Captain Fox, Michigan Engineers, for the skill and cool gallantry displayed in securing a permanent lodgment on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, and in putting in position the pontoon bridge on the night of the 26th instant. *The successful execution of this duty was attended with the most important results in obtaining a safe and easy communication with Bridgeport, and shortening our line of supplies.*

By command of Major-General Thomas.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
No. 265. } Chattanooga, Tenn., November 7, 1863.

The recent movements resulting in the establishment of a new and short line of communication with Bridgeport, and the possession of the Tennessee River, were of so brilliant a character as to deserve special notice.¹ * * *

By command of Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Thomas.

C. GODDARD,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In a later report General Thomas says:²

To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the *ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Brown's Ferry.* * * * When the bridge was thrown at Brown's Ferry on the morning of the 27th, the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga as it was to the army besieging it from without.

CHATTANOOGA, October 28, 1863—5 p. m.

Everything perfectly successful. The river is now open, and a short and good road in our possession along the south shore. We had an insignificant skirmish near Wauhatchie. The great success, however, is General Smith's operation at the mouth of Lookout Valley. Its brilliancy can not be exaggerated.³

[C. A. DANA.]

HON. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 12, 1863.

HON. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

SIR: I would respectfully recommend that Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith be placed first on the list for promotion to the rank of major-general. He is possessed of one of the clearest military heads in the Army; is very practical and industrious; no man in the service is better qualified than he is for our largest commands.⁴

I have the honor, etc.,

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

Feeling confident, from the orders, letters, and dispatches given herewith, that there was no question about the authorship of the plan, and that in the encomiums of my superior officers I had received all the credit due to my fortuitous reconnoissance, and the plan evolved from it, I was, as has been before said, content to let the matter pass into history on the case as made by the Official Record. I now leave the history of the movement to be written in such a way as may be seen by the historian to be in accordance with the indisputable facts.

As an appendix to this paper I give extracts from the reports of Bragg and Longstreet, giving their views of the situation before and after the 27th of October, 1863.

The suggestion of a movement by our right⁵ immediately after the battle to the north of the Tennessee and thence upon Nashville require notice only because it will find a place on the files of the Department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reinforcements just before the battle without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if not quite, a third of the artillery horses on the field had been lost. The railroad bridges, too, had been

¹ Vol. 54, p. 68.

² Vol. 1, p. 398. History of the Army of the Cumberland by Van Horne.

³ Vol. 54, p. 72.

⁴ Vol. 56, p. 122.

⁵ R., vol. 51, p. 37.

destroyed to a point south of Ringgold, and on all the road from Cleveland to Knoxville. To these insurmountable difficulties were added the entire absence of means to cross the river except by fording at a few precarious points too deep for artillery and the well-known danger of sudden rises, by which all communication would be cut, a contingency which did actually happen a few days after the visionary scheme was proposed. But the most serious objection to the proposition was its entire want of military propriety. It abandoned to the enemy our entire line of communication and laid open to him our depots of supplies, while it placed us with greatly inferior force beyond a difficult and at times impassable river, in a country affording no subsistence to men or animals. It also left open to the enemy, at a distance of only 10 miles, our battlefield with thousands of our wounded and his own, and all the trophies and supplies we had won. All this was to be risked and given up for what? To gain the enemy's rear and cut him off from his depot of supplies by the route over the mountains, when the very movement abandoned to his unmolested use the better and more practicable route of half the length on the south side of the river. It is hardly necessary to say the proposition was not even entertained, whatever may have been the inference drawn from subsequent movements.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRAXTON BRAGG, *General*.

On this question Bragg had other and very sound views,¹ as appears from the following extract in the same report:

* * * As soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted the army was moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had with his supplies in the rear. *His most important road and the shortest by half to his depot at Bridgeport lay along the south bank of the Tennessee.* The holding of this all-important route was confided to Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command, and *its possession forced the enemy to a road double the length over two ranges of mountains by wagon transportation.* At the same time our cavalry, in large force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and difficult route. *These dispositions, faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage.* Possessed of the shortest road to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, *we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time.*

*Longstreet to Brent.*²

OCTOBER 27, 1863.

The position just taken by the enemy is the ridge along the river bank, near Browns Ferry. The position can be attacked on the flank by about a company front, in front by a line covering the entire front. * * * Any force that may be designed to attack it will be obliged to pass under the batteries on the other side or up by Trenton. The only disposition that I have made is to draw the brigade that was on the other side of Lookout Mountain close into the foot of the mountain.

*Longstreet's report.*³

About October 31 Lieutenant-General Hardee, Major-General Breckinridge, and myself were ordered to examine this position with a view to a general battle. It was decided that an attack was impracticable; that the only route by which our troops could reach the field was a difficult mountain road, only practicable for infantry and entirely exposed to the enemy's batteries on the other side of the river. His positions were connected by a short and easy route, while ours would have been separated by a mountain, impassable to artillery except by a detour of some 50 miles, and hardly practicable for infantry. Our position was so faulty that we could not accomplish that which was hoped for. We were trying to starve the enemy out by investing him on the only side from which he could not have gathered supplies.

On the subject of the last sentence Bragg says:

That disastrous loss of these advantages and our subsequent operations in consequence must be the subject of a future communication.⁴ (See Bragg's report quoted above.)

¹ R., vol. 51, p. 37.

² Vol. 54, p. 221.

³ Vol. 54, p. 218.

⁴ Vol. 51, p. 37.

[Appendix 3.]

GENERAL SMITH'S THIRD PRESENTATION.

[From Chattanooga Times, September 15, 1895.]

Gen. H. V. Boynton has reviewed with apparent severity, in the Philadelphia Star of August 16, a pamphlet recently published by me on the reopening of the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga, in 1863.

In order to set the situation clearly before anyone desirous of studying the subject, it is necessary to make an explanation as to what was absolutely required to free the Army of the Cumberland from the seemingly hopeless position in which it stood from the 12th to the 27th of October of 1863.

The giving up of Lookout Mountain on the 24th of September, 1863, lost to the army at Chattanooga the short road to Bridgeport, the supply depot of the army, and the use of the Tennessee River between the two places named above. The road thus given up, across Lookout Valley to Bridgeport, was about 28 miles. The shortest of the new roads was about double that length and over Waldens Ridge, with its 1,200 feet of altitude. It soon became evident to the careful observer that no army could be supplied over such a long and rugged road for any length of time. The pinch began about the 10th of October and rapidly increased until the relief came on the 28th of that month. It took no military knowledge to see that a shorter line must be acquired or the army must leave Chattanooga. The only shorter line was the whole or part of that which had been given up. To gain that required one of three plans—first, to regain the whole line by the recapture and holding of Lookout Mountain, a mountain wall protecting the road and river to Bridgeport; second, the acquisition of, with power to hold it, the valley of Lookout Creek, with the passes in Raccoon Mountain, through which valley and passes ran the road, and around which ran the river; third, the holding of the northern end of Raccoon Mountain on the river and the passes in that mountain, thus protecting Bridgeport and the river as far as Raccoon Mountain.

No other plan except driving Bragg away from his lines near Chattanooga was possible.

The third plan would not have acquired the road through Lookout Valley, but it would have given to the army the use of the river to the northern end of Raccoon Mountain, and from there a wagon road on the right or northern bank of the river of about 4 miles in length would have reached Chattanooga. There was opposite the point of Raccoon Mountain an island of about 2 miles in length, which would have afforded a cover for steamboats and depots, protecting them in a great measure from the artillery fire of the enemy.

The first plan required to carry it out a battle and a victory; and Lookout Mountain was an almost impregnable natural fortress.

The second and third plans required a lodgment—a bridge connecting that lodgment with the Army of the Cumberland—and prompt support from a column moving from Bridgeport. No lodgment either in Lookout Valley or at Raccoon Mountain could be effected in the face of serious opposition to the landing of the boats, and the only hopeful way was by a surprise.

On the 19th of October, 1863, I left Chattanooga to go down and examine the country, with a view to carrying out the third of the above plans—that is, to see if we could find on Raccoon Mountain a suitable place to effect a lodgment, and then use Williams Island for a place to land and shelter stores. I followed the road from Chattanooga to where it turns up over Waldens Ridge, and then kept the river road to below Williams Island, where I began my examination. To be of any value it had to be very carefully made, and, though I had left Chattanooga at 8 o'clock, it was, I

think, after 3 o'clock before I reached the head of Williams Island. I had found nothing of value, and, accepting the failure, had turned my horse's head toward Chattanooga, when I caught sight of a small earthwork above me on the river. Curious to know why a battery should be posted there, I rode into the work and asked the captain why he was there. He replied, to prevent a crossing at Browns Ferry.

I was attracted by the lay of the land, and, finding from the captain that the pickets were on good terms, I went to the waters' edge and spent an hour or more there, until I could see nothing more for the darkness. I estimated the width of the river, the velocity of the current, the distance to the smoke of the picket reserves, and scanned closely the opposite hills, to see if they could be scaled, and the gorge, to see if it could be cleared of the enemy by artillery.

This point was not, strictly speaking, in Lookout Valley, but was only about 3 miles from the railroad there, and through a comparatively good, smooth, country. A lodgment effected there and held until a bridge could be laid would be then placed securely under the protection of the army, less than 2 miles away at Chattanooga, and any hostile force attempting to hold the passes in Raccoon Mountain could be attacked in flank by the troops from Chattanooga. The Bridgeport reinforcements once through the passes, Lookout Valley could be held even at the risk of a general engagement. (See Longstreet's report, *Official Record*, vol.¹ 54, pp. 218-221.)

This operation, however, belonged to plan No. 2, and I had started out to examine localities for plan No. 3. The examination for one drifted into the other, as I have explained, and that is why in a former paper, from which I copied in my late pamphlet, I called it a "fortuitous reconnoissance." In my report of November, 1863, I naturally gave the whole day's work as a part "of the operations for making a lodgment on the south side of the river at Browns Ferry."

Upon going back to headquarters this thought was with me: Everything depends upon a surprise. If that is not effected the troops will be seriously beaten. Some risk, however desperate, has to be taken to save us.

Arriving at headquarters I found that General Rosecrans had been relieved, and I had no talk with him on the subject.

The next morning, on reporting to General Thomas, I was directed to throw a second bridge at Chattanooga. I asked him to delay the order until he had considered my plan for a movement to reopen the river, and detailed it to him. I am sure that he did not then attribute the plan to anyone else, for in two or three hours he sent for me to say that he had been told that I was simply seeking notoriety in a big list of killed and wounded, and that he would lose two of his best brigades—the force I asked for.

After I had talked with him further about the matter, I was told to go ahead with the preparations. This was on the 20th, and his orders to Hooker were dated October 23 and were explicit as to what was to be done at both ends of the line. There was in this case no order for Hooker to move without a corresponding order for troops to effect a lodgment—supporting batteries and a bridge party. Compare it with Rosecrans's orders to Hooker—accompanied by no order to the engineers and no orders for a detail of troops to capture and hold a footing on the south bank.

General Boynton, in his paper, speaks of a withdrawal of a pamphlet formerly published by me, averring that my friends told me that it was short in proofs from the record. That was news to me.

When my attention was called to Rosecrans's paper in the *North American Review*, which attacked Grant for claiming the plan of the movement to reopen the river, and set himself up as the author, I did not suppose that such a violent attack would have been published without convincing proof, and therefore in my pamphlet, I, as it were, made Grant "a party to the suit," showing that Mr. Dana had telegraphed the plan to Stanton before Grant had arrived at Chattanooga.

¹ Should be serial number.

After a few copies had been distributed, I found that both before and after the movement Grant had telegraphed to Halleck calling it a plan of Thomas's. I, of course, stopped the distribution of the pamphlet, as to include General Grant as a sinning party was to "beat the air." General Boynton says my chief reliance in my pamphlet is upon the Merrill map of September 8, 1863, in which Browns Ferry is put down at Moccasin Point and the place where the bridge was thrown is called Williams Ferry. When that map was sent to me, about a year and a half ago, I became interested in it because it explained certain statements of Rosecrans which I had never before been able to explain in any but a noncomplimentary way to Rosecrans. It explained some discrepancies between his statement before the committee in 1865 and his paper in the *North American Review* in 1885. Notwithstanding General Boynton's reiterated assertion, my utmost research has never been able to find a map from the engineer department of the Army of the Cumberland published after Merrill's map of September 8, 1863, until my map of that year, which naturally had the place where the bridge was thrown called Browns Ferry, because that was the name given to me. Nor did any person ever call my attention to such a map. I assume that General Boynton has some authority for such statements. To attempt to make capital out of my own map, made after the events had long passed, and in which I had corrected the error in Merrill's map, seems hardly worthy of the subject.

To General Stewart, commissioner of the National Park, I was indebted for information as to the names of the ferries in the vicinity of Chattanooga. I learned that I was correct in calling the ferry where the bridge was thrown Browns Ferry. I might have learned the same thing had I carefully read Longstreet's report of October 27, 1863.

General Boynton refers to an apparent contradiction in General Thomas's statements. He can account for them as he pleases. The statement with reference to me is explicit, and will not bear the doctoring he has given it. The concise expression used by General Thomas with reference to me I first saw in Chaplain Van Horne's history of the Army of the Cumberland. Chaplain Van Horne was the friend of Thomas, to whom he confided all his papers. (See Van Horne's entire account, which is most interesting.) Were I asked to explain the discrepancy I should say that General Thomas could have had no personal knowledge of the matter, and must have taken it as Mr. Dana on October 4 took Rosecrans's statements about the bridge for the river at Lookout Creek, as Mr. Dana also took the story on the 14th about the concentration of Hooker's command, viz, that Rosecrans told him so. That Thomas was wrong about the boats is shown by a dispatch of Rosecrans's dated October 18, in which he says: "Our pontoon bridge restored"—that is, the bridge at Chattanooga, which had been broken for three days—"boats for a second under way"—that is, for a second bridge at Chattanooga, which proves that Thomas had been misinformed, and that as late as the 18th, the day before Thomas assumed command, there was no bridge being constructed for Lookout Valley. The sneer, therefore, at Captain Fox for saying that he was making a bridge, but had no knowledge where it was to go, is without reason.

It is just as well to be uninformed, like Captain Fox, as to be misinformed, as was General Thomas.

General Boynton says "upon General Hooker's arrival at Bridgeport the next day (October 1) General Rosecrans ordered him to cross the Tennessee and move toward Chattanooga, to cooperate in opening the river. This order was repeated on the 12th and again on the 19th, the day General Rosecrans was removed." It is generally assumed that in cases like this correct quotations will be made. Let us see how General Boynton carries out this assumed rule of ethics. I quote from the record: "Put down a pontoon bridge and make immediate preparations for crossing your command at that point." Nothing said about Chattanooga, and as little said about any cooperation to open the river.

The order of the 12th, to which reference is made in the above quotation, is as follows: "Can you have ready a column of one division to move up to Shellmound, and push an advance brigade to Whitesides, to start by daylight in the morning? They can take ten days' rations in haversack and knapsack; answer." There was no order in that—no order, certainly, for cooperation in opening the river. There was no order published by Rosecrans for any concentration on "the 19th, the day General Rosecrans was removed." It is very difficult to maintain a discussion on a matter like this, when one party makes up orders to suit his case as he goes along. I denied in my pamphlet the existence of such an order from Rosecrans or any reference to it in the order of General Thomas of that date. In his review in the *Star* General Boynton says I denied the existence of the order of General Thomas of the 19th, while the fact is that I quote the order. In proof of his statement, General Boynton quotes, as he says, from the testimony of Thomas, as to what that last order of Rosecrans's meant. Rosecrans's last order to Hooker as to concentration is dated the 17th, and that had reference to a movement of his forces in case Bragg crossed the river to the north of Chattanooga, and had not a word to say about "opening the communications with Chattanooga by river and rail." I have given that order in full in my pamphlet, and there is no necessity for explaining its meaning, for it is as explicit as the English language can make it.

General Boynton says that the claim that Rosecrans "rode on the 19th of October to the ferry opposite Lookout," designated on the progress map as Browns Ferry, with a view of throwing a bridge there, is "preposterous to the last degree, as anyone familiar with the ground will admit. He could only have ridden there at the imminent risk of his life; and as to the throwing a bridge at that point for the purpose of transporting supplies, it was simply impossible without a general engagement. The point was within rifle range of the Confederate infantry * * * and within close range of the enemy's field artillery, posted in inaccessible positions. No bridge could have existed there for an hour, even if an army had succeeded in establishing it," etc. Now it so happens that Rosecrans, in his testimony of 1865, says that on the 4th of October, 1863, after a conference with Thomas and Garfield, and with the "map of Chattanooga and vicinity" before them, selected that place for his crossing, and had a copy of the map made and sent to Hooker to guide him. Rosecrans's description fixes the place beyond doubt, and on that same day, October 4, Mr. Dana telegraphs that "engineers are at work on a bridge to be thrown to the mouth of Lookout Creek." That was not a fact, but that statement must have been gained from Rosecrans after the conference with Thomas and Garfield. On that same day, too, Garfield sends Hooker a set of maps. General Rosecrans says that that map (a copy of which was sent to Hooker) was probably the one shown to General Grant on the night of his arrival, which Grant mistook for a map of the new lines to be taken up when Rosecrans fell back. General Reynolds was present on that occasion, and, as he was chief of staff, that map must have been in his possession.

Now, General Rosecrans went into the battery at Moccasin Point without great risk. General Reynolds says that they did visit a battery which conforms to that location, and that only. General Rosecrans could not have made a proper examination to fix decisively upon Browns Ferry, where the bridge was thrown, without going within range of the rifles of the pickets; that General Reynolds does not hint at.

General Boynton has been for some years earnestly engaged in the effort to prove that Chattanooga and the Army of the Cumberland would not have been lost if General Rosecrans had been retained in command in 1863. He has been persistent in trying to make out that Rosecrans would have reopened the Tennessee River by the same operation, and at the same place, upon which Thomas moved. His zeal is worthy of all praise, but, unfortunately, it is shown in direct opposition to the testimony of Rosecrans before the committee on the conduct of the war, given in 1865, two years after the work was done. It is also in conflict with his dispatch to Halleck,

written on the 19th of October, after he had acknowledged the receipt of the order placing Thomas in command. That dispatch looked forward only to opening the river by the recapture of Lookout Mountain, and other contingences which would have taken months to bring about.

Mr. Dana, whose position ought to have entitled him to know everything that Rosecrans intended to do, telegraphs to the Secretary of War, October 16: "Our dazed and mazy commander can not perceive the catastrophe that is close upon us or fix his mind upon the means of preventing it."

Can anything be stronger than that?

I will conclude this long letter by one more telegram from Mr. Dana to Secretary Stanton:

CHATTANOOGA, *October 24, 1863, 10 a. m.*

Grant arrived last night, wet, dirty, and well. He is just going to reconnoiter an important position which General Smith has discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and which will be occupied from here simultaneously with Hooker's occupation of Raccoon Mountain. This movement will probably take place within three days.

That information Mr. Dana must have derived from General Thomas or his chief of staff.

General Thomas himself must have suggested to General Grant this reconnoissance in the same terms with more of detail.

Had General Thomas heard of this position from General Rosecrans would he have reported it to Mr. Dana as a discovery by General Smith? Would he have made the suggestion to General Grant that it was a discovery of mine? General Grant could not have understood that it was a plan of Rosecrans, either from Rosecrans, October 21, at Stevenson, or from Thomas at Chattanooga, for directly after he had approved of the plan he telegraphed to Halleck of Thomas's plan.

WM. FARRAR SMITH.

BOYNTON BRIEFLY ANSWERS SMITH.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES:

Returning from the exercises attending the dedication of the National Military Park at Chattanooga, my attention was called to a long article in your journal wherein Gen. William F. Smith takes sharp issue with a statement of mine to the effect that the Browns Ferry movement for the relief of Chattanooga in 1863 was devised by General Rosecrans. As everybody admits, this plan was afterwards most brilliantly executed by General Smith, to whom the working out of all the details was committed.

General Smith's claim, to sustain which he has published two pamphlets and many newspaper columns, is that he alone both originated the plan and executed it.

Please allow me space to say, briefly, that this claim can not be substantiated, for the following sufficient reasons:

1. General Rosecrans, upon the arrival of the head of General Hooker's column at Nashville, notified those directing its movements that it would operate in Lookout Valley. This was before the arrival of General Smith in the Western Army. Any cooperation from that valley with the forces in Chattanooga required a pontoon bridge.

2. Work on this bridge at once began, under an order from General Rosecrans himself, and a thousand feet of it had been completed before General Smith was directed by General Rosecrans to examine the river in the vicinity of Browns Ferry with a view to the execution of the plan for opening a short line of supplies. This statement is upon the authority of the officer thus ordered by General Rosecrans to construct the bridge.

3. Concerning General Smith's contention that General Rosecrans did not ride with him to Browns Ferry upon the day of General Smith's first reconnoissance, but rode to an upper ferry instead, Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds of the Army, who was chief of staff to General Rosecrans and rode with him the day of the reconnoissance, was present at the recent dedication, and visited Browns Ferry. He fully recognized the point where the bridge was thrown as the one visited by General Rosecrans. Upon riding to a point opposite the mouth of Lookout Creek, farther up the stream, at which point General Smith claims General Rosecrans intended to throw the bridge, General Reynolds was not only certain that they did not examine that point for a bridge, but that, owing to its being fully commanded at short range from Lookout Mountain, the idea of throwing a bridge there would have been preposterous.

4. During the recent visit it was determined, by evidence which can not be set aside and to the full satisfaction of a company of prominent officers interested in the question, that Browns Ferry, as now known, has been so known back to the times that the Indians occupied the country; that no other ferry was so known by the inhabitants of the country or by General Rosecrans's army after its arrival at Chattanooga, and that no other ferry existed between Browns Ferry and Chattanooga.

5. Capt. W. C. Margedant, who was General Rosecrans's topographical engineer, brought to Chattanooga and exhibited at the meeting of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland photographs of the Browns Ferry crossing and adjacent points taken by direction of General Rosecrans as part of the working plans for the opening of the river. These were taken before General Smith's arrival in the Western Army. They have been placed at the disposal of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland and will be reproduced in its forthcoming volume of proceedings.

6. Soon after General Smith's assignment to duty with General Rosecrans's army, on the 3d of October, 1863, employees of the coast survey from General Smith's head-quarter's appeared at Captain Margedant's office in civilians' dress and demanded his maps for General Smith. These he refused under a special order of General Rosecrans strictly forbidding the exhibition of any maps without an order direct from the headquarters of the army. The coast survey men soon returned, one of them wearing a sword, and repeated their demand in the name of General Smith, and were again refused. Captain Margedant was then placed in arrest, by order of General Smith, and these officials carried off the maps they were seeking to obtain. Among these was one showing the river at Browns Ferry and its shores, with the boats of a pontoon bridge as contemplated in General Rosecrans's plan sketched in in pencil upon the map at the exact point where it was afterwards laid by General Smith.

H. V. BOYNTON.

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1895.

GENERAL BOYNTON'S FULL REPLY TO GENERAL SMITH'S PAMPHLETS AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES.

[Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette, January 26, 1896.]

There are thousands of veterans in all quarters of the land in whose eyes General Rosecrans is one of the chief heroes of the war. This widely scattered company of graybeards will not fail to challenge the recent studied attempt of an Eastern officer to claim the authorship of one of "Old Rosey's" most brilliant plans.

For several months Gen. W. F. (Baldy) Smith has been industriously at work trying to convince the Eastern public that he and not General Rosecrans conceived the Browns Ferry movement by which the Tennessee River was opened and the army at Chattanooga relieved through the establishment of a short and reliable line of supplies.

No one has ever questioned the fact that the details of this movement were intrusted to General Smith soon after he reached Chattanooga from the East and that finally they were most brilliantly executed under his direction. But when he claims that he originated the plan he simply makes himself ridiculous in the eyes of all who are either informed concerning the official records relating to this affair or who take the trouble to examine these records.

Not only was the plan devised by General Rosecrans, but in pursuance of his orders it was well under way toward execution before General Smith arrived at Chattanooga. If he had never come or if he had never been born, the line of short supplies by way of Browns Ferry would have been as promptly opened and the army at Chattanooga as speedily relieved. And yet he has published two pamphlets and several newspaper columns to prove that what was fully decided upon before he started for Chattanooga was first conceived by him some three weeks after his arrival at that point.

General Smith's specific claim is that on October 18, 1863, he informed General Rosecrans that he would the next day make a reconnoissance of the north bank of the Tennessee River below Chattanooga "to see if we could not utilize Raccoon Mountain," and thereupon General Rosecrans volunteered to go with him; that the next day, riding along the river by himself, he discovered Browns Ferry, which he insists was not then known to General Rosecrans or the army, and that upon discovering this favorable point he conceived the plan of throwing a pontoon bridge there and opening a certain and adequate line of supplies.

The object of this article is to prove, from the official records, beyond room for doubt, that General Rosecrans planned this movement before General Smith was assigned to the Army of the Cumberland and to show that this amazing attempt of the latter officer to wrest from General Rosecrans the credit of this most brilliant plan and appropriate it to himself has nothing substantial to rest upon.

The Army of the Cumberland arrived in Chattanooga from the battle of Chickamauga during the night of September 21, 1863, and in the morning of September 22. Two days later the river route to Bridgeport was closed by the Confederate occupation of Lookout Mountain below the city. From that time supplies began to decrease owing to the difficulties of transportation over the mountain roads from Bridgeport, and by the middle of October the situation had become serious and the question of holding the city turned on the problem of supplies. The claim of General Smith, in its essence, is that the great Army of the Cumberland, which in spite of low rations was in high heart and as confident as ever of its prowess under the command of Rosecrans—a genius in planning as well as executing—ably assisted by George H. Thomas and the long array of notable subordinates who rendered that army illustrious, lay helpless and hopeless at Chattanooga, slowly starving to death and grimly waiting for its last gasp, when suddenly "Baldy," the great deliverer, arrived and showed these eminent but now thoroughly prostrated and imbecile officers how to extricate themselves from their desperate situation and save their army.

Unfortunately for this romance the official records tell a very different story and tell very little about "Baldy" until after the plan had been turned over to him to execute.

The misleading title of Gen. "Baldy" Smith's juggling with the records is: *The Reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863, as Related by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas and the Official Record. Compiled and Annotated by Bvt. Maj. Gen. William Farrar Smith.*

If what General Thomas really did say in his well-known official papers had been reproduced in this pamphlet of 40 pages, or even if a reasonably fair story from the official records had been given, the pamphlet itself would have presented a case of suicide on General Smith's part, as his pamphlet would, in either of these cases, have killed his claim.

Besides glaring omissions of vital dispatches of General Thomas which are prominent in the volumes from which he makes partial quotations, there is one volume of the published records to which, however, he makes no reference, which contains voluminous proof and the clearest proofs that the plan of reopening the river was fully formed before General Smith started for the Western army. This is the volume containing the history of the transfer of Hooker's corps from the Army of the Potomac to the Tennessee River, known in the War Record series as the Mine Run volume. One of two things must be true: Either General Smith has never discovered and read this record, or he has deliberately ignored it.

The dedication of this misleading pamphlet is in exact keeping with the title: "Dedicated to the Army of the Cumberland in memory of the fortitude with which it endured starvation during the siege of Chattanooga in September and October, 1863"—and, of course, until relieved by General Smith. The army at Chattanooga had full rations until after the 1st of October, three-quarter rations October 19, the day General Rosecrans was relieved, with 300,000 full rations on hand and 300 wagons then loaded and ready to start from Bridgeport. For ten days after that the case was much worse, but not bad enough to carry the period of "starvation" back over the month when the army had full rations.

Before examining the development of General Rosecrans's plan for reopening the river to Bridgeport by way of Browns Ferry it is well to fix a few dates in mind.

The Army of the Cumberland reached Chattanooga after the battle of Chickamauga in the morning of Tuesday, September 22.

September 24 Mr. Dana telegraphed Secretary Stanton that "It [Chattanooga] has now been made so strong that it can only be taken by regular siege."

General Smith did not arrive from the East until September 30, and was not assigned to duty until October 3.

General Rosecrans was relieved October 19.

General Smith claims that he discovered Browns Ferry on that day, that it was not known to General Rosecrans or the army up to that time, and that on that day, namely, October 19, he (Smith) conceived the Browns Ferry movement.

Turning from this claim to the official records, it immediately dissolves into nothingness. The references after the quotations to follow are the serial numbers and pages of the War Record volumes.

Stanton to Dana, September 24—3.30 a. m. (Serial No. 48, page 150):

We have made arrangements to send 15,000 infantry, under General Hooker, from here, and will have them in Nashville in five or six days from to-day, with orders to push on immediately wherever General Rosecrans wants them.

Halleck to Rosecrans, September 24—10 a. m. (48, 151):

The corps of fourteen or fifteen thousand men to be sent from here has the usual amount of artillery, but no cavalry. If the artillery is not deemed necessary, the railroad transportation will be greatly diminished. Please answer.

Rosecrans to Halleck, September 24—2 p. m. (48, 151):

Please send the infantry by brigades as fast as possible. Let the artillery follow at leisure. The great point is to have the troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport to secure those points and the railroad. We can hold this point if we can keep up communication and supplies.

Itinerary, Whitaker's brigade (50, 864, 865):

September 22 (Tuesday).—The command was ordered [by General Rosecrans] to occupy the hill opposite Chattanooga, and accordingly marched over and took that position [Moccasin Point]. The Ninety-sixth Illinois Volunteers [Colonel Champion] was sent to guard the ferry and crossing at Williams Island Ferry.

September 24.—The rebels opened fire on Colonel Champion's men and took the ferryboat that was being floated down the river. The balance of the brigade was moved down to the ferry, the boat was retaken, and the command was distributed along the river between Browns and Williams ferries.

General Smith contends that General Rosecrans only knew of one ferry and did not know of the real Browns Ferry at all up to October 19.

September 24.—Whitaker, from Moccasin Point, to Steedman (52, 828):

The One hundred and fifteenth Illinois Volunteers, one section of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery, at Browns Ferry, 3 miles below the position of Colonel Champion. The latter was:

“Directly opposite the base of Lookout Mountain, protecting the ferry.”

The Eleventh Illinois and the battery were, by order of General Rosecrans, guarding Browns Ferry, where the pontoon bridge was afterwards thrown.

This same day Whitaker was reporting to and receiving orders direct from General Rosecrans in regard to the positions he occupied on the river and the operations at each (52, 827, 830).

September 24, headquarters Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, at Williams's house (52, 834). This was close to Williams Ferry and opposite Williams Island.

September 26.—Dana to Stanton (50, 201):

Rosecrans is about to lay a bridge across the Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek, so that he can operate from here in that valley without crossing the mountain.

This was the contemplated bridge at Browns Ferry, and General Smith did not arrive from the east until the week following.

September 29—8 a. m.—Dana to Stanton (50, 203):

All quiet at Bridgeport. * * * Railroad bridge there will soon be done, and that over Running Water also ready to put up. Hooker will first be stationed at Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley.

These bridges were contracted for by General Rosecrans before he started on the Chickamauga campaign. (Conduct of the War, 1865, vol. 3, p. 30, Rosecrans's campaigns.)

September 26.—Hooker to Rosecrans, Washington (48, 159):

The head of the column left last night. No transportation. I hope to have it in Nashville by the 1st proximo. I desire that Major-General Rosecrans will have orders waiting me there for the disposition of my force.

September 27.—Rosecrans to Hooker (48, 164):

Your dispatch received. Trains will await the arrival of your troops to bring the advance to Bridgeport. The remainder will follow to the same point. Your transportation will be supplied at Bridgeport.

September 27.—Rosecrans to Thomas A. Scott (48, 165):

All the eastern troops must be concentrated at Bridgeport with all possible dispatch; every effort will and must be bent to this. * * * Want to secure our communications.

September 27.—Meigs to Stanton (52, 890):

When the troops understood to be on their way here arrive, General Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport. Supplies can then be accumulated by water.

General Smith declares that General Meigs knew nothing of any plan of Rosecrans to open the river, and, curiously, concludes from this that Rosecrans could have had no plan.

September 29.—Rosecrans to Colonel Innis (48, 177):

Strain every nerve to send through Hooker's corps; the troops must come through to Bridgeport. Let me know how soon those two companies of engineers will be ready; we need them very much.

These were wanted for bridge work.

September 30.—Rosecrans to Hooker (48, 179):

Your corps will pass directly to Bridgeport without reshipment at Nashville. Field transportation will be ready for you at Bridgeport.

September 30.—Hodges, quartermaster at Nashville, to Rosecrans (52, 947):

Will you please give me an idea of where the troops now coming in will be for the present?

September 30.—Rosecrans to Hodges, at Nashville (52, 947):

The troops coming in will operate on the Lookout Valley line unless called northward.

Upon this day General Smith arrived. If he gathered any correct information, he ascertained that Hooker was to come forward into Lookout Valley and that Rosecrans was preparing to throw a bridge to afford communication. Indeed, it did not require overshadowing military knowledge to see that a bridge was necessary, and an ordinary incident of the plan.

October 1.—Garfield to Hooker (53, 24):

The major-general commanding directs you to * * * put down a pontoon bridge and make immediate preparation for crossing your command at that point.

Everything that had occurred up to this point was before General Smith was assigned to duty at Chattanooga, which was October 3.

October 4.—Dana to Stanton (50, 207):

Engineers are now engaged upon the pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek.

And they were so engaged when General Smith went on duty.

Because of the formidable raid of General Wheeler on the Union line of communications, which began the day General Rosecrans first ordered General Hooker forward from Bridgeport toward Chattanooga, and which was the day of General Hooker's arrival there, the order for this movement was suspended until the movements of the enemy's cavalry should be ascertained. General Smith cites this suspension of the order to move and then, totally ignoring and suppressing General Rosecrans's explanation of it, declares in his pamphlet that up to October 16 "no line emanating from him has squinted toward a movement to recapture Lookout Valley, nor has he given to Dana or Meigs any hint of such a plan being on foot."

Yet, in explaining this order to Hooker, General Rosecrans, through his chief of staff, Garfield, telegraphed as follows, October 4 (53, 90):

It was the intention of the general commanding to put your force across the river at Bridgeport as soon as you were supplied with field transportation, and the dispatch of October 1 was written with that in view. * * * The general commanding hopes that the enemy's cavalry will soon be destroyed and that he may be able to bring your whole command forward to this side of the river. I have just sent you a set of maps.

October 9.—The Eighteenth Kentucky Infantry was added to infantry and artillery force at Browns Ferry.

October 12.—Rosecrans to Hooker, at Stevenson (53, 322):

Can you have ready a column of one division to move up to Shellmound and push an advance brigade to Whitesides to start by daylight in the morning? They can take ten days' rations in haversack and knapsack.

This was the second attempt to start Hooker's column for Lookout Valley.

October 12—7.45 p. m. (53, 322):

I can do it, but only with infantry. I should prefer to have a battery to accompany the column, but as the horses have just arrived I don't if they will be in readiness that early.

October 12.—Rosecrans to Hooker (53, 322):

I will delay the order until your batteries are ready. Hasten their preparation and report when ready. The object is to get possession of the line of the river up to this place.

October 12.—Rosecrans to Hooker (53, 323):

Push Edwards to hasten on the steamboat. The preparation of that is of primary importance, both for your movements and mine.

October 14.—Dana to Stanton (50, 216):

The troops now receive but three-quarter rations. The necessity of opening the river being thus imperative, General Rosecrans has ordered Hooker to concentrate his troops preparatory to seizing the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupying Shellmound, and possibly Lookout Valley.

This relates to the order given October 12.

October 16.—Dana to Stanton (50, 219), (in reading which it is well to notice that Browns Ferry is at the head of Williams Island):

I have just had a full conversation with General Rosecrans upon the situation. He says the possession of the river as far up as the head of Williams Island, at least, is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible for him to make any movement toward gaining such possession until General Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. Hooker's troops are now scattered along the line of the railroad and can not be got together before next Wednesday (October 21). The wagons must all have arrived by that time, and if the enemy does not interfere sooner the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted.

It was not until three days after this that General Smith claims to have discovered Browns Ferry and conceived his plan for a bridge there.

While Mr. Dana telegraphed on the 16th to Mr. Stanton that the movement upon Raccoon Mountain, which overlooks Browns Ferry, was only waiting the appearance of Hooker, General Smith asserts that on the 18th he informed General Rosecrans that he would go down the river the next day "to see if we could utilize Raccoon Mountain."

October 19.—Rosecrans to Thomas, by Thoms, aid-de-camp (53-480):

The general commanding directs me to notify you that he had started to reconnoiter the other side of the river and would probably be gone some hours. He wishes you to take command in the meantime.

October 19.—Rosecrans's testimony before Committee on Conduct of War, 1865, vol. 3, page 33, Rosecrans's Campaigns:

On the 19th of October I examined the river and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at [Browns] Ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chattanooga. * * * On my returning from selecting the position of the pontoon bridge I received orders to turn over the command of the Army of the Cumberland to Major-General Thomas.

Statement of Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds, Rosecrans's chief of staff:

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 19, 1894.

Gen. H. V. BOYNTON.

MY DEAR GENERAL: In reply to your note I have to state that I rode with General Rosecrans, by his direction, from Chattanooga, on a reconnoissance, the object of the trip being, as I remember it, to select a point where a pontoon bridge should be laid, crossing the Tennessee River, below Chattanooga. The point selected, as I have always understood, was where the bridge was subsequently placed, and where a ferry had been established for years and known as "Browns Ferry."

We returned from the ride shortly before sunset—the exact hour in the day I can not recall. The date is settled in my mind by the following circumstances:

When we reached General Rosecrans's headquarters we met, on the porch, Gen. Gordon Granger. He greeted us, and stopped me as General Rosecrans passed into the house, and said to me: "The old man has been relieved, and General Thomas is in command." This was the first intimation we had of this order, as we had left before it was received. The date was the 19th of October.

Very truly, yours,

J. J. REYNOLDS.

Statement of Maj. Frank S. Bond, chief aid to General Rosecrans:

My recollections as to the ride with General Rosecrans October 19, the day on which he was relieved from command of the Army of the Cumberland, are not very clear as to everything that occurred, and this is hardly to be expected, as the incidents connected with that ride occurred more than thirty years ago. They are, however, perfectly clear as to the fact that General Rosecrans, General Reynolds, General Baldy Smith, and I started early on the morning of October 19 to make a

reconnaissance of the north bank of the river for the purpose of selecting a point for a practicable crossing for General Hooker's command into Lookout Valley. A careful examination of the river was made, and a point known as "Browns Ferry" was selected for such crossing. The entire day was spent in making this examination, and my recollection is that it was just after dark when we returned to Chattanooga, and the General, stopping at General Thomas's headquarters, there learned that the order relieving him from command had been received. General Smith, while admitting that he started with General Rosecrans to make an examination of the river, claims that the General stopped at some hospital en route, and that he, General Smith, went on by himself and made an examination of the river on his own account. I have no recollection of General Smith leaving the party, and until I knew of his claim I supposed that he had accompanied General Rosecrans, General Reynolds, and myself along the north bank of the river to Brown's Ferry and returned with us to Chattanooga.

I do not wish to be understood as questioning General Smith's statements as to his personal movements; he should know as to them much better than I. I do know, however, that I accompanied General Rosecrans, with General Reynolds, in making that reconnaissance, and that the point on the river known and believed to be Browns Ferry was selected as the best point for a crossing. I also know, of my own knowledge, that previous to making this examination of the river orders had been given for the building of some fifty or more pontoons additional to those required for a second bridge (at Chattanooga), and that these were intended to be used for such crossing, and they were about completed on the day General Rosecrans made his selection of Browns Ferry as the point where he intended to move General Hooker's command across the river. I also have a distinct recollection that prior to this examination of the river bank I accompanied General Rosecrans a number of times to the point where the pontoons necessary for this movement were being constructed.

Statement of Col. A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster, staff of General Thomas:

My duties, as you are aware, were such as pertained to the Quartermaster's Department of the Army. It was in this capacity that I became somewhat familiar with the plans of the campaign and the manner in which they were carried out. And here let me say that soon after the loss of our wagon train, to which you referred in your correspondence, I saw General Thomas and reported to him that we were short of supplies of every kind. The animals were suffering for the want of forage, and were even dying from starvation, and the men were then on short rations. I could not make up another serviceable train to haul supplies from Bridgeport over the mountain on the north side of the river. Upon mentioning my difficulties to General Thomas, he said to me that he was aware of the serious condition that we were in, but that the pontoon boats then building were for the purpose of bridging the river at Browns Ferry, and he added that General Rosecrans intended to open the way on this side of the river to Bridgeport very soon.

When the way was opened, a steamer, he said, would come laden with supplies from Bridgeport to Kellys Landing, a few miles below Chattanooga. I was directed to be ready with such animals as could move trains to haul supplies from Kellys Landing when the way was opened.

Among other things, General Thomas asked me how they were getting on in the work of building pontoon boats. I replied that I had not been over to the sawmill for two or three days; that laboring parties were getting out logs on the north side of the river to saw into lumber for repairing the steamers which were partly destroyed and dismantled by the rebels, and to build boats for a bridge. I went immediately to the mill, and in its vicinity saw several pontoons completed and others building under the direction of officers and men from a regiment of engineers and mechanics to whom General Rosecrans had given orders. Up to that time I had supposed, and I later ascertained to be a fact, that the boats were intended for a new and additional bridge to be thrown over the Tennessee River at Chattanooga.

Besides the pontoons necessary for this work, the men were busy constructing an extra lot of boats for any emergency. The rebels had broken both of our two bridges by putting driftwood in the river above, which floated down at every rise of the water and carried some boats away; these had frequently to be replaced.

Let me here say that I fully concur in your statement that orders had been given to build boats for bridging the river at Browns Ferry previous to the arrival of General Smith. Upon his arrival General Smith assumed full charge and direction of the work to open the "cracker line," a service for which he secured the recognition of the principal generals.

Lieut. Col. P. V. Fox, of the Michigan Mechanics and Engineers, who built the Browns Ferry bridge, said in his recent address at the dedication of the monument to his regiment at Chattanooga:

We had boats and equipage enough completed for a bridge 1,000 feet long when General Rosecrans was relieved October 19.

That is, so much of this work of magnitude was completed before the date that General Smith now claims to have discovered Browns Ferry and conceived the Browns Ferry movement.

According to Colonel Fox, General Rosecrans gave him the order for this bridge October 7, though he did not inform Colonel Fox where it would be laid. But General Thomas knew this, as appears above in his testimony.

Says General Smith, in his pamphlet, thirty-two years after the event:

On the 18th of October I told Rosecrans I would go down the river and see if we could not utilize Raccoon Mountain. He said he would go with me, and I fixed the hour—8 o'clock of the 19th—for starting.

But in his official report, made at the time, he said (54, 77):

GENERAL: I have to submit the following report of the operations for making a lodgment on the south side of the river at Browns Ferry:

On the 19th of October I was instructed by General Rosecrans to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of Williams Island with a view of making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and storehouses, and began the examination near the lower end of the island. Following the river up, I found on the opposite bank, above the head of the island, a sharp range of hills whose base was washed by the river. This range extended up the river nearly to Lookout Creek and was broken at Browns Ferry by a narrow gorge, through which ran the road to the old ferry, and also flowed a small creek.

Reynolds, chief of staff, to Hooker, October 19, 11 p. m. (53, 485):

Major-General Thomas directs me to state that, in obedience to orders of the President of the United States, he has assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland. He desires that you will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards.

October 19—9 a. m.—Hooker, at Stevenson, to R. S. Granger (53, 482):

Have just received orders from department headquarters to hold my command in readiness to march at short notice.

General Thomas's testimony, *Conduct of War*, Supplement, Part I, page 118:

The instructions referred to in the above [order] were to concentrate as much as possible of his [Hooker's] command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga, for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and rail.

General Smith, in his pamphlet, emphatically denies that any such order was issued as this described by Hooker and explained by Thomas.

Four days after General Rosecrans was relieved, and the same number after General Smith's "discovery" of Browns Ferry and "conception" of his plan, everything was ready at the Chattanooga end of the line, waiting for General Hooker to move into Lookout Valley. This appears from a telegram of October 23 from Mr. Dana to Secretary Stanton (54, 69):

An immediate movement for the occupation of Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley is indispensable, but Hooker, though ordered ten days since to concentrate his forces for the purpose, has not done so, but waits, on the ground that his wagons have not arrived from Nashville. * * * The pontoons are done for a bridge across to Lookout Valley as soon as Hooker has moved into that position.

This state of things, upon the theory that the plan was his, left General Smith just three working days after his return from "discovering" Browns Ferry (night of October 19) to get his bridge ready and advance matters, so that all that was causing

delay was waiting for Hooker to move up to Lookout Valley. As bridges requiring fifty pontoons are not made "while you wait," or procured on demand, like a hand-me-down suit, the plan must have dated some time back of any connection he had with it.

The story of his "discovery" of Browns Ferry he has recently related in the *Philadelphia Times*, as follows:

To be of any value it (the examination of the river) had to be very carefully made, and, though I had left Chattanooga at 8 o'clock (October 19), it was, I think, after 3 o'clock before I reached the head of Williams Island. I had found nothing of value, and, accepting the failure, had turned my horse's head toward Chattanooga, when I caught sight of a small earthwork above me on the river. Curious to know why a battery should be posted there, I rode into the work and asked the captain why he was there. He replied, "To prevent a crossing at Browns Ferry."

I was attracted by the lay of the land, and, finding from the captain that the pickets were on good terms, I went to the water's edge and spent an hour or more there, until I could see nothing more for the darkness.

In other words, whatever he had in mind had failed until he "discovered" Browns Ferry and found it occupied by a military force, which, as records quoted above show, was placed there by General Rosecrans's orders two days after his army occupied Chattanooga and before General Smith had even started for the Western army.

In the face of the statement of his official report, as above quoted, that General Rosecrans on October 19 instructed him to reconnoiter the river, with a view of opening a new line of supplies, General Smith says in his pamphlet:

On my part I can positively assert that at no time did General Rosecrans impart to me any plan for opening the river or give any instructions to the engineer department to make a bridge to connect with Lookout Valley, or even suggest that he had the intention of throwing such a bridge.

If this be correct, General Thomas was mistaken in supposing that General Smith had any part whatever in the matter when he said, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (Supplement to Part I, Report of Thomas, pp. 118, 120):

Before he was relieved in command of the Department of the Cumberland General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to the means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement, which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short route of supplies from Bridgeport.

And again, in the same testimony, from which General Smith quotes sparingly:

Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command of the department devolved upon me. This bridge, which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry, to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river, was nearly completed.

The reader will not fail to see that the story "as related by General Thomas" in the Smith pamphlet, and as really related by him, are totally different versions.

General Grant, who had ridden to Browns Ferry the day after his arrival in company with General Thomas and General Smith, and had the plan explained to him, received no idea that it was General Smith's conception, since upon its successful execution he telegraphed General Halleck (54, 56):

General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south-side road hence to Bridgeport has proven eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled.

General Thomas, however, as has been seen, attributed the plan to General Rosecrans.

While it must be clear to all readers that the claim of General Smith to originating the Browns Ferry movement is absolutely disproved by the official records, there yet remains to him the following "claim" thus put forth in the *National Tribune* of

August 18, 1892, by a close personal friend, who, after setting forth the claim of General Smith to the Browns Ferry plan, added, in writing of the battle of Chattanooga, which followed a few weeks latter:

* * * It has only been imperfectly put on record that the plan of that battle was General Smith's, patiently yet vigilantly wrought out, adopted by Grant, and departed from in certain particulars by force of circumstances of the hour, but fortunately not greatly to the variation of results originally aimed at. This statement I make with great positiveness.

H. V. BOYNTON.

GENERAL SMITH'S APPEAL TO SECRETARY ALGER.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Wilmington, Del., November 5, 1897.

HON. RUSSELL A. ALGER,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: I have the honor to make this appeal to you to correct the official misrepresentation of history which has been made by your subordinates in the War Department. I make this appeal to you as the only source to which such appeals can be made and through whom justice can be done.

In series of maps entitled "Atlas of battlefields of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and vicinity," a copy of which has recently come into my possession, there is found in the second paragraph of the legend under the head of Chattanooga the following statement, viz:

At daylight of October 27 the river line of communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley, devised by General Rosecrans, approved by General Thomas, and ordered executed by General Grant under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith. * * *

It is true that General Thomas had approved the plan submitted to him for reopening the short route to Bridgeport, for on the 22d of October, three days after he had relieved Rosecrans from the command of the army, he telegraphed to Halleck: "Hope to move Hooker in a few days to open the wagon road and railroad from here to Bridgeport." On the following day—the 23d—he ordered Hooker to concentrate his command for a movement south of the Tennessee, and that a force would cooperate with him at Browns Ferry.

It is a fact that General Grant arrived in Chattanooga on the evening of the 23d and assumed command of the troops under Thomas and all others in the vicinity, and that in consequence his approval of the plan adopted by Thomas for the reopening of the short or river line to Bridgeport was necessary. That he lost no time in making himself acquainted with the plan and locality is evident from the fact that on the morning of the 24th Dana telegraphed to the Secretary of War announcing Grant's arrival and adding, "He is just going to reconnoiter an important position which General Smith had discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and which will be occupied from here simultaneously with Hooker's occupation of Raccoon Mountain. This movement will probably take place within three days;" and this statement as to the time of making the movement was sent before Grant had started to reconnoiter or had approved of the plan.

It is not, however, true that this plan was devised by General Rosecrans, nor is there a line in the official record which affords the slightest authority for making any such statement. Had Rosecrans imparted any such plan to Thomas or Dana, and the former begun to execute it, Dana, who had been in intimate official relations with Rosecrans, must have known of it, and would hardly have sent a dispatch so worded, nor would Thomas, in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War,

have stated that "to Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry. When the bridge was thrown at Browns Ferry on the morning of the 27th the surprise was as great to the army within Chattanooga as it was to the army besieging it from without."¹

The testimony of General Rosecrans is all in the same direction so far as it is official and within any reasonable time of the operations alluded to. That excludes only the statements of Rosecrans in the *North American Review*, October 1, 1885, made twenty-two years later, and like other still later statements which quote no official authorities.

In the testimony of Rosecrans before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, December, 1865, he says that as early as the 6th of October, fourteen days after the battle of Chickamauga, "he called the attention of General Thomas and General Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly get the bridge material for that purpose I would take possession of Lookout Valley, *opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain*, and fortify it, thus completely covering the road to Bridgeport on the south side as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both as well as of Lookout Valley."² That statement applies only to a hill opposite Moccasin Point, on the bank of Lookout Creek, at its mouth, and some 3 miles from the place where the bridge was thrown, which, by the way, was not in Lookout Valley at all, but in a short valley drained through the gorge captured on the 27th of October, 1863. This explanation as to Rosecrans's idea is confirmed by a dispatch from Mr. Dana to the Secretary of War dated October 4, in which, giving, of course, information furnished by Rosecrans, he states that "the engineers are at work on a pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of Lookout Creek." While it is true that no orders for boats for a bridge at or below Lookout, under the administration of Rosecrans or his successors, to the chief of engineers of the Army of the Cumberland or to any subordinate who had any connection with bridge building, were ever given, Mr. Dana's dispatch, however, shows that on the 4th of October Rosecrans had a plan for opening the short line without recovering possession of Lookout Mountain. The only trouble about it was that the bridge and the fortifications would have been commanded by the guns from the batteries on the slope of the mountain.

No plan for the reopening of the short line was of any value that did not include both the throwing of a bridge below Lookout Mountain and a corresponding movement of troops from Bridgeport through the passes of Raccoon Mountain. The bridge builders, the Michigan battalion of engineers, under Capt. Perrin V. Fox, were hard at work making boats and other bridge material, but not for use at any point below Chattanooga, as is shown by the following dispatch from Rosecrans to Halleck, dated October 18, 7.30 p. m., the day before Thomas assumed command:³ "Our pontoon bridge restored; boats [for] a second under way." A second bridge at Chattanooga was vitally important to the safety of the army, and strenuous efforts were being made to that end. Therefore on that day no bridge was being made ready for any point of the river below Chattanooga. On that same day Rosecrans writes Hooker indicating an intention to fortify the river on both sides at Shellmound and use a steamboat from Bridgeport. That distance saved would not have benefited the army at Chattanooga, and the same letter urges Hooker to make extraordinary efforts to get the road passable from Bridgeport to Jasper. There is no hint of any intention to secure Lookout Valley, and yet he had at that time in his

¹ Vol. 1, p. 398, *History of the Army of the Cumberland*, by Van Horne. Taken from report of Committee on Conduct of the War.

² Vol. 3, p. 33, *Report on Conduct of the War*.

³ Vol. 53, pp. 455, 456.

hands the same force and all other things necessary for the movement to reopen the short line that Thomas had when he made his operation a success. Can it be possible that Rosecrans had in his mind any plan in any way similar to that carried out by Thomas?

That such was not the case is shown by Rosecrans's dispatch to Halleck, dated on the 19th, one hour and forty minutes after he had acknowledged the receipt of the order placing Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland, of which I give an extract:

Lookout was given up temporarily because we could not then safely hold it. It was isolated from us by distance and the defile of the Chattanooga Creek; we expect to retake it [Lookout Mountain] as soon as we are prepared to hold it. That could be done only when the railroad being secured, the depots replenished, and Hooker's transportation provided; without that he can not subsist in a suitable position.¹

The record of the condition of the army at Chattanooga will show that it would have retreated or starved before those conditions were fulfilled, and yet that was all Rosecrans had to offer after he had given up his command, and when he should have shown that he had a plan for the immediate relief of the army.

I have put before you some of the main points to show that at the time General Thomas assumed command he had no plan submitted to him by General Rosecrans for the recovery of the possession of the short line to Bridgeport, for as late as October 14 Rosecrans had ordered a railroad built from Bridgeport to Battle Creek, and that, too, when he had the men and means for carrying out, with far less time than it would take to build the railroad, the plan adopted by General Thomas.

I have no desire to ask you to take the time from your busy life to examine into the justice of this appeal, but I have to request that you will refer the matter to some engineer officer of high rank, who understands the bearing of topography upon military questions and positions, and can also give to the orders and correspondence quoted their full value. I would respectfully suggest that no one who has been engaged in any way on the Chickamauga or Chattanooga Park Commission should enter in the question except to furnish their own statement as to their authority for the legend quoted above, and from which this appeal is taken.

If the Chief of Engineers has the time necessary, I would cheerfully abide by his decision, or by that of any engineer officer he might select.

I forward herewith a pamphlet published by me, containing much other evidence on this subject which, if you accede to my request, might save much time in the examination and decision of this question.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. F. SMITH,
Major of Engineers (Retired), Brevet Major-General.

GENERAL SMITH'S SECOND APPEAL TO SECRETARY ALGER.

WILMINGTON, DEL., November 15, 1897.

HON. RUSSELL A. ALGER, *Secretary of War.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to make an appeal to you as to a misrepresentation of history made by the commissioners of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga military parks.

In the series of maps entitled "Atlas of the battlefields of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and vicinity," there is found in the second paragraph of the legend under the head of "Chattanooga" the following statement, viz: "At daylight of October 27

¹Vol. [Serial Number] 53, p. 477, 478.

the river line of the communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley, devised by General Rosecrans," etc. This statement I most positively assert is incorrect in every respect. I can show from the official records of the time, from the testimony of General Rosecrans (1) before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that on the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle of Chickamauga, he stated to Generals Thomas and Garfield that as soon as he could get the bridge materials for that purpose he "would take possession of Lookout Valley *opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain and fortify it*, thus completely covering the road to Bridgeport on the south side, as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both as well as of Lookout Valley."

This testimony fixes the position of the bridge as starting from Moccasin Point, and the hill to be fortified at the mouth of Lookout Creek on its left bank, where was found the only hill on the south side which covered the *passage over the extremity of the mountain*.

This position is furthermore fixed by Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who was with the army to gather from Rosecrans his plans, and report them to the Secretary of War.

On the 4th of October, the day on which Rosecrans says he confided his plans to Thomas and Garfield, Mr. Dana telegraphed to the Secretary of War, "The engineers are at work on a pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of Lookout Creek." (2)

That covers the only plan for opening the short line to Bridgeport Rosecrans ever made public by letters, orders, or telegrams, and unfortunately the point selected for the bridge and fortifications were both under hostile guns and could not have been used.

No plan for obtaining possession of Lookout Valley would have been practicable that did not embrace the throwing of a bridge across the Tennessee with which to open communication with troops marching from Bridgeport through the passes of Raccoon Mountain.

The making of boats and other bridge material was intrusted to Capt. Perrin V. Fox, commanding a battalion of Michigan engineers, under the direction of the chief of engineers of the Department of the Cumberland, and no order was ever given to the Engineer Department, or any person connected with it, for boats for a bridge across the Tennessee River below Chattanooga by General Rosecrans or any of his successors. Captain, now Colonel, Fox, now living at Grand Rapids, Mich., states that in the most positive terms.

On the 18th of October, the day before Rosecrans was relieved, he telegraphed to Halleck, "Our pontoon bridge restored. Boats [for] a second under way," (3) showing that at that time there was but one bridge at Chattanooga, and the second one for that point not completed: therefore, at that time no bridge was being built to cross the river below Chattanooga.

The record shows that when Rosecrans was relieved he was devoting his energies to building a railroad on the long route, and his dispatch of October 19, (4) one hour and forty minutes after he had received the order to turn over the command to Thomas, looks forward only to the recapture of Lookout Mountain at some future time beyond the power of the army to remain at Chattanooga.

General Rosecrans had on the 19th of October all the force and materials used by Thomas to recover the short line.

I will add to this statement only the report of Thomas to the Committee on the Conduct of the War: "To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry." (5)

I have no desire to take up any time in your busy life to examine this subject, but I have to request that some officer, other than any member of the present Chattanooga commission, who is possessed of knowledge of the military art and understands

the bearing of topography upon military positions and movements, may have this question referred to him.

If the Chief of Engineers can spare the time, I would be entirely satisfied with his decision, or, if he can not do that, would you allow him to select an officer of his corps to take up the subject and write out his decision?

I forward with this a pamphlet, printed by me some years since, which, I think, contains everything relating to this matter and gives all the authorities.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,

Major of Engineers (Retired), Brevet Major-General, U. S. A.

- (1) Report of the Commission on the Conduct of the War, volume 3, page 33.
- (2) Official Record, volume 50 [Serial No.], page 207.
- (3) Official Record, volume 53 [Serial No.], pages 455-456.
- (4) Official Record, volume 53 [Serial No.], pages 477-478.
- (5) Volume 1, page 398, History of the Army of the Cumberland, by Van Horne.

THE CLAIM OF GEN. W. F. SMITH STATED.

APPENDIX 8 OF A-1.

The claim is this: That General Smith, on October 19, 1863, alone and without assistance from anyone, fixed upon Browns Ferry as the best, if not the only, place where a lodgment could be made on the left bank of the Tennessee River, and, owing to the conformation of the ground, securely held, at such a distance from the enemy's batteries that a bridge, if thrown across the stream at that point, would be safe from their fire and available for the needs of the military situation.

It is not denied that General Rosecrans had in mind the desirability of establishing a bridge over the river, nor that he visited the river also on October 19, 1863, for the purpose of selecting a site for a bridge; but it is denied that he visited Browns Ferry, where the bridge was thrown, and it is claimed that this spot was selected, not by him, but by General Smith.

The matter in dispute, therefore, is a very narrow question of fact.

What do we know of General Smith's movements on October 19, 1863?

His own statement is full and minute. He started from Chattanooga with General Rosecrans at 8 o'clock on the morning of October 19 and crossed the river with him. General Rosecrans then went into a hospital to visit the soldiers, and General Smith, after waiting for him half an hour, and seeing Mr. Charles A. Dana riding along on his way to Bridgeport, joined and rode with him to the place where the latter turned to go up the mountain. This is corroborated by Mr. Dana in a letter to General Smith, hereto appended and marked A.

General Smith then rode down the river, accompanied only by his orderly, and, having his attention arrested by the position of a battery just above Williams Island, examined the opposite shore and decided on that spot as meeting his requirements. This place, he was informed, was known as Browns Ferry. He stayed there till dark. On returning he was told that General Rosecrans had been relieved. He did not see either him or General Thomas that night. The next morning he saw General Thomas and explained his plan to him.

The dispatches of Mr. Dana to the Secretary of War, October 24, 1863 (54 W. R., 70), that "He [Grant] is just going to reconnoiter an important position which General Smith had discovered at the mouth [i. e., the westerly end] of Lookout Valley," written, as it doubtless was, with the knowledge of Grant and Thomas, confirms General Smith's claim.

II.

What do we know of General Rosecrans's movements on October 19, 1863?

We know that he was accompanied by Gen. J. J. Reynolds and Major Bond, of his staff, and that they all say that they went to Browns Ferry.

But there were two places on the Tennessee River which were called Browns Ferry. And from this unfortunate circumstance all this controversy has arisen.

The only map in use at army headquarters at that time was drawn by Capt. W. E. Merrill, of the topographical engineers, and a copy of it can be seen in the atlas which accompanies the Official Records of the War, Part VII, Plate XXXV, Map C. It is entitled "Map of Chattanooga and vicinity." It is dated July 10, 1863. On this map Browns Ferry is shown just east of the mouth of Lookout Creek and just west of Moccasin Point; and the ferry just south of Williams Island, which was the one General Smith visited, is called Williams Ferry. A later printing of this map, dated September 8, 1863, shows no change in these particulars.

It can therefore confidently be asserted that the Browns Ferry of this map, close to the mouth of Lookout Creek and some two miles and a half above the real Browns Ferry, which General Smith visited, and where the bridge was afterwards thrown, was the only Browns Ferry known to General Rosecrans.

This is shown by the following facts:

(1) On September 26, 1863, Mr. Dana telegraphed to Mr. Stanton as follows (50 W. R., 201):

Rosecrans is about to lay a bridge across Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek.

(2) In 1865 General Rosecrans testified as follows before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (Report, vol. 3, 1865, campaign of General Rosecrans, p. 35):

As early as the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle, I called the attention of General Thomas and General Garfield to the "Map of Chattanooga and vicinity,"¹ and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose I would take possession of Lookout Valley opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain and fortify it.

The mouth of Lookout Creek is close to "the passage over the extremity of the mountain."

(3) On this same 4th of October to which General Rosecrans refers in his testimony, Mr. Dana telegraphed Mr. Stanton as follows (50 W. R., 206):

Engineers are now engaged upon the pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of Lookout Creek.

(4) Continuing his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, given in 1865, General Rosecrans says (*supra*, p. 35):

On the 19th of October I examined the river and selected a point for the cross of the bridge at ferry [sic].

This must have been the Browns Ferry denoted on the map of Chattanooga and vicinity to which he had just testified that he called the attention of Generals Thomas and Garfield.

(5) Gen. J. J. Reynolds, chief of staff to General Rosecrans, accompanied the latter in the ride of October 19, and in a letter to General Smith, a copy of which (marked "B"), is hereto appended, speaks as follows:

We crossed the river at Chattanooga and examined the country on the north side, with the view of selecting a location for a pontoon bridge. As I remember it, Browns Ferry was already in everybody's mind as the proper place, but the point had not been decided definitely. We visited our battery on the high ground on the north side of the river and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain. My understanding was that Rosecrans fixed Browns Ferry as the place for the bridge.

¹This was the title of the Merrill map.

This place, nearly opposite Lookout Mountain, is the site of Browns Ferry on the Merrill map.

(6) Major Bond's diary reads as follows:

October 19, Chattanooga.—Took long ride over the river with General Rosecrans and General Smith. Went to Browns Ferry, the proposed point for location of pontoon bridge, pontoons for which are being built and are nearly finished at Chattanooga. On return heard General Rosecrans was relieved of command, with orders to report at Cincinnati. Remainder of the night was busy getting ready to start in the morning.

October 20, Chattanooga.—Left at 7 a. m., General, Captain Thoms, and myself for Cincinnati.

Neither General Rosecrans nor Major Bond returned to Chattanooga during the remainder of the campaign, and they therefore can not and do not undertake to say of their own knowledge whether the place which they visited was the place where the bridge was laid.

It will be noticed that Major Bond's diary speaks of Browns Ferry as "the proposed point for location of pontoon bridge." This Browns Ferry can not, therefore, be anything but the Browns Ferry of the Merrill map, as it is not contended that General Rosecrans had ever, before the 19th of October, visited the river for the purpose of fixing the site of the proposed bridge.

III.

General Boynton is unquestionably in error in saying that General Smith accompanied General Rosecrans to the river on October 19, 1863.

Not only does Mr. Dana, in his letter (marked "A"), recall the fact of his riding with General Smith from the hospital and parting with him, but General Reynolds, in his letter (marked "B"), speaks of another officer being with General Rosecrans and himself, whose name he can not recall. This officer, it is admitted, was Major Bond. Had General Smith been with them General Reynolds would not have forgotten it.

IV.

If General Rosecrans visited, as we think must be admitted, the place called "Browns Ferry" on the Merrill map, it will hardly be contended that he also visited the place called "Williams Ferry" on the Merrill map, i. e., the place which General Smith visited the same afternoon. The distance between the two places is between 2 and 3 miles, and the river road could not at that time be used on account of the enemy's sharpshooters. Besides, had both places been visited, and the place called "Williams Ferry" on the Merrill map, selected, General Reynolds would have described in his letter (marked "B") that place, instead of describing, as he does, the place marked "Browns Ferry" on the Merrill map.

An examination of all this evidence demonstrates, it is submitted, that the spot where the bridge was thrown on October 27 was selected by General Smith alone, and that the place which General Rosecrans visited was a spot (to use the language of General Reynolds) "nearly opposite the rebel battery on Lookout Mountain"—that is, the place marked "Browns Ferry" on the Merrill map.

W. F. SMITH.

APPENDIX A.

NEW YORK, May 22, 1895.

DEAR GENERAL SMITH: In compliance with your request, I have examined anew the various documents relating to events at Chattanooga in October, 1863, and I will now proceed to state what I find in the records and in my own recollection concerning certain matters which it appears have become the subject of controversy.

For some two months or more I was attached to the headquarters of General Rose-

crans as Assistant Secretary of War, for the purpose of shortening the line between the Army of the Cumberland and the War Department and for getting forward more promptly any reinforcements or other assistance that General Rosecrans might desire. My daily duty was to report to the Secretary and the President everything that happened in the Army and to receive for this purpose information not only as to events, but also as to plans and designs of the commanding general. These reports were written by me in cipher and were sent daily by telegraph.

About the middle of October the situation of the army at Chattanooga became dangerous. Supplies were brought up with extreme difficulty and in limited quantities. Draft animals were perishing for lack of forage, and even after General Hooker arrived at Bridgeport with two army corps from the Army of the Potomac it was manifest that the Army of the Cumberland was still in a perilous and uncertain position.

During this period I saw General Rosecrans every day, and had many conversations with him respecting the measures he contemplated for changing this situation. The one idea which he put forward was the establishment of a pontoon bridge at a ferry which led from the north side of the Tennessee across to the Lookout Valley. Orders were given for the preparation of this bridge, but materials were very scarce, and no actual step toward putting up a bridge was accomplished while General Rosecrans was there. Of Browns Ferry, which was some distance down the river, or of any operations connected with it, I never heard General Rosecrans speak, nor did any member of his staff ever say anything in my hearing upon the subject.

The first intimation respecting Browns Ferry which I received was on the 19th of October, as I was leaving Chattanooga under the order of Secretary Stanton to join him at Louisville. After having previously taken leave of General Rosecrans, I proceeded as promptly as possible to obey the order. I remember quite distinctly that as I rode across the bridge over the Tennessee at Chattanooga and proceeded up the northern slope toward the hospital I met you there on horseback. You told me you had come out with General Rosecrans and were going to reconnoiter down the line of the river; that General Rosecrans had gone into the hospital; that you had waited for him as long as you could, and now, without waiting any longer, you would ride on with me. We proceeded together until we came to the spot where the road divided, one branch going up the mountain and the other leading down toward the river. I took the mountain path on my way to Bridgeport, while you went down in the direction of Browns Ferry, and somewhere about there you thought a position could perhaps be found which would enable us greatly to shorten the road from Bridgeport. This was the first time that I remember hearing of Browns Ferry. Indeed, I never heard of it from any person but yourself until its occupation had been accomplished by you under General Thomas's orders. If General Rosecrans had any views or designs respecting it, he could hardly have failed to inform me, and I should have promptly conveyed the information to headquarters at Washington.

After a careful study of the documents in the case and after reviewing my own recollection, I remain convinced that the credit of planning as well as executing the occupation of Browns Ferry belongs to you alone.

I remain, very sincerely, yours,

CHAS. A. DANA.

APPENDIX B.

1601 S STREET NW.,
Washington, D. C., May 20, 1895.

MY DEAR BALDY: My recollections about the ride with General Rosecrans are as follows:

We crossed the river at Chattanooga and examined the country on the north side, with the view of selecting a location for a pontoon bridge. As I remember, it Browns Ferry was already in everybody's mind as the proper place, but the point had not

been decided definitely. We visited our battery on the high ground on the north side of the river and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain. My understanding was that Rosecrans fixed Browns Ferry as the place for the bridge.

I do not recollect having seen Mr. Dana in the party on that day. The party, as I remember it, was larger when we crossed the river in the morning than it was when Rosecrans and I returned to headquarters toward sunset. There was another officer of the Army besides Rosecrans and myself, but I can not recall who he was.

I left the Army of the Cumberland soon after the battle of Mission Ridge. Thomas's report makes four hundred and seventy-odd pages, dated Nashville, March 9, 1866. I had nothing to do with the preparation of any of it.

When we returned Gordon Granger met me on the porch of Rosecrans's headquarters and said: "The old man has been relieved; Thomas is in command." This was our first information on that point.

Will be glad to see you when you come to Washington again.

Very truly, yours,

J. J. REYNOLDS.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, November 30, 1897.

DEAR COLONEL: Inclosed find papers sent me yesterday through Senator Proctor from Gen. W. F. Smith. They relate, as you will see, to the controversy between General Rosecrans and General Smith concerning the Chattanooga campaign. General Smith seems to feel sure that he has been wronged. I wish you to examine this case carefully, and bring to me between now and January 1 your conclusions, going to the root of the whole matter, even if you find it necessary to visit the field of operations itself. It is a matter that, if General Smith has been wronged, this Department should correct. You will please bring the inclosed papers here and return them to this Department on your coming here.

Yours, very truly,

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

Col. HENRY M. DUFFIELD,

Historian, etc., Detroit, Mich.

FIRST OFFICIAL ACTION OF THE PARK COMMISSION.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,

Washington, March 22, 1898.

Col. HENRY M. DUFFIELD, *Detroit, Mich.*

MY DEAR COLONEL: I have received your letter of March 10, instant, transmitting to this commission a copy of a communication from Gen. W. F. Smith to Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, which the latter has referred to you for report. This communication of General Smith is a protest against the correctness of a certain historical statement incorporated by this commission in one of the legends of its "Atlas of the battlefields of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and vicinity," in relation to General Rosecrans's plan for reopening the Tennessee River.

The clause in the legend to which General Smith objects he states as follows:

At daylight of October 27 the river line of communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley, devised by General Rosecrans, etc.

The whole clause, which General Smith thus quotes in part, is as follows:

At daylight of October 27 the river line of communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley, devised by General Rosecrans, approved by General Thomas, and ordered executed by General Grant under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith. Browns Ferry was captured by troops from Chattanooga, and simultaneously Hooker's forces marched from Bridgeport and the next afternoon appeared in Lookout Valley.

To this communication from General Smith to the Secretary of War you request an answer from this commission.

In his letter to the Secretary, General Smith, in referring to that part of the clause which he quotes, says: "This statement I most positively assert is incorrect in every respect."

In another paper signed by General Smith, and transmitted by you, he thus sets forth his claim:

The claim is this: That General Smith on October 19, 1863, alone, and without assistance from anyone, fixed upon Browns Ferry as the best, if not the only, place where a lodgment could be made on the left bank of the Tennessee River, and, owing to the conformation of the ground, securely held, at such a distance from the enemy's batteries that a bridge, if thrown across the stream at that point, would be safe from their fire and available for the needs of the military situation.

It is not denied that General Rosecrans had in mind the desirability of establishing a bridge over the river, nor that he visited the river, also on October 19, 1863, for the purpose of selecting a site for a bridge, but it is denied that he visited Browns Ferry, where the bridge was thrown, and it is claimed that this spot was selected not by him, but by General Smith.

The matter in dispute, therefore, is a very narrow question of fact.

So far as General Smith's claim, as here stated, is concerned, there is no position which this commission has taken in its maps, legends, or historical tablets at issue between General Smith and the commission. These legends and tablets simply ascribe the origin of the general plan for opening the Tennessee River to General Rosecrans and the execution of it (the Browns Ferry part) to General Smith. The claim thus stated reduces itself to the contention that General Smith and not General Rosecrans selected Browns Ferry as the position for throwing the bridge, a point which this commission, notwithstanding its dissent from General Smith's position, has not called in question by the legend of which General Smith complains.

General Smith himself admits in this claim that General Rosecrans had in mind the desirability of throwing a bridge to communicate with Lookout Valley, and that he visited the river on October 19, the day that General Smith first visited Browns Ferry, for the purpose of selecting a bridge site. General Smith, however, contends that General Rosecrans did not visit Browns Ferry for this purpose, but that he examined a point near Moccasin Point and opposite the mouth of Lookout Creek.

The points to which General Smith further directs attention are those which have never been promulgated or adopted in any form by this commission, but were set forth in newspaper letters of the present chairman of the commission before he became a member of it, which were not written even in his capacity as historian of the commission, which were not suggested by the commission, and which never had either official form or official sanction. Upon this purely unofficial matter he now asks the Secretary of War to rule officially.

If, as seems apparent from the communication of General Smith to the Secretary of War, as well as from his notes upon the Browns Ferry movement set forth in the additional paper signed by him, he contends that the plan for opening the river line of supplies through Lookout Valley to Bridgeport did not originate with General Rosecrans, but with himself, this commission finds full official support for its claim that General Rosecrans originated the plan in the following official records:

Three days after Browns Ferry had been occupied by General Rosecrans's orders, and three days before General Smith's arrival from the East, Quartermaster-General Meigs telegraphed from Chattanooga to the Secretary of War as follows:

When the troops understood to be on their way here arrive, General Rosecrans expects to recover command of the river to Bridgeport. Supplies can then be accumulated by water.

Upon the arrival of General Hooker at Cincinnati in command of the forces proceeding from the Army of the Potomac to the relief of General Rosecrans at Chattanooga, General Hooker telegraphed General Rosecrans on September 29, "Will General Rosecrans please indicate the points where the troops will leave the railroad?" and on September 30 General Rosecrans replied: "Your corps will pass directly to Bridgeport without reshipment at Nashville. Field transportation will be ready for you at Bridgeport."

On the same day Colonel Hodges, chief quartermaster at Nashville, telegraphed General Rosecrans: "Will you please give me an idea as to where the troops now coming in will be for the present?" To which General Rosecrans immediately replied the same day: "The troops coming in will operate on the Lookout Valley line unless called northward." At this time General Smith had not reported from the East to General Rosecrans.

It is held by the commission that these dispatches make it perfectly clear that General Rosecrans, at a time previous to the arrival of General Smith at Chattanooga, and at least three days before the latter was put on duty there, and nearly three weeks before the day which General Smith himself fixes as the date of his first visit to Browns Ferry, had fully decided upon the plan of opening Lookout Valley by an advance of General Hooker's troops from Bridgeport in cooperation with the troops from Chattanooga.

On the 22d of April, 1865, General Rosecrans appeared before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in Washington, and, upon being sworn, testified as follows in regard to his plan for opening the line of supplies through Lookout Valley to Bridgeport, this testimony being quoted in part only by General Smith in his letter to the honorable Secretary of War:

As early as the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle, I called the attention of General Thomas and General Gartfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for the purpose I would take possession of Lookout Valley opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain and fortify it, thus completely covering the road from there to Bridgeport on the south side as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well as of Lookout Valley; because, by means of a fortified tête-de-pont, after our fortifications at Chattanooga were completed, we could easily concentrate our whole force to fight the enemy if he entered Lookout Valley, and that within less than two hours' march, while he could not approach us in force with artillery without making a circuit over Lookout Mountain, by way of Fricks and Stevens Gap, 26 miles southeast, which would take two or three days.

An interior line of fortifications was laid out and put in course of construction, designed to cover our depots with a garrison of one or two divisions against all the forces the enemy could bring. I had, moreover, ordered the construction of small steamboats and barges at Bridgeport to run thence to Chattanooga, two of which were well advanced when the army crossed on its advance into Georgia; and from the 23d of September my correspondence and my staff officers will testify that I was urging the quartermaster, Captain Edwards, who had the work in hand, to hasten its completion, which it was hoped would be the case by the time we were ready to take and hold Lookout Valley. To effect this, General Hooker was directed to concentrate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport and advised that as soon as his train should arrive, or enough of it to subsist his army 10 or 12 miles from his depot, he would be directed to move into Lookout Valley to take possession of that; and every effort was made to complete the pontoons, etc., to connect that with our troops at Chattanooga. On the 19th of October I examined the river and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at Ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chat-
tanooga.

nooga. I, moreover, directed Gen. W. F. Smith to reconnoiter the shore above Chattanooga, with a view to that very movement on the enemy's right flank which was afterwards made by General Sherman. (Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, 2d series, p. 33 of Rosecrans's Campaigns.)

This sworn statement of General Rosecrans in regard to his plan for opening the line of communication by way of Lookout Valley to Bridgeport was accepted without question for twenty-eight years, and, so far as this commission is informed or believes, was never called in question by anyone until the publication of General Smith's present claim in 1891. It was also regarded by this commission as very significant that General Smith, in his official report of the Browns Ferry movement, made a few days after it had been executed, does not hint at this claim even by inference. In fact, he states distinctly in the opening of his report that he was ordered to reconnoiter the river for an entirely different duty, namely, to ascertain whether he could find a location for storehouses behind Williams Island. This of itself, in the opinion of the commission, shows clearly that General Rosecrans, when he ordered General Smith to make this reconnoissance for the purpose named, had fully in mind his plan for opening Lookout Valley, and thus making it possible for steamboats to reach the proposed storehouses behind Williams Island, which is an island in the river a short distance below Browns Ferry.

In regard to the origin of this plan, General Grant, on the 28th of October, the day after its execution under General Smith, telegraphed General Halleck at Washington:

CHATTANOOGA, *October 28, 1863—8 p. m.*

(Received 1.50 a. m., 29th).

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.:

General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south side road hence to Bridgeport has proven eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time, I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for offensive operations.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

General Thomas, in his report made to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, as appears in the supplement Volume I, page 118, has the following to say in regard to the origin of the Browns Ferry movement:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND,

October 19, 1863—11 p. m.

Major-General HOOKER, *Stevenson:*

Maj. Gen. G. H. Thomas directs me to state that, in obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, he has assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland. He desires that you will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards.

J. J. REYNOLDS,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.

The instructions referred to in the above were to concentrate as much of his command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and by rail. Before he was relieved in command of the Department of the Cumberland General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement, which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short line of supplies from Bridgeport.

It is pertinent to add, upon the authority of Gen. J. J. Reynolds, chief of staff, that upon the morning of this order from General Thomas, General Rosecrans, before starting on his ride to Browns Ferry, sent an order to General Hooker at Bridge-

port, directing him to hold his command in readiness to march, for reasons set forth in General Thomas's testimony, as quoted above. This dispatch, as it will be noticed, was received at Stevenson at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 19th:

STEVENSON, *October 19, 1863—9 a. m.*

Brig. Gen. R. S. GRANGER:

Dispatch received. Have just received orders from department headquarters to hold my command in readiness to march at short notice. Yours will be the only troops left on the line when I leave, therefore I can not relieve them. Confer with General Rosecrans on the subject.

JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding.

In 1868, when General Thomas's headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, were at Louisville, the engineer office, being ready to issue General Thomas's official map of the campaigns of the Army of the Cumberland, wrote to General Thomas's headquarters for such corrections, if any, as it was thought desirable to make in the legends which had been furnished in 1865, with the map, to the engineer's office. These legends, as first submitted to the engineer's office, contained this paragraph, omitting, as will be seen, any part that General Rosecrans may have had in the plan for opening the river:

On the 19th October Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas succeeded General Rosecrans in the command of the Department of the Cumberland. General Grant arrived in Chattanooga on the 23d, and, approving of General Thomas's plans, they were carried into execution. General Thomas directed Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, to make a lodgment on the south bank of the Tennessee River, at Browns Ferry, and seize the range of hills in that vicinity, as they commanded the Kelleys Ferry road. In connection with this movement, General Hooker was to cross the Tennessee River at Bridgeport and advance on Wauhatchie.

This portion of the legend was amended at General Thomas's headquarters by returning it with the following insertion, showing that prior to being relieved—that is, prior to the day that General Smith, as he himself claims, first visited Browns Ferry—General Rosecrans had ordered Hooker's troops to advance toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening the line of supplies:

Prior to being relieved General Rosecrans had ordered the concentration of Hooker's troops at Bridgeport, preparatory to advancing along the line of the railroad toward Chattanooga. On assuming command of the Army of the Cumberland General Thomas ordered the immediate execution of this movement, and, after consulting with Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, he determined upon certain other movements in conjunction with General Hooker's advance, looking to the opening of the Tennessee River and main wagon road from Bridgeport to Browns Ferry, it being impossible to supply the army at Chattanooga by the road on the north bank of the river.

The technicalities by which General Smith seeks to limit the point in Lookout Valley where General Rosecrans intended to throw his bridge to the exact mouth of Lookout Creek are not regarded by this commission as of any force, since this was not only a thoroughly unmilitary point, but an impossible point, unless the throwing of a bridge was to be supported by a sufficient force to clear Lookout Valley of the enemy and drive the Confederate army off Lookout Mountain. A bridge thrown at this point, as everyone who examines it sees at a glance, would have been under the plunging fire of batteries and riflemen upon inaccessible bluffs on the opposite shore, and the route of supply wagons to and from the bridge would have been under artillery fire for more than a mile. It is held by this commission that to assume that an officer of General Rosecrans's attainments would have attempted to throw a bridge at the mouth of Lookout Creek, when the long-established road from Chattanooga into Lookout Valley crossed at Browns Ferry, much nearer Chattanooga and quite beyond the reach of the enemy's guns, is too preposterous for serious con-

sideration. Undoubtedly the terms "mouth of Lookout Creek" were used as equivalent to the mouth of Lookout Valley.

While no official decision has been made by this commission because of the unofficial agitation of the various claims of General Smith, the members of this commission have given much and careful study to all questions involved in the present discussion. They have satisfied themselves by abundant testimony and, as they think, beyond possibility of doubt that what is now known as Browns Ferry has been so known back to the time of the Indian occupation of the surrounding country.

Mr. Allison, a resident of Chattanooga and a pilot upon the Tennessee River in that vicinity for a long term of years before the war, says that to his knowledge no other ferry than what is now known as Browns Ferry has ever existed, within his knowledge of the river, between that point and Chattanooga.

Mr. Parker, an old citizen who has lived all his life in Lookout Valley near Browns Ferry, informs members of the commission that the present Browns Ferry has been known as such, to his knowledge, for seventy-five years, and that during that time there has been no ferry above it from Lookout Valley either by that or any other name.

Much has been made at times in the course of this discussion of a claim that a ferry existed in the vicinity of Moccasin Point, and it has been attempted to establish this claim by reference to the capture and recapture of a ferryboat at the foot of Lookout Mountain, above the mouth of Lookout Creek. Upon prosecuting inquiry into this matter the commission discovered and entered into correspondence with members of the One hundred and fifteenth Illinois Infantry who were engaged in navigating this boat at the time of its capture by the Confederates. It turns out to have been a boat which had floated down from the vicinity of Chattanooga and caught upon the shoal between the city and Lookout Mountain. The boat was dislodged from this position by a detail from the One hundred and fifteenth Illinois Infantry, and in the attempt to take it to the vicinity of Williams Island it came under the fire of the Confederate pickets and was captured. It was subsequently recaptured by our forces. Full information in regard to these facts in writing from the persons engaged in the attempt to take the boat down the river is now in the possession of this commission. The boat had never been used as a ferry anywhere in the vicinity of Lookout Mountain or Lookout Valley.

Capt. William Margedant, now residing at Hamilton, Ohio, who was General Rosecrans's topographical engineer at the time of the Browns Ferry movement, has exhibited to members of the commission photographs of the river, including Browns Ferry and the adjacent shores, taken before General Smith arrived from the Eastern army, by direction of General Rosecrans, as part of the work of preparing for opening the river at that point.

Gen. J. J. Reynolds, chief of staff to General Rosecrans, who rode with the General on the 19th of October, 1863, to Browns Ferry for the purpose of examining it with a view to throwing a bridge at that point, has recently visited that position with a member of the commission. He clearly recognized it as the point to which he rode with General Rosecrans the day the latter was relieved. Upon also visiting the river in the vicinity of Moccasin Point and opposite the mouth of Lookout Creek, he was equally certain that no point in that vicinity had been examined with a view to bridging the river at that location.

Maj. Frank S. Bond, now residing in New York, and senior aid to General Rosecrans in Chattanooga, also rode with the General and General Reynolds on October 19 to Browns Ferry for the purpose of selecting a point for a practicable crossing for General Hooker's command into Lookout Valley. He said of his recollections:

They are, however, perfectly clear as to the fact that General Rosecrans, General Reynolds, General "Baldy" Smith, and I started early on the morning of October 19 to make a reconnoissance on the north bank of the river for the purpose of selecting a

point for a practicable crossing for General Hooker's command into Lookout Valley. A careful examination of the river was made and a point known as Browns Ferry was selected for such crossing. The entire day was spent in making this examination, and my recollection is that it was just after dark when we returned to Chattanooga, and the General, stopping at General Thomas's headquarters, there learned that the order relieving him from command had been received. General Smith, while admitting that he started with General Rosecrans to make an examination of the river, claims that the General stopped at some hospital en route, and that he (General Smith) went on by himself and made an examination of the river on his own account. I do not wish to be understood as questioning General Smith's statements as to his personal movements; he should know as to them better than I. I do know, however, that I accompanied General Rosecrans, with General Reynolds, in making that reconnoissance, and that the point on the river known and believed to be Browns Ferry was selected as the best point for a crossing. I also know of my own knowledge that previous to making this examination of the river orders had been given for the building of some fifty or more pontoons additional to those required for a second bridge (at Chattanooga), and that these were intended to be used for such crossing, and they were about completed on the day General Rosecrans made his selection of Browns Ferry as the point where he intended to move General Hooker's command across the river. I have also a distinct recollection that prior to this examination of the river bank I accompanied General Rosecrans a number of times to the point where the pontoons necessary for this movement were being constructed.

Col. A. J. Mackay, chief quartermaster on the staff of General Thomas, writing to Major Bond, says:

Let me here say that I fully concur in your statement that orders had been given to build boats for bridging the river at Browns Ferry previous to the arrival of General Smith. Upon his arrival General Smith assumed full charge and direction of the work to open the "cracker line"—a service for which he secured the recognition of the principal generals.

In reference to General Rosecrans's plans for the Browns Ferry movement as they had developed previous to General Smith's arrival in the Western army, Captain Margedant, topographical engineer of the department, writes to this commission that he had already prepared for General Rosecrans a map of Browns Ferry and its surroundings, being the Browns Ferry where the pontoon bridge was afterwards thrown, and that at this point he had on his map sketched in the boats of a pontoon bridge, and, further, that this map was taken from his headquarters to General Smith's headquarters immediately after General Smith was assigned to duty as chief engineer of the Department of the Cumberland, by Coast Survey officers acting under General Smith's orders.

As to the claim of General Smith that no progress map exists after the one to which he calls attention, which was issued at Bridgeport previous to the occupation of Chattanooga, and which showed Browns Ferry at the mouth of Lookout Creek and Williams Ferry at the point now known as Browns Ferry, and that consequently General Rosecrans knew of no other position except that one at the mouth of Lookout Creek under the name of Browns Ferry, it is, notwithstanding, a fact that General Rosecrans ordered the occupation of the present Browns Ferry on the 22d of September, the day that the Federal army reached Chattanooga after the battle of Chickamauga. In obedience to this order, Browns Ferry was occupied in force by artillery and infantry on the 23d day of September, which was a week before General Smith's arrival in the Western army and two weeks before he assumed command of the engineering forces. According to the report of Gen. W. C. Whitaker, dated on the 24th of September, 1863, to Gen. J. B. Steedman, "the One hundred and fifteenth Illinois Volunteers, one section of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery, at Browns Ferry, about 3 miles below the position of Colonel Champion," Colonel Champion's command being stationed at Moccasin Point.

According to General Smith's own statement, when he first visited Browns Ferry, on the 19th of October, he found it in the possession of troops which had been stationed

there for the purpose of guarding it. These were the same troops that had been placed there by General Rosecrans's orders some time before General Smith's arrival at the West.

It is also a fact that the first official map issued after the occupation of Chattanooga by the Union Army showed Browns Ferry in its proper place; that is, at the point where the pontoon bridge was thrown at the time of the Browns Ferry movement. This map was called to the attention of members of the commission at the time General Smith's claim became a matter of discussion before the public, and, while there is no doubt of its existence, it has been mislaid and it has not been possible to produce it at the present time.

General Smith, in his communication to the Secretary of War, in his pamphlet, and in other papers in which he has preferred his claim, contends that since General Rosecrans was engaged previous to his relief in energetically prosecuting the building of a railroad on the north side of the river, on the long route, for supplies, it follows that he did not have in mind a plan for opening the line of supplies on the south side of the river through Lookout Valley. This line of railroad, which was nearly completed at the time of General Rosecrans's relief, extended from Bridgeport to Jasper, in the Sequatchie Valley, and its completion would have obviated the long haul over the Cumberland Mountains and have left only the crossing of Waldens Ridge to enable the supply trains to reach Chattanooga.

General Smith, however, throughout this contention, fails to state that on the very page of the record which sets forth General Rosecrans's activity in opening this section of railroad, to avoid the crossing of the Cumberland Mountains by his trains, there is a letter to General Hooker bearing the same date as the one urging the completion of this section of railroad, in which he is notified that "we must have the river, and that soon," the letter further informing General Hooker that if Sherman, whose troops had left Corinth that day under orders to push forward to Tusculumbia, should come in at Huntsville, he [General Rosecrans] would then be able to concentrate and move Hooker's entire force at once, and follows this with the statement just quoted, "We must have the river, and that soon."

This is held not only to dispose of General Smith's partial presentation of this branch of the subject, but of his whole contention upon this point, and, further, to show the wisdom of General Rosecrans in not being willing to allow the vital question of supplies to rest upon one line alone while it was within his power to make another available.

General Smith quotes the following from General Thomas's report, as establishing his claim for originating the plan for opening the Tennessee River:

To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry.

The simple meaning of this is, as the whole context plainly shows, that, the execution of the Browns Ferry movement being placed in General Smith's hands, he conceived all the details necessary to its execution with great ingenuity and executed the plan intrusted to him, or, as General Thomas further expresses it on the next page of his testimony, "the work assigned him," with ability.

To sum the whole matter up, for the reasons herein set forth the commission holds to the views:

First. That General Rosecrans originated the plan for opening the line of supplies from Chattanooga by way of Browns Ferry through Lookout Valley to Bridgeport before the arrival of General Smith from the Eastern army.

Second. That General Rosecrans selected what he then knew as Browns Ferry and which is now known as such, for the location of a pontoon bridge to connect Chattanooga with Lookout Valley.

Third. That when the time for executing the Browns Ferry movement arrived its details were committed to General Smith and the troops for the execution thereof placed under his command, and that he performed the important duty thus intrusted to him with an ability and brilliancy which secured him universal approbation at the time and which has been as universally accorded him ever since.

Very truly, yours,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

GENERAL SMITH'S COMMENTS ON THE PRECEDING PAPER.

1825 PINE STREET, PHILADELPHIA, *April 3, 1898.*

Col. HENRY M. DUFFIELD, *Detroit.*

MY DEAR SIR: I thank you for your favor of the 24th ultimo, inclosing General Boynton's lengthy reply to my claim, which I herewith return.

I shall not undertake to reply to or even to comment on the greater part of General Boynton's statements or arguments. To my mind there are but two questions to be answered.

1. Is it in accordance with the truth to speak, as the legend does, of the operations at Browns Ferry as being "the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley *devised by General Rosecrans*," if it should be found as a fact that General Rosecrans did not visit Browns Ferry himself or select it as the site where the bridge should be thrown?

To my mind this question admits of but one answer. That General Rosecrans "had in mind the desirability of establishing a bridge over the river" I have admitted in my claim. But the language of General Boynton, that General Rosecrans had a "*general plan* for opening the Tennessee River," I think is far in advance of the facts, unless it can at least be shown that he selected the spot where the bridge could be thrown. But if the only place which he visited was a place where a bridge could not be thrown—or if thrown, maintained—he can not properly be said to be entitled to the credit of having "*devised a plan*" the *execution* only of which was left to me.

2. If I am right in this contention, the old question, and to my mind the only real question in this whole controversy, recurs—did General Rosecrans select or even visit the place where the bridge was thrown?

On this point I have in my claim marshaled my evidence. I have called your attention to the Merrill map, with its notation of Browns Ferry near the end of Lookout Mountain; to Mr. Dana's telegram of September 26, that General Rosecrans was about to lay a bridge across the Tennessee at the mouth of Lookout Creek; to General Rosecrans's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in which he said he intended to take possession of Lookout Valley opposite the passage at the extremity of the mountain; to Mr. Dana's telegram of October 4, that the pontoons were being built "to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of Lookout Creek;" to Rosecrans's testimony where he says he selected a point "at Ferry," meaning without question the ferry mentioned on Merrill's map; to General Reynolds's letter, in which he says that he visited a battery "on the high ground on the north side of the river and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain." And for a more extended mention of this evidence I would respectfully refer you to my claim.

That the place which General Rosecrans visited on the 19th of October was a wholly unsuitable place to throw a pontoon bridge I admit as fully as does General Boynton on page 12 of his reply; but I have never claimed or believed that General Rosecrans ever thought it would answer. Certainly the dispatch which he sent that

evening to General Halleck makes no allusion to his having secured such a position. In my opinion General Rosecrans was relieved from duty before he had found a suitable place for his pontoon bridge. How, then, can he properly be credited with having devised the plan which I executed?

3. General Boynton has devoted considerable space to showing that the ferry where the bridge was thrown had always been known as Browns Ferry. Very possibly this is so; certainly I am not disposed to question it. But the place marked Browns Ferry on the Merrill map, which was the only map then in use, is at the end of Lookout Mountain.

4. The attempt to weaken the effect of the letter of General Reynolds, a copy of which I append to my claim, will not commend itself, I apprehend, to your judgment. What General Boynton says General Reynolds said to him on being shown the place where the bridge was thrown is certainly likely to be just what General Boynton wanted him to say. What he wrote at first to me was very clear and admitted of no controversy. Had he visited any other place but the place mentioned by him—"the high ground on the north side of the river and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain"—he would have said so then.

5. I pass by the scandalous accusation relating to Captain Margedant without comment.

6. No doubt it is true that the place where the bridge was thrown was afterwards known as Browns Ferry. I certainly knew it myself as Browns Ferry, and no doubt the first map published after the 27th of October corrected the mistake of Merrill. I see General Boynton says this map is lost. But what if it is?

7. I must decline to follow General Boynton into his examination of the plans of General Rosecrans in reference to the cooperation of the commands of Generals Hooker and Sherman.

Lastly, General Boynton says that General Rosecrans originated the plan of the Browns Ferry movement before I arrived at his headquarters, and selected the spot where the bridge was finally thrown. How this conclusion can be reconciled with General Rosecrans's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War or with the information which he gave to Mr. Dana I am unable to see.

But I leave the case in your hands, and remain, with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH.

UNITED STATES SENATE,

Washington, D. C., January 8, 1900.

DEAR GENERAL CORBIN: On the application of Gen. "Baldy" Smith to Secretary Alger, some two years ago, an officer was appointed to report on who was entitled to the credit for the flanking movement at Bridgeport, below Chattanooga. General Duffield was appointed in the autumn of 1897 to report on that matter. He has never made his report, and General Smith is anxious that it should be made, whether it may be favorable to him or not. Will it be in order for you to suggest to General Duffield that the Department would be glad to receive his report? I should be pleased to have a copy of it for General Smith before it is published.

Very respectfully, yours,

REDFIELD PROCTOR.

Gen. H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General U. S. A.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, January 19, 1900.

MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of January 16 in reference to the legend of the atlas published by the Chickamauga Park Commission in so far as it

refers to the authorship of the plan for relieving the Army of the Cumberland from its position of starvation in 1863.

Upon your request in 1897 the matter was referred by the Secretary of War to Gen. H. M. Duffield, of Detroit, a soldier of the Army of the Cumberland and a member of the staff of Gen. George H. Thomas at Chattanooga.

General Duffield made an exhaustive study of the case from the records, and visited the ground of operations for the purpose of refreshing his memory and gathering new information. The official records upon which this commission bases its claim to the absolute correctness of the legend in its atlas, to which you refer, were also furnished General Duffield. When General Duffield had about completed his report the war with Spain was declared, and he went into the field. This postponed the completion of his report.

I find that the report is now ready, and its receipt may be expected within a few days, when you will be furnished with a copy.

Very truly, yours,

ELIHC ROOT,
Secretary of War.

Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH,
824 Adams street, Wilmington, Del.

DETROIT, MICH., *January 22, 1900.*

Gen. H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I only last Saturday found the papers in the Browns Ferry case. They had been put away with other papers when I went to Cuba. There was no completed report, but only the data for one. I am completing the report now, however, and will have it finished in a day or two. It will be necessary for me to refer to some maps in the Engineer's Office, at Washington, before submitting the report, and as soon as the report is ready I will run down and present it in person. I think now I can leave here the latter part of this week.

Yours, sincerely,

HENRY M. DUFFIELD.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, January 24, 1900.

DEAR SENATOR PROCTOR: In connection with your conversation this morning, I beg to hand you the inclosed from General Duffield, which has just been received.

Very respectfully,

H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General.*

Hon. REDFIELD PROCTOR,
United States Senate.

GENERAL DUFFIELD'S REPORT.

DETROIT, MICH., *January 23, 1900.*

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: In obedience to the instructions contained in the letter of November 30, 1897, from Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, referring to me the claim of Bvt. Maj. Gen. William F. Smith respecting the legend on the Atlas of the Battlefields of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and vicinity, I have the honor to submit the following report. It was prepared to be submitted in the spring of 1898, but deferred by direction of Secretary Alger on account of the pressure of affairs in the Department incident to the Spanish-American war.

A copy of General Smith's claim was presented to the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission and their reply was sent to General Smith, and, with his rejoinder and claim, accompanies this report.

In connection with these papers, I have given the matter very careful attention, and have visited Moccasin Point and Browns Ferry, with which I was familiar during service at Chattanooga in 1863, and have also made personal examination of the maps and documents in the War Department referred to in this report.

This is the matter in dispute: In the Atlas of the Battlefields of Chickamauga, Chattanooga, and vicinity, published under the direction of Daniel S. Lamont and Russell A. Alger, Secretaries of War, by the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, 1896-97, the legend accompanying "Map No. 6, Chattanooga," contains the following statement:

"At daylight on October 27 the river line of communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley devised by General Rosecrans, approved by General Thomas, and ordered executed by General Grant under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Smith. Browns Ferry was captured by troops from Chattanooga, and simultaneously Hooker's forces marched from Bridgeport and the next afternoon appeared in Lookout Valley."

The correctness of this statement is challenged by General Smith. In support of his contention he submits with his claim a pamphlet published by him some years since (1895) and other papers.

The argument in his pamphlet is that General Rosecrans had no determined plan for opening the short line along the south side of the river between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, while the claim in his letter of November 15, 1897, to Secretary Alger, which is the basis of this reference, is that Rosecrans's plan, as stated in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, was to "take possession of Lookout Valley opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain and fortify it;" that General Rosecrans contemplated a crossing from Moccasin Point nearly abreast of the mouth of Lookout Creek, which, with the bridge, if laid there, would be under the fire of the enemy's cannon on the nose of Lookout Mountain, and was wholly impracticable; that he (General Smith) discovered the strategic importance of Browns Ferry, where the bridge was laid, and conceived the plan of making a crossing there, and that General Rosecrans did not select or even visit the locality."

The reply of the commission asserts that as to the latter claim of General Smith:

"there is no position which this commission has taken in its maps, legends, or historical tablets at issue between General Smith and the commission. These legends and tablets simply ascribe the origin of the general plan for opening the Tennessee River to General Rosecrans and the execution of it to General Smith. The claim thus stated reduces itself to the contention that General Smith, and not General Rosecrans, selected Browns Ferry as the position for throwing the bridge, a point which this commission, notwithstanding its dissent from General Smith's position, has not called in question by the legend of which General Smith complains."

In his rejoinder General Smith strenuously combats this position of the commission and furthermore insists that he "must suppose that the maps, legends, and historical tablets are in accord with the book prepared by General Boynton, which is not only a guide to the park but contains a brief history of the events preceding the battle of Missionary Ridge," and asks that the statements in this book be taken up and examined.

I do not understand that the reference to me authorizes any investigation of the accuracy of the book referred to; neither do I think I should ask the enlarging of the instructions in this regard suggested by General Smith. While it is prepared by General Boynton, who is now chairman of the commission, it does not purport to be official, is not published by the commission, and was never approved by the Secretary of War.

On the other hand, I am of the opinion that the legend fairly implies that "the

plan devised by General Rosecrans" contemplated a crossing at the point where the crossing was in fact made.

General Smith had charge of the preparation for and execution of the movement at Browns Ferry, and performed the service with such signal skill and energy that it was a complete and perfect success. The credit and honor to General Smith of this service has never been questioned and can not be taken from him, whoever may have discovered the strategic importance of Browns Ferry or conceived the plan in respect of such a movement.

The thanks of Gen. George H. Thomas, commanding the department, were officially tendered to General Smith and the officers and men of the expedition under his command,¹ and in a later report General Thomas says, "To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry."² Assistant Secretary of War Dana, who had been sent to the army by Secretary Stanton to keep him informed of the situation, reported: "The great success, however, was General Smith's operation at the mouth of Lookout Valley; its brilliancy can not be exaggerated;"³ and shortly after General Grant recommended that General Smith be placed first on the list for promotion to the rank of major-general.⁴ But this does not dispose of the controversy.

Two questions remain: First, had General Rosecrans any plan for opening the short line along the south side of the river between Bridgeport and Chattanooga? Second, did that plan have in view the crossing of the river at the point where the bridge was laid by General Smith?

First. The Army of the Cumberland, after the battle of Chickamauga, retired into the valley and town of Chattanooga September 21, 1863. It took position on the 22d of September from the mouth of Chattanooga Creek on its right to Citico Creek on its left flank. Within these lines it occupied both banks of the Tennessee River, with detachments sufficient to guard the fords and ferries in the vicinity. The Confederates held the points of Lookout and Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley, which lies between them, and thus closed the Union line of supplies by river and by railroad to Bridgeport.

The accompanying map gives a clear idea of the topography of the locality. It was prepared under General Smith's directions after the battle of Missionary Ridge.

It is important to bear in mind the course of the river, which makes a horseshoe bend around Moccasin Point and flows back (northerly) almost parallel with its course, by Chattanooga, to a point considerably above Williams Island. Some of the references speak of "up" to Williams Island when it is "down" according to the current of the stream.

September 24, 1863, Secretary of War Stanton telegraphed Mr. Dana at Chattanooga that the War Department had made arrangements to send 15,000 infantry, under General Hooker, from Washington, and would have them in Nashville in five or six days, with orders "to push on immediately wherever General Rosecrans wants them."⁵

To a like dispatch from General Halleck, Rosecrans replied to send the infantry by brigades as fast as possible, and let the artillery follow at leisure. "The great point is to have troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport to secure those points and the railroad. We can hold this point if we can keep up communication and supplies."⁵

¹ Official Records, Serial No. 54, p. 68.

² Van Horn's History Army of the Cumberland, vol. 1, p. 398.

³ Official Records, Serial No. 54, p. 72.

⁴ Official Records, Serial No. 56, p. 122.

⁵ Official Records, Serial No. 48, p. 151.

General Hooker was ordered, with the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, to proceed at once to the relief of the Department of the Cumberland and to report to General Rosecrans. On the 26th of September General Hooker reported to General Rosecrans that his command would leave Washington that day, and he hoped to be with it in Nashville by the 1st of October, and asked for orders for the disposition of his forces.¹ In reply General Rosecrans instructed him that trains would await the arrival of his troops to bring the advance to Bridgeport and that the remainder would follow to the same point.² A dispatch from General Rosecrans to Col. Thomas A. Scott, of the same date, with respect to transportation of the troops, shows the urgent desire of General Rosecrans to concentrate General Hooker's forces at Bridgeport.²

A like dispatch to Colonel Innis, under date of 29th.³ On September 30, at 10 a. m., General Rosecrans telegraphed to General Hooker, "Your corps will pass directly to Bridgeport without reshipment at Nashville. Field transportation will be ready for you at Bridgeport." September 30 Colonel Hodges, quartermaster at Nashville, telegraphed General Rosecrans the arrival of part of the Eleventh Army Corps, which had passed through Nashville that morning, and asked General Rosecrans to give him an idea as to where the troops now coming in will be for the present. To which General Rosecrans replied on the same day, "Troops coming in will operate on the Lookout Valley line unless called northward," and in the same dispatch he says, "We want nails assorted for pontoons; have plenty of rope assorted sizes."⁴ October 16 Mr. Dana telegraphed a conversation with General Rosecrans, in which General Rosecrans represented that "the possession of the river as far up as head of Williams Island [which was but a short distance from Browns Ferry and 3 miles or more from Moccasin Point] is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible for him to make any movement toward gaining such possession until General Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. Hooker's troops are now scattered along the line of the railroad and can not be got together before next Wednesday." General Hooker had been ordered to concentrate his troops, and on the 12th of October General Rosecrans had ordered him to move a division as far as Whitesides, but at Hooker's request had delayed it until his batteries could go. With respect to this order Mr. Dana telegraphed Secretary Stanton, "The necessity of opening the river being thus imperative, General Rosecrans has ordered Hooker to concentrate his troops preparatory to seizing the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupying Shellmound, and, if possible, Lookout Valley."⁵

October 19, 1863, 9 a. m., General Hooker telegraphs General Granger: "Have just received orders from department headquarters to hold command in readiness to march at short notice. Yours will be the only troops left on the line when I leave."⁶

On the same day, at 11 p. m., General Thomas notifies General Hooker that he has assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland, and "desires that you will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards."⁷

These instructions were to concentrate as much as possible of Hooker's command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point

¹ Official Records, Serial No. 48, p. 159.

² Official Records, Serial No. 48, p. 164.

³ Official Records, Serial No. 48, p. 177.

⁴ Official Records, Serial No. 52, p. 947.

⁵ Official Records, Serial No. 50, p. 216.

⁶ Official Records, Serial No. 53, p. 482.

⁷ Official Records, Serial No. 53, p. 485.

and Nashville, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and rail.¹

These contemporaneous dispatches leave no doubt that General Rosecrans had in mind the general plan of recovering Lookout Valley and opening the river to Bridgeport by operations as far up (down the river) as the head of Williams Island, and this is confirmed by the official reports.

General Grant telegraphed General Halleck October 28, 1863: "General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south side road hence to Bridgeport has proven eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled."²

Gen. George H. Thomas, November 7, 1863, forwarding the reports of General Hooker and General Smith, with others, "of the operations of their respective commands between the 26th and 28th ultimo, to gain possession of the south bank of the Tennessee River and open the road for a depot of supplies at Bridgeport,"³ says:

"Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this important movement before the command of the department devolved on me. The bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed."

Soon after the war General Thomas prepared the Legends of the Operations of the Army of the Cumberland, which were published at Washington in 1869, together with the map illustrating them, which is entitled:

[Coat of arms of Engineer Department.]

Map prepared to exhibit the campaigns in which the Army of the Cumberland took part during the war of the rebellion. By order of Maj. Gen. Geo. H. Thomas, U. S. A. Compiled under the direction of Bvt. Major Gen'l Z. B. Tower, chief engr. Military Div. of the Tennessee, by Ed. Ruger, supt. top'l eng'r office at Nashville. Assistants, Capt. A. Kilp and Lieut. R. Flach, 3rd U. S. C. A. (Heavy) and Asst. Top. Engrs.

The legends were originally written on the border of the map, but for convenience in circulation were printed in pamphlet form. They are not signed by General Thomas, but were undoubtedly prepared by him or under his direction and received his approval. The copy which I have was sent to me by General Thomas with a letter from him.

On page 19 of these legends is the following statement:

On the 19th of October Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas succeeded General Rosecrans in the command of the Department of the Cumberland. Prior to being relieved General Rosecrans had ordered the concentration of Hooker's troops at Bridgeport, preparatory to advancing along the line of the railroad toward Chattanooga. On assuming command of the Army of the Cumberland, General Thomas ordered the immediate execution of this movement, and after consulting Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, he determined upon certain other movements in conjunction with General Hooker's advance looking to the opening of the Tennessee River and main wagon road from Bridgeport to Browns Ferry, it being impossible to supply the army at Chattanooga by the road on the north bank of the river.

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23d, and, approving of General Thomas's plans, they were carried into execution.

These dispatches and reports compel me to the conclusion that General Rosecrans had in contemplation a plan for opening the line of communication to Bridgeport along the south shore of the Tennessee River by crossing the river and taking possession of Lookout Valley.

¹ Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War, Supplement Vol. I, p. 118, testimony of General Thomas.

² Official Records, Serial No. 54, p. 56.

³ Official Records, Serial No. 54, p. 42.

Second. Did this plan of General Rosecrans's have in view the point at which the movement was executed under General Smith's direction?

It is strenuously urged by General Smith that the only point of crossing the river which General Rosecrans had in mind was opposite the mouth of Lookout Creek and that General Rosecrans never selected or even visited Browns Ferry near the head of Williams Island. To establish this he refers to the Merrill map, the telegrams of Mr. Dana of September 26 and October 4, 1863, the testimony of General Rosecrans before the Committee on the Conduct of the War; a letter from Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds in 1895; a narrative of his (General Smith's) visit to Browns Ferry October 19, 1863, unaccompanied by General Rosecrans or any of his staff, and a letter from Mr. C. A. Dana, May 22, 1895.

The Merrill map is dated Camp Stevenson, Alabama, September 8, 1863. A copy is attached to General Smith's pamphlet, *The Reopening of the Tennessee River*, etc. It shows two ferries, "Browns" and "Williams," the former designated abreast of the mouth of Lookout Creek and the latter near the head of Williams Island. It is indorsed "Rec'd Sept. 26, 1863, without letter of transmittal. J. C. W."

General Smith says it was the only map in use in the Army at the date of these operations. On the contrary, General Reynolds, who was General Rosecrans's chief of staff, writes General Smith in a letter dated May 23, 1895, "I have no recollection of ever having seen this map before to-day." He also says, in reference to another map which located Browns Ferry where the Merrill map does, "I have run my pencil through the name 'Browns Ferry' and have made a pencil mark across and down the river beyond the mouth of Lookout Creek; why and when I made these marks I can not now tell."

That the location of Browns Ferry on this map is erroneous is not disputed. Browns Ferry near Williams Island has been well known for sixty years and more, and there is no evidence except the map in question that there ever was a ferry by that name abreast the mouth of Lookout Creek.

Again, I can not attach the importance to this map claimed for it by General Smith in view of the knowledge of the true location of Browns Ferry by officers of our Army after the occupation of Chattanooga.

Gen. John T. Wilder, with his brigade of mounted infantry, as early as *August 21, 1863*, crossed Waldens Ridge and bombarded Chattanooga. He stated to the commission and confirmed it to me that on his arrival in front of Chattanooga on that day he sent Colonel Monroe, of the One hundred and third Illinois Regiment of Mounted Infantry, to Browns Ferry, and on the next day he visited the place under the guidance of William Crutchfield, who told him that it was the main road for emigration to pass from that section of the country and that it was the direct road to Nashville.

Browns Ferry was occupied by artillery and infantry of our Army on the 23d day of September. General Whittaker reports September 24 the operations of his command on the 23d and the distribution of his troops.¹

The Ninety-sixth Illinois, Eighty-fourth Indiana, Tenth Indiana Battery, Fortieth Ohio, and one section Eighteenth Ohio Battery are directly opposite the base of Lookout Mountain, protecting the ferry. The One hundred and fifteenth Illinois and one section of the *Eighteenth Ohio Battery, at Browns Ferry, about 3 miles below the position of Colonel Champion [Moccasin Point].*²

These were doubtless the troops which General Smith found there upon his reconnaissance.

General Reynolds, in the letter of May 20, 1895, upon which General Smith relies, describing the reconnaissance with General Rosecrans, says:

We crossed the river at Chattanooga and examined the country on the north side with a view of selecting a location for a pontoon bridge. As I remember it, Browns

¹Official Records, Serial No. 52, p. 827, 828, Whittaker to A. A. G. 1st Div. Res. Corps.

²Italics throughout are by General Duffield.

'Ferry was in everybody's mind as the proper place, but the point had not been decided definitely. We visited our battery on the high ground on the north side of the river and about opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain. My understanding was that Rosecrans fixed Browns Ferry as the place for the bridge.

The documents quoted from by General Smith are not irreconcilable with this view.

General Rosecrans's testimony that he stated to General Garfield that he "would take possession of Lookout Valley opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain and fortify it, thus completely covering the road to Bridgeport on the south side, as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well as of Lookout Valley," does not necessarily imply that he intended to cross the river abreast of Lookout Creek.

The movement which General Smith executed did these very things. General Hooker came up to Browns Ferry, and the result gave the Union forces practical possession and use of both river and the road to Bridgeport, as well as of Lookout Valley.

The dispatches of Mr. Dana are not conclusive on this question. It is true he says, in a long dispatch of October 4, 1864, concerning other matters, " * * * Engineers are now engaged upon the pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek,"¹ but he does not state his authority for the location of the bridge. It is obvious that in such an intended movement the place of crossing would be kept as secret as possible. But on October 16, 1863, he telegraphs: "I have just had a full conversation with General Rosecrans upon the situation. He says the possession of the river as far up² as the head of Williams Island at least is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga. * * * The wagons must have all arrived by that time [next Wednesday], and if the enemy does not interfere sooner the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted."³ Obviously no movement upon Raccoon Mountain by crossing the river at Moccasin Point is here contemplated, but a movement from the neighborhood of Williams Island. He telegraphs October 24, 1863: "Grant arrived last night, wet, dirty, and well. He is just going to reconnoiter an important position which General Smith has discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and which will be occupied from here simultaneously with Hooker's occupation of Raccoon Mountain."⁴ Again,⁵ "the force which will cross at Browns Ferry to occupy the mamelon at the mouth of Lookout Valley will consist, etc." Again,⁶ "the great success, however, is General Smith's operation at the mouth of Lookout Valley."

Finally, it is urged both by the commission and General Smith in their respective presentations of the matter that a permanent crossing at the "Browns Ferry" designated on the Merrill map was utterly impracticable and would avail nothing. An inspection of the locality so clearly shows this that it is not reasonable to conclude that officers of General Rosecrans's and General Reynolds's ability and experience would have selected it as the point of crossing the river.

In an article in the December (1885) North American Review General Rosecrans states that he visited the place where the bridge was afterwards laid. This is denied by General Smith, who asserts that General Rosecrans did not select or even visit the place where the bridge was thrown, and claims that the decision of this question should settle the whole controversy.

In support of his position he relies upon his personal narrative of his visit and to the letters of Mr. Dana and of Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds, above noted. Unless it is

¹ Official Records, Serial No. 50, page 207.

² Down—a natural error because of the peculiar course of the river.

³ Dana to Secretary of War, Official Records, Serial No. 50, page 219.

⁴ Dana to Secretary of War, Official Records, Serial No. 54, page 70.

⁵ Dana to Secretary of War, Official Records, Serial No. 54, page 71.

⁶ Dana to Secretary of War, Official Records, Serial No. 54, page 72.

absolutely necessary—and I do not think it is in this case—it is obviously undesirable to test the accuracy of the legends by the recollections of persons after more than twenty years have passed. However, I do not see any irreconcilable conflict in the premises.

Mr. Dana recalls meeting General Smith on October 19 and General Smith saying that he had come out with General Rosecrans to reconnoiter down the line of the river; that General Rosecrans was visiting in the hospital and he (General Smith) would not wait for him any longer, and that they rode together until they parted where their roads diverged, Mr. Dana going up the mountain and General Smith down toward the river.

General Reynolds remembers the reconnoissance on October 19 with General Rosecrans and another officer whose name he can not recall, to select a location for a pontoon bridge; that they skirted the river generally as far as practicable and returned to headquarters toward sunset; that Browns Ferry was already in everybody's mind as the proper place.

This other officer was undoubtedly Maj. S. Frank Bond, who, in a letter to General Boynton November 7, 1895, recalls the occasion and states emphatically "that General Rosecrans, General Reynolds, General Smith, and himself started early in the morning of October 19 to make a reconnoissance of the north bank of the river; that a careful examination of the river was made, and a point known as Browns Ferry was selected; that the entire day was thus spent, and it was just after dark when they returned to Chattanooga.

It seems to me very clear that these letters and the statement of General Smith only prove that both General Rosecrans and General Smith visited the place where the bridge was afterwards thrown, but not at the same time. I can not agree that General Reynolds's letter fixes the place for the bridge at the point where the battery which is mentioned was. The battery was on Moccasin Point, and both sides of the river between Chattanooga and the battery were occupied by our troops. It would naturally be the starting point of the reconnoissance, which was to skirt the river as far as practicable. Again, it was so near Chattanooga—not to exceed 4 miles—that if the reconnoissance stopped there it could not have occupied the entire day.

My conclusion from these letters is that both General Smith and General Rosecrans on October 19 visited the place where the bridge was thrown, but not together, and that each selected it as the proper place for the bridge.

Both were educated and practical military engineers, and both recognized the fact that the place was about the only practicable point along the river for the bridge.

For these reasons I am convinced that there is no error in and no injustice intended or done to General Smith by the legend in question.

Respectfully,

HENRY M. DUFFIELD.

Accompanying this report I send under separate cover the following papers:

- (1) Letter of instructions from Secretary Alger, November 30, 1897, with General Smith's appeal and letter from him to Senator Proctor.
- (2) General Smith's pamphlet, *The Reopening of the Tennessee River, etc.*, with maps attached.
- (3) Reply of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission to General Smith's appeal, March 22, 1898. [With A 1.]
- (4) General Smith's rejoinder to the above, April 3, 1898.
- (5) Copy of letter of Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds to General Smith, May 20, 1895.
- (6) Copy of letter of May 23, 1895, from same to same.
- (7) Letter of Gen. H. V. Boynton, January 12, 1898, stating conversation with Gen. John T. Wilder.
- (8) Letter of Maj. Frank S. Bond to Gen. H. V. Boynton, November 7, 1895. [See page 33.]

HENRY M. DUFFIELD.

GENERAL SMITH'S APPEAL TO SECRETARY ROOT.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 26, 1900.

Hon. ELIHU ROOT, *Secretary of War*.

SIR: On the 15th of November, 1897, I had the honor to address to your predecessor a protest in reference to a part of the "legend of the series of maps published by the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission."

In the second paragraph is a statement giving to General Rosecrans credit for devising the plan for recovering possession of the short line of communication with Bridgeport by seizure of the hills at Browns Ferry. As this statement is entirely incorrect, I requested Secretary Alger to refer the question at issue "to some officer, other than any member of the present Chattanooga Commission." November 30, 1897, Secretary Alger referred my protest to Col. Henry M. Duffield, the historian of the aforesaid Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission.

The simple condition in my request—that no member of that commission should be selected to report upon the historical accuracy of their legend—was thus disregarded, and, as I could do nothing, I submitted.

The directions of the Secretary required a report before *January 1, 1898*, and having had no information in regard to it, in November, 1899, I made inquiries at the Department, where I found that no report had been received from Colonel (now General) Duffield, and gathered that none was expected. On February 15, 1900, I received from the Department General Duffield's report, dated January 23, 1900, and in it he gives no reason for the fact that it was not submitted as directed, before January 1, 1898, but pleads that the pressure of business at the Department in the *spring of 1898* caused the Secretary to direct that the *report* be deferred.

The report is, as I foresaw, adverse, and concludes by stating that "there is no error in, and injustice intended or done to General Smith by the legend in question." I therefore have to submit to you a reply to this report, compiled from the official records and sufficient to show the justice of my protest. This reply will further show that I am making no effort to detract from the reputation of anyone, but that I am forced by these incorrect statements to attempt to bring out the truth of this matter, as shown by the records.

As the selection of General Duffield makes a report a mere statement by counsel for the defense, and as the Department is indirectly responsible for the historical accuracy of the statements of its appointees, I am emboldened to ask you, in simple justice, to appoint a board to examine into this question.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,

Brevet Major-General, United States Army.

[First indorsement.]

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Washington, August 23, 1900.

Respectfully referred to Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, United States Army, Governors Island, New York City, president of the board of officers this day appointed by the Secretary of War to consider and report upon the question herein referred to.

The address of Maj. William F. Smith, United States Army, retired, is 824 Adams street, Wilmington, Del.; the address of Gen. H. V. Boynton, president of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, is room 524, War Department, Washington, D. C. These papers will be returned to this office with the report of the board.

By order of the Secretary of War:

W. H. CARTER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Washington, August 23, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

*Commanding Department of the East,**Governors Island, New York.*

SIR: By direction of the Secretary of War a board of officers, to consist of Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, United States Army, Col. George L. Gillespie, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, Col. Michael V. Sheridan, assistant adjutant-general, United States Army, is hereby appointed to meet at Governors Island, New York, at the call of the president of the board, to consider, investigate, and report upon a claim made by Maj. William F. Smith, United States Army, retired, that the legend of the atlas of the Chickamunga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, which declares that "At daylight of October 27 the river line of the communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley devised by General Rosecrans," is incorrect, and that he (Major Smith) conceived the plan mentioned.

The Secretary of War directs that the Chickamunga and Chattanooga National Park Commission and Major Smith furnish the board such papers, records, and information as may be pertinent to the question at issue, and he also directs that the report of the board be forwarded to this office.

Very respectfully,

WM. H. CARTER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE.

HAVERFORD, PA., *August 26, 1900.*

DEAR COLONEL GILLESPIE: I see you have been appointed on a board to consider and report on a charge I brought against the Chickamunga Park Commission. I hope it does not bore you, for it is vitally important to my record that it should have thorough airing. The reply to my last paper presented to the Secretary will, I suppose, be put before your board. I should like to see that paper and reply to it if I find statements without evidence. Will you kindly aid me in that?

Will you also, if you have time, read what Van Horne says in his History of the Army of the Cumberland; also what Rhodes says in his fourth volume, History of the United States? Those are independent statements, made with no help from me.

John Fiske has lately, I am told, written a history with the same conclusion.

I am, yours, sincerely,

WM. F. SMITH.

This letter was received to-day, and I send it for you to read and file.

G. L. G.

AUGUST 28.

 HAVERFORD, PA., *September 8, 1900.*

MY DEAR COLONEL GILLESPIE: I am very sorry that you have any disagreeable duty thrust upon you through any action of mine, though I will confess that if I had been consulted with reference to the naming of the engineer officer of the board I should have selected you. Perhaps if you do not look upon the investigation as settling a dispute between two parties, but as deciding upon a point of history, it may take away the disagreeable part, for you, like every other officer, must be interested in real history. I shall not be able to send the histories to the board, for I do not own them and they are beyond my means to purchase, but I will send to the recorder titles and pages carefully specified.

Yours, sincerely,

WM. F. SMITH.

WILMINGTON, DEL., *September 14, 1900.*

DEAR COLONEL GILLESPIE: I do not know precisely how to address your board, and so send to you to ask you to forward or present to the board at the proper time a list of the books I wish the board, if possible, to consult during their hearing of the case as to the truth or falsity of the legend on the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Park Commission.

Yours, very sincerely,

WM. F. SMITH.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Wilmington, Del., September 14, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, *United States Army,*
President Board of Inquiry.

GENERAL: In the discussion by your board as to the correctness of the legend published by the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Park Commission, referring to the movement at Browns Ferry, Tennessee, on the 27th of October, 1863, I have to request your board to examine—

First. The History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, fourth volume, pages 403–405, by James Ford Rhodes.

Second. The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, by Prof. John Fiske, pages 287 to 293, inclusive.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. A.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE.

DEAR GENERAL GILLESPIE: I send herewith, for you to present or forward at the proper time to General Brooke, president of the board to examine into the truth of the "legend," etc., a revised list of books which I have to request the board to examine while discussing the subject before the board.

Yours, sincerely,

WM. F. SMITH.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Wilmington, Del., September 20, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, *United States Army,*
President Board to Examine, etc.

GENERAL: I most respectfully ask your board, when you are discussing the question of my protest to the Secretary of War of November, 1897, having reference to a statement in the legend of the atlas of the Chickamauga Park Commission, to refer to and examine the following authorities, viz:

1. History of the Army of the Cumberland, by Thomas B. Van Horne, U. S. A.: Robert Clarke & Co., 1875, pages 393 to 404, both inclusive.

2. The Life of Gen. George H. Thomas, by Thomas B. Van Horne, U. S. A.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882, pages 155 to 159, inclusive.

3. History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, by James Ford Rhodes, Volume IV, pages 403 to 405.

4. The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, by John Fiske: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston, 1900, pages 287 to 293, inclusive.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. A.

1013 CLINTON STREET, PHILADELPHIA.

DEAR COLONEL SHERIDAN: May I trouble you to make a correction in a quotation made by Mr. Talcott Williams in a letter to me, a copy of which I sent with copies and extracts of letters to Gen. Brooke the other day? Mr. Williams is so distinguished in the world of letters that I can not think of having a quotation of his marred by the blunder of a typewriter. Will you kindly get the letter from the papers in the possession of General Brooke and erase the first line of the incorrect quotation, leaving it as I have left it in the copy inclosed?

Yours, sincerely,

WM. F. SMITH.

[NOTE: For corrected copy of letter from Talcott Williams, esq., see page 171.]

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,

Wilmington, Del., October 8, 1900.

Col. MICHAEL V. SHERIDAN,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Member of the Board, etc.,
Governors Island, New York Harbor.*

COLONEL: I beg to send you herewith certain papers as follows:

Extracts from Van Horne's Life of Thomas, from page 154.

List of letters received at various times from well-known parties. [See page 172.]

Copy of letter of John C. Ropes, dated May 2, 1895. [See page 162.]

Pamphlet entitled "The Reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863."

I assume that the board has been furnished with my letter to Secretary of War, being a reply to General Duffield's report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,

Brevet Major-General, United States Army.

[Extract from Van Horne's Life of Thomas, from page 154.]

The first duty, therefore, of the new commander was the deliverance of his army from starvation, which threatened its hold upon Chattanooga, if not its own existence; and fresh from his parting from General Rosecrans, General Thomas addressed himself to the imperative work. His first order, issued before he had formally assumed command of the army, had reference to the movement of Hooker's forces to Chattanooga, which had been projected by General Rosecrans:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,

October 19, 1863—11 p. m.

Major-General HOOKER,
Stevenson.

Maj. Gen. G. H. Thomas directs me to state that, in obedience to the order of the President of the United States, he has assumed command of the Department of the Cumberland. He desires that you will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards.

J. J. REYNOLDS,

Major-General and Chief of Staff.

This order was exceedingly courteous to General Rosecrans. In giving a copy of it to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Thomas thus explained his action:

The instructions referred to in the above order were to concentrate as much of his (Hooker's) command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and by rail.

But no definite plan had yet been devised to gain possession of the left bank of the Tennessee River, so as to support Hooker's advance with forces from Chattanooga. Such was the condition of the army that immediate steps must be taken to open the Tennessee and the short roads to Bridgeport, or the withdrawal of that army from Chattanooga would be unavoidable. That no plan for obtaining this object had been definitely formed is evident from the following statements by General Thomas:

Before he was relieved in ^{mi 5}command of the Department of the Cumberland General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short route of supplies from Bridgeport.

General Thomas was too just to permit, by his own silence, the credit of a successful movement which he had not originated to be given to himself. He therefore repeated General Rosecrans's instructions to General Hooker and disclaimed any other relation to the definite plan proposed by General Smith than approval and generous support in its execution. General Hooker could not move with safety from Bridgeport until measures had been taken to drive the enemy from the left bank of the Tennessee River. Had his command moved into Lookout Valley before support was practicable from Chattanooga, General Bragg could have sent an overwhelming force against him, and the army at Chattanooga would only have witnessed the failure of the effort to avert starvation. The definite plan was so evidently originated by General Smith that General Thomas gave him credit for its conception and execution.¹

The dispatches sent by General Rosecrans at the close of the battle of Chickamauga had so plainly revealed his fear that he could not hold Chattanooga that it was imagined in Washington that he would needlessly abandon the place. And doubtless General Grant's first dispatch to Thomas indicated some anxiety lest he should withdraw the army before Grant could himself reach Chattanooga. On the 19th of October he telegraphed: "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards." The terse reply of Thomas, "We will hold the town till we starve," was equally the expression of his own purpose and that of his army.

This bold answer had this significance also: The confidence of General Thomas in his army. He knew that its morale had been exceedingly good from the day it retired from the battlefield of Chickamauga. In leaving that field there had been no panic, no hurried retreat, even by those troops who, through no fault of their own, were forced to fight on conditions which forbade success. But the troops on the right who lost their position, and those who withstood the whole Confederate army until they were withdrawn by orders, were in no respect, except from loss of material, unfitted for the immediate renewal of the conflict. And no army had ever endured the reduction of its ration to one-half, one-third, and one-fourth with less complaint and less demoralization. The necessity of this reduction was apparent to every soldier, and every soldier was as unwilling as the commanding general to abandon Chattanooga.

On the 20th of October General Thomas, in the following order, assumed the command to which he had been assigned:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
(Chattanooga, Tenn., October 20, 1863.)

In obedience to the orders of the President of the United States, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Department and Army of the Cumberland.

¹ In his report to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War he said: "To Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry."

In assuming the control of this army, so long and ably commanded by Major-General Rosecrans, the undersigned confidently relies upon the hearty cooperation of every officer and soldier of the Army of the Cumberland, to enable him to perform the arduous duties devolved upon him.

The officers on duty at the various departments of the staff at these headquarters will continue in their respective places.

All orders heretofore published for the government of this army will remain in full force until further orders.

GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General, United States Volunteers.

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the evening of October 23. With his coming General Thomas, though an army commander, became subordinate to an immediate superior in rank, and as completely subject to direction in handling his army as he had previously been in the management of his corps. He therefore made known to General Grant at once the scheme which had been devised for the relief of the army. The plan had been perfected in all its details and needed only the approval of General Grant. On the 24th Generals Grant, Thomas, and W. F. Smith, with other general and subordinate officers, examined the river below Chattanooga, Williams Island, and the hills on both banks of the river in reference to the proposed plan of operations. General Grant approved this plan and ordered its immediate execution. Thereupon Thomas telegraphed definite instructions to Hooker in reference to his movement, and promised him cooperation from Chattanooga. General Hooker replied that he would commence his movement at daylight on the 27th. Orders were then issued for the cooperative movements. Two brigades—Hazen's and Turchin's—and three batteries of artillery, under Major John Mendenhall, were given to Gen. W. F. Smith for his operations. His plan provided that 1,500 men, with a sufficient force of pontoniers, should embark on pontoons and at night glide past Lookout Mountain, held almost to the edge of the water by the enemy's pickets, and debark on the left bank of the river, just above Browns Ferry.

For this service a part of General Hazen's brigade, under his own command, was taken. The remainder of this brigade, General Turchin's brigade, and the artillery were ordered to march across the peninsula formed by the course of the river and take position on the wooded hillside near the ferry, to cover the troops on the pontoons should they fail to land on the left bank or to join them on that bank in the event of their success. This expedition was eminently successful. The pontoon boats, hugging the right bank of the Tennessee, glided by the frowning mountain, gleaming here and there with the enemy's campfires, and the troops, with slight opposition, gained the left bank at the designated place. A pontoon bridge was soon thrown by a detachment of trained men from the First Michigan Mechanics and Engineers, under Capt. P. V. Fox, and fortifications for the two brigades were constructed on the enemy's side of the river. Having accomplished all that the plan of operations required of them, these troops were in position to welcome Hooker's column to Lookout Valley in the evening. And then the Tennessee River from Bridgeport to Chattanooga was held by the cooperating forces.

In view of the fact that General Bragg's hope of regaining Chattanooga depended upon his continued grasp of the river and the short road to Bridgeport, it is inexplicable that he did not resist the advance of Hooker. He did attempt late at night to cut off Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps at Wauhatchie, but, failing in this, he abandoned all effort to intercept the newly established communications of the beleaguered army.

The problem of supplies was thus brilliantly solved. The boldness of the plan, the nice adjustment of all its details, and the importance of the results place these operations among the prominent achievements of the war.

General Grant was as explicit as Thomas in denying any connection with the

plan beyond approval. On the 26th of October he sent the following dispatch to Washington:

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI,
Chattanooga, October 26, 1863.

Major-General HALLECK, *Washington*:

* * * General Thomas had also set on foot, before my arrival, a plan for getting possession of the river from a point below Lookout Mountain to Bridgeport. If successful—and I think it will be—the question of supplies will be fully settled. * * *

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

Two days later he again telegraphed in relation to this plan:

CHATTANOOGA, *October 28, 1863.*

General Thomas's plan for securing the river and south-side road hence to Bridgeport has proved eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time, I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may soon commence for offensive operations.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

OCTOBER 9, 1900.

GEN. WILLIAM F. SMITH,
624 Adams street, Wilmington, Del.

GENERAL: Yours of the 8th instant, inclosing certain papers relating to the matter which has been referred to the board, is received; also the printed letter containing a summary of dispatches, etc.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

A SUMMARY OF DISPATCHES REFERRING TO MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS, SUGGESTIONS, OPINIONS, ETC., FROM THE 12TH OF OCTOBER, 1863, TO THE 19TH OF THAT MONTH, BEARING UPON THE ROUTE FOR SUPPLIES FROM BRIDGEPORT TO CHATTANOOGA FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY AT THE LATTER PLACE.

To the Board of which Maj. Gen. Brooke, U. S. A., is President:

This summary of evidence, taken from official records, is written to save the board some reading in the paper written as a reply to General Duffield, to whom my papers were referred by Secretary Alger. I have not embodied in this paper my remarks on the statements of General Thomas nor my personal statement, which are in the "Reply." Where quotations are given I have referred to my pamphlet, *The Reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga*, where the volume and page of the authorities may be found, should the board prefer to seek the official record. I have taken the 12th of October as a starting point, as at that time affairs with the army at Chattanooga began to approach a crisis.

On that day Rosecrans sends a dispatch to Mr. Lincoln which is not jubilant, ending with these words:¹ "Every exertion will be made to hold what we have and gain more, after which we must put our trust in God, who never fails those who truly trust."

On the same day² he sends to Hooker, asking if he can send a division at daylight the next morning to Shellmound, with an advance pushed to Whiteside, taking ten days' rations in haversack and knapsack. To which Hooker replies, "Only with infantry, as battery horses not in readiness to move." To this Rosecrans answers,²

¹ See page 8 of my pamphlet. [Page 94 of this reprint.]

² See page 9 of my pamphlet. [Page 94 of this reprint.]

"I will delay the order till your batteries are ready. Hasten their preparations and and report when ready. *The object is to get possession of the line of the river up to this place.*" Here is a specific plan for the recovery of the short line. A division with an advance to Whiteside; no occupation of Lookout Valley; no orders for connection by a bridge with the army at Chattanooga. Possession of the river is thus to be obtained by one division from Hooker's force, with an advance to Whiteside. Is that the plan which the legend complained of says was "devised by General Rosecrans" and carried out by General Thomas? It is positively the only one given by Rosecrans in the record. On this same day of October Mr. Dana reports:¹ "* * * At any rate, such is our present situation. Our animals starved, and the men with starvation before them, and the enemy bound to make desperate efforts to dislodge us. In the midst of this the commanding general devotes that part of the time which is not employed in pleasant gossip to the composition of a long report to prove that the Government is to blame for his failure."

Rosecrans drops that idea of an order to Hooker, but we hear of it from a conversation of Rosecrans with Dana, who, on the 14th, reports that "Rosecrans has ordered Hooker² to concentrate his troops preparatory to seizing the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupying Shellmound and, if possible, Lookout Valley," and perhaps even capturing Lookout Mountain. Hooker reported on the 12th that his battery horses had arrived, but received no further orders, and yet on the 14th the simple question to Hooker of the 12th is given to Mr. Dana as an order to Hooker to concentrate for the purpose of obtaining grand results reported by Mr. Dana, and all without cooperation by the army at Chattanooga. On the day when Mr. Dana reports this imaginary order for the seizing of the passes in Raccoon Mountain *Rosecrans orders a railroad built from Bridgeport to Battle Creek*, a superfluous work after the short line was opened.

But on the 16th Rosecrans telegraphs to Halleck: "Had we the railroad from here to Bridgeport³ and the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops brought up, we should not probably outnumber the enemy." Had Rosecrans any right under those circumstances to expect any such result from the movement of one of Hooker's divisions as Mr. Dana reported on the 14th to the Secretary?

On the 16th Mr. Dana reports: "Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight⁴ * * * except the opening of the river. General Hooker has been ordered to prepare for this.⁵ * * * All this precious time is lost because our * * * commander can not perceive the catastrophe that is upon us *nor fix his mind upon the means of preventing it.*"

General Rosecrans evidently has not up to this time developed a plan to Mr. Dana such as Thomas carried out on the 27th of October.

5.30, 16th, to Halleck:⁶ "The enemy will probably operate on our left flank." That firm belief explains conclusively why Rosecrans was making every possible exertion to repair the long route and give no heed to the recovery of the short line. "* * * Our future is not bright." The plan carried out by Thomas, had it been in the mind of Rosecrans, would have left no place for such a despondent idea as that quoted above. The last part of this message gives Rosecrans's ideas of conditions necessary to secure Chattanooga, discussed on page 17 of my pamphlet.

¹ See page 9 of my pamphlet. [Page 94 of this reprint.]

² See page 11 of my pamphlet. [Page 95 of this reprint.]

³ See page 17 of my pamphlet. [Page 98 of this reprint.]

⁴ See page 14 of my pamphlet. [Page 97 of this reprint.]

⁵ Nothing later than the telegram of the 12th about moving a division to Shellmound. See page 19 of my pamphlet. [Page 99 of this reprint.]

⁶ See page 16 of my pamphlet. [Page 98 of this reprint.]

The next dispatch of Rosecrans bearing on the movement of troops is dated October 17, 1863, 10 p. m.¹ In this there is no order to concentrate; only an order to make preliminary preparations to move promptly should the enemy cross the Tennessee River above Chattanooga. Hooker in that event is to move up on the long route to meet Bragg, for the Eleventh Corps is not mentioned in the dispatch; and that, being on the long route from Bridgeport to Anderson's, was evidently to be picked up as Hooker marched. Hooker's artillery was not indispensable, as there were batteries at Chattanooga for which there were no horses; therefore Hooker was not expected to have any fighting until he had effected a junction. A direct movement on Lookout Valley was not, therefore, in his mind. But in the event of Sherman's arrival, Rosecrans would then be able to concentrate and move with Hooker's entire strength, *according to circumstances*. That idea also covers the movement on Lookout Valley, but only in the event of Sherman's arrival. Sherman did not get up until after the middle of November, and by that time there would have been no Army of the Cumberland had we waited for him; but the river had been opened with just what Rosecrans had in his possession when he wrote that dispatch. This dispatch is, however, of importance, as Thomas says in his first order to Hooker, 11 p. m., 19th of October: "Use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans." Thomas at this hour has had nearly five hours (which is referred to by Van Horne in his Life of Thomas, p. 154) to go over with Rosecrans the status—the expectations and the orders extant; and Thomas explains the meaning of Rosecrans's instructions in the dispatch of the 17th, saying "they were to concentrate as much of his (Hooker's) command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville, and to hold himself to move at any moment toward Chattanooga, for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and by rail" (*wagon road?*).

In this conversation with Rosecrans, Thomas has evidently gotten a wrong impression of the dispatch of October 17, 10 p. m., for that only looks forward to a partial concentration of the Twelfth Corps, not mentioning the Eleventh Corps, scattered on the long route from Bridgeport to Anderson's. Nor is there any hint in that dispatch of any immediate movement on the "short line," and yet Thomas's remarks leave no doubt as to his understanding of the status when he took command.

Reference must here be made to the dispatch of Mr. Dana dated October 16, 4 p. m.,² in which Rosecrans is reported as saying that the possession of the river up to the head of Williams Island at least is a "*sine qua non*" to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible to make any movement toward such possession until Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. That can not be done before the following Wednesday. If the enemy does not interfere sooner, the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted. "Rosecrans, however, expects that as soon as the weather will allow the enemy will cross the river in force on our left, and then it will be necessary for us to fight a battle or else to retreat from here and attempt to hold the line of the Cumberland Mountains." It must be patent to each member of the board that the "*sine qua non*" idea is not to be counted to Rosecrans as evidence of a masterly knowledge of the art of war, for it was only saying in substance that a sufficient portion of the "short line" must be captured before it could be used.

The dispatch to Hooker of the 18th of October looks forward to the repair of the road to Jasper on the long route and to the old idea of using the river to Shellmound, which is to be fortified, and a depot made "on this side." This was one day before Rosecrans was removed, and yet there is not a hint of any plan for getting possession of the river beyond Shellmound nor of entering upon any plan developed by the

¹ See page 18 of my pamphlet. [Page 99 of this reprint.]

² See page 15 of my pamphlet. [Page 98 of this reprint.]

conversation with Dana at 4 o'clock of the 16th of October. On the 18th Rosecrans informs Halleck¹ that "our pontoon bridge is restored. Boats [for] a second under way." This extract shows that up to that time (October 18, 7.30 p. m.) there was but one pontoon bridge at Chattanooga and that the boat builders were at work on a second bridge. Every layman can see the urgent necessity for a second bridge at Chattanooga, and as there was but one set of men at work on boats, turning them out as fast as possible, those men would be at work on boats for the bridge which was useful and not on a bridge which had not been ordered. So at 7.30 p. m. of the 18th we were making every effort for a second bridge at Chattanooga and for no other point on the river. This extreme urgency made Thomas, early on the morning of the 20th of October, order the second bridge laid at the town. Had he received from Rosecrans and approved of any plan for the movement on Browns Ferry with the cooperative movement from Bridgeport, as has been asserted by those who had no personal knowledge of facts and without a line of evidence from any official source, Thomas would not have ordered the laying of the second bridge at Chattanooga and would have deemed that at Browns Ferry to be the more urgent of the two, there not being sufficient boats for both bridges. This second bridge *was never laid*, and Thomas had adopted the plan that was carried out, for on the 22d of October he telegraphed Halleck:² "Hope to move Hooker in a few days to open the wagon road and railroad from here to Bridgeport." This could not possibly have been done by the holding of the river to the head of Williams Island. There is no pretense by any person, not even by Rosecrans himself, that he visited the spot where the bridge was thrown before the 19th, and that then, on his return from his reconnoissance, he found the order removing him from command. It must then be concluded from the assertions of those who support the truth of the Legend of the Atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Park battlefields that in his conversation with Thomas after 6.20 and before 11 o'clock p. m. of the 19th he had developed an entirely new plan, which had met the approval of Thomas and was launched on the 20th.

Though there is no proof of this, it would be possible, except for my positive statement as to being ordered by Thomas on the morning of the 20th to lay a second bridge at Chattanooga. That statement, which I am entirely willing to confirm under oath, is certainly of as much value as the vague theories and assertions of all those who can make no pretense to personal knowledge of matters involved in this question.

It is, however, humanly improbable, not to say almost impossible, that such a plan as that carried out should have been devised on the evening of the 19th of October by Rosecrans and approved by Thomas on that same night, without some reference to it by Rosecrans in his telegram to Halleck, written one hour and forty minutes after his acknowledgment of the receipt of the order removing him from command. The instinct of self-preservation, which man holds in common with the rabbit, would have dictated such reference. The telegrams sent introduced conditions unnecessary to the plan carried out and postponed the day of relief beyond the capacity of the army to endure.

I will not trouble the board with other dispatches, but will refer to the discussions of this question by Van Horne in his life of Thomas, pages 154 et seq., copy herewith, and to the various telegrams, reports, and orders after October 19 from Thomas, Dana, and Grant, all of which are contained in my pamphlet, with indices to the authority quoted.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,
Brevet Major-General, United States Army.

¹ See page 20 of my pamphlet. [Page 100 of this reprint.]

² See page 32 of my pamphlet. [Page 107 of this reprint.]

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Wilmington, Del., October 8, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, United States Army,
President of Board, Governors Island, New York Harbor.

GENERAL: I beg to inclose certain papers which have been sent to me by the War Department, as follows:

Copy of letter of R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, dated November 30, 1897.

Copy of letter from me to Col. H. M. Duffield, dated April 3, 1898.

Copy of letter of Gen. J. J. Reynolds, dated May 20, 1895.

I also inclose the following:

Map of Chattanooga and vicinity.

Copy of letter of John C. Ropes, dated May 2, 1895.

Extract from Van Horne's Life of Thomas, from page 154. [See pages 154 to 157.]

A package of letters from various sources relating to the matter.

A pamphlet entitled "The reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863."

List of references to authorities.

List of letters received at various times from well-known persons.

I assume that the board has been furnished with my letter to the Secretary of War, being a reply to General Duffield's report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. F. SMITH,
Brevet Major-General, United States Army.

1601 S STREET NW.,
Washington, D. C., May 20, 1895.

MY DEAR BALDY: My recollections about the ride with General Rosecrans are as follows:

We crossed the river at Chattanooga and examined the country on the north side with the view of selecting a location for a pontoon bridge. As I remember it,¹ Browns Ferry was already in everybody's mind as the proper place, but the point had not been decided definitely. We visited our battery on the high ground on the north side of the river and about opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain. My understanding was that Rosecrans fixed Browns Ferry as the place for the bridge. I do not recollect having seen Mr. Dana in the party on that day. The party, as I remember it, was larger when we crossed the river in the morning than it was when Rosecrans and I returned to headquarters toward sunset. There was another officer of the Army besides Rosecrans and myself, but I can not recall who he was. We skirted the river, generally, as far as practicable.

I have no recollection of ever having seen Thomas's report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Thomas's report makes 470 odd pages, dated Nashville, March 9, 1866. I had nothing to do with the preparation of any part of it.

When we returned Gordon Granger met me on the porch of Rosecrans quarters and said: "The old man has been relieved; Thomas is in command."

Will be glad to see you, etc.

J. J. REYNOLDS.

¹ [Note by General Smith.] At that date the engineer's map, which was the guide for the army and to which Rosecrans referred in his testimony of 1865 had Browns Ferry at the mouth of Lookout Creek. That was an error, but we were not aware of it at headquarters.

[Endorsement.]

No description of a locality could better fix the position than this letter does of the battery—rebel—on Lookout Mountain.

General Rosecrans says they skirted the river. They could hardly have done that below our battery at Moccasin Point, for they would have been under the fire of the rebel pickets.

W. F. S.

BOSTON, *May 2, 1895.*

Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH.

DEAR GENERAL: I have been thinking a good deal lately in regard to the statement made by General Boynton in his recently published book on the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Park that you accompanied General Rosecrans when he rode to Browns Ferry on October 19, 1863. This statement is directly contrary to the one made in your paper, which will be published ultimately with the other papers of the Military Historical Society; and the statement in Boynton's book, coming (as it does) from the pen of one of the Government commissioners of the national park—a man, too, who has apparently nothing to gain by making this statement—can not but have considerable weight with the public. Yesterday I looked over Bond's letters, and find that he says that while he believes your statement to be true, he should certainly have said, if he had not seen your statement, that you accompanied General Rosecrans and himself throughout that morning ride. Now, there are two persons whose recollections as to the persons who constituted that party of the 19th of October have not yet been tested, and they are Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds and Mr. Dana, the Assistant Secretary of War. Can not you secure from them a statement of their recollection on this point?

As to Reynolds I imagine he is old and his recollection is hazy, but Dana, I suppose, is still in full possession of his faculties, and I think he would probably remember your joining him at the hospital and riding along with him until he took the diverging road to Bridgeport, while you went to the river. You were at that time chief engineer of the army and would therefore, from official as well as personal reasons, be a person whose conversation and a meeting with whom Mr. Dana would be pretty sure to remember.

I do not at all know on what terms you and Mr. Dana are, but I suppose you are at least acquaintances, and that you would feel at liberty to address him on the subject; but if you do not feel like doing this yourself I can easily procure from friends of mine in New York a good introduction to him, and my position as the writer of a new history of the war would undoubtedly give me access to his recollection.

What I am aiming for is to get Boynton to change his book in this regard in the next and subsequent editions. The book, I think, is likely to have several editions, because it is now, and probably always will be, the official guide to this great park, and I am very anxious that the facts in regard to Browns Ferry should be correctly set forth in it.

Very sincerely, yours,

JOHN C. ROPES.


824 ADAMS STREET,

Wilmington, Del., January 31, 1898.

HENRY M. DUFFIELD, Esq.

DEAR SIR: I send you, in accordance with our conversation at Wilmington, Del. (Thursday, 27th), such papers as I have been able to collect up to this hour, being:



First, a pamphlet, with marginal notes, entitled "The Relief of the Army of the Cumberland," etc., published by me in 1891, and withdrawn after finding that General Grant, by his telegrams to Halleck, October 28, gave, as was proper, credit to



CHATTANOOGA AND VICINITY

NOTES: THREE ROUTES FOR SUPPLIES TO CHATTANOOGA
MARKED IN RED [BLACK LINES]. HALEY'S TRACE
WAS CLOSED BY SHARPSHOOTERS OCTOBER 11,
1863. BLUE LINE [DOT AND DASH LINE] SHOWS
ONLY POSSIBLE ROUTE FROM SHELLMOUND.

SCALE



Thomas for the movement, and therefore was not considered by me as preferring any claim to the plan. The paper also had many typographical errors, and had not specified the authorities.

Second. My pamphlet entitled "The Reopening," etc., with all authorities given. It contains a letter from Colonel Fox directly contradicting the statement made by General Boynton as to what Fox told him, as reported in a copy of a letter here inclosed, directed to Mr. J. C. Ropes, of Boston, and marked.

Third. The statement in Boynton's letter to the Philadelphia Times as to the same pamphlet.

Fourth. Letter from Office of Chief of Engineers saying no maps of Merrill's on file later than that of September 8, 1863; that maps of Chattanooga and vicinity placed Browns Ferry at Moccasin Point.

Fifth. Letter from Ropes, with one sentence from Gen. James H. Wilson.

Sixth and sixth (1). Letters from Col. P. V. Fox.

Seventh. Colonel Fox's address, published in Chattanooga Times September 25, 1895.

Eighth. The paper from the Philadelphia Times of September 15, 1895, which I think is the same you have from the Chattanooga Times, which please return, as it is my only copy.

Ninth. Is a letter from Mr. Ropes only to show what I had to contend with in Boynton's attack, never hesitating to distort or directly to put words into the mouths of men directly the reverse of what was said. Boynton's incorrect quotation of orders and his manufacture of orders are a part of his stock and always ready when they make a point. In his statement (page 32 of my pamphlet [page 106 of this reprint]) with reference to Thomas's orders of October 19, Rosecrans gave Hooker no order of that date nor any after the 17th. Then he ordered Hooker to obey the instructions of Rosecrans—the order of October 17.

Mr. Ropes is a most successful lawyer and understands what is evidence. He is also a most successful military historian and can sift out facts from a deal of chaff, and I offer this not as evidence but as an opinion of an expert as to the kind of statements that crept into Boynton's papers.

Tenth. Is sent because it is an official paper and shows the weight given to the statement of General Thomas on his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War (Supplement, vol. 1, p. 119, given in my pamphlet, p. 30 [page 106 of this reprint]).

Very respectfully,

W. F. SMITH.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,

Ann Arbor, August 14, 1895.

Gen. WM. F. SMITH, *Wilmington, Del.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: Upon return from an absence of four weeks I find your valuable paper on "The reopening of the Tennessee River at Chattanooga," which you were so kind as to send me.

Please accept my thanks for the pleasure of receiving it from your own hands. I have long felt *holy indignation* at the efforts to rob you of the honor justly your due in this matter. I have always believed that I *knew* that you were entitled to credit for the conception as well as for the successful execution of the plan to enter Look-out Valley by way of Browns Ferry, and I am very glad that you have proven it beyond dispute by evidence from official records. You have also proven conclusively that *the plan* and *the place of crossing the river*, as claimed by General Rosecrans years after the event, is not *the plan* which you conceived nor *the place* where you successfully crossed the Tennessee River. Between the dates September 25 and October 19, 1863, many humble volunteer officers like myself began to fear that the grand old

Army of the Cumberland was doomed to annihilation either by starvation or by an attempt to escape it, and, after a lapse of more than thirty years, I believe that that would have been its fate but for your conception and execution of the brilliant movement at Browns Ferry, which gave it a short and safe line of communication with its base of supplies.

With assurances of highest regard, I remain,

Yours, very respectfully,

HENRY S. DEAN,
Late Lieutenant-Colonel Twenty-second Michigan Infantry Volunteers.

99 MOUNT VERNON STREET,
Boston, September 3, 1894.

DEAR GENERAL:

* * * * *

I have also before me the Bond correspondence, touching which I shall have somewhat to write some of these days.

J. C. ROPES.

99 MOUNT VERNON STREET,
Boston, September 8, 1894.

DEAR GENERAL:

* * * * *

I am awaiting a letter from Bond, which will, I trust, clear up his mind. He went, I have no doubt, to the Browns Ferry at the mouth of Lookout Creek. *Mais nous verrons!* What a blooming fool, by the way, he is with his ridiculous antithesis—"those who make history can not write history, etc."—and his cheap two-cent reflections, patriotic and otherwise.

J. C. ROPES.

Gen. W. F. SMITH.

50 STATE STREET,
Boston, August 19, 1895.

DEAR GENERAL: I have your two letters. I inclose Reynolds's two letters, and return the highly satisfactory one of Colonel Dean.

I can send you Thomas's report whenever you want it.

If you could get Reynolds to say that you were not the other officer who accompanied Rosecrans and himself, it would be something. See Reynolds's letter of May 20.

In haste, very sincerely,

J. C. ROPES.

Gen. W. F. SMITH.

Thanks for your letter about Mr. Lincoln.

99 MOUNT VERNON STREET,
Boston, October 12, 1895.

DEAR GENERAL SMITH:

* * * * *

I am anxious or rather curious to see the reply you get from Reynolds. If Reynolds will say that only one officer accompanied himself and Rosecrans in their ride to the river on October 19, 1863, we have got Boynton in a tight place, for we know that Bond did accompany them.

Yours, faithfully,

J. C. ROPES.

Boston, September 12, 1895.

Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH, *Wilmington, Del.*

DEAR GENERAL: I have just examined Boynton's letters in regard to the maps. On December 14, 1894, he wrote me, saying he had been examining the various maps in the possession of the War Records Office which bear upon the subject. He says:

The official copy of Merrill's map of Chattanooga and vicinity of 1863 * * * shows Browns Ferry, as you wrote, a short distance below the mouth of Lookout Creek.

On December 20, 1894, Boynton wrote me again, as follows:

Upon receiving your letter of the 16th instant I went to the office of the Chief of Engineers * * * they found the original map, a blue print of which they said had been sent to General Smith and is probably the one which you have. It proves to be one of a series compiled from progress maps, which were issued frequently and almost daily during a campaign. * * * The map of which you have a blue print, according to the statement made to me in the Engineer's office, was one of these issued from Stevenson, Ala., September 8, 1863.

General Boynton then speaks of a previous map of Chattanooga and vicinity, also issued by Captain Merrill and dated July 20, 1863. He also speaks of another map of Merrill's, dated August 12, 1863. The only other map of Merrill's of which Boynton speaks is one published in 1865.

From these extracts it appears that the map dated September 8, 1863, was the latest of these progress maps issued before the relief of General Rosecrans. I felt sure that this was so, but thought I would examine Boynton's letters and make assurance doubly sure.

Yours, truly,

JOHN C. ROPES.

ST. PAUL, MINN., *July 24, 1889.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have read with deep interest your review of General Turchin's Chickamauga. If you have Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I wish you would read the article on Chickamauga by Gen. D. H. Hill in third volume. It is the best account of that battle ever published, either by Federal or rebel authority. I am sure of this, because I was in that battle and had a prominent part thrown on me after Brannan and Baird failed to "bag" the brigade of rebels which Dan McCook reported to be on the north side of the Chickamauga unsupported and with the bridges destroyed in its rear. Be sure and read it, as it will well repay you and give you an insight into some of the history of that struggle which you may not know. No one knows better than you do that history does not always record events as they should be. No one knows better than I do that the boat excursion you made and conceived, by which the river was opened up to within 8 miles of Chattanooga, the credit was due to you, but I believe that it has passed into history as the conception of another's brain. However, time will make it all right, but it will be after we are all dead.

With many kind wishes, I am, very truly,

R. W. JOHNSON.

Rosecrans's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

[Report on the Conduct of the War, April 22nd. Sworn. 1865. Vol. 3 Library Works, M. Lib., 10th st., Phila., page 33rd seq.]

I mention facts on this subject. As early as the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle, I called the attention of Generals Thomas and Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, and, pointing to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose I would take possession of

Lookout Valley, *opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain, and fortify it*, thus completely covering the road from there to Bridgeport on the south side, as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well as the Lookout Valley; because by means of a fortified tête de pont after our fortifications at Chattanooga were completed we could easily concentrate our whole force to fight the enemy if he entered Lookout Valley, and that within less than two hours' march, while he could not approach us in force with artillery without making a circuit over Lookout Mountain, * * * which would take two or three days. * * * From the 23d of September my correspondence and my staff officers will testify that I was urging the quartermaster, Captain Edwards, who had the work in hand, to hasten its completion, which it was hoped would be the case by the time we were ready to take and hold Lookout Valley.

To effect this, General Hooker was ordered to concentrate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and advised that as soon as his train should arrive, or enough of it to subsist his army 10 or 12 miles from his depot, he would be directed to move into Lookout Valley to take possession of that; and every effort was made to complete the pontoons, etc., to connect that with our troops at Chattanooga.

On the 19th of October I examined the river and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chattanooga. I moreover directed Gen. W. F. Smith to reconnoiter the shore above Chattanooga, with a view to that very movement on the enemy's right flank which was afterwards made by General Sherman. On the 19th of October, on my returning from selecting the position of the pontoon bridge, I received orders to turn over the command, etc.

I have compared the above extract made by Gen. William Farrar Smith with the original report.

EDWARD B. CLARKE,
Assistant Librarian, Mercantile Library, Philadelphia, Pa.

99 MOUNT VERNON STREET, Boston, October 10, 1895.

DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 8th, together with the slip from the newspaper containing Boynton's rejoinder to you, received this morning.

I think Boynton will end by losing his moral sense altogether. This contribution of his contains nothing in the way of evidence at all—simply his own say so from beginning to end. But I have but little time to write now. [See page 115.]

In accordance with your request, I inclose Col. P. V. Fox's letter to you, dated Grand Rapids, Mich., May 18, 1895, and remain, as always,

Very sincerely, yours,

JOHN C. ROPES.

Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH.

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 20, 1895.

MY DEAR BALDY:

My recollections about the ride with General Rosecrans are as follows:

We crossed the river at Chattanooga and examined the country on the north side with the view of selecting a location for a pontoon bridge. As I remember it, Browns Ferry¹ was already in everybody's mind as the proper place, but the point had not

¹[NOTE BY GENERAL SMITH.]—At that date the engineer's map, which was the guide for the Army, and to which Rosecrans referred in his testimony of 1865, had Browns Ferry at the mouth of Lookout Creek. That was an error, but we were not aware of it at headquarters.

been decided definitely. *We visited our battery on the high ground on the north side of the river and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain.* My understanding was that Rosecrans fixed Browns Ferry as the place for the bridge.

I do not recollect having seen Mr. Dana in the party on that day. The party, as I remember it, was larger when we crossed the river in the morning than it was when Rosecrans and I returned to headquarters on toward sunset. There was another officer of the Army besides Rosecrans and myself, but I can not recall who he was. [Bond says he was with the expedition, and he was therefore the other officer.]

I left the Army of the Cumberland soon after the battle of Mission Ridge. Thomas's report makes 470 odd pages, dated Nashville, March 9, 1866. I had nothing to do with the preparation of any of it.

When we returned Gordon Granger met me on the porch of Rosecrans's headquarters and said: "The old man has been relieved; Thomas is in command." This was our first information on that point.

Will be glad to see you when you come to Washington again.

Very truly, yours,

J. J. REYNOLDS.

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., *October 2, 1895.*

Gen. W. F. SMITH, *Wilmington, Del.*

MY DEAR SIR: I received your letters. I wish you could have been here at the dedication services two weeks ago. It is true that we had a great crowd and the opportunities for comfortable and desirable places were a little overcrowded, yet I think you would have enjoyed meeting many of your old friends of war times that were here.

I have been noticing one thing I want to suggest to you in connection with the little pamphlet that you issued with reference to the controversy of the opening of the "Cracker route." I suspect that the map that you furnish, made by Colonel Merrill, is in error. I came here the year following, and have been familiar with the country here and hereabouts ever since. *I am satisfied there never was a ferry at Moccasin Point, where he locates Browns Ferry.* I am satisfied, too, that the map is in error with reference to the name of Browns Ferry proper ever having been called Williams Ferry. Browns Ferry has been called that name for seventy-five years. It was named after a half-breed Indian who lived there at that gap in the ridge and had a ferry at that place. There is a son of his living in that vicinity now.

Williams Ferry was a private ferry, which ran across the river, on the eastern side of the river, from Williams's farm to Williams Island, which took its name from old Sam Williams, the owner of the island. When I came here the Government had two sawmills on that island, and I crossed there numbers of times looking after the property, having been chief property clerk of this depot.

I only mention this; possibly the map may have been made by Colonel Merrill before the ground was sufficiently understood. Allen Parker, who lives on the line of the old mail route, afterwards used as the "Cracker route" going to Browns Ferry, and who lives there now, being an old man, too, having always lived in this vicinity, says there never was a ferry at the point where Merrill has one located in that map called Browns Ferry. I only give you these as matters you may be interested in with reference to the controversy you have on hand.

Very truly, yours,

H. CLAY EVANS.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 22, 1895.*

MY DEAR BALDY: I have your letter of 21st. Have been to the Engineer Department and have seen the map to which you refer, dated September 8, 1863, made at Camp Stevenson, Ala., and marked on upper right-hand corner "Chattanooga, No. 4."

I have no recollection ever having seen this map before to-day. It has two ferries—Browns, opposite mouth of Lookout Creek, and Williams, several miles, probably 3 or 4, down the river toward Williams Island. This is called map of Chattanooga and vicinity (No. 4 below bears the same title).

I went into an old trunk and found four other maps, to which I will now refer. No. 1. "Mountain region of North Carolina and Tennessee," from United States Coast Survey; a fine folding map for pocket use; quotes many authorities from 1820 to 1862, including Michler, Merrill—under Rosecrans; scale, 1 inch = 10 miles. This map has no Browns Ferry at all, but Williams Ferry where the other maps put it as long as the name Williams Ferry was used on them.

No. 2. Large map about 6 feet by 4. Compiled March, 1862, to December, 1862. This map has both Browns and Williams Ferry, placed as in the map dated September 8, 1863, now in Engineer Department. I have run my pencil through the name "Browns Ferry" and have made a full pencil mark across and down the river beyond the mouth of Lookout Creek. Why and when I made these marks I can not tell.

No. 3 is a map reduced from Michler's by Merrill June 1, 1863. This map has Browns Ferry about opposite the mouth of Lookout Creek and no Williams Ferry at all.

No. 4 is a map of "Chattanooga and vicinity," compiled by Capt. P. C. F. West, United States Coast Survey, Chattanooga, November 21, 1863. This map has no Williams Ferry at all, but has Browns Ferry where the other maps locate Williams Ferry and where our pontoon bridge was thrown.

All these maps except the last one were made before any of us had seen Chattanooga and vicinity. We never used, so far as I know, the locality of "Browns Ferry" of the older maps for any purpose whatever. We evidently dropped the name "Williams" Ferry and applied to its location the name Browns Ferry, and there, as I understood it, we put our pontoon bridge. There were doubtless two ferries, Brown's and Williams's, "before the war." How the name Brown came to misplace Williams I can not tell. *Browns Ferry in my mind, when at Chattanooga, meant the place where our bridge was thrown*, and which evidently was called on the older maps "Williams Ferry," though the latter name was never heard among us that I remember.

I went with Rosecrans to the hospital on one occasion, and as I remember but one, it was probably the same day. We did not actually water our horses in the Tennessee River, but went near it, I think, more than once. Thousands of men crossed the Browns Ferry bridge. Many of them probably remember whether their crossing was at Moccasin Point (directly opposite the nose of Lookout Mountain) or farther down the river toward Williams Island, though they might not remember the precise locality of the bridge itself.

Very truly, yours,

J. J. REYNOLDS.

WILMINGTON, DEL., September 12, 1895.

DEAR JOE: I will not trouble you with questions after this letter, and thank you for all the trouble you have taken to help me to get at facts. Dana, in a dispatch of October 24, says "Grant is just going out to reconnoiter a position discovered by General Smith at the mouth of Lookout Valley." That information must naturally have come from Thomas or yourself. Had you known that Thomas had so expressed himself to Dana would you not have corrected the error and said, "Why, that is the place where I went with General Rosecrans on the 19th, and where he had determined to throw a bridge?" Do you suppose, under such circumstances, Thomas had been told by Rosecrans that he had fixed the position for the bridge where it was thrown?

Do you suppose that I, or anyone else, should have had the audacity to claim that as my find if you stood there to confront me in such a statement? I can not go to Chattanooga. I have neither strength nor money, I am sorry to say, though I have been longing to go for a long time.

Yours, sincerely,

W. F. S.

Letter sent, but never answered.

[The Bridge Builder, Chattanooga, September 20, 1895.]

Colonel Fox read a paper at a Chickamauga dedication to-day.

* * * * *

Colonel Fox gave a full history of the much-discussed bridge building on the Tennessee, of which he had immediate charge of the Michigan men being engaged in the work. *He shows that Gen. William F. Smith, the chief engineer, originated the brilliant Browns Ferry movement.*

HEADQUARTERS LOCAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE,
SOCIETY OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Grand Rapids, Mich., May 18, 1895.

DEAR GENERAL SMITH:

* * * * *

Before the battle of Chickamauga I was ordered to Chattanooga in command of a detachment of the First Regiment of Michigan Engineers and Mechanics. General Rosecrans gave me verbal orders, when his army fell back to Chattanooga, to construct a pontoon bridge from anything I could find to cross the Tennessee River. You already have the details of that work. Near its completion, standing on that bridge, General Rosecrans gave me verbal orders to take charge of the two sawmills (run by General Morton's Pioneer Brigade) and get out another bridge soon as possible—to use my own judgment as to the form of the boats, saying I could have all the details I could use. You also have the details of this work, which was well advanced when you assumed control as chief engineer, and General Rosecrans was relieved. *He never told me where he intended to have the bridge thrown, either personally or any other source.* The first intimation that it was to be at Browns Ferry was given to me by yourself, confidentially, about five days before it was done. I understood that the plan to descend the river in pontoon boats and get possession of the west bank of the river at that place originated with you, and safer than the ordinary method. You certainly had charge of the expedition and preparations for it. Col. T. R. Stanley had nothing to do with operating the sawmills, making the boats, or laying the bridge, or even gave me any orders from General Rosecrans. I understood his regiment was selected to manage the boats because so many were rivermen and expert boatmen. As soon as Hazen's men landed, Colonel Stanley recrossed the river and took over Turchin's brigade. He then delivered the boats to me, by your direction and as part of the plan, and I had charge of laying the bridge, the equipage for which was concealed near as practicable the night before, and brought forward as soon as the boats could be used. The bridge was soon finished (900 feet long), and troops crossed into Lookout Valley to join with Hooker's advance that day. The complete success of the expedition led up to a similar movement of General Sherman to get possession of the south bank of the river near the mouth of South Chickamauga, and was also under your direction, and equally successful.

General orders, reports of general officers, and the memory of living witnesses who were there recognize you as the author of the strategy to which the nation owes so much, notwithstanding General Rosecrans's paper, published in the North American Review of December, 1885.

* * * * *

Yours, truly,

PERRIN V. FOX.

GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., *September 9, 1895.*

DEAR GENERAL SMITH:

* * * * *

The facts are in the memory of many living witnesses, and also on record in the orders of Rosecrans, Thomas, Grant, Meigs, and Secretary of War, shown in the official record.

Yours, sincerely,

PERRIN V. FOX.

GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., *September 26, 1895.*

DEAR GENERAL SMITH:

* * * * *

General Boynton tried hard to have me say that General Rosecrans told me he intended the bridge for Browns Ferry. I asked why Rosecrans was examining the river at Williams Island if he had decided on Browns Ferry for the bridge. He was so busy I did not talk much with him. I think he was sorry that the article in the North American Review ever appeared. He can not change facts that are in the recollection of so many living witnesses.

Yours, sincerely,

PERRIN V. FOX.

CALUMET, MICH., *October 13, 1895.*

DEAR GENERAL SMITH:

* * * * *

I joined you at Chattanooga October 20, 1863. Gen. George H. Thomas was in command. Some time after my arrival you placed the topographical office under my supervision, and I naturally visited that office to see what was there. Information was denied me by the one in charge. I reported that fact to you and had no further trouble. I remember no map of Browns Ferry, as described, and, as you know, no map or maps were "carried off" by me or my associates. The topographical office was but a step from your headquarters, and, as it was under you, maps were in all probability taken to you for inspection and returned.

It seems strange that General Rosecrans and staff should have made a reconnoissance on the 19th of October to select a point for bridging the Tennessee when Browns Ferry, where the crossing took place, had been selected previously and so marked on the missing map by pontoons; and all these preliminary arrangements, photographing, etc., had been going on from a period previous to your arrival, October 3, and you, as chief engineer of the department and on the ground, were not informed about it; yet this seems to be what General Boynton is trying to prove through Captain Margedant and aside from any official record.

As to Captain Margedant's arrest for withholding information from you, I do not doubt it, for those were perilous times for the Army of the Cumberland, and I know that you would not let anyone "sulk in his tent" in your department. * * *

Yours, faithfully,

PRESTON C. F. WEST.

[From ex-Governor Stewart, of Vermont.]

MIDDLEBURY, VT., *October 5, 1895.*

Gen. W. F. SMITH.

MY DEAR SIR: I received your pamphlet, written and printed in correction of historical errors on the relief of our army at Chattanooga in October, 1863, and have recently received a clipping of a Philadelphia paper in which you expose errors of statement made by General Boynton.

Men of my profession hold record evidence in highest esteem. Your statements, fortified by the "record," are easily comprehended by a nonprofessional and are unanswerable, save by a newspaper man who writes "at large," who early learns that the sensational gives "go" to his production, the truth thereof being of secondary consequence.

Boynnton is not even a good advocate of a bad cause, else he would have been careful to avoid resting his case upon misstatement sure of exposure. The record shows two things; first, that Rosecrans was incompetent; second, that he had nothing to do either with the plan for relief or its execution.

Your statement of the case, fortified by the records quoted and referred to, will stand in history as conclusive proof that you were the author of the plan which was successfully wrought out under your direction. I had always so understood it, and was more than surprised when you told me at York Harbor that anybody had challenged the truth.

I hope your health is fully restored.

Very sincerely, yours,

JOHN STEWART.

RADOM, WASHINGTON COUNTY, ILL., *June 15, 1889.*

Gen. W. F. SMITH.

DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 11th instant with the extracts of your letters came safely to hand. They are interesting and constitute an uncontrovertible proof of your claim on the plan of Browns Ferry. I am glad that you furnished me these proofs at present; they are timely for me, as I am busying myself at present in collecting all records and datas for my next volume, "Missionary Ridge." When reading General Wilson's article, I noticed one remark there relating to you in regard to the Grant plan of the battle of Missionary Ridge by directing his principal attack against the *north end of the ridge*, and intimating that you had suggested that plan, stating as the proof of it Van Horn's life of Thomas. * * *

I am, General, yours, sincerely,

JOHN B. TURCHIN.

GIRARD BUILDING, *Philadelphia, Pa., April 18, 1900.*

Gen. WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH, *1013 Clinton street.*

DEAR GENERAL: I have gone over the manuscript. It seems to me that you make it perfectly plain from the official record that the relief of Chattanooga by the "short line" was due to your plan, and that this is clinched by your personal statement. Your criticism of General Thomas's report is, I think, plainly and fairly stated.

I have one suggestion to make. The little map accompanying the manuscript does not cover enough ground, and persons who are not acquainted with the situation of towns and mountains in the vicinity would fail to grasp the point of many of the statements. As I went along I made little pencil memoranda and have helped myself out by looking at a volume of the Comte de Paris's history of the war, which contains a map of the country around Chattanooga, including Bridgeport, Jasper, etc. I suggest that if any more extensive circulation is desired to be given to the paper a map covering a somewhat larger ground should accompany it.

Very sincerely, yours,

GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM.

916 PINE STREET,
Philadelphia, Pa., August 30, 1900.

MY DEAR GENERAL SMITH: I should have returned these papers earlier. You asked me two questions—first, if the argument was convincing, and, next, if it should

be followed up. The argument leaves nothing to be said. A weaker *non sequitur* than Duffield's I never saw. The issue is not whether Rosecrans was there—we all know that—but whether he had any military idea worth having when he was there, and on this issue the affirmative and inferential evidence is all one way. I am delighted to hear you have your court of inquiry. I think you already know that Rhodes gives you the credit in his history. He is Hanna's brother-in-law.

I have spoken of this matter where I hoped it would do good. Let me know if I can be of any special service.

Yours, cordially,

TALCOTT WILLIAMS.

By way of reminder that the situation is not unknown to the greatest, I commend you to these two lines in Shakespeare's Sonnets:

Art made tongue-tied by authority,
And Folly, doctor-like, controlling skill.

LIST OF MISCELLANEOUS LETTERS.

- No. 1. Copy of letter from Gen. William F. Smith to Henry M. Duffield.
 - No. 2. Letter from Prof. Henry S. Dean to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 3. Copy of letter from J. C. Ropes to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 4. Copy of letter from J. C. Ropes to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 5. Copy of letter from J. C. Ropes to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 6. Letter from Maj. Gen. R. W. Johnson to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 7. Rosecrans's testimony before the Committee on Conduct of the War compared by Edward B. Clarke, assistant librarian, Mercantile Library, Philadelphia, Pa.
 - No. 8. Copy of letter from J. C. Ropes to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 9. Copy of letter from J. J. Reynolds to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 10. Letter from H. Clay Evans to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 11. Copy of letter from J. J. Reynolds to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 12. Copy of letter from Gen. William F. Smith to J. J. Reynolds.
 - No. 13. Copy of letter from Perrin V. Fox to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 14. Copy of letter from Perrin V. Fox to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 15. Copy of letter from Preston C. F. West to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 16. Copy of letter from ex-Governor John Stewart to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 17. Brig. Gen. John B. Turchin to Gen. William F. Smith.
 - No. 18. Letter from George Tucker Bispham, member of the Philadelphia bar.
 - No. 19. Copy of letter from Talcott Williams, esq., to the Press, Philadelphia.
- The letters referred to in the above list are forwarded not as evidence, but in general as showing the opinions of well-known persons who have examined the evidence deduced from official records. Only one copy is submitted.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
New York, N. Y., October 24, 1900.

Gen. W. F. SMITH,

824 Adams Street, Wilmington, Del.

DEAR GENERAL: I have been reading your papers as rapidly as possible, so as to get certain facts well established in my mind before the board convenes in November. I notice on page 27 of your paper a copy of a letter from Chas. A. Dana, May 22, 1895, in which this expression is used: "I took the mountain path on my way to Bridgeport * * * and somewhere about there you thought a position could be found," etc. Will you please inform me why you "thought" so, and if your "thought" or impression came from a study of the maps or was the result of a previous reconnaissance of this part of the river? Did you, in fact, ever reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of Brown's Ferry, or below, before October 19?

Very truly,

G. L. GILLESPIE.

1013 CLINTON STREET,
Philadelphia, October 25, 1900.

MY DEAR GENERAL GILLESPIE: I am glad to get yours of yesterday, as it gives me an opportunity of explaining some things, and especially Mr. Dana's letter. When I arrived at Chattanooga, September 30, or shortly after, in a conversation with Rosecrans I told him that he would have to shorten his line, for he could not support his army on the one in use. He contradicted me so emphatically, and gave his issues and receipts, that I merely said, "Wait for the autumn rains." From that day to the 18th of October *there was never a word* between Rosecrans and myself on that subject. I wonder and have wondered at it for some years past, for I was his chief of engineers, and took the place much against my own desires and on the condition that he would make Brannan his chief of artillery. I had hard work to get Brannan to take the place, and it was to his disadvantage, but without his services our final results in November would, I think, have been very different.

I was hard at work getting forts made, so that we could leave a garrison to hold the position while the rest of us fell back *somewhere*.

From the hills at Chattanooga, the side of Raccoon Mountain and its base on the river were always in my sight. When I saw that we could get no provisions nor ammunition with which to stand a siege I thought we were gone unless we could materially shorten our line, and the idea came to me that if we could hold Raccoon Mountain at its base—the passes in the mountains with roads on the top between them—that we could hold the river that far and make a depot on Williams Island which we could protect from artillery, and from there make a short road into Chattanooga. Under that idea, on the afternoon of the 18th, I said to Rosecrans that I wished to go down the river and see if we could not utilize Williams Island. How much more I explained to him I do not recollect, nor is it important. Rosecrans said he would go with me, which I did not desire, as I had my own way of doing that sort of work, and wished no superior with me to dictate our route.

He started, but wanted to go into the hospital, and on my urgency as to the time required for a careful examination he said, "I will be out in fifteen minutes." I waited half an hour, and then Mr. Dana coming along, I told him I could wait no longer and would ride with him as far as our routes were the same. *I never had reconnoitered the lower river before, nor the upper river in fact, and had never studied the maps in my department.* I was entirely occupied with what was in the locality of my work. Mr. Dana's letter was a little hazy, but I printed it because of the statement that he and I rode together, and that Rosecrans was not with us. *My object in making the trip was as I have explained, and without any other purpose.* I examined carefully the north end of Raccoon Mountain and could find no place to seize and hold, and turned back to headquarters very despondent. As I passed along on my way I saw a battery to my right, and as I had not known of its existence or object I went there to learn about it. In answer to my inquiry the captain *said the battery was there to prevent a crossing at Browns Ferry, and that was the first I ever heard of Browns Ferry.* On looking at the opposite shore and being told by the captain that there was an *entente cordiale* between the pickets, I went down to the shore and remained there making a thorough examination of the opposite hills, the gorge through which ran the road, the position and distance to the reserve of the pickets and also to the brigade there in the valley.

I think I reached there about 3 o'clock and stayed as long as I could see *anything*.

Rosecrans, as he states, reached headquarters about sunset. Had he been there before me he must have been home earlier. He was not there while I was there, and he could not have gone along the river from Moccasin Point as the whole bank was under the fire of the enemy's pickets. His testimony which you have is clear as to the places he had selected, and as that was given only two years after the event in

question, I don't see how Duffield can ignore that without a serious impeachment of his own witness.

I have written more than you asked but I think I have answered all your questions directly or indirectly, and I hope have not wearied you past forgiveness.

I am going to Hartford on the 7th proximo to see General Franklin who is in bad health, and am to go on the 9th to see Mr. Rhodes, the historian, on a matter of history in another field.

I hope, therefore, if I should be wanted before your board that you will not meet before the 15th of November as I should like to keep my affairs which have been postponed by reason of a bad cold, which housed me for a week. Ex-Senator Higgins will have a paper to hand in and of course I should expect the privilege of answering any paper that may be put in by the opposition, though I think the record and Rosecrans testimony are all that I require.

Yours, sincerely,

WM. F. SMITH.

Gen. GEORGE L. GILLESPIE, *New York City.*

1013 CLINTON STREET,
Philadelphia, December 29, 1900.

DEAR GENERAL GILLESPIE: I have your letter of the 28th instant, and will do my best at answering your questions. My route from where I parted from Mr. Dana, at the forks of the road about opposite the lower end of Williams Island, was all in open ground. After getting above the island, having carefully examined the base of Raccoon Mountain for a position for a lodgment there which could be held, I bore to the left to take the road to headquarters, when I espied on my right front the battery, into which I rode from pure curiosity to find out why it was there. My impression is that it was on the same level—the valley land of the river, over which I had traveled after parting from Mr. Dana. I should think the height above the shingle of the river shore might have been 20 feet—perhaps a little more, perhaps less.

The guns were directly opposite the gorge through which ran the road, and commanded the road near the river entirely. A road from our side (right bank) led down to the river, and I should say the bank on our side had been cut down and did not run through a natural gorge. The shingle shore on the river bank was about 20 to 25 feet wide at that stage of the river. The battery was a Tennessee volunteer battery, and was one of a kind of brigade of Tennessee volunteer batteries, commanded, I think, by Colonel Stokes, a graduate of '35. In volume 54 (serial number), page 83, accompanying Hazen's report, is a fair sketch of the locality. I should say the road on the right bank came to the water a little above the gorge. I think my position on the shore was a little above the road on the other side, but Hazen puts it directly opposite, and so does the map in the pamphlet I sent you. That is a photograph of a Geological Bureau survey or a photograph of a copy I had made from a sheet of the Geological Bureau survey, I do not recollect now which. If it is a copy, the details of the altitude curves can not be depended upon. My map gives open, flat country from below Williams Island to Browns Ferry, as I have described from memory. The battery could not have been 75 feet from the water on a horizontal line during our operations. I do not know where Strikers Ridge is, as I had never heard the name. It may be on Merrill's map of September 8, 1863, a copy of which I think was attached to my pamphlet and called there *Stringer's* spring, which may be our *Strikers* Ridge.

The battery had support, as Whittaker had a brigade in that vicinity.

I think I have answered all your questions.

If you have Hazen's Narrative of Service, Ticknor & Co., 1885, you will find Hazen's map and story on page 156 et seq.

Yours, sincerely,

WM. F. SMITH.

If you wish Hazen's book I will send it to you. Turchin, commanding Second Brigade under me, is at Radom, Washington County, Ill. He may give you some details; J. B. Turchin.

Your
h

W. F. S.

there was a
f

WILMINGTON, DEL., September 21, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Gen. W. F. Smith, being in uncertain health, has requested me to represent him before the board, of which you are the president, appointed by the Secretary of War to consider, investigate, and report upon the claim of General Smith that the legend of the atlas of the Chattanooga and Chickamauga National Park Commission as to who devised the plan for the recovery of Lookout Valley of the Chattanooga campaign is incorrect.

Will you kindly let me know, as near as you can, upon what date the board will want to meet and receive communications from the parties interested, and oblige?

Very truly, yours,

ANTHONY HIGGINS.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, September 27, 1900.

HON. ANTHONY HIGGINS,

834 Market Street, Wilmington, Del.

MY DEAR MR. HIGGINS: Your note of the 21st instant received on my return from an absence, and in reply to it would say that we have a letter of General Smith which seems to point out his objections to the present "legend" you refer to.

The board to which has been referred this subject will not be able to meet until some time in November, owing to the pressure of other matters. I will inform you in time as to the date of this meeting. In the meantime any communications addressed to me on the subject will be laid before the board when it does meet.

I am, very truly, yours,

JOHN R. BROOKE.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Wilmington, Del., September 28, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, U. S. Army,

*Commanding Military Division of the Atlantic,
Governors Island, New York.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to request that I may be furnished with a list of the papers forwarded by the War Department to you as president of the board for the consideration of the truth or falsity of the legend published by the Chickamauga National Park Commission, which states that the plan for the occupation of the position at Browns Ferry was devised by General Rosecrans.

I make this request because I have some papers forwarded by the War Department pertaining to the case and do not know if they are originals or whether the originals are in the possession of the board. If such be the fact, I shall not consider it necessary to burden your records with duplicates. My address is 1013 Clinton street, Philadelphia.

Very respectfully,

WM. F. SMITH,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, September 29, 1900.

Gen. W. F. SMITH,
1013 Clinton Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

GENERAL: In reply to your letter of the 28th instant I would state that the only paper received from the War Department thus far is your letter commenting on the report of General Duffield, of Detroit. The chairman of the Chickamauga National Park Commission has written that he will submit certain papers in connection with the matter, but they have not yet been received.

I think General Gillespie has informed you that it will be impracticable to take up the matter until some time in November, owing to the fact that he is very much engaged in official matters which will prevent his giving the time and attention to it which he desires to give. I am very much in the same fix myself. I can not but assume that the War Department will furnish such information as it may have on file, but which has not yet been asked for because the board has not been able to go into the matter.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, November 26, 1900.

GENERAL: As I have already written you about the meeting of the board which has the papers in your protest against the action of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, fixing some time in the latter part of November, I would now inform you that General Gillespie having been ordered suddenly to Porto Rico on certain duties and as he has departed, the board will not be able to meet until his return. Just as soon as the date of meeting is fixed I will inform you.

I am, very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH,
824 Adams street, Wilmington, Del.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH HON. ANTHONY HIGGINS, COUNSEL FOR GENERAL SMITH.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, December 3, 1900.

Hon. ANTHONY HIGGINS,
834 Market street, Wilmington, Del.

DEAR SIR: In the matter of your appearing before our board in the case of Gen. W. F. Smith, I would ask if you propose to submit any argument, and, if so, whether or not you can furnish a copy of that argument to the chairman of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, which has its office in the War Department, Washington, so that the commission may have an opportunity to make such written reply as they may see proper?

I have informed General Smith of the necessary postponement of the consideration of this matter owing to the absence of General Gillespie in Porto Rico. On his return I will inform you as to the time when the board will take up the case.

I am, very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General

WILMINGTON, DEL., *December 6, 1900.*

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Governors Island, New York City, N. Y.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have your letter of the 3d instant asking for a copy of my argument before your board, so that it might be submitted to the chairman of the park commissioners. I have not yet completed the preparation of my paper, having been interrupted by professional business, but hope to get it done soon. However, I have been intending to write to you to inquire if I could have a copy of any paper submitted on behalf of the park commissioners. Would you kindly let me know if they have presented any written argument; and if so, whether I can have a copy of it?

Very truly, yours,

ANTHONY HIGGINS

DECEMBER 7, 1900.

MY DEAR MR. HIGGINS: I have yours of the 6th instant, and in reply would say that the park commissioners have not submitted any paper in regard to the matter, and, so far as I know, do not propose to argue the case, pending, of course, on what you may have to say. If they should submit any argument, I shall certainly send you a copy of it.

I am, very truly, yours,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

HON. ANTHONY HIGGINS,
834 Market street, Wilmington, Del.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, January 7, 1901.

HON. ANTHONY HIGGINS,
834 Market Street, Wilmington, Del.

DEAR SIR: The board of officers in the case of General Smith will meet at my headquarters on Wednesday, the 9th instant, at 10 o'clock. Any communication that you may have to make to them, either in writing or in person, will be considered at that time.

I am, very truly, yours,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

WILMINGTON, DEL., *January 8, 1901.*

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Department of the East, Governors Island, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 7th instant is received, informing me that the board of officers in the case of General Smith will meet at your headquarters on Wednesday, the 9th instant, at 10 o'clock, and that any communication that I may have to make to them, either in person or in writing, will be considered at that time. I beg herewith to hand you a communication in writing that I have prepared on behalf of General Smith, and beg to state that I will endeavor to appear in person at the hour named.

I must apologize for the haste with which the latter part of my paper has been prepared, as it has been done to-day since the receipt of your letter.

Very truly, yours,

ANTHONY HIGGINS.

COUNSEL HIGGINS'S FIRST BRIEF.

WILMINGTON, DEL., ———, ———.

To Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, Col. GEORGE L. GILLESPIE, Col. MICHAEL V. SHERIDAN, constituting the board of officers appointed by the Secretary of War on August 23, 1900, to consider, investigate, and report upon the claim made by Gen. William F. Smith that the legend of the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission which declares that "at daylight of October 27 the river line of the communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley *devised by General Rosecrans*"¹ is incorrect, and that General Smith conceived the plan mentioned.

GENTLEMEN: At the request of Gen. W. F. Smith, and upon his behalf, I beg leave to submit to you some observations upon the matters presented for your decision by the order of the Secretary of War.

Was the plan for recovering Lookout Valley, by the execution of which, at daylight of October 27, 1863, the river line of communication with Bridgeport was opened, devised by General Rosecrans or by General Smith?

The case comes before the board by way of appeal from the finding of Gen. H. M. Duffield, the historian of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Park Commission, to whom it was referred for consideration and report by General Alger, the late Secretary of War.

General Duffield's conclusion is "that both General Smith and General Rosecrans on October 19 visited the place where the bridge was thrown, but not both together, and that each selected it as the proper place for the bridge, and that there was 'no error in, and no injustice intended or done to General Smith by, the legend in question.'"

I feel that an apology is almost demanded of me in saying anything to the board, because the subject has been treated by General Smith himself in a way so exhaustive, logical, lucid, and conclusive in the two papers which he will present to the board, namely, his pamphlet entitled "The Reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga, October, 1863," and his letter to the Secretary of War of March, 1900, in reply to the report of General Duffield.

I find no letter, order, telegram, or other evidence contained in the official record that has not been included in his discussion, and his presentation of the matter practically leaves nothing new to be said. The most I can hope to do is to endeavor to reduce the area of the dispute to its narrowest limits and to submit some observations thereon.

At the outset, then, it is admitted that General Rosecrans realized the importance and, indeed, the necessity of recovering the short line from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. Just when he first appreciated its vital character is a question, in view of his abandonment of Lookout Mountain to the Confederates, against the protests of Generals Granger and Garfield, according to the dispatch of Mr. Dana of October 12 (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 215), who says:

But the same military error which gave the enemy control of the south shore between here and Bridgeport, and which is illustrated by the stoppage of our trains by sharpshooters, deprives us of the power of using the railroad between here and Bridgeport. That error is the abandonment of Lookout Mountain to the rebels. Immediately after the retreat to Chattanooga Rosecrans ordered the withdrawal of Spear's brigade, which held the head of the mountain, and the destruction of the wagon road which winds along its side at about one-third of its height and connects the valleys of Chattanooga and Lookout. Both Granger and Garfield earnestly protested against this order, and contended that the mountain and the road could be held by not more than seven regiments against the whole power of the enemy, whether he should attack from below or, passing up Stevens Gap, make his approach by the road extending longitudinally upon the crest.

¹ Italics throughout by Mr. Higgins.

This abandonment of Lookout Mountain carried with it the loss of Lookout Valley and the short road from Chattanooga to Bridgeport, and involved the necessity of relying upon the long wagon route by way of Waldens Ridge, by which route Rosecrans ordered his supplies on September 24.

On September 30 the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac began arriving at Nashville on their way to Bridgeport, and, in reply to an inquiry from Colonel Hodges, his chief quartermaster at Nashville, "as to where the troops now coming in will be for the present," General Rosecrans replied (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 3, p. 947):

The troops coming in will operate on the Lookout Valley line, unless called northward.

As early as September 24 Rosecrans telegraphed Halleck:

Please send the infantry by brigades as fast as possible. Let the artillery follow at leisure. The great point is to have troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport to secure those points and the railroad. We can hold this point if we can keep up communication and supplies. (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 3, p. 812.)

On October 1 Rosecrans ordered Hooker at Bridgeport to "put down a pontoon bridge and make immediate preparations for crossing your command at that point; the remaining boats will be held in readiness for shipment up the river." (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 24.) On October 4 he renewed the order to Hooker to put "the pontoon bridge in order so as to be ready for crossing the river," and "to station sufficient detachments along the railroad between Nashville and Bridgeport as will secure our communication against cavalry raids. Heavy force of rebel cavalry struck McMinnville yesterday and will doubtless try to strike the railroad at Elk River and between there and Nashville." (Id., 89.)

On October 7 the dependence of the army upon the long route had begun to pinch, and Rosecrans ordered Hooker to make details "to put the wagon road from Bridgeport to Jasper in good condition. A large part of our supplies must for the present be brought over that route, and the road must be made good against the rainy season." (Id., 159.)

By October 12 the diversion caused by Wheeler's raid was over, the difficulties and perils from the long route were growing more and more pressing, and Rosecrans reverted to shortening it by asking Hooker:

Can you have a column of one division to move up to Shellmound and push an advance brigade to Whitesides? They can take ten days' rations in haversack and knapsack. (Id., 322.)

To this Hooker replied that he could with infantry only, but not with artillery, for want of horses, to which Rosecrans in turn replied the same day:

I will delay the order until your batteries are ready. Hasten their preparation and report when ready. *The object is to get possession of the line of the river up to this place.* (Id.)

Here we have the definite statement by Rosecrans of his object in the movement.

Further evidence of this appears in the dispatch of Mr. Dana of October 14, two days later (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 1, 216):

The necessity of opening the river being thus imperative, General Rosecrans has ordered Hooker to concentrate his troops preparatory to seizing *the passes of Raccoon Mountain* and occupying Shellmound, and, *if possible, Lookout Valley.*

The state of mind of Rosecrans next appears in Mr. Dana's dispatch of the 16th (id., 219):

I have just had a full conversation with General Rosecrans upon the situation. He says the possession of the river, as far up as the head of Williams Island at least, is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible for him to make any movement toward gaining such possession until General Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. Hooker's troops are now scattered

along the line of the railroad and can not be got together before next Wednesday. The wagons must all have arrived by that time, and, if the enemy does not interfere sooner, the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be attempted. Rosecrans, however, expects that, as soon as the weather will allow, the enemy will cross the river in force on our left, and then it will be necessary for us to fight a battle or else to retreat from here and attempt to hold the line of the Cumberland Mountains.

At last Rosecrans indicates Williams Island as a point from which a route from Chattanooga to Bridgeport may be opened, and the report of General Smith, of November 4, of the capture of Browns Ferry (O. R., vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 77) states:

On the 19th of October I was instructed by General Rosecrans to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of Williams Island, with a view of making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and storehouses, and began the examination near the lower end of the island.

The same day General Thomas was notified by Captain Thoms, aid de camp:

The general commanding directs me to notify you that he had started to reconnoiter the other side of the river and probably would be gone some hours. He wishes you to take command in the meantime. (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 480.)

The record, which I think I have now quoted in full, therefore, makes clear that from the time of his being informed of the reenforcement by Hooker's command General Rosecrans contemplated using it in the opening in *some way* of the line from Bridgeport to Chattanooga.

It is equally clear that during all that time he never reached any conclusion as to how he could accomplish this object. I will not weary the patience of the board by dwelling upon the grave peril in which the Army of the Cumberland stood if this route was not opened. It sufficiently appears by a single paragraph from the dispatch of Mr. Dana of October 18 (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 221):

I rode through the camp yesterday and can testify that my previous reports respecting the starvation of the battery horses were not exaggerated. A few days more and most of them will be dead. If the effort which Rosecrans intends to make to *open the river* should be futile, the immediate retreat of this army will follow. It does not seem possible to hold out here another week without a new avenue of supplies.

Of course, in this dire extremity, if General Rosecrans had had any plan conceived in his mind of connecting with Hooker he would have informed Dana and Halleck, and would have taken the promptest steps to put it into execution.

On the contrary, however, he actually contemplated withdrawing Hooker from Bridgeport and placing him on the left of the army at Chattanooga, in which quarter he was constantly apprehensive he would be attacked by Bragg. On October 16 he says to Halleck (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 414):

Evidence increases that the enemy intend a desperate effort to destroy this army. They are bringing up troops to our front. They have prepared pontoons *and will probably operate on our left flank*, either to cross the river and force us to quit this place and fight them or lose our communication.

And on the next day, the 17th, he says to Hooker (id., p. 446):

If the enemy should attempt to cross the Tennessee in force above us *it will be necessary for your force to come up*. The general commanding directs you to make such preliminary preparations as will enable you to move promptly and effectually. To this end, the Twelfth Corps ought to be as far down as is consistent with the protection of the exposed points of the railroads.

Of course, to have moved Hooker's force to the left of the Army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga would have been an abandonment of all effort to regain control of the short line, and that, too, for a length of time within which that army would have been compelled by starvation to abandon Chattanooga and take its chances of safety in retreat.

For General Rosecrans to have thus contemplated ordering Hooker away from Bridgeport to a point above Chattanooga is conclusive evidence that when he made the order he saw no way whatever to the opening of the line to Bridgeport.

But more explicit evidence to the same point, and, if possible, more conclusive, is his letter to Hooker of October 18 (id., 467), where he says:

It will be necessary to make extraordinary efforts to get the road passable from Bridgeport to Jasper; also to have rations thrown into Stevenson as rapidly as possible. It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here.

That steamboat must be got ready so that we can freight to Shellmound, and thus shorten our wagon transportation. This will require us to hold both sides of the river and fortify, but make our depot on this side. I must confide the pushing up of the repairs to the wagon roads and seeing that our supplies are brought forward to your care, as the remoteness of our position and the necessity of the active authority and intervention of officers of high rank are absolutely necessary to the preservation of our army.

Nothing of the short line here; nothing but the long route. Desperation was before the General. "*It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here. It will be necessary to make extraordinary efforts to get the road passable from Bridgeport to Jasper.*" Wagon transportation must be shortened by freighting by steamboat to Shellmound, when both sides of the river must be fortified, and the *preservation of the army* rests upon the intervention of officers of high rank to push up repairs of the wagon roads and bring forward supplies. Clearly General Rosecrans had not yet "devised" the plan of opening the short line by seizing Browns Ferry.

We are thus brought to the 19th of October and to the separate and distinct reconnoissances made on that day by General Rosecrans and by General Smith. The two started out together, but separated at the door of the hospital, not to meet again during the few hours General Rosecrans was to remain in command of that army, if, indeed, they ever after met in life. Mr. Dana riding along as he was starting on his way to Nashville, and General Smith, feeling that the long day's work before him did not justify him in longer waiting for General Rosecrans, joined Mr. Dana and rode on with him until their paths parted, and then proceeded on to the lower end of Williams Island. From that point up to Browns Ferry he made his reconnoissance. Whatever may be the evidence of the results of the separate reconnoissance made by Rosecrans, General Smith is the only witness as to what he did and saw, and how he came to perceive, ascertain, comprehend, and realize the strategic importance and value of Browns Ferry. He tells us that it was by but an accident he discovered it at all. He had completed his task and was about turning to ride back to Chattanooga when he perceived a battery overlooking and commanding the river at that point. Riding up to the battery and asking why they were stationed there, he was informed it was to command Browns Ferry. He also learned that a friendly arrangement existed between the troops of the battery and the Confederate pickets by which neither fired on the other when they might go to the river's edge.

It is of further interest to bear in mind that General Smith was not only an officer of engineers, but that he had been an officer of the *topographical* engineers during the long period of his service prior to the civil war. It thus fell out that he, on this momentous quest, could, without peril from Confederate bullets or fear of his object being suspected by the enemy, deliberately sit by the river bank for an hour and more, and, with practiced eye and trained intelligence and judgment, view, inspect, and study the topography and lay of the land on the rebel side of the river. Without such a deliberate survey and inspection an observer not theretofore familiar with it could hardly have observed or taken in the strategic facts of the situation as they existed on the far side. And upon these facts being comprehended by its commander rested the future if not the fate of the Army of the Cumberland.

When, on October 29, Hooker's forces were in restored communication with the Army of the Cumberland and that army freed from peril, the problem of achieving

its rescue had by its successful solution been made plain to everybody. But up to the time of the solution it was simply inscrutable to everybody excepting those to whom had been confided the plan by which it was accomplished. With Lookout Valley in our possession and in short and easy communication on the interior line over the Browns Ferry bridge with the army at Chattanooga, with that army saved from certain flight and possible destruction by supplies rushing in from Nashville by way of Bridgeport, the puzzle was solved to the comprehension of the meanest intelligence. Every teamster saw that the Lookout Valley line to Bridgeport was the key to saving the army at Chattanooga, and that the possession of Browns Ferry was the key to both seizing and holding the Lookout Valley line.

Had Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on October 1, or if, on the 12th, after Wheeler's raid was over, having artillery in condition, he had advanced to Shellmound and Whiteside, either movement would have been calamitous to the Army of the Cumberland if it had led Bragg to occupy Lookout Valley in force, thereby not only interposing his army between those of Hooker and Rosecrans, but what, if possible, would have been more important, holding the southern side of the river at Browns Ferry impregnable against being captured in the way it afterwards was. With Browns Ferry in Bragg's hands, Hooker, advancing upon Lookout Valley, would have had to fight practically the whole of Bragg's army, and with no object to be accomplished by this movement, since he could not connect with Rosecrans. A shortening of the long route by Waldens Ridge was all that could be accomplished by his advance to Shellmound. Only by Rosecrans's seizure of Browns Ferry, which Bragg had fatuously left unguarded, except by a picket force, and the simultaneous advance by Hooker through the passes of Raccoon Mountain and entering Lookout Valley, could the vital communication between our two armies be made. On the other hand, had Bragg, after we had seized and fortified Browns Ferry on the southern side, advanced into Lookout Valley and the Raccoon passes, he would have been open to an attack upon his flank and rear by Rosecrans's entire army, except such of it as was needed to hold his fortified lines in front of Chattanooga.

When, therefore, Rosecrans ordered Hooker to cross the river on October 1, and to advance to Shellmound on the 12th, he did not contemplate seizing Browns Ferry as a part of the movement, and in the end for that reason it was abandoned. This is further shown by Rosecrans's hopeless dispatch to Halleck of the 16th, and by his order to Hooker of the 17th to be prepared to move his army away from Bridgeport to the left of the Army of the Cumberland above Chattanooga in case Bragg attacked our left; or if Bragg made no attack, then to help open the river; though no movement to the latter end was to be made until Sherman should come in from Huntsville, and Sherman's advance did not reach Bridgeport until the middle of November. Meanwhile all the desperate efforts were being made to keep the roads in condition over the long route.

But it may be attempted in some way to establish the case for General Rosecrans by certain positive evidence. Of this nature is his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, given two years afterwards, when he says that as early as the 4th of October, "I called the attention of General Thomas and General Garfield to the map of *Chattanooga and vicinity* and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose I would take possession of Lookout Valley *opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain* and fortify it, thus completely covering the road to Bridgeport on the south side as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well as Lookout Valley."

Further, on October 4, Mr. Dana telegraphed:

Engineers are now engaged upon the pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of Lookout Creek. (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 207.)

Accepting the testimony of General Rosecrans and the telegram of Mr. Dana to the fullest extent of their statements, it remains to be said that a bridge to cross the Tennessee River either at the point "opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain" or "at the mouth of Lookout Creek" would be under the command of the Confederate batteries on Lookout Mountain. It would have been impracticable to achieve possession of the southern side of the river at either point so as to throw a bridge there, and the bridge, if thrown, would have been rendered untenable by the fire of the Confederates' guns.

But the complete answer is that neither "the point opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain" nor the one "at the mouth of Lookout Creek" is *Browns Ferry*. Neither of those plans was tenable; neither ends have succeeded; neither, in fact, ever was attempted; both, if ever really contemplated, were, in fact, abandoned, and for the good reason that they had to be, and while they indicate a groping after the key of the situation, they demonstrate that the key was not yet found, for the Browns Ferry plan had not yet been discovered or "devised."

(At that point I resume the preparation of these observations because of a letter just received from General Brooke that the board will consider the subject to-morrow at 10 a. m.)

As further positive evidence in favor of the claim made on behalf of General Rosecrans is his statement contained in the *North American Review* of December, 1885. I do not deem it necessary, even if time permitted, that I should retrace the discussion of this article by General Smith in his pamphlet, *The Reopening of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga*, pages 22 to 32 [pages 101-107 of this reprint], and which, of course, is already before the board.

I must rest content with the observation that the *North American Review* article contains no *evidence* that General Rosecrans had discovered Browns Ferry and its successful seizure and occupation by him as the way of opening the short line. The statements of this article can not be construed as an explicit assertion of General Rosecrans to that effect, and even if they were so construed, when made twenty-two years after the event they can not be accepted as even presumptive, not to say conclusive, evidence of the fact when confronted with the facts established by the official record. He says that—

While completing the first two bridges Gen. William F. Smith arrived and was assigned to duty as chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. He was told what the plan was for opening communication with Bridgeport on the south side of the river and what preparations were in progress for its execution.

A sketch was made of the river and route to Browns Ferry, the route by which troops would be able to communicate from the Chattanooga side of the river with Lookout Valley over the pontoon bridge, which we were straining every nerve to secure.

General Smith was ordered to report for duty to General Rosecrans on September 5. Just what was the date when he arrived at Chattanooga I do not know; my impression is that it was in September, and after the battle of Chickamauga. But I do not understand that it is now contended, either by the members of the park commission or by General Duffield in his report, that General Rosecrans ever settled upon Browns Ferry as a part of his plan for opening the short line at any time prior to his reconnoissance on October 19.

If such is their contention, it would be for them to defend the reputation of General Rosecrans for not promptly carrying it into execution and thus rescuing his army and the country from their dire peril.

But if the evidence is accepted that General Rosecrans had in mind the throwing of bridges across the river at two other points than Browns Ferry, namely, the one opposite the nose of Lookout Mountain and the other opposite Lookout Valley, we can well see how he had a *general* plan to connect with Hooker at Bridgeport and yet failed to carry it out simply because at neither point was a bridge feasible. We can

well understand why he sought to shorten his long line first by an advance from Bridgeport to Shellmound and throwing a bridge there, and next groping out with some vague but impossible scheme of advancing to Williams Island; but it staggers credulity to believe him possessed of the plan involved in the getting possession of Browns Ferry and then delaying, to say nothing of failing, to instantly and decisively carry it out.

In the North American Review article General Rosecrans further says:

On the 19th of October Gen. W. F. Smith accompanied me on a ride along the route and the Tennessee near Browns Ferry. We returned at sunset, when I found the telegrams awaiting me which released me from the command of the Army of the Cumberland and placed General Thomas in command.

I have read the report of General Duffield, who, discussing the letters of General Reynolds and Major Bond, both of whom accompanied General Rosecrans on his reconnoissances, says:

My conclusion from these letters is that both General Smith and General Rosecrans on October 19 visited the place where the bridge was thrown, but not together, and that each selected it as the proper place for the bridge.

I assume that no one will contend that in the lapse of years General Rosecrans was not mistaken in his recollection that General Smith accompanied him on his reconnoissance; and under that misimpression he might well come to think, upon the subject being revived at a late day, that General Smith's plan was his own plan. He remembered starting with General Smith, for they did start together. He failed to remember their parting, and probably because the parting occurred, not by his act, but by the act of General Smith, while General Rosecrans was occupied in the hospital and when he did not know that General Smith had gone on by himself.

General Duffield seems to rely for his conclusion upon the letters of General Reynolds and of Major Bond. General Reynolds was the chief of staff. His letter to General Smith, dated May 20, 1895, is important enough to quote:

As I remember it, Browns Ferry was already in everybody's mind as the proper place, but the point had not been decided definitely. We visited one battery on the high ground on the north side of the river and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain. * * * My understanding was that Rosecrans fixed Browns Ferry as the place for the bridge.

Take his first sentence: "As I remember it, Browns Ferry was *already* in everybody's mind as the proper *place*, but the *point* has not been decided *definitely*."

Now, so far as Browns Ferry "being in everybody's mind" the evidence from the record shows it to have been in nobody's mind.

After its brilliant seizure, and the escape of the army from possible destruction, it *was* in everybody's mind, not before. "As" the General "remembers it" he was wrong. "But," he goes naively on, "the point had not been decided definitely." The place in everybody's mind, but the point not decided definitely! So the army was saved; it was in everybody's mind; a sense of relief, if not hilarity, reigned; the sole object of the reconnoissance was not to fix the "place" but merely the "point," and that merely because it had not been fixed "definitely." Indeed, indefiniteness characterizes every statement in this behalf of General Reynolds. He adds:

My *understanding* was that Rosecrans fixed Browns Ferry as the place for the bridge.

"Understanding!" Could anyone ever have any other than a recollection as vivid as lightning, never to be dimmed, never to be subdued to a mere "understanding" of an event which never before known, averted calamity from both army and country.

But the further statement of General Reynolds betrays not merely confusion of

mind; it is repugnant to and demolishes his other statement that they then fixed on Browns Ferry as the "point." He says:

We visited one battery on the high ground on the north side of the river and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain.

Here at last there is a positive statement. It is coupled with no qualification or uncertainty. The party visited a battery—one battery, not two; and it was on high ground—of course it was on the north side of the river—"and nearly opposite a rebel battery on Lookout Mountain." A battery, not at Browns Ferry, nor within 2 miles of it, was the one they visited; not the battery *at* Browns Ferry, but in all human probability the battery at the point called "Browns Ferry" on the erroneous Merrill map, the battery at the point opposite the rebel battery on Lookout Mountain, where, according to his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General Rosecrans, as early as October, had contemplated throwing a bridge. The point where, on October 19, as well as October 4, he still held onto as the place to throw the bridge.

The only knowledge I have of the statements of Major Bond is from the report of General Duffield. They are contained in a letter to General Boynton, dated November 7, 1895, wherein he says that "General Rosecrans, General Reynolds, General Smith, and himself started early in the morning of October 19 to make a reconnaissance of the north bank of the river; that a careful examination of the river was made and a point known as Browns Ferry was selected; that the entire day was thus spent, and it was just before dark when they returned to Chattanooga."

In the absence of the entire letter, the above quotation from it leaves much to be desired. It states that General Smith "started" with the party. It does not say that he continued with it or joined in its examinations or conclusions. The only important statement in the letter is "that a careful examination of the river was made and a point known as Browns Ferry was selected." For what it was selected, what the point actually selected was, whether it was the real Browns Ferry or the Browns Ferry of the Merrill map, whether Major Bond's knowledge on that subject was or was not clouded as that of both General Rosecrans and General Reynolds seem to have been, must be left to conjecture. When we consider the real mass of official and other evidence bearing upon the question before the board, really this single sentence and statement of Major Bond "that after a careful examination of the river a point known as Browns Ferry was selected" does seem to be the slimmest sort of testimony of any kind adduced in it all.

And yet upon Major Bond's letter General Duffield seems to rely more than upon anything else in reaching his conclusion. In introducing the letter he says Major Bond "recalls the occasion and states emphatically that General Rosecrans," etc.

He goes on to say:

It seems to me very clear that these letters and the statement of General Smith only prove that both General Rosecrans and General Smith visited the place where the bridge was afterwards thrown, but not at the same time.

It remains to consider the statements of the report of General Thomas (O. R., vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 42). He says:

Preliminary steps had already been taken to execute this vitally important movement before the command of the department devolved on me. The bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed.

On the 23d orders were sent to General Hooker to concentrate the Eleventh Corps and one division of the Twelfth at Bridgeport, informing him at the same time what his force was expected to accomplish, and that a force from this place would cooperate with him by establishing a bridge across the river at Browns Ferry and seize the heights on the south or Lookout Valley side, thus giving him an open road to Chat-

tanooga when his forces should arrive in Lookout Valley. The force to throw the bridge was organized by Saturday, the 24th, and the boats and bridge completed.

What these "preliminary steps" were, which had already been made before General Thomas relieved General Rosecrans of the command of the army, he does not state, except "the bridge which it was necessary to throw across the river at Browns Ferry to gain possession of the northern end of Lookout Valley and open communication with Bridgeport by road and river was nearly completed."

It would seem clear that in preparing his report General Thomas was actuated by his characteristic magnanimity and modesty in allowing to General Rosecrans as much and to himself as little credit in the premises as was possible.

For example, as to the preparation of the bridge, compare the report of General Thomas with the dispatch of General Rosecrans to General Halleck of October 18, at 7.30 p. m.:

Enemy in front. Rumor of his moving a corps up as if to cross at Washington. River at a stand. Our pontoon bridge restored. Boats [for] a second under way. Roads horrid. Forage and animals failing. Great efforts making to supply deficiencies. Rumored fighting of General Burnside's command 60 miles north of Knoxville. Weather unsettled. No news from Sherman.

What did Rosecrans mean by "Boats for a *second* under way?" This sentence follows the one "Our pontoon bridge restored." Did it mean a second bridge to cross the river at Chattanooga, or did it mean that the second bridge at Moccasin Point, or opposite the mouth of Lookout Creek?

One thing it certainly could not mean, and that was for it to be used at Browns Ferry, for Browns Ferry was as yet in the womb of the unknown. General Rosecrans had as yet made no reconnoissance on the river, and had neither found the "place," or fixed the "point," or "devised" the "plan" for a bridge at Browns Ferry.

But apart from the bridge, and for whatever use it might be put to, what other "preliminary steps had already been taken before the command of the department devolved upon" General Thomas?

This statement of General Thomas could only refer to orders from Rosecrans to Hooker.

October 19, at 9 a. m., Hooker telegraphed to General Granger:

Have just received orders from department headquarters to hold command in readiness to march at short notice. Yours will be the only troops left on the line when I leave. (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 482.)

But the last and only orders from Rosecrans to Hooker affecting his movements were those of October 17, 10 p. m. (Id., p. 446), above discussed, which said:

If the enemy should attempt to cross the Tennessee in force above us, it will be necessary for your command to come up, etc.

These orders looked to an abandonment of the effort to open the short line rather than to seize it.

If General Thomas meant by "preliminary steps" the *general* idea of Rosecrans to regain the river at Lookout Valley and so unite with Hooker, then all will agree with him, and such, I respectfully submit, is the only reasonable construction to put upon his words.

But I have left for the last what I submit is the strongest and the conclusive evidence in support of General Smith's contention.

General Rosecrans returned from his reconnoissance on the evening of the 19th to find himself relieved from the command of the Army of the Cumberland. At 6.20 p. m. he telegraphs Colonel Townsend, assistant adjutant-general:

General Orders, War Department, No. 337, by telegraph, just received. Will be executed immediately. I leave to-morrow for Stevenson.

On October 18, at 10.40 a. m., General Halleck telegraphed General Rosecrans as follows (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 455):

Every available man has been sent to assist you. As fast as cavalry can be organized and equipped it will be sent forward. But you already have more men and animals than you can feed. It was for this reason that Sherman was directed to open a line on the Tennessee River to Athens. At last advices he had reached Bear Creek, and would probably cross the river at Eastport or Florence. He has already drawn a large force of the enemy against his line, thus effecting a diversion in your favor. Why give up to the enemy the passes of Lookout Mountain? By holding them can you not cover your railroad and river communications with Bridgeport? Would it not be best to regain them even at a heavy cost?

This telegram arrived at headquarters on the 19th, at 11 a. m., and after General Rosecrans had left on his reconnoissance, and could not have been read by him before his return in the evening, and at the same time he received the order relieving him from the command.

Here, then, was General Rosecrans's opportunity, in his reply to the telegram of General Halleck, to inform his superior officer of the discovery he had that day made of Browns Ferry, and his plans for seizing it, by which the army could be extricated from its peril and his campaign be turned from threatened disaster into one of triumph.

At 6.20 p. m. he telegraphed Adjutant Townsend of his surrendering his command. On October 19, at 8 p. m., he sent to General Halleck the following answer (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 477):

Your dispatch of the 18th received. Sherman's movement will operate favorably, and the cavalry force will be timely. Lookout was given up temporarily because we could not then safely hold it.

It was isolated from us by distance and the defile of Chattanooga Creek. We expect to retake it as soon as we are prepared to hold it. That could be done only when the railroad being secured, the depots replenished, and Hooker's transportation provided. Without that he can not subsist in a suitable position.

Here was General Rosecrans's unique and complete opportunity. His orders to relinquish his command alone would not have furnished it. To them he could only bow, as he did in soldierly submission, giving no sign, making no excuse, announcing no information of an achievement, which would, if known to the Government in time, have led to his retention instead of his dismissal. It was the crisis of his life and his fame; it was the crisis of the life of his army and his country. For three dreadful weeks had the peril existed. One proposal or another looking to the opening up of the river and the short line been made only to prove abortive.

General Rosecrans's denials in his North American Review article of General Grant's statements in the Century Magazine of the state of the army will not stand before the burning dispatches of Mr. Dana, reenforced by those of General Meigs and General Garfield as to the condition of the Waldens Ridge route.

Another week, or at most two weeks, and the army would have been no longer able to be supplied by that route. Retreat would have been inevitable, a retreat where the artillery would have had to be abandoned, for there would have been no horses to draw it; and what would have been the fate of the army?

From all this, if he had "devised the plan," as now contended, he had saved the army, himself, and his country. Because of this state of things he had been held responsible; he had been relieved from his command. Here was his opportunity to set himself right as to it all, for now he had saved all. His dispatch should be read in connection with that of Halleck's, to which it is in reply.

Halleck says:

Every available man has been sent to assist you. Cavalry is being sent forward as fast as it can be organized and equipped. Sherman is advancing, and by drawing off a large force of the enemy has already effected a diversion in your favor.

But more than all this and right to the point now in question:

Why give up to the enemy the passes of Lookout Mountain? *By holding them can you not cover your railroad and river communications with Bridgeport? Would it not be best to regain them even at a heavy cost?*

Now read the reply:

Your dispatch of the 18th received. Sherman's movement will operate favorably and the cavalry force will be timely.

Now comes his reason for giving up Lookout Mountain:

Lookout was given up temporarily because we could not then safely hold it. It was isolated from us by distance and the defile of Chattanooga Creek.

With that statement we are not concerned in this discussion, but now comes the deadly part of the dispatch. Halleck asks:

Why give up to the enemy the passes of Lookout Mountain? By holding them can you not cover your railroad and river communications with Bridgeport? Would it not be best to regain them even at a heavy cost?

Why did not General Rosecrans reply, "All right; General Thomas can now regain the passes, which *will* cover our railroad and river communications with Bridgeport and at no heavy cost; indeed, at only trifling cost. I have made it easy for him, even if I did it only in the very hour you remove me from the command. Browns Ferry is the key to the problem and to my hitherto puzzle, and I have found it. I present it as my parting gift to him and to you."

Would the irony of history in any of its thousand vicissitudes ever have presented an opportunity so striking, so dramatic?

But such was not his reply. Of Browns Ferry, of the plan he had "devised," not one word, but instead we have the outline of an idea of operations, of a state of mind of General Rosecrans utterly at variance with a speedy regaining of the line to Bridgeport by seizing Browns Ferry.

First. "*We expect to retake it as soon as we are prepared to hold it.*"

When Browns Ferry was seized, and simultaneously Hooker advanced, the passes of Lookout Valley were "held" in a wise which ever afterwards bid defiance to Bragg.

Second. "That could be done only when the railroad being secured, the depots replenished, and Hooker's transportation provided."

What railroad secured? He could have meant only the railroad from Bridgeport to Nashville. Certainly not that from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, unless Browns Ferry were seized and held, without which being done it could not be held.

But third. "Hooker's transportation must be provided."

Of Browns Ferry, of regaining the passes and covering the communication, not one word.

And if General did not make his claim then, if the defense be set up in such an hour when the doors of his true court and tribunal were wide open, is it now open for him or his friends to raise the question again, and that after another soldier had found the key, had unlocked the puzzle, had solved the problem which had defied the scrutiny and the best endeavors of General Rosecrans?

For many years the honors of this great achievement were conceded on all hands to General Smith. I shall not add to the length, already too great, of this paper by quoting the general orders of General Thomas, of General Grant, and the dispatches or the letters of Mr. Dana, awarding, and with no one to dispute them, to General Smith the credit of devising the place for seizing Browns Ferry. But the board, without my asking it, will give full consideration to them in coming to their conclusion as to the historical correctness of the legend upon which they are called upon to pass.

ANTHONY HIGGINS,
Of counsel for Gen. W. F. Smith.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, January 11, 1901.

HON. ANTHONY HIGGINS,
334 Market street, Wilmington, Del.

DEAR SIR: I inclose herewith copy of the letter of the chairman of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission which you desired to have. Please advise me at your earliest convenience if you have any answer to make to this communication.

I am, very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE, *Major-General.*

WILMINGTON, DEL., January 12, 1901.

Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Department of the East, Governors Island, New York City.

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have received your letter and General Boynton's article and will give it prompt attention, and will let you hear from me at an early date.

Very truly, yours,

ANTHONY HIGGINS.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, January 25, 1901.

Gen. WILLIAM F. SMITH,
1013 Clinton street, Philadelphia, Pa.

GENERAL: In reply to yours of the 21st instant, the board is of the opinion that having received your later letter and the brief of Mr. Higgins, it will hardly be necessary for you to appear before it, as the board thinks it understands the subject now very thoroughly. The board has not received any oral evidence or argument from anyone except ex-Senator Higgins, and does not think that it is necessary for you to appear before it.

I am, very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

1013 CLINTON STREET,
Philadelphia, January 21, 1901.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
United States Army.

DEAR GENERAL: On your first notification of the meeting of the board to examine into the question of my appeal to the Secretary of War with reference to the legend on an atlas of the Chickamauga National Park Commission, I had intended to appear before you, but was too ill to travel. Mr. Higgins, I think, to-day mailed his reply and I sent a short paper.

It has come to me that justice to the board and to myself should make offer a request to appear before you before you close your sittings, and I therefore beg to say that if you will give me notice I will present myself before you to explain any points or answer any questions you may desire to ask.

Yours, respectfully,

WM. F. SMITH.

1013 CLINTON STREET,
Philadelphia, January 24, 1901.

DEAR GENERAL GILLESPIE: I wrote to General Brooke three days since, asking to be allowed to appear before your board. As I have not heard from him, I fear he may be absent or not have received my letter. As the opposition have "darkened

counsel with words," I think a personal hearing may make a simple matter out of what now seems a mass of verbiage.

If you will kindly lend your aid to my request, I shall be greatly obliged to you.

I can leave here at 9.20 a. m. and can arrive at Governors Island or elsewhere about noon. If that hour does not suit the board, I can leave here to spend the night in New York and be at the island by 10 o'clock. That will require a day's notice in advance. May I trouble you to have someone send me a card of the departures of the boat from New York for the island?

Yours, sincerely,

WM. F. SMITH.

WILMINGTON, DEL., *January 21, 1901.*

To Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, Col. GEORGE L. GILLESPIE, Lieut. Col. MICHAEL V. SHERIDAN.

GENTLEMEN: I learned from my counsel that there was some uncertainty among the members of the board as to what precisely was the question I had raised in my appeal to the Secretary of War, dated March, 1900. The preface to that relates that the legend in the atlas of the Chickamauga Park Commission states that "on the 27th of October the river line of the communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley, devised by General Rosecrans, etc."

I stated that the legend was not true.

That is the contention in a nut shell.

To my counsel I leave the answer to the argument and statements (not evidence) submitted by the president of the Chickamauga National Park Commission, but I ask the privilege of submitting a few remarks in my own name on the question.

On the 18th of October Rosecrans advises Hooker that a "steamboat must be got ready, so that we can freight to Shellmound and thus shorten our wagon transportation. This will require us to hold both sides of the river and fortify, but make our depot on this side."

That means, first, freighting to Shellmound "to shorten our wagon transportation;" that is, the wagon transportation from Shellmound to Chattanooga. By what route? Certainly not on the south side of the river, for we owned no roads there. Will the board kindly measure the route from Shellmound to Chattanooga on the north side of the river? Why did not Rosecrans expect to use the roads on the south side for his wagon transportation? Because he was to fortify there on both sides of the river and *make a depot there*. Would any military man say that fortifications and a depot at Shellmound could be of any service if he expected to use the roads on the south side of the river?

When, then, he gave those instructions, on the 18th of October, it is simply impossible that he intended at that time to capture Lookout Valley.

There is one more point to notice.

The record gives the last order from Rosecrans to Hooker having any reference to concentration as of date of October 17, 10 p. m. It is asserted that another order from Rosecrans was dated October 19, which called for immediate concentration.

Rosecrans left Chattanooga sharply at 8 o'clock on his reconnoissance. If that be the case, something happened in the night to drive out the plan of the 18th with reference to fortifying Shellmound, and it was before 8 o'clock in the morning of the 19th. Hooker's telegram to Granger of October 19, 9 a. m., is given as proof of such an order.

An order leaving Chattanooga on the morning of the 19th before 8 o'clock would hardly have reached Hooker in person to have been the subject of a telegram from Hooker to Granger by 9 a. m. It is, besides, extraordinary that such an order should

have, apparently, been the only one missing from the files of both Rosecerans and Hooker's headquarters. The board can not, I think, accept the existence at any time of such an order.

On the 16th, the day before the issuance of the order of October 17, 10 p. m., Mr. Dana states that the telegraph line was broken between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, and under those conditions the order of the 17th, 10 p. m., would hardly have reached Hooker in person before a late hour of the 18th or the morning of the 19th.

Having discussed Hooker's projected movement to Shellmound and the topographical order of the 19th, I will end this paper. It may be that the paper to be submitted by Mr. Higgins may include these points, in which case I will ask the board to excuse the repetition.

Very respectfully,

WM. F. SMITH.

WILMINGTON, DEL., *January 22, 1901.*

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

Governors Island, New York City, N. Y.

DEAR SIR: I herewith return you General Boynton's paper and one which I beg to submit to the board in reply to it; also a short letter from General Smith, himself, upon the same subject.

If General Boynton's paper, herewith inclosed, is not the original paper, but is a copy thereof which you intended for my use, I would be very much obliged if you would remail it to me.

Very truly, yours,

ANTHONY HIGGINS.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, January 24, 1901.

Hon. ANTHONY HIGGINS,

334 Market street, Wilmington, Del.

DEAR SIR: The copy of General Boynton's paper sent to you is marked "copy," and is intended for you if you desire it. According to your request of the 22d instant I herewith return it.

I am, very truly, yours,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF COUNSEL HIGGINS.

WILMINGTON, DEL., *January 22, 1901.*

Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

Chairman, etc., Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: I regret that, not having the paper of General Boynton at the time I prepared my communication already submitted to your board, I am compelled to trouble you with some further observations that seem to me to be called for by its statements. In doing this I will endeavor as far as possible to avoid repeating what is contained in my previous paper.

As there seemed to be some uncertainty on the part of the board when I met them, and also some confusion on the part of General Boynton, as to just what the contention of General Smith is, I will restate it. His objection is to the correctness of the legend in question for Map No. 6, which is as follows:

At daylight of October 27 the river line of communication with Bridgeport was opened by the execution of a plan for recovering Lookout Valley devised by General Rosecerans, approved by General Thomas, and ordered executed by General Grant, under the immediate command of Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith.

General Smith contends that the plan approved by General Thomas and executed by General Smith was not devised by General Rosecrans.

As I before stated, General Smith concedes fully that General Rosecrans fully realized the importance of recovering the short line from Bridgeport to Chattanooga; that he ordered the forces of General Hooker to Bridgeport with the view of accomplishing that result, but that he never worked out the scheme or gave any orders by which it could be accomplished; that the orders he did give never looked to its accomplishment, and that at the moment of his removal from his command his telegram of explanation to General Halleck demonstrates that he even then did not contemplate its accomplishment, although he had then returned from his reconnoissance to Williams Island, when, if ever, he could first perceive the vital importance to the plan of seizing and bridging Browns Ferry in connection with a *simultaneous* advance of Hooker's force.

It must further and all the time be borne in mind that the plan approved by General Thomas and which General Smith claims was devised by him was the advance of Hooker simultaneously with the seizure of Browns Ferry, and that the preceding orders of General Rosecrans of October 12 to General Hooker to advance to Shellmound and Whitesides looked only to the shortening of the route over Waldens ridge by seizing and holding Shellmound, and not an advance into Lookout Valley, and that had the movement thus ordered on the 12th of October been made by attracting the attention of the enemy to the point it might, and in all probability would, have led to their occupying Lookout Valley in force so as to preclude the possibility of our successfully seizing Brown's Ferry and uniting therefrom with Hooker's army, which was vital to the success of the "plan."

It is true that General Rosecrans, in his second dispatch of the 12th of October to General Hooker (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 322) as to the advance of the latter to Shellmound and Whitesides, says of the movement: "The object is to get possession of the line of the river up to this place." But the orders of the 12th could not have effectuated that result. There were no pontoons constructed at that time to throw a bridge at Browns Ferry; no orders were issued by General Rosecrans for the seizing of Browns Ferry simultaneously with Hooker's advance, and the order was for Hooker to advance on the following day, the 13th, as appears by General Rosecrans's first dispatch of the 12th:

Can you have ready a column of one division, to move up to Shellmound and push an advance brigade to Whitesides,¹ *to start by daylight in the morning?* (Ibid.)

Moreover, the column was to consist of but a single division, and with no bridge at Browns Ferry, and therefore with no possibility of connection with and support by the Army of the Cumberland, a single division, had it advanced into Lookout Valley, could not have withstood the attack it was opened to from Bragg's entire army; and, indeed, it would seem to be in no slight danger even at Whitesides or Shellmound.

Clearly the orders of General Rosecrans to Hooker of the 12th did not constitute the plan by which Browns Ferry was seized and Lookout Valley and the short line recovered.

Certain it is we hear no more in his orders or dispatches from General Rosecrans looking to such an advance, and further thought seems to have led him to seek to make use of Shellmound in another way, for in his order to Hooker of the 18th (ibid., 467) he says:

It will be necessary to make extraordinary efforts to get the road passable from Bridgeport to Jasper; also to have rations thrown into Stevenson as rapidly as possible. It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here.

¹ Italics throughout by Mr. Higgins.

That steamboat must be got ready so that we can freight to Shellmound, and thus shorten our wagon transportation. This will require us to hold both sides of the river and fortify, but make our depot on this side. I must confide the pushing up of the repairs to the wagon roads and seeing that our supplies are brought forward to your care, as the remoteness of our position and the necessity of the active authority and intervention of the officers of high rank are absolutely necessary to the preservation of our Army.

So Shellmound was to be fortified, and this, together with the employment of the steamboat, utilized in shortening the Waldens Ridge route. The necessity of supplies was now growing desperate. No word appears of Hooker's advance to Lookout Valley, while the scheme of the 12th, too, seems to have been definitely abandoned.

As showing "the connection of General Rosecrans with the reopening of the river by way of Browns Ferry and Lookout Valley," General Boynton quotes from the report of General Whitaker (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 3, p. 828) as follows:

The Ninety-sixth Illinois Volunteers, and the Eighty-fourth Indiana and Tenth Indiana Battery, Fortieth Ohio Volunteers, and one section Eighteenth Ohio Battery are directly opposite the base of Lookout Mountain protecting the ferry. The One hundred and fifteenth Illinois Volunteers, one section of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery at Browns Ferry, about 3 miles below the position of Colonel Champion,

and adds:

This is held by this commission to dispose of General Smith's contention, presented at length in his pamphlet furnished this commission (pp. 24, 25), that General Rosecrans had no knowledge of the real Browns Ferry, but supposed it to be at the mouth of Lookout Creek, 3 miles below [misquotation—"below" should be "above"], and opposite Moccasin Point.

I respectfully submit that this report of General Whitaker shows there was a ferry "directly opposite the base of Lookout Mountain;" that this ferry was 3 miles above Browns Ferry, and that it was to this ferry General Rosecrans referred in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, quoted by General Boynton (and also by General Smith's pamphlet, p. 22), where he says:

As early as the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle, I called the attention of General Thomas and General Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, and, pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for the purpose I would take possession of Lookout Valley opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain and fortify it, thus completely covering the road from there to Bridgeport on the south side, as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well as of Lookout Valley; because, by means of a fortified tête-de-pont, after our fortifications at Chattanooga were completed, we could easily concentrate our whole force to fight the enemy if he entered Lookout Valley, and that within two hours' march, while he could not approach us in force with artillery without making a circuit over Lookout Mountain by way of Fricks and Stevens Gap, 26 miles southeast, which would take two or three days.

The point in *Lookout Valley* which General Rosecrans here says he told General Thomas and General Garfield, on October 4, he would "take possession of as soon as he could possibly get the bridge materials for the purpose," he says was "*opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain.*"

General Whitaker in his report says his infantry (brigade) and Ohio battery "are directly opposite the base of the mountain protecting the ferry."

The board will find further references to this ferry by General Whitaker in several reports of September 24 (*ibid.*, pp. 827, 828, 829), and also to the *ferryboat* belonging to the ferry, which *was first* captured by the rebels and afterwards recaptured from them.

Whether General Rosecrans actually contemplated throwing a bridge at that point will never be known. It is rather to be inferred from its being a ferry nearest the point in Lookout Valley he intended to seize.

On the other hand, it apparently was impracticable for a bridge because commanded by the rebel batteries on Lookout Mountain.

But General Whitaker's reports can not be used as evidence to show that General Rosecrans contemplated Browns Ferry as a place for a bridge; and the further statement in his testimony—

On the 19th of October I examined the river and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at the ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chattanooga—

is conclusive that he had not determined, even if there was any evidence to show that he had considered the matter before. Certainly there is no evidence to show that he had visited the spot or made any reconnoissance of the river before the 19th of October.

General Boynton calls attention to the following telegrams of Mr. Dana to Secretary Stanton as indicating General Rosecrans's preparations for meeting General Hooker's forces in Lookout Valley:

September 26 (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 201):

Rosecrans is about to lay a bridge across the Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek, so that he can operate from here to that valley without crossing the mountain.

September 29 (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 203):

Hooker will be first stationed at Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley, at the junction of the Chattanooga and Trenton and Memphis and Charleston railroads.

It is to be observed that while these telegrams show that General Rosecrans thus conceived the idea of the cooperation in the opening of the Lookout Valley route of the forces of General Hooker with the Army of the Cumberland, yet General Rosecrans never gave any orders to carry such plan with effect.

General Boynton relies upon the following order from General Rosecrans to General Hooker of October 1 (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 25) as being in furtherance of such plan: "Put down a pontoon bridge and make immediate preparation for crossing your command at that point."

Other dispatches of Mr. Dana might have been quoted to show that General Rosecrans contemplated the opening of the short line:

October 4 (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 207):

Engineers are now engaged upon the pontoon bridge to cross the Tennessee at mouth of Lookout Creek.

October 14 (ibid., p. 216):

The necessity of opening the river being thus imperative, General Rosecrans has ordered Hooker to concentrate his troops preparatory to seizing the passes of Raccoon Mountain and occupying Shellmound and, *if possible, Lookout Valley*.

This refers doubtless to the orders to Hooker of the 12th, which I have already discussed.

October 16, 12 m. (ibid., 218):

Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight, and with a vast loss of public property and possibly of life, except the opening of the river. General Hooker has been ordered to prepare for this, but Rosecrans thinks he can not move till his transportation arrives from Nashville, from which place it marched on the 8th. It should have been in Bridgeport on the 14th, but is not yet reported. The telegraph between there and here is broken, however, and it now requires ten or twelve hours for carriers to make the distance.

October 16, 4 p. m. (ibid., 219):

I have just had a full conversation with General Rosecrans upon the situation. He says the possession of the river as far up as the head of Williams Island at least is a *sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga, but that it is impossible for him to make any movement toward gaining such possession until General Hooker's troops are concentrated and his transportation gets up. Hooker's troops are now scattered along the line of the railroad and can not be got together before next Wednesday. The wagons must all have arrived by that time, and if the enemy does not interfere sooner the movement upon Raccoon Mountain and Lookout Valley may then be

attempted. Rosecrans, however, expects that as soon as the weather will allow, the enemy will cross the river in force on our left, and then it will be necessary for us to fight a battle or else to retreat from here and attempt to hold the line of the Cumberland Mountains.

I will say frankly to the board that, in my opinion, these dispatches of Mr. Dana above quoted make up the strongest features of the case for General Rosecrans.

They manifest that he was lost without the opening of the Lookout Valley line, and that further delay was dangerous, if not fatal.

His idea included both the movement of Hooker to Wauhatchie and a bridge at Lookout Valley, and this was his view as early as the first dispatch of September 26 and as late as that of October 16. But conceding all that, it still leaves his plan defective. It was not the plan by which Browns Ferry was seized, Hooker's force brought up, the two armies united, and the Army of the Cumberland saved.

These dispatches, as well as the orders of October 1, 12, and 17, indicate action and movement by Hooker without any reference whatever to a simultaneous seizure and bridging of Browns Ferry. September 29 Hooker's objective was to be Shellmound. October 1 he was merely to cross the river at Bridgeport. October 12 he was to go certainly to Shellmound and to Whitesides and, if possible, Lookout Valley. On the 16th it was Williams Island which was the "*sine qua non* to the holding of Chattanooga," but not Browns Ferry.

No word appears in these dispatches of Mr. Dana that the advance of Hooker and the bridging of the Tennessee at Lookout Valley were dependent on one another. Nothing of the kind appears in the orders of October 1, 4, 12, 17, or 18.

I will not cumber this paper by here re quoting these orders nor with repeating the presentation of the military fact that either movement, if made disjointly and by itself, would, through attracting Bragg in force into Lookout Valley, have hopelessly defeated the achievement.

The pinch of the lack of any order or orders from General Rosecrans by which the Browns Ferry movement was planned seems to be felt by General Boynton, and so we have introduced certain testimony by General Butterfield, General Wilder, General Garfield, General Reynolds, Colonel MacKay, Major Bond, Captain Margedant, and others; also the speech of General Rosecrans at the banquet of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland December 15, 1869; the remarks made by way of interruption of General Rosecrans by Generals Granger and Sheridan, besides the report of General Thomas in 1866 to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and the testimony of General Rosecrans before the same committee on April 22, 1865.

I assume it will not be disputed that all such testimony given by witnesses years after the happening of the events will be received with the largest measure of allowance.

In no case can they be permitted to contradict the official record of dispatches and orders. Where they are the evidence recorded by the witnesses at the time of the transactions, as, for example, the diary of Captain Fox as to the fact that 1,000 feet of bridging was ready at the date of seizing Browns Ferry and that 900 feet only was needed, and also the personal letters of General Smith to his home as to the facts and circumstances of the Browns Ferry movement, such a private record, made at the time and before this dispute was mooted, will be second only, if at all, to the official record as authentic evidence of the facts therein stated.

It is casting no imputation upon the veracity of gentlemen that under such conditions they are subject to the infirmities of human memory.

The unreliability of testimony of this character is made especially manifest by the letter of General Butterfield, which is sought to be used to eke out the following dispatch of General Hooker to Brig. Gen. R. S. Granger, then at Nashville (O. R., vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 482):

Dispatch received. Have just received orders from department headquarters to hold my command in readiness to march at short notice. Yours will be the only troops left on the line when I leave; therefore I can not leave them. Confer with General Rosecrans on the subject.

The attempt is by this dispatch to show that the "orders just received from department headquarters" were orders from General Rosecrans. As no such orders appear of record, it must be claimed that they were lost or left out of the record by some mistake. Of course such a claim is a mere assumption, and unless otherwise established must be held by the board as being contrary to the fact.

The orders in question can only be those of the 17th, 10 p. m. (*ibid.*, p. 446), a part of which I here reproduce:

If the enemy should attempt to cross the Tennessee in force above us, it will be necessary for your command to come up. The general commanding directs you to make such preliminary preparations as will enable you to move promptly and effectually. To this end the Twelfth Corps ought to be as far down as is consistent with the protection of the exposed points of the railroad.

Reliance is doubtless placed upon the words of Hooker to Granger, "have just received orders from department headquarters," etc., to show that the dispatch had been sent that day, the 19th, or at most on the 18th, the day preceding.

But the dispatch of Hooker to Granger of the 19th was dated at 9 a. m. That of General Rosecrans to General Hooker of the 17th was dated at 10 p. m. Now, Mr. Dana, in his first dispatch of the 15th, at 12 m., to Mr. Stanton (*O. R.*, vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 218), says of certain information expected from Hooker:

It should have been in Bridgeport on the 14th, but is not yet reported. The telegraph between there and here [Chattanooga] is broken, however, and it now requires ten to twelve hours for carriers to make the distance.

And this he gives as a probable explanation of the nonreceipt of information two days old.

And yet it is sought to fill this gap and buttress this theory by a statement from General Butterfield, nearly forty years later, that "by General Hooker's orders and through telegraphic agreement with General Rosecrans I left Stevenson for Chattanooga and a conference and agreement with General Rosecrans as to our proposed march to the relief of the situation at Chattanooga with our forces."

Here is an attempt, after this lapse of time, to prove the existence of one lost order by further proof by word of mouth of the existence of a second lost order, both orders being from the commander of the army and of the highest character of importance.

But General Hooker's dispatch to General Granger was dated on the 19th, at 9 a. m. On that morning General Rosecrans left upon his reconnoissance. The alleged dispatch could only have been sent, according to the theory, on the 18th. But why would Rosecrans give Hooker, on the 18th, orders to concentrate and move more peremptory than those of the 17th, when he had not yet, by visiting Browns Ferry, made up his mind where and when to throw a bridge there?

Moreover, is General Butterfield now advancing a theory that after all it was he and General Hooker who had worked out the scheme for the relief of the Army of the Cumberland; that somehow General Rosecrans devised this and had asked Hooker to send up Butterfield to help work it out? If that be true, what becomes of the dispatches of Mr. Dana?

Further, how does this late-born theory of General Butterfield comport with the dispatches of Mr. Dana?

CHATTANOOGA, *October 25—11 a. m.*

I am going to Bridgeport to observe General Hooker's movement to Raccoon Mountain, in which he has so far manifested a surprising unreadiness. (*O. R.*, vol. 31, pt. 1, p. 70.)

BRIDGEPORT, *October 27—6.30 a. m.*

Troops are now just moving out for Shellmound and Raccoon Mountain. No evidence to show that the rebels will oppose the undertaking. Hooker came here from

Stevenson last night. He is in an unfortunate state of mind for one who has to cooperate—fault-finding, criticising, dissatisfied. No doubt the chaos of Rosecrans's administration is as bad as he describes, but he is quite as truculent toward the plan he is now to execute as toward the impotence and confusion of the old régime. (*Ibid.*, p. 72.)

The speech of General Rosecrans at Indianapolis in 1869 adds nothing that I can perceive to this discussion. That he had "directed other pontoons to be constructed by which we could throw a bridge across the Tennessee below the mouth of Lookout Creek, on which to march and take possession of Lookout Valley," is not disputed, except so far as he had, at the time he ordered the pontoons, fixed upon a point *below* Lookout Creek as the place to throw the bridge.

This statement by General Rosecrans is not consistent with the later utterance in his speech:

On the 19th of October we proceeded to examine the exact point where we intended to cross the river for the purpose of taking possession of Lookout Valley.

He does not say *where* he located the point to throw the bridge.

He does not say that on either the day before or on the 19th, before he started on his reconnoissance, he sent fresh orders to Hooker for any cooperation with some movement that might grow out of his reconnoissance. Nor is it improbable that General Rosecrans, as he says, consulted with the commanders of his army corps or with General Sheridan as to his plans. General Granger says:

I remember the night of the discussion in General Sheridan's tent about crossing that river, and when we would cross it, and where, and how, and what was necessary to cross it with.

General Granger does not state that any plan was concluded upon, or what the plan was, or the place of crossing, or at what date the discussion took place.

All his indefiniteness the board must supply from the full and ample dispatches of Mr. Dana, recorded at the time, from whom nothing could or would have been withheld by General Rosecrans that he would confide to his corps commanders.

For further evidence that General Rosecrans, before being relieved of the command, gave such an order to General Hooker, reliance is placed upon the clause in the order of General Thomas in taking command of the Army of the Cumberland (*O. R.*, vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 485), issued at 11 p. m. of October 19, as follows:

He desires that you will use all possible dispatch in concentrating your command and in preparing to move in accordance with the instructions of General Rosecrans, leaving proper railroad guards.

And also to the following statement, appended by General Thomas to the above order, in the report he made in 1866 to the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

The instructions referred to above were to concentrate as much of his command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and by rail. Before he was relieved in command of the department of the Cumberland, General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement, which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short line of supplies from Bridgeport.

As to both this order and statement of General Thomas I beg to renew the points made by General Smith in his reply to the paper of General Duffield.

Taking the last part of his statement up first, General Thomas could not speak of his own knowledge of what passed between two other people—General Rosecrans and General Smith—unless it occurred in his presence, which is not contended. He was writing his recollections, three years after they happened, of events that took place prior to his taking the command. It is probable in this statement he gave his mere

impressions as they remained after the lapse of three years. It is improbable that he could have named his informant, or that he even made it on hearsay. He probably was not thinking of how this might affect General Smith. He was merely manifesting toward General Rosecrans a characteristic magnanimity. (See General Smith's remarks quoted by General Boynton, page 9. [Page 30 of this reprint.])

But, second, after quoting his order of the 19th to General Hooker, General Thomas says (to repeat):

The instruction referred to in the above were to concentrate as much of his command at Bridgeport as he could safely spare from guarding the railroad between that point and Nashville, and to hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening communication with that place by river and by rail. Before he was relieved in command of the Department of the Cumberland, General Rosecrans and his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith, had consulted together as to means of relieving the army at Chattanooga from the perilous condition it was in, owing to the great difficulty of obtaining supplies, and had partially planned the movement which was left to me to be completed when I assumed command, namely, to open a short line of supplies from Bridgeport.

I contend that the constructions here referred to by General Thomas are, and can be, no other than those of the 17th instant, which looked two ways.

If the enemy should attempt to cross the Tennessee in force above us it will be necessary for your force to come up.

The general commanding directs you to make such preliminary preparations as will enable you to move promptly and effectually. To this end the Twelfth Corps ought to be as far down as will enable you to move promptly and effectually. * * *

We must have the river, and that soon.

I repeat here the reasons why no order to "concentrate" could have gone from General Rosecrans to General Hooker on the 18th or 19th.

First. There is no such order of record.

Second. Nothing appears in the record, nor has any reason been advanced to show that General Rosecrans sent such orders on the 19th, in the early morning, before he started on his reconnoissance. Of course he did not on his return when he found himself relieved of the command.

Third. His dispatch to Hooker of the 18th, of record, precludes the idea of his sending any other, inconsistent, variant, or even supplemental. Its directions were:

- (1) To "make feasible" the road from Bridgeport to Jasper.
- (2) To throw rafts into Stevenson.
- (3) To shorten wagon transportation by bridging, by steamboat, to Shellmound.
- (4) "This will require us to *hold both sides of the river* [at Shellmound] *and fortify*; but make our depot on this side."

Clearly the seizing and fortifying Shellmound on the 18th, thus moving into Look-out Valley and arousing Bragg from his slumber, does not imply a scheme at the same time for the seizure of Browns Ferry with the simultaneous advance of Hooker, let alone an order on the same day looking to such an alteration.

(5) "It will require almost superhuman efforts to sustain us here." Not by the short line, nor by Browns Ferry, but by Jasper, through Shellmound, by the Waldens Ridge route, and through shortening it. How can the mere impressions, even of General Thomas, three years later, stand against the weight of the records of this official dispatch?

(6) "If Sherman comes in from Huntsville the general commanding will be able to concentrate and move your entire strength according to circumstances. We must have the river, and that soon." Here it would seem that any move to "have the river" was dependent on Sherman's arrival.

Where in this dispatch of the 18th to Hooker is there anything to admit that on *the same day* he sent Hooker another order "to concentrate and hold himself in readiness to move at any moment toward Chattanooga for the purpose of opening

communication with that place by river and rail," as General Thomas says in his "statement?"

Fourth. Where is there any evidence to corroborate the theory of such a lost order to Hooker on the 18th in the dispatch of that date of General Rosecrans to General Halleck? (O. R., Vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 476) or,

Fifth. In his dispatch of the 19th to General Halleck (*ibid.*, 477, 478), both which I have fully discussed in my former paper, except in the latter as to one point. General Halleck on the 18th asks (*ibid.*, 455):

Why give up to the enemy the passes of Lookout Mountain? By holding them can you not cover your railroad and river communications with Bridgeport? Would it not be best to regain them, even at a heavy loss?

To which General Rosecrans on the 19th replied:

We expect to retake it as soon as we are prepared to hold it. That could be done only upon the railroad being secured, the depots replenished, and *Hooker's transportation provided. Without that we can not subsist in a suitable position.*

This dispatch undoubtedly was General Rosecrans's military reason why the movement urged by General Halleck to reopen the short line could not then be made. But,

First. How can this state of General Rosecrans's mind be reconciled with the theory that on the day before, the 18th, he had sent this alleged lost order to General Hooker, looking to an immediate movement to recover the Lookout Valley line?

Second. I would call the attention of the board to the order of General Rosecrans to General Hooker on the 12th (O. R., Vol. 30, pt. 4, p. 322), asking if he can move a division to Shellmound and push a brigade to Whitesides, when he says: "They can take ten days' rations in haversack and knapsack." Also, to the following extract from the order of General Thomas to General Hooker of October 24 (O. R., Vol. 31, pt. 1, pp. 43, 44), being the specific order for the advance to cooperate with the seizure of Browns Ferry:

If you can do so, it is better not to move wagons to the south side of the river at present. You will, however, exercise your judgment on this point. Report by telegraph when you are ready. We will cooperate at Browns Ferry, as well as at Rankins Ferry. The object of this movement is to hold the road and to gain possession of the river as far as Browns Ferry.

Also, to the order of General Hooker to General Geary of October 25 (*ibid.*, 46): "Hold your command in readiness to march at 12 m. to-morrow. We march with three days' rations without wagons."

So it would seem that on the 12th General Rosecrans did not consider Hooker's transportation indispensable to the movement. Neither did General Thomas, while in fact it was made with only three days' rations and without wagons.

These dispatches are cited to show how improbable is the theory of a lost order from General Rosecrans to General Hooker of the 18th for an immediate movement to open the Lookout Valley line, or, as indicated in the statement of General Thomas.

I would further call the attention of the board to the specific character in the orders for the movement of General Thomas of the 24th that the march of Hooker was in cooperation with the seizing of Brown's Ferry.

It is further shown in the order of General Thomas to General Hooker of October 26 (*ibid.*, p. 47):

Your telegram of 10 p. m. last night received. Commence the movement to-morrow morning, 27th, and open and secure the railroad and wagon road from Bridgeport to Rankins Ferry, and thence as far toward Chattanooga as you can. General Palmer will cooperate with you at Rankins Ferry. We will cross a cooperating force at Browns Ferry and take possession of the south bank there.

And also of the same date (*ibid.*).

Except in the most general way, as I have before submitted, the dispatches of General Rosecrans show no evidence of a dispatch and former plan of cooperation. Nothing of the kind appears as coming from him on the 18th or 19th.

General Smith's plan does appear in the above orders of General Thomas to General Hooker of the 24th and 26th, orders based upon the vital quality of cooperation between the force of Hooker and those seizing Browns Ferry.

That it was the plan of General Smith and not of General Thomas and not of General Garfield is shown by the dispatch of Mr. Dana, of October 24 (*ibid.*, 70), which I here quote:

Grant arrived last night, wet, dirty, and well. He is just going to reconnoiter an important position which General Smith has discovered at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and which will be occupied from here simultaneously with Hooker's occupation of Raccoon Mountain. This movement will probably take place within three days.

Also by the later report of General Thomas (pamphlet of General Smith, p. 30):

To Brigadier-General Smith, chief engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movement at Browns Ferry.

To these I would add the record made by General Smith at the time in the form of a letter home, dated October 31. (See his paper of March, 1900, pp. 30-31.) As I said before, this record, made at the time and before the dispute was mooted, comes as evidence entitled to the highest credence:

On the 19th of October I was scouting along the river bank 3 or 4 miles below here and I came to a place that attracted my attention. On the other side of the river was a sharp ridge of hills, a mile and a half long, the base of which was washed by the river. Between this ridge and a high, rugged mountain was a narrow valley, which was a strong place for us, and would give a good share of the river if we owned it, and would also give us an opportunity of aiding Hooker on his march to seize the rest of the river, should he meet with any heavy force. Its immense importance struck me, and I found a deep gorge in the hills through which ran a road for an old ferry. I sat down on the bank of the river for two hours, within a thousand feet of a rebel picket who thought me some soldier not on duty, and as I sat there I conceived a plan for the capture of that hill, which, if taken, would make Hooker's work easy and give our soldiers and animals something to eat, and give Chattanooga to us. That day General Thomas took command, and I proposed it to him and asked him to go and look at the place and see for himself. General Grant came then, and the day after he came I took the two down and showed them the promised land. They were both impressed with the great value of it, and I was allowed to arrange the details myself. Mr. Dana suggested that I be allowed to command the expedition, and that was done. * * * These two hours' work with the axes and we could not be driven out. The thing was done, and I thanked God, who had given us so signal a success when the risks were so great and where the stake was so immense. * * * The next day Hooker came into the valley, which we already occupied, but posted his troops so carelessly that he was nearly overwhelmed, and all our gains nearly lost.

ANTHONY HIGGINS,
For Gen. W. F. Smith.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF GENERAL SMITH.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Wilmington, Del., January 31, 1901.

Gen. GEORGE L. GILLESPIE,
Corps of Engineers, United States Army.

GENERAL: A few days ago General Smith gave our typewriter the manuscript of a letter to the board of which you are a member, to be put in type, and later took the letter from her and sent it to the board. General Smith has been more or less ill for some time, and was then in no condition to examine and correct the letter. I

understand that there were some errors in it, and I have therefore had a copy made of the original letter and inclose it herewith for such use as may be desired. I do this as I know General Smith would have it done. He is now under a physician's care.

Yours, truly,

H. SIEBERG, *Clerk.*

WILMINGTON, DEL., *January 28, 1901.*

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, U. S. A.,

President Board, etc.

GENERAL: I have your letter of the 25th instant, in which you state that it will "hardly be necessary for me to appear before the board, as you thoroughly understand the subject." Had I not been ill and in bed I should have accompanied my counsel and appeared before the board at that time. I had understood that the locality had been visited by two members of the board in company with the president of the National Park Commission, at which time I supposed you were receiving oral and ex parte evidence, though I am relieved from that supposition by the statement in your letter, to which I am replying, "that you have not received any oral evidence or argument from anyone except ex-Senator Higgins." I trust that the board will correct the unwitting mistake made to my counsel, causing delay in final papers, that in the paper furnished to your board by the president of the National Park Commission he presented "only a statement of the record."

I have written a paper on matters of moment, which I had intended to present orally to the board, but as I am not to appear, may I ask the courtesy of the board, even if it is not considered, that it may be forwarded by you with your report and papers in the case? I think I am entitled to bring before the board any paper going to disprove the statements in the paper written in answer to my letter to the Secretary of War on this subject in March, 1900.

Very respectfully,

WM. F. SMITH.

WILMINGTON, DEL., *January —, 1901.*

Maj. Gen. J. R. BROOKE, U. S. A.,

Col. G. L. GILLESPIE, U. S. A.,

Lieut. Col. M. V. SHERIDAN, U. S. A.,

Board in re Legend on Atlas:

I suppose it will be conceded nem. con. that on the 25th of September, 1863, the fate of the Army of the Cumberland depended upon shortening the line of supplies from Bridgeport to Chattanooga to fit the transportation capacity of the army.

Second. It will doubtless also be conceded that the only possible way in which that line could be sufficiently shortened to meet the exigency of the situation was by getting control of a part or the whole of the line south of the Tennessee River between Lookout Mountain and Bridgeport.

That truth must have stared in the face even the meanest capacity in that army. No person, therefore, could claim special credit for ability or knowledge for evolving such a self-evident truth.

That that was in the mind of General Rosecrans when on the 26th of September Mr. Dana spoke of Wauhatchie as the place to secure in Lookout Valley can not be doubted. The dispatch to Hooker of the 1st of October followed by that of the 4th of October was also born evidently of the same idea.

There were three ways of obtaining the desired end: First, the capture and holding of Lookout Mountain; second, the capture and holding of Lookout Valley; third, the holding of Raccoon Mountain from the passes to its base on the Tennessee River.

I think no one will dispute that the first two plans at least required a cooperative and simultaneous movement from Chattanooga, such as bridge material, bridge makers, a guard to hold the ground at the south end while the bridge was being built, and a force to cross and hold the ground and be ready to assist in clearing the way for the Bridgeport contingent when it should enter through the passes of Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley. That required study and preparations which had to be confided to officers at both ends of the line without danger of leakage, and if Rosecrans had not such agents he was handicapped indeed. That such question of leakage was not in Rosecrans's mind will appear, not from Mr. Dana's dispatches of September 26 and October 4, but from the dispatch of Rosecrans to Hodges September 30, and from Rosecrans's testimony as to his conference with Generals Thomas and Garfield October 4.

That which has been brought in evidence before your board as to Rosecrans's speech in 1869, with the remarks of Generals Granger and Sheridan thereto, if accepted, strengthens the idea. There was then no valid objection to Rosecrans planning out in detail this whole cooperative movement and giving to Hooker at one end and his own chief engineer at the other end (who was not thrust upon him, but accepted the position under protest) such parts as they would have to carry out. That this was never done as far as Hooker was concerned is shown by Dana's dispatch from Bridgeport, showing Hooker's opposition "to the new plan," and by General Hooker's protest, October 27, I think.

That the plan was not made known to the Engineer Department and orders given for a bridge to be made is shown by the dispatch of Rosecrans to Halleck, 7.30 p. m., October 18, wherein he states that boats for a second bridge at Chattanooga are being built. There was but one bridge plant and one set of makers, and they were turning out boats, etc., as fast as possible. Two bridges could not, therefore, be under way at the same time. Therefore, up to the 18th no cooperation had been directed.

Rosecrans's order of October 1 might have been intended to inaugurate a movement to open the short line. It could not have been cooperative, for there were no boats for a bridge at Chattanooga at that time.

The order of October 12 could not possibly have looked forward to an occupation of Lookout Valley. The suggestion of the 17th is with reference to a movement of Bragg on our left and as affording, when Sherman arrives, a movement "according to circumstances." That was Rosecrans's last order referring to the concentration of Hooker's command.

The suggestions or order of the 18th can not possibly be distorted into anything but a plan to transport to Shellmound by water and take to the road over Walden's ridge. On the 19th Rosecrans went on a reconnoissance, claims that he found Browns Ferry, and went back to headquarters to find himself out of command. Did he then impart to Thomas his plan, and thus entitle himself to the place accorded to him in the obnoxious "legend?" There is not a particle of evidence to favor that idea.

Rosecrans's testimony in 1865, which is before your board, must be accepted. That is positive as to his plan, and the reasons for its being a success, and no photograph could fix the locality better than the words "opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain." That locality was not used by Thomas, and therefore the plan adopted was not devised by General Rosecrans.

Rosecrans's testimony is supported by Mr. Dana's telegram of the 4th.

It will not do in the face of such evidence to state that General Rosecrans could not have intended to put the bridge at the mouth of Lookout Creek, as he was too clever an engineer. Very many clever engineers have made grave mistakes before, and Rosecrans had had two years to select his words and his place for a bridge, and his statement before the committee must have been made deliberately, leaving nothing to correct.

If the board will read carefully the dispatches of Mr. Dana during that trying month of October, 1863, they may find ample reasons for the confusion that seemed to reign in affairs at that time.

I will call the attention of the board to Mr. Dana's dispatch of October 16, 12 m., in which he says, speaking of Rosecrans, that he "can not perceive the catastrophe that is close upon us, nor fix his mind upon the means of preventing it."

Very respectfully,

WM. F. SMITH.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH PARK COMMISSION.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, September 4, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, U. S. A.,
Commanding Department of the East,
Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: I address you as chairman of the board appointed by the Secretary of War, August 23, 1900, to consider a claim made by Maj. William F. Smith, United States Army, retired, that a certain legend in the atlas issued by this commission is erroneous.

This commission has been directed to furnish your board with "such papers, records, and information as may be pertinent to the question at issue." Upon inquiry in the office of the Secretary of War and in the Adjutant-General's Office, we find that certain papers transmitted to Maj. William F. Smith have not been returned to the files, and Major Smith will doubtless transmit these direct to you. From the card retained in the Record Division it appears that these papers included the report of Gen. Henry M. Duffield, dated Detroit, Mich., January 23, 1900, made in accordance with directions of the Hon. Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War, upon the claim of Maj. W. F. Smith, and that accompanying this report were the following papers:

1. Letter of instructions from Secretary Alger, dated November 30, 1897, with General Smith's appeal and letter from him to Senator Proctor.
2. General Smith's pamphlet, "The Reopening of the Tennessee River," etc., with maps attached.
3. Reply of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission to General Smith's appeal, dated March 22, 1898.
4. General Smith's rejoinder to the above, dated April 3, 1898.
5. Copy of letter of Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds to General Smith, dated May 20, 1895.
6. Copy of letter of May 23, 1895, from same to same.
7. Letter of Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated January 12, 1898, stating conversation with Gen. John T. Wilder.
8. Letter of Maj. Frank S. Bond to Gen. H. V. Boynton, dated November 7, 1895.
9. Summary and review of the claim of Gen. W. F. Smith for the information of the Secretary of War, by the chairman of the commission.
10. Letter of General Duffield to the Secretary of War, dated January 23, 1900, transmitting his report and inclosures with various indorsements thereon.

If these papers should have been lost, we will thank you to inform us, that we may supply the deficiency from this office.

From the Adjutant-General's Office we are informed that General Smith's reply to General Duffield's report had reached that office and been forwarded to you. As this paper was sent you during my vacation, I did not see it, and consequently am at a loss to know whether any additional evidence is required from us to sustain the statements of our legend than we have already furnished the Secretary of War.

If there is no impropriety in my seeing a copy of this last paper of General Smith's, I would be glad to have it before me as a guide in selecting from the evidence in our possession such further portions as may be called for by statements in this paper.

In the absence of the other members of the commission, I will, upon learning what papers are in your hands, prepare a full summary of the case, consecutively arranged for transmittal to your board, and will be very glad to be informed by you as to the time when your board will probably meet to consider this case.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, September 6, 1900.

Gen. H. V. BOYNTON,
Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission.

War Department, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL: In reply to yours of the 4th instant, I would say that the only paper that we have thus far received is the letter of Gen. William F. Smith, retired, addressed to the Secretary of War in March, 1900 (the date was not inserted), in which he discusses the report made by General Duffield. General Duffield's report we have not got. In fact, we have received nothing as yet except the paper above referred to. If you want this paper of General Smith's, I will send it to you.

This board has come to the conclusion that their other duties are such that they will not be able to give this matter particular attention until some time in November, and therefore plenty of time will be given you to get up what you think advisable to submit to it. You have named in your letter ten different papers, none of which have we received. I will be away for a day or two. On my return I expect to remain only an hour or so, when I will go away for a considerable absence.

Very truly, yours,

JOHN R. BROOKE, *Major-General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, September 7, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York City.

GENERAL: Replying to your letter of September 6 instant, you will confer a great favor if you will send me, as you offer to do, the letter of Gen. William F. Smith, retired, addressed to the Secretary of War in March last, in which he discusses the report made by General Duffield. After examination the paper will be promptly returned to your board.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, September 18, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: Herewith I return the letter of Gen. William F. Smith, retired, transmitted to this commission by your letter of September 8 instant, with thanks.

Very respectfully, yours,

H. V. BOYNTON, *Chairman.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, October 13, 1900.

Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Governors Island, New York.

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 9th instant was forwarded to Chattanooga, and reached there the day after I left, and has just come to hand here.

The article which you have in mind appeared in the *North American Review* for December, 1885, page 580, being entitled "The mistakes of Grant." It was signed, as you suppose, by General Rosecrans. I have no doubt you can borrow a copy from the Astor Library in New York; but if you do not succeed, it is in the War library here, from which, of course, you can obtain it.

As you are looking for statements from General Rosecrans in regard to this matter, I send you under separate cover the third volume of the *Proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland*, which, as you will notice in a preface to the volume, was stenographically reported at the time. I have marked certain paragraphs of General Rosecrans's statement on pages 76, 77, and 78, certain statements of General Sheridan on page 77, and of Gen. Gordon Granger on pages 79 and 80, which refer directly to the matter in question.

We have incorporated all of these statements in an official letter written in accordance with the directions of the Secretary of War, presenting to your board such papers and information as are in the possession of this commission. We had intended to send the book with that communication, but as you are reading the article in the *North American Review*, these statements of General Rosecrans and his associates—Sheridan and Granger—will prove of interest, and I send the book at this time in advance of our official communication to your board.

Very truly, yours,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, October 30, 1900.

Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: In accordance with instructions from the Secretary of War, this commission has the honor to submit to the board of which you are president "such papers, records, and information" in its possession as are pertinent to the claim of Gen. W. F. Smith that he and not General Rosecrans devised the plan for recovering the river line of supplies between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Bridgeport, Ala., in October, 1863.

Very respectfully,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, November 24, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: General Gillespie asked me about the sending of maps by General Rosecrans's order to General Hooker.

The dispatches on this subject will be found in Serial No. 53, War Records, page 33, Dickson to Garfield, Nashville, October 2; page 59, Garfield to Merrill, Chatta-

nooga, October 3; page 90, Garfield to Hooker, Chattanooga, October 4, and page 91, Hooker to Garfield, Stevenson, October 4 (postscript October 5).

In regard to the question which arose as to communication along the river between the vicinity of Williams Island and Browns Ferry, the dispatches in Serial No. 52, War Records, show the Fifth Kentucky Cavalry headquarters at Williams House with patrols above and below, and that the Ninth Kentucky Cavalry was patrolling the banks of the river up to the infantry pickets from Chattanooga. The following are the pages: 806, Sinclair to McCook, top of page; 807, Hoblitzell to Sinclair, 859. 860, Hoblitzell to Sinclair.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, November 24, 1900.

Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: General Gillespie asked me to look for the letter of Captain Margedant, topographical engineer, Army of the Cumberland, on the staff of General Rosecrans, which described to me the maps and plans on hand before General Rosecrans was relieved, and which General Smith took possession of.

I have found such letter giving a very full statement, but do not find one in which he assured me that one of these maps showed Browns Ferry with boats for a bridge sketched in in pencil.

This is a letter written in 1895, upon receiving General Smith's pamphlet of that year attacking me on the opening page. Captain Margedant, being a warm friend of mine, wrote freely, and his letter was made confidential so far as quoting him in such form as to make him a party to the newspaper controversy which I opened on General Smith.

We would like to have this paper added to those in the appendix of our case.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

HAMILTON, OHIO, *September 4, 1895.*

Gen. H. V. BOYNTON,

*War Department, Chickamauga and Chattanooga
National Military Park Commission, Chickamauga, Ga.*

DEAR GENERAL AND COMRADE: I am in receipt of your letter of August 31, and also pamphlet of General Smith.

I have heard of the claims of General Smith before. He is the man to claim most everything. He would claim the creation of the world after this lapse of time, and evidence to the contrary being destroyed, if he could possibly do so and find an audience outside of the world to lay the claim before.

I remember Baldy Smith (as we called him) very well, but I think he has forgotten all about me—the topographical engineer on the staff of the commanding generals, who worked day and night to arrange the maps necessary for field operations at that time. I remember very well that Gen. Charles A. Dana, now of the New York Sun, was sent about 1863 to the headquarters of General Rosecrans, representing the War Department at that time at the headquarters. I remember his coming there and also that he and General Smith were antagonistic toward Major-General Rosecrans.

I remember also the day when Baldy Smith came by the order of the War Department (I understood) to take charge of the engineer department, etc. At that time Baldy Smith was not known to me. *We had strict orders not to loan any of the engineering instruments to civilians or military men not in connection with the engineer department*, and while he was standing in front of the headquarters of General Rosecrans he took from my hand, I may say forcibly, an instrument belonging to the engineer department in order to use it himself, without introduction by himself or others. I objected strongly, demanding the return of the instrument at once, when General Rosecrans turned around and said: "Why, Captain, don't you know General Smith, who will be in charge of the engineer department for some time?" General Rosecrans introduced me, and I requested General Smith to give me a receipt for the instrument, for which I was responsible, in conformity with the rules of the department. General Smith did not even answer. I saw at once that he meant mischief and trouble, and that he came for that purpose.

One evening while I was at the engineer department office (a small house near the headquarters), a gentleman dressed as a civilian came into the office demanding to see the map of the defense of Chattanooga and Chickamauga, etc.

I informed the gentleman that *I had strict orders* by the department commander *not to show the battle maps, war maps, or anything connected with the engineer department to anyone* except by order from the general commanding. This strict order was given me by Generals Rosecrans and Garfield for the first time since the battle of Chickamauga. We had a standing rule not to show anything pertaining to the making and compiling of maps. This peremptory order was given on account of the planned movements to regain communications and to take the offensive again. The gentleman, without introducing himself, demanded and ordered me to show these maps at once, which I refused to do. He left the office and another civilian returned within a few minutes with a sword buckled over his civilian dress coat, and drawing the same, demanded the maps. I took my own sword, which was hanging on the wall, and told him that *I would not do so* under any circumstances unless he had an order from the general commanding.

He returned (I learned afterwards) to General Baldy Smith's headquarters, and returning, he brought a written order signed (I believe) by General Baldy Smith, putting me under arrest *because I refused to show the maps of the department to the civilian upon their demand*. Now this person was not an officer in the service of the United States, but a civilian employed by the Coast Survey Office of the United States. After placing me under arrest, he took possession of the maps, and I went to the headquarters of the department to see General Rosecrans in regard to the occurrence. The general directed that I should at once make a statement of the case through Gen. Baldy Smith to the headquarters. Conforming to the military rules, I did so at once, writing the whole night on this statement and a part of the next day, and delivered the same in person at the headquarters of Baldy Smith.

This statement was kept by General Smith for some time, and after eight long days I was reinstated in charge of the topographical engineer department by order of the general commanding. The next day after my reinstatement I received the order of General Smith to proceed in person every morning at 3 a. m. sharp to the outside picket line and make a complete round of the same, to make observation and measurements of the enemy's camp fires, note all changes, and report each morning at 6 o'clock at General Smith's headquarters the result of my reconnoiter. For about ten mornings I proceeded faithfully on this trip around the line, although it was well known that on account of the very heavy fog prevailing no one could see 15 steps ahead. I considered it a piece of spite work, because I was kept busy in daytime until late at night to compile the reports and sectional maps sent in, and we had plenty of officers and men in our department who could attend to this, not having anything else to do. After disturbing the very heavy slumber of the general for several mornings and making the usual fog reports, the order was revoked.

While the topographical department, its maps, sketches, and plans were in the hands of General Smith and his engineers, they surely must have seen the plans of the proposed movements. We had been working on a fine large topographical map, made in color, all fixed objects, the course of the river, the elevations of the heights, points of triangulation, the ferries, the fortifications around Chattanooga, were in ink, while some of the proposed movements were shown in pencil lines so that they could be changed. This map was intended for the War Department, to accompany Major General Rosecrans's report.

There was another map in pencil lines only. It contained the movements of the Union and rebel armies at the battle of Chickamauga; also the changes of the line of fire from the enemy at the battle of Chickamauga; proposed fortifications around Chattanooga. This was largely used by General Rosecrans himself at his headquarters. I found this map afterwards, and sent it about ten years ago to the general. The other large map should be on file in the War Department. General Dana had a number of copies of parts made for sending to Washington to accompany his reports.

While I had no opportunity to inform myself whether General Smith and his engineers had seen the maps and plans while they had taken charge of the same, I hardly can believe that they did not see the plans and understand fully the lines of proposed movements on the maps. I never had a thought at that time that there could be a dispute raised in reference to the origin of these contemplated movements. These gentlemen and soldiers were apparently in full power and control of affairs by the order of the War Department, and they had a right to inform themselves fully, and I suppose they did do this.

Dear General, perhaps you are not aware that the engineer department of the Army of the Cumberland was one of the best organized and arranged in existence. We had at that time representative assistant engineers with every division and brigade, and even with regiments, whose duty it was to report to headquarters regularly, and who had every day to work hard. We engaged about 30 draftsmen in our office; we had two photographic apparatuses, solar cameras for enlarging objects taken at a distance; we had a special arrangement to lithograph maps by means of two full lithographic presses, and also new apparatuses for printing the so-called black war maps invented by myself and bearing my name; also maps printed on neckties and shirts, etc., used by the scouts. We had a regular information bureau, to which the prisoners were brought for giving information in regard to the movements of the enemy, etc.

We arranged a system of information maps and printed them often on the march, which were sent out daily, and which had to be returned in the evening with any corrections and additions which had been made. They were known as information maps. All this was done by order of General Rosecrans and Captain Merrill, engineer officer, United States Army, under my personal direction, having full charge of all topographical matters concerning the department.

Colonel Merrill took charge principally of the building of fortifications and bridges, of securing supplies necessary for the engineer department and for the pioneers of the army.

I may say to you that the plans for defense and offense for reopening of the Tennessee River, the building of bridges, the opening of the roads, and all the movements which afterwards took place after General Rosecrans was relieved of the command, *were fully developed under General Rosecrans before he left Chattanooga.* General Rosecrans kept his own counsel, and there were only a few officers on his staff who were posted as to his intended movements.

There can hardly be any doubt that Gen. Baldy Smith was instrumental in changing somewhat the details of the intended movements. The origin of the plans, however, are Generals Rosecrans's and Thomas's.

Now, a few words in regard to the names and positions of the Williams and the Browns ferries. The map of Chattanooga, made in Camp Stevenson, Alabama, Sep-

tember 8, 1863, is a copy of what we called "information map," often called by the assistant engineers of the divisions "progressive maps." It should be understood that we had at that time of the war very few maps; they had to be made by us. We generally started by using the very meager lines of the State maps or those of counties, if we could get hold of them; further, by the information of the people living in the vicinity, which was generally very incorrect; also by the information received through prisoners, and by surveys made by our own engineers scouting in the enemy's lines. We compiled the various reports and sent out sectional maps among the various engineers of the army, ordering them to fill up or complete certain sections and return the same to headquarters. We furnished them these new maps and kept on compiling and sending and receiving information maps until we corrected the errors which necessarily would creep in. The map shown in General Smith's pamphlet is one of these incorrect information maps which were sent out for correction and completing. * * *

Very respectfully,

WM. C. MARGEDANT,
*Formerly Superintendent of the Topographical Engineer Department,
Army of the Cumberland.*

NOTE.—The omission noted above relates solely to two maps after the battle of Chattanooga, and so has no bearing whatever upon the questions now at issue.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, November 27, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
Commanding Department of the East.

GENERAL: We have the names and addresses of 16 survivors of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery, and have sent them all a copy of the inclosed letter. Whatever replies we receive will be forwarded to your board.

A set of the proceedings of the beef board will go to you to-day from the Senate. I see that there is no index. I intend to make a very general one, and will mail you a copy.

Very respectfully,

H. V. BOYNTON.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, November 27, 1900.

MY DEAR SIR: This commission is trying to ascertain—

(1) Which section of Captain Aleshire's Battery (Eighteenth Ohio) was stationed at Browns Ferry a few days after the battle of Chickamauga.

(2) About how far was the earthwork in which the guns were placed from the bank of the river and the ferry.

(3) Was it at any time on the high ridge a half mile back of the ferry, or was it all the time in the river bottom near the river.

Can you give us any information on any of these points?

An early reply, for which we send a franked envelope, will greatly oblige us.

Thanking you in advance,

Very truly, yours,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, December 29, 1900.

Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: Inclosed please find copy of a letter addressed by this commission to several members of the Eighteenth Ohio Battery of Whitaker's brigade, which was stationed at Browns Ferry immediately after the battle of Chickamauga [page 209], and the replies thereto.

We have heretofore informed you that this letter had been sent with the purpose of ascertaining, if possible, the location of the battery which General Smith visited on the day of his reconnoitering Browns Ferry.

Gen. John T. Wilder called at our office a few days since, and when asked if at the time of his visit to Browns Ferry, Williams Island, and the ford below, on the 21st of August, 1863, there was an open way between Browns Ferry and Williams's house he replied that he rode through there along the bank of the river with his command without encountering any obstacles.

General Gillespie asked if we had any idea where Gen. Gordon Granger's papers could be found. We have not been able to trace them, though we understand that his widow is still alive. Some time after his death she married the adjutant of the Fifteenth Infantry (Granger's regiment), Lieut. Thomas Blair.

As a fact tending to corroborate Gen. Gordon Granger's statement, as recorded in the third volume of the proceedings of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland, heretofore sent you, to the effect that he had in writing the instructions of General Rosecrans concerning the plan for opening the Tennessee River, you will doubtless recall that the records show that a portion of General Granger's troops in the region of Bridgeport were cooperating with General Hooker in preparations for the advance into Lookout Valley. This appears from the dispatch to which your attention has heretofore been directed from General Hooker to Brig. Gen. Robert S. Granger, the latter being a part of the command of Gen. Gordon Granger, which appears on page 482 of serial No. 53, War Records.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

WILKESVILLE, OHIO, *December 5, 1900.*

H. V. BOYNTON,

Chairman of Park Commission, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SIR: In reply to inclosed letter of yours of November 27, would say that, to the best of my recollection, on the 22d of September, 1863, our battery crossed the river at Chattanooga. Crossed over Waldens Ridge and went south to Moccasin Point. The right section of the Eighteenth Battery was temporarily placed at Browns Ferry to protect the crossing, and only remained there one day and night, without earthworks, on a sand bar, close to the river, not over 100 yards from the river and ferry. (There were earthworks erected afterwards, but I do not know what battery occupied them.) The right section of the Eighteenth Battery, together with the balance of the battery, was permanently located on Moccasin Point, at the extreme south end of Moccasin Point, opposite Lookout Mountain, where earthworks and a bomb-proof fort were erected for our protection, and remained there until the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. We were not at any time stationed on the high ridge east and back of Browns Ferry.

Yours, truly,

L. E. SIMMONS,
Late Sergeant, Right Section Eighteenth Ohio Battery.

WASHINGTON, FAYETTE COUNTY, OHIO, *December 5, 1900.*

CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION.

DEAR SIR: Yours of the 27th of November received. The reason for my delay in replying to you was that I wanted to see a comrade of the battery and talk with him, thinking perhaps his mind would be clear on the subject. I have not kept any records, so have to depend on my memory to the best of my ability.

According to my memory—

First. It was the right piece of the right section and the left piece of the left section.

Second. So far as I can remember, from 50 to 100 feet from the bank of the river.

Third. This part of the battery was all the time in the river bottom near the river. They were commanded by Lieutenant Bierce.

Respectfully,

JOHN HAYS.

SIoux CITY, IOWA, *December 3, 1900.*

CHICKAMAUGA PARK COMMISSION, *War Department, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR SIR: The right section of Captain Aleshire's battery, Eighteenth Ohio, was stationed on the bank of river.

Am not positive whether it came back to the two sections, established on Moccasin Point, before the battle of Lookout Mountain or not.

Respectfully,

F. M. BLAGG.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, November 30, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: Hearing that Gen. W. F. Smith has retained ex-Senator Higgins as his attorney to submit an argument to your board during the consideration of his case, this commission respectfully requests that such argument be in writing, to the end that if it contains errors of statement this commission may have an opportunity of endeavoring to point them out in a written communication.

We do not ask or desire to argue this case to your commission, either orally or in writing, but to submit it solely upon the record and ascertained corroborating information.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
Governors Island, New York, November 12, 1900.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. A., *Washington, D. C.*

SIR: The board appointed to report upon the matter of Maj. William F. Smith, U. S. A., retired, thinks it advisable to visit Chattanooga, in order to more fully determine upon the questions referred to it. I would therefore ask that it be authorized to do so.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,
Major-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Washington, November 15, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE, U. S. A.,

Governors Island, New York.

SIR: The Acting Secretary of War directs, as necessary for the public service, that the board of officers convened by the letter to you from this office, dated August 23, 1900, to consider, investigate, and report upon a certain claim made by Maj. William F. Smith, U. S. A., retired, in the matter of the legend of the atlas of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park Commission, and of which board you are president, proceed to Chattanooga, Tenn., in order to more fully determine upon the questions before the board, and that upon the completion of this duty the members of the board return to their proper stations.

Very respectfully,

W. H. CARTER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF THE COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY,

Washington, D. C., January 11, 1901.

Gen. GEO. L. GILLESPIE,

Army Building, New York City.

GENERAL: I have made a thorough search in the archives and chart and other divisions of the survey for a chart said to have been published prior to the one mentioned in your letter (November 4, 1863), and find no trace of it.

The only original records in the archives are two plane table topographical sheets—one entitled "Chattanooga and its approaches, showing the Union and rebel works before and during the battles of 23, 24, and 25 November, 1863. Surveyed under the direction of Brig. Genl. Wm. F. Smith, chief engineer of the military division of the Mississippi, during parts of November and December, 1863, by F. W. Dorr, U. S. Coast Survey. Scale 1:10000."

The other sheet is entitled "Lookout Valley north of Wauhatchie, and parts of Lookout and Raccoon Mountains, Tenn. Scale 1:10000. Surveyed during the months of November and December, 1863, under the direction of Brig. Genl. W. F. Smith, chief engineer, military division of the Mississippi, by John W. Donn, U. S. Coast Survey."

There are no original sheets by Capt. P. C. F. West, United States Coast Survey, who was aid-de-camp on General Smith's staff.

Among the miscellaneous charts in the archives and library I find one lithograph map, in colors, with title, "Battlefield of Chattanooga, with the operations of the national forces under command of Genl. U. S. Grant, during the battles of Nov. 23-24-25, 1863," with note: "Published at the Coast Survey Office from surveys made under the direction of Brig. Genl. W. F. Smith, by Capts. F. W. Dorr and J. W. Donn, U. S. Coast Survey, and by Maj. Morhardt, Capts. Ligowsky, McDowell, Jenney, and Lts. Boeckh and Dahl, U. S. Vols., and from information relative to the battles furnished by Capt. Preston C. F. West, U. S. Coast Survey." (Scale about 1:40000.)

Also one photograph map, scale 1:20000, with no date, which may have been the base map for a photograph map on reduced scale, which in turn may have been the map used for the lithograph chart mentioned above, although it shows the fortifications more in detail than the lithograph. The fortifications are drawn by hand in blue ink; no date is given. There is also a manuscript map, with no date, which shows rebel positions around Raccoon Mountain and Browns Ferry, not indicated on the lithograph and other maps, and which covers more territory, taking in from Ringgold on the east to Kelleys Ferry on the west.

These are all the records now in the office. The want of dates complicates the matter to a degree.

Photographic copies of any of the above-mentioned maps can be sent to you if you desire it, and if I can serve you in any other way please command me.

Yours, very truly,

HENRY L. MARINDIN,
Coast and Geodetic Survey.

WAR DIARY OF MAJ. FRANK S. BOND, LATE A. D. C., STAFF OF GENERAL ROSECRANS.

38 WEST FIFTY-FIRST STREET,
New York, December 27, 1900.

Gen. G. L. GILLESPIE,

Of Board of Officers, New York City.

GENERAL: AS I understand, the board of officers of which you are a member desire all the information that can be obtained in respect to the Browns Ferry movement, early in October, 1863. I submit herewith an extract from my diary of events, kept during the three years I was in the service, covering the period from and including September 30 to October 20, 1863, that may be of use in determining who originated the plan that was subsequently carried into practical effect by General Thomas's orders under the immediate supervision of Gen. W. F. Smith.

Yours, very truly,

FRANK S. BOND,
Late Major and A. D. C., U. S. Vols., Staff Major-General Rosecrans.

1863, September 30, Chattanooga.—Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith and staff arrived. General Wheeler, with rebel cavalry, reported as having crossed Tennessee River near Washington.

October 1, Chattanooga.—Reorganization of the army discussed; General Smith, chief engineer, and General Reynolds, chief of staff, probably. Garfield going to Washington with dispatches. Wheeler's cavalry across river.

October 2, Chattanooga.—Hooker's troops arrived at Bridgeport. Wheeler's cavalry destroyed General Thomas's wagon train in Sequatchie Valley. Mr. Dana returned from Nashville.

October 3, Chattanooga.—McCook pitched into rebel cavalry in Sequatchie. General Smith announced as chief engineer. Hooker reported with Eleventh Army Corps at Stevenson and this side. Corps reports of the battle received.

October 4, Chattanooga.—McMinnville was captured by Wheeler's cavalry.

October 5, Chattanooga.—Check on New York to pay General Garfield \$130 for dark-brown mare. Mr. Dana gets a tumble while out riding with me. Rebels commenced shelling from Lookout Mountain and from Mission Ridge; not much account.

October 6, Chattanooga.—Strange sounds of battle heard yesterday and to-day to the east of Mission Ridge. McCook and Crittenden heard yesterday of the order relieving them. Only one bridge across river. At work on pontoons.

October 7, Chattanooga.—Three p. m., Wheeler's cavalry got hurt near Shelbyville. Duck River and other bridges destroyed. Crook and McCook in close pursuit—so reported by General Butterfield.

October 8, Chattanooga.—Evident signs of movement by rebs. Cutting timber, etc. At work on general's report.

October 9, Chattanooga.—Report to Adjutant-General at Washington, in accordance with General Order No. 244.

October 10, Chattanooga.—Reorganization of army completed. Generals McCook and Crittenden and staff started north. Sent flag of truce for body of General Lytle. Colonel Sanborn in charge.

October 11, Chattanooga.—Rebs stopped trains and cars at Nanvers with the sharpshooters.

October 12, Chattanooga.—General Reynolds announced as chief of staff.

October 13, Chattanooga.—General's report finished. Election for Ohio State officers held.

October 14, Chattanooga.—Upper bridge taken up. Trestle bridge removed.

October 15, Chattanooga.—General Garfield left for Washington with official reports of battle. Twelve p. m., pontoon bridge carried away in consequence of heavy rains.

October 16, Chattanooga.—My servant, Sam, arrived from Nashville with traps.

October 17, Chattanooga.—At work on pontoon bridge; hope to have it finished to-morrow.

October 18, Chattanooga.—Pontoon bridge finished at dark. General Butterfield arrived at headquarters, and Colonel Simmons, C. S., arrived.

October 19, Chattanooga.—Took long ride over the river with General Rosecrans and General Smith. Went to Browns Ferry, the proposed point for location of pontoon bridge, pontoons for which are being built and are nearly finished at Chattanooga. On return heard General Rosecrans was relieved of command, with orders to report at Cincinnati. Remainder of night was busy getting ready to start in the morning.

October 20, Chattanooga.—Left at 7 a. m., General with Captain Thoms and myself, for Cincinnati. General Butterfield and Lieutenant Oliver joined us. Spent the night at Prior's house. Wagons did not get up.

PAPERS SUBMITTED BY GENERAL SMITH.

EXTRACT FROM THE MEMOIRS OF GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN (PP. 298-302) RELATIVE TO THE RELIEF OF CHATTANOOGA, OCTOBER, 1863.

On October 16, 1863, General Grant had been assigned to the command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi." * * * The same order that assigned General Grant relieved General Rosecrans and placed General Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland. At the time of the reception of the order Rosecrans was busy with preparations for a movement to open the direct road to Bridgeport, having received in the interval, since we came back to Chattanooga, considerable reinforcement by the arrival in his department of the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, under General Hooker, from the Army of the Potomac. With this force Rosecrans had already strengthened certain important points on the railroad between Nashville and Stevenson, and given orders to Hooker to concentrate at Bridgeport such portions of his command as were available and to hold them in readiness to advance toward Chattanooga. * * * General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on October 23 and began at once to carry out the plans that had been formed for opening the shorter or river road to Bridgeport. This object was successfully accomplished by the moving of Hooker's command to Rankins and Browns ferries in concert with a force from the Army of the Cumberland, which was directed on the same points, so by the 27th of October direct communication with our depots was established.

EXTRACT FROM ARTICLE BY GEN. J. D. COX ON THE CHICKAMAUGA CRISIS.

[Scribner's, September, 1900, p. 332.]

To return to Chattanooga in October, 1863; one thing remained to be done before a new campaign could begin. A better mode of supplying the Army must be found. Thomas had answered Grant's injunction to hold Chattanooga at all hazards by saying: "I will hold the town till we starve." The memorable words have been interpreted as a dauntless assurance of stubborn defense, but they more truly meant that the actual peril was not from the enemy, but from hunger. Rosecrans had begun to feel the necessity of opening a new route to Bridgeport before he was relieved, and

on the very day he laid down the command he had directed Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith (sent to him since the battle to be chief engineer of his army) to examine the river banks in the vicinity of Williams Island, 6 or 7 miles below the town by the river, and to report upon the feasibility of laying a pontoon bridge there which could be protected. The expectation had been that Hooker would concentrate his two corps at Bridgeport, make his own crossing of the Tennessee, and push forward to the hills commanding Lookout Valley.

Hooker had shown no eagerness to take the laboring oar in this business, and excused his delay in concentrating at Bridgeport by the lack of wagons. General Smith's reconnoissance satisfied him that Browns Ferry, a little above the island, would admirably serve the purpose. A roadway to the river on each side already existed. On the south side were a gorge and a brook, which sheltered the landing there, and would cover and hide troops moving toward the top of the ridge commanding Lookout Valley. Smith reported his discovery to Thomas, and suggested that pontoons be built in Chattanooga and used to convey a force by night to the ferry, where they might be met by Hooker coming from below. Thomas approved the plan, and as soon as Grant arrived he inspected the ground in company with Thomas and Smith, and ordered it to be executed. The boats were completed by the end of a week, and on the night of the 26th of October the expedition started under the command of General Smith in person. * * *

Hooker crossed the river on the bridge at Bridgeport, and on the morning of the 28th marched, by way of Running Waters and Whitesides, to Wauhatchie. The enemy made a vigorous but unsuccessful attempt to dislodge him; his position was made strongly defensible; Bragg did not again venture to disturb it, and the easy lines of supply for Chattanooga were opened. The subsistence problem was solved.

EXTRACTS FROM MEMOIRS OF GENERAL GRANT, VOL. II.

Page 28.—On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching Stevenson, Ala., after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north. He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at Chattanooga and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out.

Page 29.—During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. I found Gen. W. F. Smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. * * * He explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that I could see it without an inspection. I found that he had established a sawmill on the banks of the river by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood, and by rafting logs from the north side of the river above had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river.

Page 31.—The next day, the 24th, I started out to make personal inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of

hills, reached the Tennessee at Browns Ferry, some 3 miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by the enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot.

Page 32.—That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport—a *cracker line*, as the soldiers appropriately termed it.

Page 35.—Gen. W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following details were made: General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Browns Ferry. General Palmer, with a division of the Fourteenth Corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had passed. *Four thousand* men were at the same time detailed to act under General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under General Hazen, were to take 60 pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Browns Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to Browns Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 27th Hazen moved into the stream with his 60 pontoons and 1,800 brave and well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near the river when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view of the top of Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched. At 5 o'clock Hazen landed at Browns Ferry, surprised the picket guard and captured most of it. By 7 o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By 10 o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout Valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the Army. The two bridges over the Tennessee River—a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at Browns Ferry—with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Browns Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division of the Twelfth Corps, stopped 3 miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout Valley to Bridgeport. Between Browns Ferry and Kelleys Ferry the Tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. To get up these rapids steamers must be cordelled—that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from Bridgeport to Kelleys Ferry. The latter point is only 8 miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side of the river to Browns Ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing, and provisions.

EXTRACT FROM ROSECRANS'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR OF 1865.

[D-9]

[Report of committee, part 3, 1864-65, pp. 32-33.]

General Halleck in his annual report says I abandoned the passes of Lookout Mountain, leaving the public to imagine that these passages were within the possible control of my army, and their abandonment not justified as a military measure. I call the attention of the committee to the fact that one of these passes was 42 miles south of Chattanooga, and the next nearest 26 miles south of Chattanooga, and the nearest at the extremity of Lookout Mountain in front of our lines. This latter may have been the one which gave rise to his report; and, if so, it ought to have been so stated. I was satisfied that I could not hold even *this* pass and Chattanooga at the same time if the enemy did his duty, and therefore withdrew my troops from it, but established batteries on the other side of the river, which rendered it practically of little, if any, use to them. Subsequent events amply justified the wisdom of this decision, for the enemy, with a division and a half, were unable to hold it against General Hooker, and it was their attempt to cover this point which was one of the causes of their being beaten so easily at Missionary Ridge. In General Grant's official report of the battle of Missionary Ridge, I think—for I have not the document—there is an implication that when he assumed command there was great danger of my abandoning Chattanooga. Nothing could be more mistaken or unjust to me than such an impression. All my actions and sentiments were utterly at variance with the idea of giving up that point, which I had won, and the possession of which formed an epoch in the war. I mention facts on this subject, viz, as early as the 4th of October, fourteen days after the battle, I called the attention of General Thomas and General Garfield to the map of Chattanooga and vicinity, and pointing out to them the positions, stated that as soon as I could possibly get the bridge materials for that purpose, I would take possession of Lookout Valley, opposite the passage over the extremity of the mountain, and fortify it, thus completely covering the road from there to Bridgeport, on the south side as well as the river, and giving us practical possession and use of both, as well as of Lookout Valley; because, by means of a fortified tête-de-pont, after our fortifications at Chattanooga were completed, we could easily concentrate our whole force to fight the enemy if he entered Lookout Valley, and that within less than two hours' march, while he could not approach us in force with artillery without making a circuit over Lookout Mountain, by way of Fricks and Stevens's gaps, 26 miles southeast, which would take two or three days.

An interior line of fortifications was laid out and put in course of construction, designed to cover our depots with a garrison of one or two divisions against all the forces the enemy could bring. I had, moreover, ordered the construction of small steamboats and barges at Bridgeport to run thence to Chattanooga, two of which were well advanced when the army crossed on its advance into Georgia, and, from the 23d of September, my correspondence and my staff officers will testify that I was urging the quartermaster, Captain Edwards, who had the work in hand, to hasten its completion, which it was hoped would be the case by the time we were ready to take and hold Lookout Valley. To effect this General Hooker was directed to concentrate his troops at Stevenson and Bridgeport, and advised that as soon as his train should arrive, or enough of it to subsist his army 10 or 12 miles from his depot, he would be directed to move into Lookout Valley to take possession of that, and every effort was made to complete the pontoons, etc., to connect that with our troops at Chattanooga. On the 19th of October I examined the river and selected a point for the crossing of the bridge at ferry to connect Hooker's with the forces at Chattanooga. I, moreover, directed Gen. W. F. Smith to reconnoiter the shore above

Chattanooga, with a view to that very movement on the enemy's right flank which was afterwards made by General Sherman.

On the 19th of October, on my returning from selecting the position of the pontoon bridge, I received orders to turn over the command of the Army of the Cumberland to Major-General Thomas, repair to Cincinnati, and report from there, by letter, to the Adjutant-General for orders.

PAPERS FROM THE PARK COMMISSION.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, November 12, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,

Commanding Department of the East, Governors Island, New York.

GENERAL: In further compliance with the instructions of the Secretary of War to furnish the board which is to act on the claim of Gen. W. F. Smith, of which you are president, with such papers or information pertinent to the case as are in our possession, we have the honor to forward this day a copy of the atlas issued by this commission, the first page of which contains the full text of the legend to which General Smith objects,¹ and Plate VI of which shows the positions about Browns Ferry. The topographical base of this last map was executed under the direction of Gen. W. F. Smith, to accompany General Grant's official report of the battle of Chattanooga.

The attention of your board is respectfully called to the three points marked, respectively, A, B, and C² on the slope of Lookout Mountain between the Cravens House and the mouth of Lookout Creek.

Between the road at the point A and the river bluff, which is perpendicular and about 260 feet high, the Confederates had a battery of two heavy guns, protected against the Union batteries on Moccasin Point, which commanded the whole ground, under which teams would have been obliged to approach a bridge thrown at or near the mouth of Lookout Creek.

The point B is about 180 feet above Lookout Creek, and there were numerous positions on the road between A and B where field batteries would have a plunging fire upon a bridge at the mouth of Lookout Creek and at the same time a fire over their entire range for trains approaching or leaving either end of the bridge.

At the point C the Confederates had a strong earthwork mounted with heavy guns, which of itself would have rendered the maintenance of a bridge at the mouth of Lookout Creek impossible.


It is respectfully submitted that these conditions were such as to preclude the assumption that General Rosecrans ever entertained a purpose of attempting to throw a bridge either at the mouth of Lookout Creek or any other point near it within the range of the guns on the slopes of Lookout Mountain.

Very respectfully,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

¹ For full text see page 134, Boynton to Duffield, March 22, 1898.

² It is impossible to reproduce the atlas here. The points A and B were on the road leading over the north point of the mountain following the crest of the perpendicular river bluffs down to a point near the mouth of Lookout Creek, A being at the highest point of the road and B part way down the western slope. C was on the western slope south of the road between A and B. See map Chattanooga and vicinity, page 162, upon which the points A, B, and C have been designated. See also the half tone, page 219.




LOOKOUT BATTLEFIELD.
(Hotel and railroad built after the war.)


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WAR DEPARTMENT,
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION,
Washington, November 26, 1900.

Maj. Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE,
*Commanding Department of the East,
Governors Island, N. Y.*

GENERAL: Herewith please find three copies of a half tone made from a photograph which we had taken some years since, showing the western slope of Lookout Mountain, the mouth of Lookout Creek, Browns Ferry, and the roads from that point toward Kellys Ferry and toward Chattanooga.

On one of these half tones I have indicated in red ink¹ the sites of the two batteries on Lookout Mountain which overlook Lookout Valley and the farming country between Browns Ferry and Moccason Point. The battery² to the left of the picture is the one we looked down upon in our visit to Lookout Mountain, as you will readily see, and the position indicated at the right is in the vicinity of that earthwork which we first visited, directly on the river bluff.

Very respectfully and truly, yours,

H. V. BOYNTON,
Chairman of Commission.

¹As red ink would not show in this reproduction, the sites have been indicated by the letters A and B.

²The remaining battery, to the left of the picture, is indicated by the letter C.

INDEX.

Adjutant-General, correspondence with—	Page.
Board of officers	211, 212
Proctor, Hon. Redfield	142, 143
Appeal of General Smith to Secretary Alger.....	125, 127
to Secretary Root	43, 151
Atlas battlefields Chickamauga and Chattanooga—	
Legend called in question by General Smith.....	7, 25, 125
Copy of atlas submitted to board.....	218
Bond, Frank S., late major, U. S. V., aid-de-camp to General Rosecrans—	
Correspondence with Gen. A. J. Mackay.....	33, 139
Diary for 1863, extract from	33, 213
Recollections of events.....	33, 121, 138
Board of army officers—	
Appointment of	5
Conclusions of.....	20
Approved by Secretary of War	21
Correspondence with—	
Adjutant-General	211, 212
Higgins, Hon. Anthony, counsel for General Smith....	175, 176, 177, 189, 191
Park Commission	24, 203-211, 218, 219
Smith, Gen. William F.....	152-176, 190, 200
Superintendent United States Coast and Geodetic Survey.....	212
Order appointing.....	5
Reference to, of General Smith's appeal.....	151
Report.....	7
Inclosures, list of	21
Smith, General, asks for appointment of.....	127
Boynton, Gen. H. V., chairman of Park Commission:	
Brief answer to General Smith's article in Chattanooga Times of September 15, 1895, in the Philadelphia Times of September 30, 1895.....	115
Full answer to General Smith's pamphlets and newspaper articles, from the Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette of January 26, 1896	116
Correspondence with—	
Board of army officers	24, 203-211, 218, 219
Blagg, F. M., Eighteenth Ohio Battery	211
Bond, Frank S., Major and A. D. C., U. S. V	121, 138
Duffield, Gen. Henry M	133
Hays, John, Eighteenth Ohio Battery	211
McKay, Col. A. J	122
Parkhurst, Gen. J. G	36
Reynolds, Maj. Gen. J. J., U. S. V	121
Simmons, L. E., Eighteenth Ohio Battery	210
Wilder, Brig. Gen. J. T., U. S. V	35

	Page.
Browns Ferry and vicinity, view of	219
Butterfield, Gen. Daniel, recollections of	28
Claim of Gen. William F. Smith:	
Letter to Gen. Henry M. Duffield, April 3, 1898, commenting on letter from Park Commission of March 22, 1898	141
Statement of General Smith's claim	129
Referred to board of officers.....	151
Referred to Gen. Henry M. Duffield	133
Coast and Geodetic Survey, correspondence with board of army officers	212
Conclusions of the board.....	20
Approved by Secretary of War	21
Corbin, H. C., Adjutant-General, correspondence with—	
Duffield, Gen. H. M.....	143
Proctor, Hon. Redfield	142, 143
Cox, Gen. J. D., extract from article on "The Chickamauga crisis"	214
Dana, Hon. C. A., recollections of	11, 104, 131
Dispatches, summary of official, by Gen. William F. Smith.....	157
Duffield, Gen. Henry M., correspondence with—	
Alger, Hon. R. A	133
Corbin, H. C., Adjutant-General	143
Park Commission	133
Smith, Gen. William F	141, 162
Claim of General Smith, referred to.....	133
Report of	143
Smith's, General, answer to report, March, 1900.....	43
Fiske, John, extract from <i>The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War</i> , attention called to by General Smith.....	153
Fox, Col. P. V., correspondence with Gen. William F. Smith	105, 169, 170
Garfield, Gen. James A., recollections of.....	32
Granger, Gen. R. S., remarks at meeting of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland	34
Grant, Gen. U. S., memoirs of, extract from	215
Higgins, Hon. Anthony, counsel for General Smith—	
Correspondence with board	175, 176, 177, 189, 191
First brief	178
Second brief	191
Objects to statements introduced by the Park Commission upon the point at issue of Generals Rosecrans, Thomas, Sheridan, Gordon Granger, Butterfield, and Wilder; Colonel Mackay, Major Bond, and Captain Margedant, of General Rosecrans's staff.....	195
Investigation of General Smith's claim referred to Duffield	133
Legend questioned by General Smith	7, 25, 125
Letters:	
Alger, Russell A., Secretary of War, to Gen. Henry M. Duffield, Novem- ber 7, 1897.....	133
Bispham, George Tucker, to Gen. William F. Smith, April 18, 1900.....	171
Blagg, F. M., Eighteenth Ohio Battery, to Park Commission, December 3, 1900.....	211
Board of Army officers to—	
Adjutant-General, November 12, 1900.....	211
February 1, 1901.....	
Higgins, Anthony, counsel for General Smith—	
September 27, 1900	175

Letters—Continued.

Page.

Board of Army officers to—Continued.

Higgins, Anthony, counsel for General Smith—Continued.

December 3, 1900.....	176
December 7, 1900.....	177
January 7, 1901.....	177
January 11, 1901.....	189
January 24, 1901.....	191

Smith, William F., Gen.—

September 29, 1900.....	176
October 9, 1900.....	157
October 24, 1900.....	172
November 26, 1900.....	176
January 25, 1901.....	189

Bond, Frank S., Major and A. D. C., U. S. V., to Park Commission.... 121, 138

Carter, William H., assistant adjutant-general, to board of officers—

August 23, 1900.....	5
November 15, 1900.....	212

Coast and Geodetic Survey, superintendent, to board of officers, January 11, 1901.....

212

Corbin, H. C., Adjutant-General, to Hon. Redfield Proctor, January 22, 1900.....

143

Dana, Hon. Charles A., to Gen. William F. Smith, May 22, 1895..... 104, 131

Dean, Henry S., to Gen. William F. Smith, August 14, 1895..... 163

Duffield, Gen. Henry M., to Adjutant-General, January 22, 1900..... 143

to Secretary of War, January 23, 1900..... 143

Evans, Hon. H. Clay, to Gen. William F. Smith, October 2, 1895..... 167

Fox, Col. Perrin V., to Gen. William F. Smith—

May 18, 1895.....	169
June 1, 1895.....	105
September 9, 1895.....	170
September 26, 1895.....	170

Hays, John, Eighteenth Ohio Battery, to Park Commission, December 5, 1900.....

211

Higgins, Hon. Anthony, to board of officers—

September 21, 1900.....	175
December 6, 1900.....	177
January 8, 1901.....	177
January 12, 1901.....	189
January 22, 1901.....	191

Johnson, R. W., to Gen. William F. Smith, July 24, 1899..... 165

McKain, Henry P., assistant adjutant-general, to Park Commission, March 21, 1901.....

3

Mackay, Col. A. J., to Maj. Frank S. Bond..... 122

Margedant, Capt. William C., to Park Commission, September 4, 1895... 206

Park Commission to—

Board of officers—

September 4, 1900.....	203
September 6, 1900.....	204
September 7, 1900.....	204
September 18, 1900.....	204
October 13, 1900.....	205
October 30, 1900.....	205

	Page.
Letters—Continued.	
Park Commission to—Continued.	
Board of officers—Continued.	
November 12, 1900	218
November 24, 1900	205, 206
November 26, 1900	219
November 27, 1900	209
November 30, 1900	211
December 29, 1900	210
Duffield, Gen. Henry M., March 22, 1898	133
Eighteenth Ohio Battery, members of, November 27, 1900	209
Parkhurst, Gen. J. G., to Park Commission, September 10, 1900	36
Proctor, Hon. Redfield, to Adjutant-General, January 8, 1900	142
Reynolds, Gen. J. J., to Gen. William F. Smith—	
May 20, 1895	132, 161, 166
May 22, 1895	167
Reynolds, Gen. J. J., to Park Commission, November 9, 1894	121
Root Hon. Elihu, to Gen. William F. Smith, January 19, 1900	142
Ropes, J. C., to Gen. William F. Smith—	
September 3, 1894	164
September 8, 1894	164
May 2, 1895	162
August 19, 1895	164
September 12, 1895	165
October 10, 1895	166
October 12, 1895	164
Simmons, L. E., Eighteenth Ohio Battery, to Park Commission, December 5, 1900	210
Smith, Gen. William F., to board of officers—	
August 26, 1900	152
September 8, 1900	152
September 14, 1900	153
September 20, 1900	153
September 28, 1900	175
October 8, 1900	154, 161
October 25, 1900	173
December 29, 1900	174
January 21, 1901	189, 190
January 24, 1901	189
January 28, 1901	201
January 31, 1901	200
Smith, Gen. William F., to Gen. Henry M. Duffield—	
January 31, 1898	162
April 3, 1898	141
Smith, Gen. William F., to Gen. J. J. Reynolds, September 12, 1895	168
Smith, Gen. William F., to Secretary of War—	
November 5, 1897	125
November 15, 1897	127
March —, 1900	43
March 26, 1900	151
Stewart, Hon. John, to Gen. William F. Smith, October 5, 1895	170
Turchin, Gen. John B., to Gen. William F. Smith, June 15, 1889	171
West, Preston C. F., to Gen. William F. Smith, October 13, 1895	170

	Page.
Letters—Continued.	
Williams, Talcott, to Gen. William F. Smith, August 30, 1900	171
Wilder, Gen. John T., to Park Commission September 8, 1900.....	35
Mackay, Col. J. A., recollections of	33, 122, 139
Maps:	
Atlas of the battlefields of Chickamunga and Chattanooga, copy referred to board of officers.....	218
Browns Ferry and vicinity.....	219
Margedant, Capt. W. E., recollections of	206
Newspaper articles—	
Boynton, Gen. H. V., in Philadelphia Times, September 30, 1895.....	115
Boynton, Gen. H. V., in Cincinnati-Commercial Gazette, January 26, 1896 ..	116
Smith, Gen. William F., in Chattanooga Times, September 15, 1895.....	111
Park Commission:	
Additional papers submitted to board of officers by	218
Case of, presented to board of army officers	24
Inclosures	42
Case of, presented to Gen. Henry M. Duffield	133
Comments of General Smith thereon	141
Correspondence with—	
Board of army officers	24, 203-211, 218, 219
Blagg, F. M., Eighteenth Ohio Battery.....	211
Bond, Frank S., Major and A. D. C., U. S. V	121, 138
Duffield, Gen. Henry M	133
Hays, John, Eighteenth Ohio Battery	211
McKay, Col. A. J	122
Parkhurst, Gen. J. G	36
Reynolds, Maj. Gen. J. J., U. S. V.....	121
Simmons, L. E., Eighteenth Ohio Battery	210
Wilder, Brig. Gen. J. T., U. S. V.....	35
Parkhurst, Gen. J. G., correspondence with Park Commission.....	36
Pamphlets:	
The Relief of the Army of the Cumberland and the Reopening of the Short Line of Communication between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Bridgeport, Ala., in October, 1863, by General Smith	61
The History of the Brown's Ferry Operation in 1863, as taken from the Official Records of the War, by General Smith	91
Proctor, Hon. Redfield, correspondence with H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General. 142, 143	
Reports:	
Board of officers.....	7
Inclosures	21
Duffield, Gen. Henry M.....	143
Inclosures	150
Ropes, John C., correspondence with General Smith.....	162, 164, 165, 166
Ropes's criticisms of Gen. H. V. Boynton.....	166
Rhodes, James Ford, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, submitted by General Smith	153
Rosecrans, Maj. Gen. W. S., testimony of, before Committee on the Conduct of the War, extract from	28, 135, 165, 217
Remarks at meeting of Society of the Army of the Cumberland.....	34
Sheridan, Gen. P. H., remarks at meeting Society of the Army of the Cumberland.....	34
Memoires of, extract from	214

	Page.
Smith, Gen. William F., additional statement by.....	200
Appeals to Secretary Alger.....	125, 127
to Secretary Root.....	43, 151
Claim of, stated	129
Correspondence with—	
Alger, Hon. R. A., Secretary of War.....	125, 127
Bispham, George Tucker	171
Board of army officers	152-176, 190, 200
Dana, Hon. C. A	104, 31
Dean, Henry S.....	63
Duffield, Gen. Henry M.....	141, 162
Evans, Hon. H. Clay	167
Fox, Col. P. V	90, 105, 169, 170
Johnson, R. W.....	165
Reynolds, Gen. J. J	132, 161, 166, 167, 168
Ropes, John C	162, 164, 165, 166
Stewart, John.....	170
Turchin, Gen. John B.....	171
West, Preston, C. F	170
Williams, Talcott.....	171
Letters to his home, written at Chattanooga in 1863; part of his answer to Gen. Henry M. Duffield's report.....	58
Pamphlets announcing his claim.....	61, 91
Papers submitted to board of officers, additional.....	214
Presentation of case, March, 1900	43
Presentation of case from Chattanooga Times, September 15, 1895.....	111
Recollections of; part of answer to Gen. Henry M. Duffield's report	55
Reply to report of Gen. Henry M. Duffield.....	43
Society of the Army of the Cumberland, extract from proceedings; remarks of Generals Rosecrans, Sheridan, and Granger.....	34
Summary of official dispatches by Gen. William F. Smith, presented to board..	157
Testimony before Committee on the Conduct of the War—	
Rosecrans, Gen. W. S.....	28, 135, 165, 217
Thomas, Gen. George H.....	30, 136
Thomas, George H., Life of, by Van Horne, extract from	36, 154
Testimony of, before Committee on the Conduct of the War	30, 136
Van Horne's Life of Thomas, extract from	36, 154
Wilder, Gen. J. T., letter from	35

